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THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

By F. E. Chadwick

THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN:

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THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

BY

FRENCH ENSOR CHADWICK

REAR-ADMIRAL U. S. NAVY (RETIRED)

AUTHOR OF "CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR"

VOL. II

WITH MAPS

NEW YORK

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THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

CHAPTER I

THE ARMY EXPEDITION TO SANTIAGO

TAMPA, selected as the base for the army which it was expected to send to Cuba, is on a shallow arm of Tampa Bay, in a perfectly flat district of coral sand covered at this time with open forests of moderate-sized pines. From the sandy and absorbent character of the soil, and the shade afforded by the park-like distribution of the pines, it was in many ways an ideal point for a large camp. The vast and palatial Tampa Bay Hotel, the only building of value (separated by an arm of the bay from the small town, made up of cheap wooden structures used as cigar factories, in which most of the employees were Cubans), was an important element as affording excellent headquarters. Ten miles south-west was Tampa Port, the head of navigation, and the terminus of the railway. This was the point of departure for the Plant line of steamers for Key West and Havana. The railway was the property of Mr. Plant, under whose able administration the district had been developed and whose energetic and able staff was of much assistance in the working of the overtaxed single line of rails. The chief drawback was the heat of the district at this season, accentuated by the sandy character of the soil, and which was almost unbearable to men brought from the higher plains of the Western regions, and even from Alaska, in the same woollen clothing with which they had left the Western posts. They wore this same clothing until the end of July.[1]

[1] Twenty thousand suits of the lighter clothing arrived at Santiago July 20. (General Shafter: *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain.* Senate Doc. 221, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, 3192.)

The stations of the troops of the regular army April 1, were as follows: the First Infantry was stationed in San Francisco; the Second Infantry was stationed at Omaha; the Third at Fort Snelling; Fourth at Chicago (Fort

No definite army plan of campaign seems to have been developed in anticipation of war, a fact which marks as strongly as possible the haphazard system of our army previous to the development of its present excellent general staff—a want of system which was largely influential, thirty-eight years earlier, in bringing secession to a focus and in allowing to develop the civil war.[1]

The very general idea which prevailed, and which was the outcome of the historical records of the great losses met by the British expeditions to the Caribbean in the eighteenth century, was that it was impossible to send a large army to Cuba during the rainy season. Says the then secretary of war: "As the rainy or 'sickly' season was due within a month, and was likely to last until the middle of September, it was determined that the wisest course would be to devote the summer to organizing, equipping, and drilling the volunteers, and to make such harassing incursions into Cuba as might seem to be practicable."[2] It was not foreseen that our home camps were to prove more deadly than Cuba and the Philippines in July.

Sheridan); Fifth at Atlanta, Ga.; Sixth at Fort Thomas, Ky.; Seventh at Denver, Col.; Eighth at Cheyenne; Ninth at Madison Barracks; Tenth in the Indian Territory; Eleventh in Arizona; Twelfth at Fort Sam Houston; Thirteenth with headquarters at Buffalo, N. Y.; Fourteenth at Vancouver; Fifteenth in Arizona; Sixteenth at Fort Sherman, Ida.; Seventeenth at Columbus Barracks; Eighteenth at Fort Bliss, Tex.; Nineteenth in Detroit, Mich.; Twentieth at Fort Crook (Leavenworth); Twenty-first at Plattsburg Barracks; Twenty-second at Fort Keogh, Mont.; Twenty-third at San Antonio; Twenty-fourth at Fort Douglas, Utah, and the Twenty-fifth at Missoula, an adjoining post in Montana. Those were the stations of the infantry regiments. The artillery regiments were stationed on the sea-coast—one regiment on the Pacific and the other on the south-western coast, and some batteries at Fort Riley, and the light batteries were stationed at Chicago, and one at San Antonio, and the cavalry was stationed about on the same lines as the infantry, divided in different parts of the country. (Adjutant-General Corbin, *Ibid.*, 3281.)

[1] Had there been a general staff in 1860, the forts of the South would have been garrisoned (many were only in charge of a sergeant and caretakers); with these and all the Southern ports held, it is more than probable that the passage of acts of secession would have ended with that of South Carolina. It would have been impossible for the South to have begun and continued the war with ports sealed. The Confederacy finally succumbed through the inanition produced by the blockade. That there were sufficient troops in the North which could have been spared for such re-enforcement is unquestionable. (See Chadwick, *Causes of the Civil War.*)

[2] Alger, *The Spanish-American War*, 41.

The general commanding the army (Major-General Miles) was loth to move, at this time, any expeditionary force on a large scale to Cuba. He had addressed the following letter to the secretary of war:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., *April* 18, 1898.

To the Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR:

SIR: Referring to my former letters concerning healthful camps for the troops and the uncertainty of Congress requiring an army to move to Cuba at this season of the year, I would respectfully call attention to the letter of the surgeon-general of the army, dated Washington, March 25 of this year, as to the danger of putting an army in Cuba during what is known as the "rainy" or "sickly" season. That opinion is also confirmed by reports of Dr. James Guiteras, of Philadelphia, a well-known authority on yellow fever, and others.

In my opinion, it is extremely hazardous, and I think it would be injudicious, to put an army on that island at this season of the year, as it would undoubtedly be decimated by the deadly disease, to say nothing of having to cope with some 80,000[1] troops, the remnant of 214,000, that have become acclimated, and that are equipped with 183 guns. And still another element of extreme danger would be to place an army there with the possibility of our own navy not being able to keep the waters between our own territory and that island clear of hostile ships or fleets.

By mobilizing our force and putting it in healthful camps and using such force as might be necessary to harass the enemy, and doing them the greatest injury with the least possible loss to ourselves, if our navy is superior to theirs, in my judgment we can compel the surrender of the army on the island of Cuba with very little loss of life, and possibly avoid the spread of yellow fever over our own country.

There is still time, if this is favorably considered, to put a small force of regular troops, numbering approximately 18,000 men, in healthful camps until such time as they can be used on the island of Cuba with safety.

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General Commanding.

Many articles appeared in the press giving vivid pictures of what had occurred in the British expeditions of the eighteenth century, and deploring the risks which were about to be taken.

Brigadier-General William R. Shafter had, on April 21, been assigned command of the troops assembling at New Orleans,

[1] A serious underestimate, as has been shown.

and arrived there on April 25 from San Francisco.[1] He was, however, on April 29, ordered to command at Tampa and prepare an expeditionary force for Cuba, which was "to be in the nature of a reconnaissance to gather information for use in subsequent movements and to furnish supplies to the insurgents. No extensive movement was contemplated at the time, but while waiting for events to shape themselves it was intended to give all possible aid to the Cuban insurgents in order that they might continue to wage warfare against the Spanish troops."[2] Eight regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and eight batteries of light artillery were assigned to this expedition, which was to sail as soon as possible, with a large quantity of supplies of all kinds for distribution to the insurgents. It was purposed to touch first at Tunás, upon the south side of Cuba, and communicate with General Gomez, and go thence to the north-west coast of the island unless in the meantime the movements of the Spanish naval force should make this hazardous. It was enjoined upon Shafter that he was expected to stay in Cuba but a few days.[3]

The orders for this movement are given in full as embodying the general idea of the war department at the moment:

[1] General Shafter had been appointed a lieutenant in the Seventh Michigan Volunteers in June, 1861; was wounded at Fair Oaks; on recovery was appointed a major in the Nineteenth Michigan; was captured by Van Dorn near Spring Hill early in 1863 and held in Libby Prison until May 5, 1863. He was then exchanged and promoted to a lieutenant-colonelcy, commanding his regiment for a time as such. In April, 1864, he was made colonel of the Seventeenth United States colored infantry; was with Thomas at the battle of Nashville in December; was mustered out February 15, 1865; was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the Forty-first Regulars in July, 1866; served in Texas until 1879, having had command of the troops along the Mexican border during the troubles of 1877 and 1878; was appointed colonel of the First Infantry in March, 1879, and served thereafter in the West until the concentration of the army at Tampa.

The writer is pleased to be able to have this opportunity of testifying to his esteem for General Shafter, the outcome of frequent communication with him. The general had, with at times considerable roughness of manner and bearing, thorough courage, strong will, and much strength of character. He was unfortunately handicapped for tropical service by his great weight, a difficulty he fully appreciated.

[2] Lieutenant-Colonel John D. Miley (aide-de-camp to General Shafter), *In Cuba with Shafter*, p. 2.

[3] Miley, p. 3, and Miles, *Investigation of the Conduct of the War with Spain*, VII, 3249.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., *April* 29, 1898.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, *United States Army, Washington, D. C.*

SIR: The following letter of instructions is sent you for your guidance:

By authority of the secretary of war, you are hereby directed to assume command of an expedition composed of Company E, Corps of Engineers; the 9th Cavalry; Light Batteries A and F, 2d Artillery, C and F, 3d Artillery, B and F, 4th Artillery, and D and F, 5th Artillery; the 1st, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 22d, and 24th Infantry, and all necessary quartermaster, commissary, and medical supplies; pontoon train, arms, and ammunition sufficient to engage the Spanish troops; with a very limited amount of transportation; and proceed with your expedition from Tampa, Florida, to the south side of Cuba, under convoy of the ships of the United States navy, and land your force, or such portion of it as you may deem advisable, and penetrate far enough into the interior to form a junction, if practicable, with General Gomez's forces. Issue to them all the arms, ammunition, and supplies that may be required, giving them all aid, support, and succor possible. Returning your command to your ships, proceed to the north-west coast of Cuba, communicate with the commanders of our naval ships of fleet, and endeavor to send arms and supplies to the insurgents on that coast, as circumstances may warrant, unless you shall have received satisfactory information that the Spanish fleet has crossed the Atlantic and proceeded to Cuban waters. On receipt of such information, you will move your command to the nearest place of safety on our coast, and relieve your convoys, to enable them to join our fleet. In landing on Cuban soil, you will endeavor to select the most healthful location and avoid exposing your command to the yellow-fever or other epidemics of the island. It is not expected that you will penetrate farther into the interior than to form a junction with General Gomez, to render him all assistance possible; and you are not expected to have your command on the island of Cuba but a few days. This expedition is in the nature of a reconnaissance in force, to give aid and succor to the insurgents, to render the Spanish forces as much injury as possible, and avoiding serious injury to your own command.

In conducting this enterprise great confidence is placed in your zeal, judicious management, and good judgment. You will report all important information at every opportunity.

By command of Major-General Miles.

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

On the day General Shafter's orders were signed, Cervera left the Cape Verdes for the west. This, says Secretary Alger, "left but one logical theory, to wit; that Cervera had in mind the relief of Havana, involving, of course, an attack upon our blockading fleet. Naturally, under the circumstances, the expedition to Tunás (that of Shafter) was abandoned."[1]

On April 30 Shafter was ordered to delay movement, as the navy department did not feel that, at the moment, it could spare ships for convoy, all naval energies being directed toward meeting the Spanish fleet. Active preparations of the transports were to be continued. The consequence of the new conditions was a conference at the White House on the 2d of May to discuss plans of campaign, at which were present the secretaries of war and of the navy, General Miles, and Admiral Sicard. The result was a decision to invest Havana, the first troops to land at Mariel, twenty-six miles west of Havana, under cover of the navy and in strength sufficient to hold the position. The plan provided for the establishment there or near by of a fortified position as a base. "This accomplished, the force could be rapidly increased and Havana deliberately approached."

On the suggestion of the war department, Shafter sent General Lawton, on May 4, to Key West to confer with the naval officer in command, and received assurance that a small expedition of one or two vessels, to land arms and ammunition on the north coast of Cuba, could be safely convoyed at any time. It was also considered by the commandant safe to undertake the larger expedition ordered April 29, but he could not convoy both at the same time. Shafter was assured that an expedition of five to seven thousand men as a reconnaissance in force to the vicinity of Mariel (twenty-two nautical miles westward of Havana) was safe at any time. On Lawton's return, May 7, Shafter, however, informed the war department that in the uncertainty regarding the movements of the Spanish fleet he did not consider it prudent for his command to sail as a body; that his expedition would be completely fitted out by May 12, at any time after which he would be prepared to take and hold permanently some point on the north coast as a base of operations.

[1] Alger, 46.

The preliminary order for the proposed movement was then given as follows:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, *May* 9, 1898.
(Sent 6.07 A. M.)

GENERAL WADE,[1] *commanding troops at Tampa, Fla.*

With the approval of the secretary of war, the major-general commanding directs that General Shafter move his command, under protection of navy, and seize and hold Mariel or most important point on north coast of Cuba and where territory is ample to land and deploy army. Follow up his command with all the forces sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly as possible from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully equipped; send abundance of ammunition, and ship with them food for men and animals for sixty days, to be followed by four months' supplies. Acknowledge receipt.

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

This order, next day, was suspended until May 16, but 12,000 infantry were ordered despatched to Key West and held there for later movement. This transfer, however, was not carried out on account of the limited supply of fresh water at Key West, and for want of convoy, which the navy could not then furnish. Cervera had now arrived in the West Indies and all army movement was suspended to await naval developments.

An attempt, however, in accordance with an order of May 6 to expedite arms and stores to the insurgents, to land arms and ammunition for the Cubans twenty miles west of Havana, near Mariel, was made by an expedition, under Colonel J. H. Dorst, which left Tampa on May 10 with two companies, E and G, of sixty men each, of the First Infantry. They left Key West on the 11th,[2]

[1] On May 9, through an oversight of the war department, General Wade for a moment superseded General Shafter in command at Tampa. Both were present there as brigadier-generals, Shafter being senior. Both were confirmed on May 8 as major-generals of volunteers, and as the law gave precedence, to officers confirmed the same day, to the one who had been longest in the service, the seniority, by this rather extraordinary arrangement, went to Wade, who was Shafter's service senior by a few weeks. The difficulty was solved by ordering General Wade, on May 10, to command at Chickamauga.

[2] The officers were Captain J. J. O'Connell and Lieutenant W. M. Crofton of Company E, and Captain M. P. Phister, Lieutenants F. E. Lacey and D. E. Nolan of Company G. Assistant Surgeon C. M. Gandy, a hospital steward, and six men of the hospital corps accompanied the force.

and arrived next morning accompanied by the revenue cutter *Manning* off the Cuban coast.

The *Gussie* was an ancient side-wheel steamer particularly noticeable in build and paint, and was thoroughly well known at Havana. Her advent with an expedition had been heralded in the press, so that her coming in no wise surprised the Spaniards nor was there a possibility of mistaking her for any other craft.

On her arrival off Havana the *Gussie* and her escort were joined by the armed yacht *Wasp*, Lieutenant Aaron Ward, stationed at the westerly end of the blockade. As the expedition stood west along the shore, "it was apparent," says Mr. Stephen Bonsal, "that the whole country was apprised of our coming and knew the purpose of it. The heliograph stations upon the low mountains near the coast were at work signalling our presence, and were evidently expecting us to attempt a landing in force under the protection of our flanking gunboats."[1]

Standing close inshore a little east of Mariel, it became evident that the coast there was too well guarded. From there to the west of Cabañas, twelve miles from Mariel, the vessels were frequently fired upon, sharp returns being made at times by the *Wasp* and *Manning*. A little west of Cabañas at a Point Arbolitos, a landing was finally made by Company E under rather trying circumstances of weather and sea at 2.47 P. M. The little force occupied the small peninsula upon which it found itself. It was attacked by a rapid enfilading fire, which was returned both by those ashore and by Company G aboard the *Gussie*, as well as by the 6-pounders of the two naval vessels. A skirmish line ashore was advanced, and no enemy now being observed, three Cubans who with their mounts had been brought ashore, mounted and rode inland to join the insurgents they had expected to meet.

It was clear that there would be no opportunity to land the supplies for the Cubans, who were nowhere discoverable. Thus, though at 3.30 the *Dolphin* with Commodore Watson's broad pennant had appeared as a re-enforcement, the troops were brought off, the only casualty during their time ashore being

[1] *McClure's Magazine*, July, 1889, 235.

the wounding in the arm of a newspaper correspondent, Mr. James F. J. Archibald, of San Francisco. Three Spanish dead were found, one a lieutenant of the Civil Guard.

The *Gussie*, accompanied by the *Manning*, drifted during the night, and next morning, the *Wasp* again joining at 8.15, the three proceeded westward to a point three miles east of Mariel, where, being fired upon from a watch-tower, the fire was returned from the *Wasp* and *Manning* for a short time. The *Gussie* and *Manning* now hauled off and the *Wasp* "resumed her patrol to the westward," the effort to communicate with the insurgents proving wholly unsuccessful, as, indeed, might at that point have been foreseen.

In the meantime the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth regiments of infantry arrived at Tampa (May 10). On May 15 the Seventy-first New York Volunteers and Second Massachusetts were ordered to join, and by general orders of May 16 the forces already there, and to be sent there, were constituted the Fifth Army Corps, with Major-General Shafter in command. By May 25 the First, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth regiments of cavalry, ten batteries of light and four of heavy artillery, and two companies of engineers (all of the regular army) had also reached Tampa, which with eight regiments of volunteers[1] made a total of 1,061 officers and 16,482 enlisted men. The Fifth Cavalry and Ninth Infantry were added June 7.

Transports had begun to arrive from New York by the end of April, and there were some thirty at hand by May 26. One of these, the *Florida*, was employed on a second expedition under Captain Dorst, who left Tampa May 17 with a Cuban general, Lacret, and 300 Cubans recruited from the refugees at Tampa, and with a large supply of army ammunition, clothing, and food. Furnished at Key West with the navy armed tug *Osceola*, Lieutenant J. L. Purcell, as convoy, Dorst proceeded, in order to avoid possible Spanish gun-boats in the Bahama Channel, by the Hole in the Wall and Crooked Island passage to Port Banes, where he safely landed his troops and stores, returning to Key West by

[1] Second Illinois, Second Wisconsin, First North Carolina, Fifth Iowa, Thirty-second Michigan, Third and Fifth Ohio, and Second Georgia.

way of the Old Bahama Channel, in which he was met returning, May 30, by Admiral Sampson on his way to Santiago.[1]

In a telegram of May 24 General Shafter had wisely recommended that all the regular regiments should be in one corps, in order that they should take the brunt of the first service in Cuba. The wisdom of this was seen in the result. The outcome was that our first army was one of extraordinary quality; such probably as will never again take the field, as the conditions of its training can never be repeated. It was the product of long years of war against the wiliest and most capable of savage races. Schooled in every trick of savage warfare, inured to every privation of heat and cold, individualized as no other soldier ever has been, these men of the plains were accustomed to fighting their own battles, and took with them to San Juan Hill the qualities and character which made this a force which it is not too much to say has never been equalled in general efficiency.

While various plans for a descent upon Cuba were in discussion, the objective was fixed by Cervera's arrival at Santiago, and on May 31, at 2.30 A. M., the following telegram was sent by the war department to General Shafter:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, *May* 30, 1898.
(Sent in cipher May 31, 1898, 2.30 A. M.)

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, *Tampa, Fla.:*

With the approval of the secretary of war, you are directed to take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your judgment may dictate, under the protec-

[1] Captain Dorst's report telegraphed from Key West May 31, was as follows: "Landed at Port Banes, northern coast, directly across the island from Santiago de Cuba. Landed over 400 armed and equipped Cubans; 1,300,000 rounds ammunition, Springfield and Remington; 7,500 Springfield rifles; 20,000 rations, besides large quantities equipment and clothing; 24 horses; 74 mules. Spanish force 700 men was at Sama, 18 miles north-west. Two small Spanish gun-boats in Nipe Bay, about 5 miles east in air line. Landing was without interruption and apparently unobserved. Spent 26th, 27th at anchor unloading." Captain Dorst in another telegram stated: "About 10,000 Spanish troops at Santiago de Cuba and about 15,000 at Manzanillo; including scattered detachments not less than 40,000 in Santiago de Cuba [department]. Movement to concentrate at above points and along main roads leading from them going on for about three weeks, apparently to meet

tion of the navy, and move it onto the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there; and cover the navy as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or with the aid of the navy capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago harbor. You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the government relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of your command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accomplishing this object with the least possible delay. You can call to your assistance any of the insurgent forces in that vicinity, and make use of such of them as you think advisable to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, etc. You are cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons outside of your troops. You will take every precaution against ambuscades or surprises or positions that may have been mined or are commanded by the Spanish forces. You will co-operate most earnestly with the naval forces in every way, agreeing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your instructions to Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On completion of this enterprise, unless you receive other orders or deem it advisable to remain in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, re-embark your troops and proceed to the harbor of Port de Banes, reporting by the most favorable means for further orders and future important service. This with the understanding that your command has not sustained serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for your transports and convoy. When will you sail?

By command of Major-General Miles:

H. C. Corbin, *Adjutant-General.*

Also, on the same date:

At the instance of the secretary of war the following suggestion from the secretary of the navy is submitted to you for your consideration and guidance:

"The navy department is of the opinion that the concert of movement, so necessary and difficult in a combined expedition, would be much advanced in the approaching expedition by the commanding general embarking on board the ship of the senior naval officer in the convoy; thus opportunity would be allowed for consultation. That it would be feasible so to arrange, when within striking distance of Santiago, that a detachment of 2,000 to 3,000 troops be sent ahead of the

reconnaissance in force mentioned in our newspapers. . . . General Garcia can be communicated with by sending to Banes. Nearly 1,000 insurgent troops arrived there before I left. He was expected there about to-day [May 31]. To take Santiago de Cuba by land side require siege-guns. Large proportion of Spanish troops mentioned are guerillas; all mounted men." *Investigation of the Conduct of the War with Spain,* II, 885.

main body of the army, to land between midnight and 4 A. M., supported by the fire of the smaller ships of the blockade, to seize the important bridge of Juragua, which is reported to be mined, and guarded by some 30 to 40 Spanish soldiers. The main body of the army could arrive about daybreak and land at the place designated for that purpose, immediately supporting its advanced corps at the bridge. The secretary of the navy is of opinion that no body of seamen should be landed for this attempt on the bridge. The primary object of the expedition is the capture and destruction of the enemy's fleet in the port, which would be almost decisive of the war. Therefore, the United States squadron should not be weakened by a loss of skilled men in view of so important a possible naval action."

Thus it was that the honor of the most important command of the war fell almost by accident to an officer who, though of good reputation as an excellent soldier in the civil war, and later, was not of such extraordinary prominence as to give him special claim to such a position; one which, no doubt, would have been alloted to the major-general commanding the army of the United States, could the turn of affairs have been foreseen. All thoughts, however, had been centred on Havana as the point of special attack, and the force which had been first ready for an expedition of wholly secondary importance, was necessarily used for Santiago, because of readiness, and to its commander naturally fell the chief command in the coming operations.

The commander of the expedition had his difficulties. Several volunteer regiments were without uniforms, some without arms, blankets, tent or camp equipage. General Henry reported five regiments in his command unfit to go into the field. On June 4 General Miles reported from Tampa:

There are over 300 cars loaded with war material along the roads about Tampa. Stores are sent to the quartermaster at Tampa, but the invoices and bills of lading have not been received, so that officers are obliged to break open seals and hunt from car to car to ascertain whether they contain clothing, grain, balloon material, horse equipments, ammunition, siege guns, commissary stores, etc. . . . To illustrate the embarrassment caused by present conditions, 15 cars loaded with uniforms were side-tracked 25 miles away from Tampa and remained there for weeks while the troops were suffering for clothing. Five thousand rifles which were discovered yesterday were needed by several regiments. Also the different parts of the siege

train and ammunition for the same, which will be required immediately on landing, are scattered through hundreds of cars on the side tracks of the railroads. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the expedition will soon be ready to sail.[1]

Lieutenant John D. Miley, of General Shafter's staff, gives a graphic description of the confusion which must always necessarily arrive in such circumstances when there is not a general staff organization. He says:

> Often the components needed to complete the ration were on trains that could not be brought to the wharf at the time, and the transport then being loaded would have to be pulled into the stream and another brought into its place to receive what remained on the train being unloaded. If the trainloads of commissary supplies had reached Tampa in time to be placed in store-houses and sorted, this difficulty would have been avoided. . . . Cars of meat would come to the port direct from some place in the north, cars of hard bread or flour from another place, cars of other components from still another place, and these cars were scattered along the congested tracks from the Port to Tampa City, a distance of ten miles. There were in round numbers, about ten million pounds of rations placed on board, a great deal of it carried there on the backs of stevedores. . . . Of course it was very important that each ration should have its full proportion of bread and meat, but how much more important was it that each siege-gun should have its breech mechanism complete in every part and the proper fuse for the projectile. The siege artillery and the ammunition had come from different arsenals and at different times, and much delay arose in gathering all the parts and mounting the guns on the carriages. For several reasons it was deemed necessary to mount the guns before placing them on board the transports, and the artillery troops worked night and day to hasten the work. To add to this congestion of the railroad, passenger trains were continually running between Tampa and the Port, carrying crowds of sight-seers and tourists; and the regular freight, passenger, and express business of the Plant system between Tampa and Key West went on without interruption. Large quantities of naval supplies were also shipped from Tampa to the blockading squadron on the north coast of Cuba, and, on one occasion, in one of the transports.[2]

But though there was much fault in prearrangement, the want of terminal facilities counted for a great deal. The last ten miles from Tampa to Port Tampa were a single track, and the wharfage

[1] *Correspondence, War with Spain*, I, p. 4. [2] Miley, 22–24.

at the port had only been arranged for the small steamers of the Plant line to Havana. Only eight vessels for loading could lie in the channel and two at the pier.

The transports had been coaled and watered by May 31. Rations for 20,000 men for six months had been ordered aboard, but this was changed on account of necessity for haste to two months only. Subsequently 100,000 rations were placed aboard each of several vessels designated by the chief quartermaster as a reserve supply in case of separation.

On June 1 the work of loading wagons, guns, and caissons of the light artillery was begun and continued for a week simultaneously with the loading of commissary stores, when the embarkation of troops began; the animals had been left ashore as long as possible and embarked just before the troops. Two squadrons were dismounted in each regiment and embarked, the remaining squadrons taking charge of all the horses and baggage of the departing squadrons. "Everybody was in a feverish haste to go on board the transports; often before one regiment was completely embarked the next would arrive, impatient and chafing at any delay in giving them the assignment of a vessel. . . . The anxiety to go on board a transport, no matter which one, was heightened when it was discovered, on June 1, that the fleet of transports, which by some mistake in calculation was supposed easily to accommodate 27,000 men with all their necessary impedimenta, had only a carrying capacity of 18,000 or 20,000. It was very evident that many organizations would have to be left, and the frantic efforts for places on the transports were only equalled by similar efforts to put back to the United States after the expedition had been in Cuba a short time." [1]

The situation is characteristically described by Colonel Roosevelt:

> When we moved down to Port Tampa I again thought there was a good deal of higglety-pigglety business, although I can't say how much was due to the congested condition of the track. We were told to go to a certain track at 12 o'clock and take a train. We got there, and then Colonel Wood and I wandered up and down trying to find somebody who knew where the train was, and we couldn't find anybody,

[1] Miley, 27.

and at 3 o'clock we were ordered to move to another track, and at 6 o'clock we got some coal cars. I believe these coal cars were not intended to take us, but we construed it that they were and went down on them and so got to the quay. You see, we had been told if we didn't get aboard by daybreak we would get left, and we didn't intend to get left, and we took these coal cars and slipped down. . . . There were so many regiments to embark on so many transports, and it does seem to me that it would have been a simple thing to have settled the day before what regiment was to go on what transport, and try to have, say, the first 10 regiments and the first 10 transports come together, so that when loaded those transports could pull out, and then 10 other regiments take more transports, and so on. But, so far as I know, the regiments did not know in advance what transports they were to get on—at least none with whom I was brought in contact had been told what transports they were to go on. We reached Port Tampa early in the morning. There were a lot of regiments there; the trains backed up everywhere along the quay, and the quay was swarming with some 10,000 men—soldiers, mostly. Transports were pulling in from midstream, but nobody could tell us what transport we were to go on. Finally General Shafter told us to find the quartermaster, Colonel Humphrey. . . . Nobody could tell us where he was, and Colonel Wood and I started on a hunt for him in opposite directions, and finally we found him, almost at the same time, and he allotted us the *Yucatan*. The *Yucatan* was coming in at the dock, and by that time we found there was a great scramble for the transports, and Colonel Wood jumped in a boat and went out in midstream. I happened to find out by accident that the transport *Yucatan* had also been allotted to the Second Infantry and the Seventy-first New York, and I ran down to my men and left a guard and took the rest and rushed them down to the dock and got on the *Yucatan*, holding the gangplank against the Second Infantry and the Seventy-first New York, and then letting aboard only the Second Infantry, as there was no room even for all of them; and I understand the Seventy-first spent the next two nights on a train. We ultimately kept four companies of the Second Infantry aboard with us, but we had the *Yucatan*.[1]

The telegram of June 7 from Admiral Sampson:

> . . . If ten thousand men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from the fleet.

was transmitted the same day to Generals Miles and Shafter, at the Tampa Bay Hotel, by the president and secretary of war

[1] *Investigation of the Conduct of the War with Spain*, V, 2257–2258.

over a line with through connections, which enabled a telegraphic conversation to be carried on. This had been preceded by the words, "You will sail immediately, as you are needed at destination," to which General Shafter had replied that he would sail the next morning (June 8). A special train was ordered for 2 A. M. for the headquarters and staff, but the congestion on the little branch to the port did not allow it to reach there until 6. The transports began to move down the bay and nearly all had left Port Tampa, when about 2 P. M., as General Shafter was going aboard the *Segurança*, his headquarters ship, he received the following telegram from the secretary of war:

Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick.

Late at night the cause was found in the report from the *Eagle* and *Resolute*[1] regarding the sighting of a Spanish squadron in the Bahama Channel. The embarkation had been completed by 9 P. M. The report had the effect of setting vivid imagination to work and "it was estimated that about 10 P. M. of the 8th, the enemy might be within a few hours' sail of Tampa Bay."[2]

All transports were recalled and as many as possible brought into the narrow channel dredged from Tampa Port to deep water, where they would be under the protection of some field-guns which had been in position for some days at the end of the pier. The gun-boats *Annapolis, Castine, Helena*, and armed yacht *Hornet* were stationed at the entrance of the bay, twenty miles away. Most of the animals were taken off and picketed a short distance up the railway and the men were allowed to go ashore in detachments, every one, however, to be aboard nightly at 9 o'clock. The interval of waiting was given to perfecting arrangements; those relating to the general charge of the expedition, as far as the passage was concerned, being turned over to the senior naval officer present, Commander Hunker, of the *Annapolis*. These provided that as the transports left the port, they should form inside the bay near the entrance in three columns eight hundred yards apart, the ships in column to be at the usual naval interval of four hundred yards. Diagrams were prepared showing each

[1] *Supra*, vol. I, p. 368. [2] Miley, 34.

transport's position, of which each master was given a copy. Each column was led by a ship of the navy; a red light on the stern was the only one to be carried unless there should be danger of collision.

By June 12 the alarm regarding the presence of the Spanish ships had passed and orders came to start immediately. But many of the ships needed water, and the greater part of June 13 was spent in renewing their supply. The convoy, however, began to move about noon and early in the morning of the 14th all vessels were ordered to leave, regardless of everything, and by 9 A. M. all were under way for the rendezvous at the entrance of Tampa Bay. At 8.30 P. M. of the 15th the convoy was joined off Tortugas by the battle-ship *Indiana*, Captain H. C. Taylor, who took over the duties of senior naval officer, and by the *Detroit*, *Castine*, *Manning*, *Wasp*, *Eagle*, *Wompatuck*, *Osceola*, and later the torpedo-boats *Ericsson* and *Rodgers*. The columns straggled badly. The speed was but 6 knots owing to the necessity of towing two water lighters, one of which was lost by the *Concho* the night of the 16th. A tug-boat, the *Captain Sam*, started with the fleet but deserted the first night out.

There were 32 transports with troops. These carried 153 boats with a capacity for about 3,000 men. There was also a steam lighter capable of carrying 400 men. Two thousand two hundred and ninety-five animals were taken, of which 390 were pack-mules (with 7 bell-mares), 943 draft-mules, 571 government and 381 private horses, 114 army wagons, 81 escort wagons, and 7 ambulances. There were many more ambulances at Tampa, but taking a greater number involved leaving behind as many army wagons for transport.[1]

The force was organized as follows:

First Division, Brigadier-General J. F. Kent, commanding: First Brigade, Brigadier-General, H. S. Hawkins; Second Brigade, Colonel E. W. Pearson; Third Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Worth.

Second Division, Brigadier-General H. W. Lawton, Commanding: First Brigade, Colonel J. J. Van Horn; Second

[1] Two additional pack-trains and ten ambulances arrived at Siboney June 26. The *Adams* carried a number of pontoons.

Brigade, Colonel Evan Miles; Third Brigade, Brigadier-General A. R. Chaffee.

Cavalry Division, Major-General Joseph Wheeler, Commanding: First Brigade, Brigadier-General S. S. Sumner; Second Brigade, Brigadier-General S. B. M. Young.

Independent Brigade, Brigadier-General J. C. Bates, Commanding.

All the cavalry went dismounted on account of want of transportation, except Troops A, C, D, and F of the Second regular cavalry.

The strength of the expedition was 819 officers, 16,058 enlisted men, 30 civilian clerks, 272 teamsters and packers, and 107 stevedores. The field artillery was 4 light batteries of 4 guns each, 1 Hotchkiss revolving cannon, 1 pneumatic dynamite gun, 4 Gatling guns, 4 5-inch siege rifles, 4 7-inch howitzers, and 8 3.6-inch field mortars.[1]

Eighty-nine correspondents of newspapers and magazines, and eleven foreign officers, naval and military, attachés of the embassies at Washington, were aboard.[2]

The failure to place a naval officer aboard each transport, thus practically leaving the command in the hands of the civilian master of the vessel, caused great straggling. The masters of merchant steamers are of course accustomed to navigating alone;

[1] For transport assignment see Appendix A.

[2] The following are the names of these officers: Colonel Yermoloff (Russian), Major de Grandpré (France), Major Shiba and Lieutenant Saneyuki (Japan), Commander Dahlgren, Captain Wester and Captain Abildgard (Sweden and Norway), Captain Lee (Great Britain), Count von Goetzen and Lieutenant-Commander von Rebeur Paschwitz (Germany), and Lieutenant Roedler (Austria-Hungary). Later, Captain Paget, British naval attaché, joined. A sum was allotted by the government for the entertainment of these officers. The following orders, in accord with a request of the navy department, were sent June 3, regarding newspaper boats:

The secretary of war and the navy have agreed that all press boats, of whatever character, shall be seized and detained in the ports of Tampa and Key West to prevent following the expedition, placing, if necessary, a file of soldiers or marines on board to enforce obedience; and likewise that the commanding naval officer of the convoy be directed, in case a press boat joins the fleet, to take charge of her and compel her to remain until he reaches the commander-in-chief, who shall also detain her so long as he thinks expedient to do so.

General Shafter's staff was as follows: Lieutenants R. H. Noble and J. D. Miley, aides-de-camp; Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. McClernand, adjutant-general;

their chief care is to keep at a good distance from other ships, and efforts to keep them at the usual naval interval, with a ship ahead of them at a distance of four hundred yards and another astern at like distance, failed; they were naturally alarmed. Ceaseless efforts by detailing naval vessels to look after stragglers were thus necessary to keep them even in sight. The *Olivette* and the *City of Washington* were sent with the *Gussie*, under convoy of the *Helena*, into Matthew Town, on Great Inagua Island, on the 19th to water the *Gussie*, which carried a large number of mules.

At 6.30 A. M. of the 20th the torpedo-boat *Ericsson* was sent ahead to communicate with the fleet off Santiago; the *Rodgers*[1] was sent into Guantánamo at 9.45 A. M. The Morro at Santiago and the blockading ships were sighted, and the whole expedition was stopped fifteen miles off shore, all being present except the transports *Yucatan* and *City of Washington*, but they arrived in the afternoon with the *Bancroft* and *Wasp*, having been separated from the fleet since the morning of the 18th on account of the pontoon and water schooner, which had to be towed by the transports.

Word of the expedition's approach had come to the flag-ship *New York* early in the morning of the 20th by the armed tug

Captain J. C. Gilmore, Jr., assistant adjutant-general; Captain C. G. Starr, acting inspector-general; Major S. W. Grosbeck, acting judge-advocate; Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Humphrey, quartermaster of the expedition. Major J. W. Jacobs, acting chief quartermaster, Fifth Corps; Colonel J. F. Weston, chief commissary; Lieutenant-Colonel B. F. Pope, chief surgeon, Fifth Corps; Brigadier-General William Ludlow, chief engineer; Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Derby, chief engineer, Fifth Corps; Second Lieutenant William Brooke, acting chief ordnance officer; Major Frank Greene, acting chief signal officer; Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Astor, inspector-general, U. S. Volunteers, and Captain Stewart M. Brice, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Volunteers, attached to staff. Major-General J. C. Breckinridge, U. S. Volunteers (inspector-general of the army), was aboard the *Segurança* with three aides, Captain F. M. Alger, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. Volunteers; Lieutenant S. M. Foote, Fourth Artillery, and Lieutenant C. D. Rhodes, Sixth Cavalry. Also Lieutenant-Colonel A. L. Wagner, in charge of Military Information Division, with his assistant, Lieutenant Edward Anderson; Dr. Joaquin Castillo of the Cuban army and Dr. John Guiteras, assigned to duty with the chief surgeon as an expert in tropical diseases. (Miley, 47–51.)

[1] A man was lost overboard from the *Rodgers* on the 19th in passing a line from the *Indiana* to take the former in tow.

Wompatuck, which had been sent from the convoy, and at 8 A. M. Captain Chadwick, the chief of staff, left in the *Gloucester* to go south, as had been arranged, in order to confer with General Shafter, give him all information as to the status of affairs and put before him Admiral Sampson's views. These were that the batteries at the entrance should be taken at once, in order that the channel should be cleared of mines for the entry of the squadron. Captain Chadwick, on arrival aboard the *Segurança*, put the wishes of the admiral regarding the immediate capture of the batteries before General Shafter, who, at the moment, agreed with the views expressed.

The *Segurança* steamed toward the blockading fleet and with Admiral Sampson, Captain Chadwick, the chief of staff, and Lieutenant Staunton, the assistant chief of staff, from the *New York*, aboard, proceeded west to Aserraderos accompanied by the *Gloucester*, to communicate with the Cuban leaders. Consideration being had for Garcia's inability to stand the motion of the sea, which had been tested the day before, it was decided to hold the consultation ashore. General Shafter, accompanied by Lieutenant Miley, and Admiral Sampson, by Lieutenant Staunton and several other officers, were landed in the boats of the *Gloucester*, and rode the mile to the headquarters of General Rabi, where Garcia was.[1]

General Rabi was always spoken of by the Cubans as one of the few remaining persons with considerable Carib blood. He was, however, considerably darker than the Indian and while showing this blood, also showed traces of the negro and Spanish. He was a handsome, soldierly person of some fifty-eight or sixty years.

The general's force of 500 men was encamped in the immediate vicinity of Aserraderos, Garcia's some little distance inland. Of tents there were none; the protection to the men being constructions of palms and other growths, of which so many in the tropics are adapted to such uses. General Castillo, who was occupying with 500 men a position at Point Sigua,

[1] Captain Chadwick did not accompany the admiral, as he had been on almost continuous duty some forty-eight hours. Sheer fatigue and the necessity of some sleep to meet the heavy work immediately at hand kept him aboard.

twenty-five miles east of Santiago, had also come by prearrangement to take part in the council.

Says Lieutenant Miley:

> The question of the most suitable place for the landing of troops was . . . discussed, and General Garcia gave it as his opinion that Daiquiri would be the best place. Cabañas, to the west of the Morro, was suggested, but was immediately dropped, General Shafter and General Garcia both considering it impracticable. Guantánamo was also thought of, but this place, being forty miles from Santiago, was considered entirely too far away.

General Garcia had evidently changed his opinion since June 13, for on that date he had written Admiral Sampson: "My opinion agrees with those of my subalterns as you tell me, that the west is the best place for the disembarkation, and to-morrow as I tell you, I march in that direction."[1]

The decision come to by General Shafter to land fifteen miles east of Santiago and attack the city itself, leaving the entrance untouched, is not altogether surprising in view of the misinformation which he received from the war department on June 4, and stated to have come from Admiral Sampson, "that 7,000 Spaniards were entrenched at Siboney and Daiquiri; 5,000 at the mouth of Santiago harbor and about 1,000 at other points near the

[1] The original is:

"Mi opinion, conforme a la de mis subalternos que V me dice, es que el oeste es el mejor sitio para el desembarco y mañana, como le digo, marcho en esa direccíon."

His letter in full, as translated, was as follows:

"MESIA, HOLGUIN, *June* 13, 1898.

"(Received, Flag-ship N. A. Station, June 18, 1898.)

"VICE-ADMIRAL W. T. SAMPSON,

"*Commander-in-Chief American Squadron:*

"To-day I have had the honor of receiving your respectable letter of the 8th inst., after deplorable delays due to the bad state of the roads. That same fact and that of still having many people in Banes taking away the expedition prevents me from taking with me to-morrow, when I march in the direction of Santiago de Cuba, as you indicated to me, all the force that I could otherwise, always taking into consideration that I cannot completely leave the jurisdiction of Holguin ungarrisoned because the Spaniards have in it ten or twelve thousand men that could march to the aid of Santiago, and I have to leave men, who, when they can no longer prevent their passage if they attempt it, will at least delay their movements and give us time to battle with them. My march, even making the greatest efforts as I will, will be a long one and

city."[1] Shafter was misled not only by the war department's telegram, but by the indefinite information given at the discussion by Garcia, who while he estimated that there were about 12,000 Spanish soldiers at Santiago and vicinity; at Daiquiri about 300 men, at Siboney about 600, at Sardinero 100, at Jutici 150, at Aguadores 150 men, also said, "the main body of the troops being at the Morro and around the city of Santiago."[2]

The misconstruction of the information sent by Sampson, a misconstruction which could easily have been made straight by a few minutes' conversation with the latter, who, remained wholly ignorant of the mistake, certainly could give cause to Shafter to hesitate in diverting any part of his force to strike an entrenched camp of supposedly 5,000 men. He thus naturally leaned to advancing at once upon Santiago itself, which, from the telegram sent him, seemed largely denuded of troops.

It would have been well to have adopted Sampson's views in part at least, and to have arranged an assault upon the entrance simultaneously with that of the main body upon Santiago, a combination of the views of the two commanders which long consideration has led the writer to believe would have given the best and easiest results. The *terrain* offered as good or better protection against the guns of the Spanish ships within as did the ground used on July 1, and the diversion of 2,000 for an assault

it will take me six or eight days, but I will advance with the force I have and will leave orders for the others to follow without rest, in order to protect with the greatest number possible the disembarkation of the American forces. My opinion agrees with those of my subalterns, as you tell me, that the west is the best place for the disembarkation, and to-morrow as I tell you I march in that direction. I wish to impress you with the fact as I did General Miles, that I will receive with pleasure whatever orders or instructions you give me because I will second your plans with the greatest spontaneity. I remain with the greatest consideration,

"P. y L.,

"Calixto Garcia,

"*Major-General, Commanding the East.*"

[1] The telegram conveying this information was a misreading of Admiral Sampson's despatch of the same date, which was fairly accurate as to the number of men at the time near the lower part of the bay, viz.: "in Morro de Cuba 400 men; at other points in the bay 100 men, with small rapid-fire gun and submarine mines at various points."

[2] Miley, 57.

upon the Morro, where were but 411 men (the former but a third of the number so unnecessarily diverted to the attack upon the outlying post of El Caney, with such loss of life), would, with the assistance of the fleet, have been ample for the purpose. The marines of the fleet and the 4,000 Cubans available, some 5,000 men in all, were much more than ample to assault Socapa, where were but 399 men. Shafter had he left El Caney aside, would at the same time have gone into action on July 1 with 15,000 men, and Santiago must have fallen at once instead of holding out until July 16. As it was, the Cubans were scarcely to be used at all and the 1,000 admirable and acclimated soldiers of the marines remained in their ships or idle in camp at Guantánamo.[1]

Before the conference was closed, Garcia placed himself and his troops under Shafter's orders, but the latter assured him that while glad to accept his voluntary services, he would exercise no authority over him. The Cuban troops, long on very meagre food, virtually "grazing," as General Shafter expressed it, were furnished with 9,000 rations on this and the following day.

A regiment acted as escort on the return from the hillside to the beach, the path being lined with "Cuban soldiers standing about a yard apart and presenting arms. The scene made a

[1] General Shafter says in a letter to the war department, December 28, 1898, in reference to the report by Admiral Sampson of the operations of the fleet, that the report "is incorrect in all that it states in reference to my assent to the plan which was proposed by the navy to first attack the forts at the entrance of the harbor, permitting them to enter and take up the mines—a plan of operation that was never contemplated by me, and which if it had been attempted, would in my opinion have resulted most disastrously to my army." (Alger, *The Spanish-American War*, 88.) The remarks of Admiral Sampson referred to were as follows: "My own view had always been that the first effort of the army should have been toward the carrying of the batteries at the harbor entrance to enable us to enter and countermine without a loss of ships, and this was in fact the view of General Shafter when he first arrived, as expressed to my chief of staff when he first went on board the headquarters ship, and also stated by General Shafter on consultation with General Garcia and myself at Aserraderos the same day. The reasons for change on his part I do not know."

The general probably meant to say "not *seriously* contemplated." That the project was mentioned, and supposed by the present writer to have been favorably thought of for awhile at least, remains indelible in his mind. It is not surprising that in the multitudinous and pressing affairs of the days to come the general's memory of what was talked of but never carried into effect should have become vague.

strong impression on all in the party; there seemed to be such earnestness and fixedness of purpose displayed that all felt these soldiers to be a power. About fifty per cent were blacks and the rest mulattoes with a small number of whites. They were only poorly clad, many without shirts or shoes, but every man had his gun and a belt full of ammunition.[1]

A memorandum was made of General Shafter's plan and a copy taken by Lieutenant Staunton, of Sampson's staff. It included the part to be taken by the Cubans, of whom some 5,000 men were present or available; 500 of these were already near Point Sigua, as mentioned, and with an additional 500 from General Rabi's force were to take part in the proposed attack at Daiquiri; 500 were to be on the west in the vicinity of Cabañas Bay, and the remainder were to be assembled at Aserraderos by the 24th and be conveyed thence to Daiquiri (eventually to Siboney).

A description of Santiago Bay and its immediate vicinity is, at the risk of some repetition, necessary to an understanding of the events about to take place.

The main part of the bay, whose axis lies almost north-east and south-west, is four nautical miles long; another mile is added by the entrance channel which, leaving the bay at Caracoles Point, curves to the south-east and thence to the south-south-west. The first reach in entering is about a quarter of a mile in length with a direction north-north-east. It then becomes an extremely narrow channel with a direction, for half a mile, north, and then broadens with a direction north-east. There were admirable positions for fortifications, besides the Morro and Socapa, one of the principal of these being Gorda Point, a mile within, which looked down the channel to the sea. There were in the bay itself, at the beginning of the war, no batteries beyond that at the south end of the town, used to return salutes of visiting men-of-war.

Three miles west of the entrance is the small harbor of Cabañas, with a shallow and narrow entrance but broadening and deepening into a beautiful small bay, admirably suited for landing purposes. Six miles further west is Cabrera Point. At

[1] Miley, 58-59.


VICINITY OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA
SIERRA MAESTRA
R.R. divides at El Cristo, goes N. to Songo and Socorro and N.W. to Moron, Dos Caminos and San Luiz.
To Bayamo
Cuabitas
10" Water Main
El Caney
Stone Fort
To El Cobre & Monte Real
Dos Caminos
Heavy Brush Trail
Santiago de Cuba
Santiago Bay
Kettle Hill
S. Juan Hill
La Cruz
General Shafter's Headquarters
El Pozo
Lagoon
S. Juan R.
Sevilla
Punta Gorda
Rolling Country Covered with heavy Brush.
Guasimas
High Hills
Mazamorra
Morro Castle
Batteries
Cliffs 200'
Old Fort
Socapa
Cabañas Bay
2 Cables to Cienfuegos.
2 Cables to Jamaica
Iron Bridge
French cable to Guantanamo & Hayti
R.R. to Mines
Siboney
Juragua
Daiquiri
0 1 2 3 4 5 Nautical Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5 Statute Miles
Wagon Road
Bad Road
Trail
N

the small cove of Guaicabon, just east of Cabrera, is a landing-place which was used by the Americans as a point of communication with the insurgents.

Three miles east of the Morro is the bight of Aguadores, where the small river San Juan enters the sea from a deep and rugged defile of the hills. The beach here affords a fair landing-place, and immediately adjacent, vessels can anchor.

Daiquiri, the selected landing-point, was a small village 16 miles east of the entrance to Santiago Bay, built up by the iron mines of the vicinity, owned and operated by an American company. There was no harbor, the only protection from the prevailing south-east wind being a slight extension of land seaward, scarcely enough to make a recognizable bight in the coast-line. There was a lofty iron pier, wholly unfit, however, from its height, for ordinary landing purposes, its only use being to load the iron on board ships by chutes. The sole landing-place was a wooden pier about 40 feet long and 20 broad, approached by 150 feet of tramway built upon piles. Over this track push-cars were operated and in these all supplies landed here were carried from the wharf. There was some open ground back of the village, of service for camps and corrals, but in general the hills rose almost at once from the sea to a considerable height, the most prominent being crowned by a Spanish block-house, over which was constantly floating a large Spanish flag, and in which there were a few soldiers. An excellent water supply came from the hills in iron piping which extended to the pier.

Five miles west of Daiquiri and ten nautical miles east of the Morro is the anchorage of Siboney, where were the shops of the railway company, a hospital, and a number of buildings, forming a considerable village, but from this the ore was carried by a steam railway to a wharf in Santiago Bay. This road followed the seashore closely as far as the mouth of the little river San Juan (three miles east of the harbor entrance), the ravine of which was crossed by an excellent iron bridge, of considerable length. Both villages, with the exception of a few houses for the better class of employees, were of the usual type of Cuban thatched huts. No pier existed at Siboney, nor was there, previous to the enemy's arrival, use for one, as everything came and went

by rail. The anchorage formed by the deposit from the small river which here entered the sea had no protection except that formed by a cliff which jutted seaward on its eastern side; it was, however, as the rare Cuban beaches go, a fair boat landing. The normal weather conditions were a south-east wind rising in the forenoon and fresh in the afternoon, which gave place at night to a breeze off the land, which in its turn next morning yielded to the breeze from sea.

From the Morro to within a mile of Siboney the coast was a lofty cliff, broken at Aguadores and at two other points, Sardinero and Jutici, where landings could be made with difficulty. The railway ran at the base of this cliff, close to the sea, turning inland at Aguadores where was the large iron bridge already mentioned, and continuing thence inland to Santiago harbor.

Santiago itself is at the eastern side of the upper end of the bay. The country about was a basin enclosed by mountains five to ten miles distant from the city. The region on the east toward the sea, ending, as described, in cliffs reaching nearly to Siboney, was of a rolling character covered with heavy brush. That on the west, with elevations of some one hundred and eighty feet at the south-west corner of the bay, was a gently rolling country to the foot of the mountains.

At Siboney, the mountains approached the coast, and the region thence eastward to Daiquiri, and beyond, was one of formidable hills touching the sea.

The roads were all of the meanest description, there being but one near the coast which was more than a trail.

General Shafter issued the following order:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD S. S. *Segurança*, AT SEA, *June* 20, 1898.

General Orders, No. 18.

1. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper commanders troops will disembark in the following order:

First. The Second Division, Fifth Corps (Lawton's). The Gatling gun detachment will accompany this division.

Second. General Bates's Brigade. This brigade will form as a reserve to the Second Division, Fifth Corps.

Third. The dismounted Cavalry Division (Wheeler's).

Fourth. The First Division, Fifth Corps (Kent's).

Fifth. The squadron of the Second Cavalry (Rafferty's).

Sixth. If the enemy, in force, vigorously resists the landing, the light artillery, or part of it, will be disembarked by the battalion commander, and brought to the assistance of the troops engaged. If no serious opposition be offered, this artillery will be unloaded after the mounted squadron.

2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket roll (with shelter tent and poncho), three days' field rations (with coffee ground), canteens filled, and one hundred rounds of ammunition per man. Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and company cooking utensils, will be left under charge of the regimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned officer and two privates from each company.

3. All persons not immediately on duty with, and constituting a part of, the organizations mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, will remain aboard ship until the landing be accomplished, and until notified that they can land.

4. The chief quartermaster of the expedition will control all small boats, and will distribute them to the best advantage to disembark the troops in the order indicated in paragraph 1.

5. The ordnance officer, Second Lieutenant Brooke, Fourth Infantry, will put ashore at once one hundred rounds of ammunition per man, and have it ready for distribution on the firing line.

6. The commanding general wishes to impress officers and men with the crushing effect that a well-directed fire will have upon the Spanish troops. All officers concerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline, and will caution their men to fire only when they can see the enemy.

. . . . . .

By command of Major-General Shafter:

E. J. McClernand,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On consultation, however, between General Shafter and Admiral Sampson's chief of staff, aboard the *Segurança*, it was decided to leave the landing in the hands of the navy and the following order was issued by Admiral Sampson:

U. S. Flag-Ship *New York*, 1st Rate,
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, *June* 21, 1898.

The army corps will land to-morrow morning, the entire force landing at Daiquiri. The landing will begin at daylight, or as soon

thereafter as practicable. General Castillo, with 1,000 men coming from the eastward of Daiquiri, will assist in clearing the way for an unopposed landing, by flanking out the Spanish forces at that point.

Simultaneously with the shelling of the beach and block-houses at Daiquiri, the Ensenada de los Altares and Aguadores, both to the eastward of Santiago, and the small bay of Cabañas, about 2½ miles to the westward of Santiago, will be shelled by the ships stationed there for that purpose.

A feint in force of landing at Cabañas will be made, about ten of the transports, the last to disembark their forces at Daiquiri, remaining during the day or greater part of the day, about 2 miles to the southward of Cabañas, lowering boats, and making apparent preparations for disembarking a large body of troops; at the same time General Rabi, with 500 Cuban troops, will make a demonstration on the west side of Cabañas.

The following vessels are assigned to bombard the four points mentioned above:

At Cabañas, the *Scorpion*, *Vixen*, and *Texas*.

At Aguadores, the *Eagle* and *Gloucester*.

At Ensenada de los Altares (Siboney), the *Hornet*, *Helena*, and *Bancroft*.

At Daiquiri, the *Detroit*, *Castine*, *Wasp*, and *New Orleans*, the *Detroit* and *Castine* on the western flank, the *Wasp* and *New Orleans* on the eastern flank. All the vessels named will be in their position at daylight.

Great care will be taken to avoid the wasteful expenditure of ammunition. The firing at Daiquiri will begin on signal from the *New Orleans*.

At Cabañas it is probable that, after a few minutes, unless the firing is returned, occasional dropping shots from the smaller vessels will be sufficient, but the semblance of covering a landing should be maintained, the ships keeping close in.

At Aguadores and Ensenada de los Altares the same rule should prevail. At Daiquiri, the point of actual landing, vessels will of course use their artillery until they have reason to believe that the landing is clear. They will take care to make the firing deliberate and effective. As General Castillo's column, approaching from the eastward, is likely to come within range of the guns, sharp-eyed quartermasters with good glasses will be stationed to look out for the Cuban flag, and care will be taken not to direct the fire toward any point where that flag is shown.

The *Texas* and *Brooklyn* will exchange blockading stations, the *Texas* going inside to be near Cabañas. The *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon* will retain their blockading positions, and will keep a vigilant watch on the harbor mouth. The *Indiana* will

take the *New Orleans'* position in the blockading line east of Santiago, and between the flag-ship *New York* and the shore. This is only a temporary assignment for the *Indiana*, to strengthen the blockading line during the landing, and avoid any possibility of the enemy's breaking through should he attempt to get out of the port.

The *Suwanee*, *Osceola*, and *Wompatuck* will be prepared to tow boats. Each will be provided with two 5 or 6 inch lines, one on each quarter, each long enough to take in tow a dozen or more boats.

These vessels will report at the *New York* at 3 A. M. on June 22, prepared to take in tow the ships' boats which are to assist in the landing of troops and convey them to Daiquiri.

The *Texas*, *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, *Oregon*, *New York*, and *Indiana* will send all their steam cutters and all their pulling boats, with the exception of one retained on board each ship, to assist in the landing. These boats will report at the *New York* at 3 A. M.

Each whaleboat and cutter will have three men; each launch, five men, and each steam cutter its full crew and an officer for their own management. In addition to these men, each boat will carry five men, including one capable of acting as cockswain to manage and direct the transports' boats. Each steam launch will be in charge of an officer, who will report to Captain Goodrich. Care will be taken in the selection of boat keepers and cockswains, to take no men who are gun pointers, or who occupy positions of special importance at the battery.

Unnecessary oars and impediments should be removed from the pulling boats, for the greater convenience of the transportation of troops, but each boat should retain its anchor and chain.

Captain C. F. Goodrich, commanding the *St. Louis*, will have, on the part of the navy, general charge of the landing.

The *New Orleans* will send her boats to report to Captain Goodrich upon her arrival at Daiquiri.

The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward, both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action, and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish admiral ever intends to attempt to escape that attempt will be made soon.

WILLIAM T. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral, Commander-in-Chief
U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

When the boats were ready to move in at Daiquiri, at 9 A. M., June 22, an active cannonade began over a stretch of twenty miles of the coast, which was nowhere returned except from the Socapa battery against the *Texas*, which was struck once

by a 6-inch shell, which killed one man and wounded eight others.[1]

The house used by the Spanish commander at Daiquiri was so hastily deserted that there was left on the desk an unfinished letter to General Linares in which the writer begged "to assure his excellency that he was abundantly able to resist any attack at Daiquiri, either by land or sea." The heliograph was also left. Twelve steam launches and forty other boats were furnished from the fleet, twenty-three of these from the *St. Louis*. This large detail took not less than 200 valuable men from the ships, who could have been ill spared had the enemy's squadron chosen this time to make its exit, but the exigencies demanded the risk. The boat service during these days of landing was hard and continuous, and it was handsomely acknowledged in a telegram, June 25, from General Shafter to the war department, saying: "The assistance of the navy has been of the greatest benefit and enthusiastically given. Without them I could not have landed in ten days, and perhaps not at all, as I believe I should have lost so many boats in the surf."[2]

Admiral Sampson had sent Commander Hunker to the general as a naval aide, and close communication was kept with the flag-ship in order that any wish of the general should at once be carried out. The landing at Siboney, which was chosen the second day as a much preferable point, was in easy view from the position of the *New York*, which was linked with Siboney by the numerous ships which had been detailed to cover the landing during the 22d and 23d, and which had orders to keep up a fire upon any parties of the enemy which might appear near the shore westward of Siboney. The difficulties of getting the troops ashore were greatly accentuated by the reluctance of the masters of the transports to come near shore. Many wandered off to

[1] Following is the list of casualties on *Texas* June 22: Frank I. Blakely, apprentice first class, killed; Raymond Russell, apprentice second class, and George Francis Mullen, apprentice second class, seriously wounded; Rudolph Earl Engel, seaman, Hugh Amos Lee, apprentice second class, John Emory Lively, landsman, John Edward Nelson, apprentice second class, John J. Simonson, seaman, Aroid Sjoquist, slightly wounded.

[2] *Correspondence War with Spain*, I, 54.

great distances, some were found as many as twelve miles to the westward. This trouble would have been avoided had a naval officer been aboard each ship to direct her movements, the masters being apparently heedless of directions given them



by the army officers aboard. Even so late as June 25, General Shafter writes Admiral Sampson from on board the *Segurança* at Siboney: "Two ships, *City of Washington* and *Saratoga*, cannot be found, they have two thousand men on board. Will you please have them found and order them in my name to

Juraguacito (Siboney) at once and disembark them. It is of the greatest importance that these troops be ashore at the earliest possible moment."

The following from his official report is Captain Goodrich's account of this very successful operation:

At 4. 30 A. M., June 22, the U. S. S. *St. Louis* was at her rendezvous at Daiquiri and within a mile and a half of the great pier. This position was taken in order to demonstrate to the transport captains that the approaches were perfectly safe. The steam cutters, sailing launches, cutters, and whaleboats detailed from certain other vessels of the fleet arrived about 6 to 6.30 A. M., in tow of the U. S. S. *Suwanee* and *Wompatuck*. Some steam cutters came up under their own power. The list of boats which joined in the enterprise of landing troops is appended marked C. It will be observed that the *St. Louis* furnished a large number of boats, which, as a matter of fact, could carry at one trip nearly 1,000 men, or rather more than half the capacity of all the boats employed. About half of the *St. Louis* boats were manned by volunteers from the fire-room. The types of boats may be arranged in the following order of individual value for the work under consideration: First, navy sailing launches; second, *St. Louis* lifeboats; third, navy cutters; fourth, *St. Louis* collapsible boats; fifth, navy whaleboats. It may be observed that experience proved it better to use the steam cutters as tugs exclusively, time being lost when they were turned into passenger boats.

A great deal of delay was experienced in getting the first batch of troops loaded—the causes being numerous and largely avoidable. Some confusion at the outset was occasioned in getting the steam cutters and their tows in readiness, but this was as nothing in comparison with the hindrance caused by the remoteness of the transports from the shore. The *Knickerbocker*, a very important member of the fleet, with 600 men to be landed in the advance of the army, had lost herself during the night and only appeared in the afternoon. In the meantime 4 steam launches, with 11 boats in tow, were vainly seeking her far out at sea. My plans were also disarranged through the absence of certain steam launches, and of the steam barge *Laura*, all of which had been promised me. I may, in all frankness, add that neither the boats' crews not the boats' officers were as familiar at first with the quickest method of getting a soldier into a boat, and of carrying on this special duty generally, as they soon became. However, shortly after 9 A. M. a sufficient number of boats were filled with troops to warrant the advance—the preconcerted signal to this effect was hoisted on board the *Wompatuck*, to which vessel I had transferred myself with my aids, Lieutenant Catlin, U. S. Marine Corps, and Mr. Richard S. Palmer.

The *New Orleans*, *Detroit*, *Castine*, and *Wasp* then opened a fire heavy enough to drive out the whole Spanish army in Cuba had it been there. So far as known no reply was made.

The *Suwanee*, which had been assigned to my particular assistance, kept close by on the port quarter of the *Wompatuck*, and shelled the low woods to the west of Daiquiri, the *Wompatuck* in the advance firing a few times also. Following the *Wompatuck* were the steam cutters with their tows of boats laden with troops.

Happily no opposition was encountered, and, also happily, the smaller or inner pier was found to be available for landing. Midshipman Halligan, of the U. S. S. *Brooklyn*, was the first man ashore, at a little before 10 A. M. The troops landed as rapidly as the heavy swell alongside the pier would permit, and the landing, once begun, continued all day. By 6 P. M. some 6,000 troops were ashore and the army abundantly capable of holding its own.

By the middle of the afternoon the boats' crews and officers had acquired the most expeditious and convenient methods of receiving and discharging troops, while the beach master, Lieutenant F. K. Hill, had systematized the approach to and handling of boats at the dock, so that a continuous stream of men disembarking could be maintained. A larger number would have been scored had the transports not as a rule kept from 2 to 5 miles off.

The next morning, June 23, the landing began afresh. Profiting by our experience of the preceding day, the operation of landing reached and maintained a surprisingly high rate. As before, the only drawback was the remoteness of the transports from the dock. The *Osceola*, on the 22d, and the steam lighter *Laura*, on the 23d, brought in, the former some 200 men, the latter some 350. As the *Laura* could and did go alongside the dock, she proved of notable assistance.

On the afternoon of the 23d the major-general in command of the Fifth Army Corps informed me that he had determined to land men at Siboney or Ensenada de los Altares, about 4 miles to the westward of Daiquiri and that much nearer Santiago. Accordingly, the entire lot of boats was sent to Siboney, where the *St. Louis* followed them. Happily, a convenient and safe anchorage was found for the ship, encouraging the transports to come closer in. Moreover, General Shafter, in response to my request that the transports should be made to come nearer, had placed their captains unreservedly under my orders so far as the landing was concerned. In consequence of this order I was enabled to go on board a transport as it came in, assure the captain that his responsibility for the safety of his ship ceased at the moment he obeyed my instructions, take charge of her, and berth her near the shore. In this way but a small distance was covered by the boats in transit, and the landing went on most rapidly in spite of the surf, which at times was quite heavy. During the night the beach was

illuminated by the *St. Louis's* search-lights, so that the work went on almost as easily and quickly as in daytime.

The disembarkation continued during the 24th, 25th, and 26th, an immense amount of ammunition, food, and forage being taken ashore by the navy, so that the troops and animals could be subsisted. The speed of landing at Los Altares was, normally, 600 Americans or 1,000 Cubans per hour.

On the afternoon of Sunday, June 26, the *St. Louis* returned to the fleet off Santiago, bringing with her all the boats, except five steam cutters, which had been already sent back on the 24th instant; also *Oregon's* boats.

The usefulness of a huge vessel like the *St. Louis,* possessing great resources in the shape of accommodations, supplies, and personnel, was amply demonstrated on the occasion just described. For four days and nights she acted as mother ship, feeding and berthing nearly 200 extra men and officers; coaling, watering, and repairing steam cutters; furnishing voluntary relief crews of machinists and firemen for the latter for night work; hoisting at her davits at sundown all navy pulling boats not detailed for night duty; and all this without even taxing her facilities. There seemed to be room for everybody and the means to supply every want.

For the success of the undertaking, which, I have reason to believe, is generally considered to reflect great credit on the naval service, I am deeply indebted to my subordinates, who manifested unflagging zeal and great ability in discharging an irksome, delicate, and, at times, dangerous duty. Especially are my thanks due to Lieutenant F. K. Hill, United States Navy, of the *Iowa,* for his firm, tactful, and seamanlike system and management of affairs as beach master. I commend him to your favorable consideration. His regular reliefs in this important post were Ensigns Chas. L. Hussey, of the *Oregon,* and Fred. R. Payne, of this vessel, with occasional spells by my secretary, Mr. R. S. Palmer. Their performance of duty merits my acknowledgment. First Lieutenant A. W. Catlin, United States Marine Corps, acted to my complete satisfaction as my principal aid throughout the time covered by the landing.

The behavior of the midshipmen in charge of boats was as a rule admirable. I was particularly impressed by the rapidity with which the third classmen from the Naval Academy now on board this ship gathered skill in handling their boats and control of their crews and passengers. I directed Naval Cadet O. G. Murfin to report to his commanding officer my estimation of the value of his services. Of Naval Cadet Hart's performance of duty I am constrained to make a separate commendatory report.

At the earnest request of Colonel Weston, of the commissary department, I left him two sailing launches with a man in charge of each for the purpose of unloading the steam lighter *Laura.* He expressed him-

self as able with the *Laura* and the launches to feed 30,000 men before Santiago; without the launches, as powerless. While it may be somewhat irregular to comment upon the actions of an officer of another branch of the service, I cannot refrain from mentioning my admiration of the energy, tact, and skill displayed by Colonel Weston and of the results he achieved under my eyes.

On the 27th the *St. Louis* accompanied the *Yale* to Siboney and landed 1,300 troops from the latter ship, the *Yale* furnishing a whaleboat and a cutter to assist. The steam cutters were from the *Indiana, Massachusetts,* and *Oregon.* On the *St. Louis's* return to Santiago that evening the last of the boats detailed from other ships to take part in the landing—viz. the *Oregon's* steam cutter and whaleboat—were sent back to their own ship. The usefulness of the steam cutters in towing empty boats off and full boats in cannot be exaggerated. The service was hard and continuous. I marvel only that breakdowns were so few and slight.

Of the navy boats, one *Brooklyn* cutter, beached at Daiquiri the first day, was the only one entirely lost; all, however, were more or less bruised and a few somewhat damaged, unavoidably.

The *St. Louis* received and cared for seven men on the 24th ultimo, wounded in the action of that day, Surgeon R. Lloyd Parker rendering valuable service. It was during this affair when word came off from shore that the Spaniards were driving back our troops, that the *St. Louis* fired a number of shells in the supposed direction of the enemy, some of which by good luck are reported to have fallen in his midst.

At the beginning much delay was caused by the timidity of the troops in getting into the boats; in other cases on account of orders not having arrived on board the transports to disembark their troops, causing much loss of time, the boats shoving off unloaded. In other cases delay was due to the efforts of company officers to make the landing by companies instead of filling the boats to their capacity each trip.

Admiral Sampson, on June 22, had telegraphed:

Landing the army progressing favorably Daiquiri. There was little if any resistance. The *New Orleans, Detroit,* and the *Castine, Wasp, Suwanee,* shelled vicinity before landing. Made a demonstration at Cabañas to engage attention of the enemy. *Texas* engaged west battery for some hours, she had one man killed. Ten submarine mines have been recovered from the channel of Guantánamo. Connection by telegraph has been established at Guantánamo.

On June 21 the 500 Cubans who were to join General Castillo's force at Point Sigua were taken aboard of the *Gloucester*

and *Vixen* with the intention of landing at Cajobabo five miles west of Sigua, but the surf was so heavy they were put ashore at the latter point.

General Ludlow had been put in charge of the preparations for embarking Gomez's force. A pier was built at Aseraderos which greatly facilitated the operation, and on June 24, as arranged, 2,978 men were taken in three of the army transports to Siboney and there landed. Admiral Sampson, in a note of June 23, had suggested to General Shafter the advisability of leaving Garcia's force west of Santiago to hold in check any proposed Spanish re-enforcements from Holguin. It would, as events proved, have been better to have done so, as it would probably have held in check Escario's column of 3,700 men, now on their way through the difficult mountain passes between Santiago and Manzanillo.

CHAPTER II

THE SPANISH SITUATION AT SANTIAGO

Early in April, Governor-General Blanco had announced to General Linares the intention (which did not then exist) of the Americans to attack Santiago, recommending preparations for the defence of that port and Guantánamo. The question of abandoning Sagua de Tanamo, Baracoa, and Guantánamo was considered, but all three were finally held. The remarkable want of foresight and energy shown in the failure to provision adequately a position such as Santiago, second in importance to Havana only, and which by force of events was to become the pivotal point of the war, has been touched upon. Though nearly a month intervened between the declaration of war, April 21, and the first arrival of a hostile ship off Santiago, not a single sack of flour entered the port after April 21, when a small English schooner arrived with a cargo of butter, potatoes, onions, and cornmeal,[1] though Jamaica was but 110 miles distant. "Had it not been for the arrival of the German steamer *Palaria*, which, fortunately, left at Santiago 1,700 sacks of rice intended for Havana, there would have been an absolute lack of provisions, as neither the merchants nor any one else attempted to import them."[2] The last vessel to arrive with provisions was the *Mortera*, April 25, with 180,000 rations of flour, 197,000 of rice, 149,000 of garbanzos (chick-peas), 79,000 of kidney beans, 96,000 of wine, and 150 head of cattle.[3] As about 360,000 rations a month were needed for the army alone,

[1] Müller y Tejeiro, *The Battles and Capitulation of Santiago*, 32.
[2] *Ibid.*, 32.
[3] Nuñez, *La Guerra Hispano-Americana, Santiago de Cuba*, 52. Müller y Tejeiro, 32.

apart from the needs of the population of a town of 30,000 people, and as nothing of importance could be drawn from the neighboring country, the inadequacy of supplies is apparent. So much was this to be felt that many were starved. "I myself," says Lieutenant Müller y Tejeiro, "saw a man who had died of hunger at the entrance of the Brooks House, opposite the captaincy of the port—died because he had nothing to eat. Horses, dogs, and other animals were dying of hunger in the streets and public places, and the worst thing was that their carcasses were not removed. I also saw . . . a dog throw himself upon a smaller one and kill and devour him."[1] This want of foresight was fatal. "It was the scarcity of provisions, confined almost entirely to rice, which, more than anything else, compelled General Linares to defend the line which, beginning at Ermitano and passing through El Caney, San Miguel de Lajas, Quintaro Hill, and the hills of La Caridad and Veguita, would protect the railway to Sabanilla and Moron, and the aqueduct. If the troops could have maintained this line they would not have suffered for lack of water, as they did in some positions, nor would the food, as long as we remained in possession of the cultivated region, have been reduced to rice bread and rice boiled in water, which the soldiers could not stand."[2]

The army was suffering, too, through long arrears of pay, the result of the chronic impecuniosity of the Spanish treasury. The pay due March, 1897, had not been received until October of that year, and that due April, 1897, not until May, 1898. The pay of officers of all ranks had been overdue eleven months when a little before the interruption of communication by sea with Havana they received the pay due to January, 1898, when it was received in notes of the Banco Español of Havana, already at a value of but 61 per cent in gold and which shortly fell in the Santiago markets to but 35 per cent of a silver value. Shortly after, the merchants would not receive it at all.[3] After May 28, the port being now permanently blockaded, it was clear that both army and city were to suffer short rations

[1] Müller y Tejeiro, 33.
[2] *Ibid.*, 72.
[3] Nuñez, *La Guerra Hispano-Americano, Santiago de Cuba*, 53.

for an indefinite period, the situation being, aggravated by the addition of the 2,000 men of Cervera's squadron, which had arrived itself short of provisions.

The total number of troops in the province of Santiago (the largest of the seven provinces of Cuba) was about 36,000 men. These, however, were widely distributed in garrisons, some of which could only be reached from Santiago by sea, most of the province being an extraordinary rough tangle of mountains and destitute of roads in any real sense. Most of the few roads which existed were not much more than what the American of the West would term trails. Even those which, with the usual Spanish faculty for self-deception, were grandiloquently termed *caminos reales* (royal highways) were of a badness only equalled by that of the roughest mountain roads in the southern part of our own Appalachian Mountains. Distributed over these 12,000 square miles of almost untravellable territory were widely detached commands, of which the most important were Santiago, Guantánamo, Holguin, and Manzanillo.

Some 9,500 men were in Santiago and in close vicinity, about 2,600 were in the small villages, most of which were within a radius of some 25 miles, but one as much as 40 miles; about 6,000 were at Guantánamo, 48 miles away in a straight line, but not less than 75 by the road which was guarded by insurgents, and over which for a long period there had been no communication with the headquarters at Santiago. To these should be added nearly 1,500 men, equally divided between the two small and isolated parts of Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo on the north-east coast, only to be reached by sea. Later there were to be added to these nearly 3,700 men under Colonel Escario, who made a remarkable march of 205 miles from Manzanillo, over rough mountain passes traversed by paths frequently cleared by the troops themselves, in which they could rarely march but in single file. At Manzanillo, in addition to the detachment just mentioned, were 5,000 men. This total of about 28,300 men, in what was known as the eastern department of Santiago, formed the command of Lieutenant-General Arsenio Linares-Pombo. Independant of these at Holguin, 70 miles north-west of Santiago

Holguin
Port Banes
BANES BAY
NIPE BAY
PORT TANAMO
Pt Mangle
Sagua de Tanamo
Cuchillas del Pino
Sierras de Cristal
Cuchillas de Toar
PORT BARACOA
Baracoa
Yumuri
CAPE MAYSI
Jamaica
Sierra de la Vela
Purial Mts
Palma Soriano
San Luis
Socorro
Songo
Dos Caminos
Moron
El Cristo
Santa Catalina de Guantanamo
Sierra Maestra
Cobre Pk
Monte Real
El Cobre
Caney
Nimanima
Aserraderos
Pt Cabrera
Santiago de Cuba
Gran Piedra
Sierra Maestra
Boney
Wreck Vizcaya
Wreck Oquendo
SANTIAGO HBR.
Juragua R
Daiquiri B
Siguas R
Caimanera
Carlos
Moquey Mts
GUANTANAMO BAY
Windward Pt
P. Escondido
1085
EASTERN CUBA.
10 5 0 10 20
NAUTICAL MILES.

and over equally rough passes, were some 8,500 men "contained," in military phrase, during the coming events, by part of the Cuban forces which were under the command of General Calixto Garcia.

General Linares's plan of defence comprised two lines: one on the coast from Cabrera Point to Daiquiri; the other, an extended line inland to hold against the insurgents the railways and the cultivated zones about the widely detached villages occupied by the Spanish troops. Mutual support between points so distant from one another as were Palma Soriano 15 miles west of San Luis; Socorro, and the others at which detachments were stationed was impossible. This inland line was under the command of General Vara de Rey, with station at first at San Luis, later at El Caney.

The following, at the time of General Shafter's landing, were the organizations scattered, in and near Santiago, over a space of about 400 square miles.

		Officers and men
Cuba (Santiago) regiment	12 companies	1,644
Asia regiment	8 companies	1,096
San Fernando regiment	6 companies	822
Puerto Rico regiment	6 companies	822
Talavera regiment	6 companies	822
Constitución regiment	6 companies	822
Mobilized troops	16 companies	2,192
Engineers and sappers	3 companies	411
Siege artillery	1 company	137
Mountain artillery	1 battery (2 guns)	50
Civil guards	1 company	137
King's regiment (cavalry)	2 troops	200
Signal corps	1 section	72
Volunteers and firemen	6 organizations	1,869
Guerillas	7 or 8 organizations	1,000
Sailors	8 companies	1,000
Total forces, including sailors		13,096[1]

[1] From Sargent, II, 49. The nominal strength of the battalion was 21 officers and 1,000 men. There were six companies to the battalion; two battalions to the regiment; two regiments to the brigade. The actual strength of the companies fell, however, frequently below the full strength of 150 men. One hundred and thirty may be taken as an average to the company.

At San Luis, under General Vara de Rey, were four companies of the Constitution Regiment, a foot company of guerillas, and a section of mountain artillery. Two squadrons of the King's Regiment and the mounted guerillas of the Second Battalion of the Cuba Regiment and a provisional battalion of the Puerto Rico Regiment, were detailed to protect the railway from El Cristo to San Luis. In El Cristo were four companies of the San Fernando Regiment and in Songo two of the Puerto Rico Regiment.

After the seizure of Guantánamo Bay, General Pareja, at Guantánamo, twelve miles inland from the head of the bay, had, as has been mentioned, no communication with the headquarters. He sprinkled the short railway leading from the bay to Guantánamo thickly with block-houses, and made the moderate effort to displace the marines from their position, already described, but whatever design General Linares may have had as to obtaining his support, it came to naught and Pareja remained quiescent and took no part in the coming operations.

On most of the hill-tops and mountain-peaks near Santiago were block-houses, a number of which were provided with flashing signal apparatus, which gave excellent means of communication.[1]

The *Reina Mercedes* herself was moored in the narrow water between Cay Smith and Socapa Point; her yards and topmasts were sent down; her chain cables used to armor her starboard side, and her two 6.3-inch bow guns left aboard, as also part of her secondary battery, to protect the mine field.

[1] The Spanish block-house is ubiquitous and a more elaborate structure than we had been led to expect. It has the air of an evolution during a course of years for dominating an inimical and insurgent country at every high point and cross-road. It is usually placed upon a commanding position and affords a lookout, the lower part built of stones and earth, and two tiers of fire, and the upper part of wood, the top of the parapet being the top of the stone wall, so that up to the height of the breast there is complete protection against small-arms fire. Around the block-house and connected with it by entrenchments are sometimes several successive lines of field entrenchments. These entrenchments are very narrow in profile, and instead of earth being thrown to the front it is more often thrown to the rear, to one side, so that the protection in front of the trench is natural solid earth. The soil is of such a nature that it will stand almost vertical in its natural condition, so that the slope of the trench is very slight. Such a trench as this is extremely

On June 22, four companies of about 130 men each were disembarked from the Spanish squadron; two were stationed at San Miguel de Paradas, on the west side of the bay directly opposite the city; one at Socapa and one at Las Cruces on the east side, a mile from town. The next day an additional force of 458 men were landed, under command of Captain Bustamante, the chief of staff, and occupied a line from Dos Caminos to the Plaza de Toros, in the north part of the town. The line extending from Dos Caminos (a mile west of the city) round by the north and east to Point Blanco on the bay at the southern end of the town, a distance of five and a half miles, was occupied by the following troops:

Four companies of sailors under Captain Bustamante . .	458	men.
Four companies of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico	450	"
The battalion of the Talavera Regiment	850	"
Four companies of the San Fernando Battalion . . .	440	"
Three companies of volunteers	330	"
Other volunteers	440	"
Total	2,968	"

The ground west of the harbor, which fell off from the Socapa heights into a rolling country bordering the sea, with a very low cliff-like formation as far as the Sierra Cobre range, which ends at the sea some eight miles west, was occupied by seven companies (some 980 men) of the Asia Regiment and two companies of volunteers. These, distributed over a territory of not less than forty square miles, were more or less in touch with Socapa. Four companies under the direct command of the colonel were entrenched at Point Calavera, covering the coast road; one company and a company of volunteers at Mazamorra, covering the little bay

difficult to injure, even in artillery fire, and it is extremely difficult to reach men in the entrenchments, as they are thoroughly protected, even from artillery fire, by crouching. The trenches are usually very short, so that there is not much chance of bringing an enfilading fire upon them. In fact, nearly all the trenches we have met with have been in the nature of permanent or semi-permanent works. Barbed wire has been used very freely in front of the entrenchments and rather near to them, that near Santiago being interlaced on four or six rows of stakes in quincunx order. In fact, barbed-wire fences are about the only kind that are seen in [Cuba]. (Report of Major-General Breckinridge, Inspector-General.)

of Cabañas; one company at Monte Real, and one and a volunteer company garrisoned El Cobre, ten miles west of Santiago. "With these forces all the roads leading to Santiago from the west had to be covered."[1]

[1] Müller y Tejeiro, 71.

CHAPTER III

THE ARMY'S ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO

About 4 o'clock in the afternoon of June 22 General Lawton, whose division was the first landed, was informed that the Spaniards had left Siboney as soon as the navy began to shell the position, and was ordered to push forward two regiments to occupy the place, go into camp, entrench, and remain there. Overtaken by night, he bivouacked on the road; started again at 4 A. M., June 23, and arrived at Siboney at daybreak. Some of the Spanish troops had returned, but they hastily again abandoned the village, firing some few scattering shots. The change was advantageous not only in saving of distance, but in the smoother water for landing, due to the protection afforded by a headland which protected from the prevailing south-east swell; also in the easy shelving beach and in the much greater extent of level land for encampment. A locomotive and about one hundred cars, many loaded with coal, were left intact on the railway. No damage of any kind was done by the Spaniards to property, either at Siboney or Daiquiri, at which latter place even the pipe which brought the excellent water supply from the hills was left uninjured. The Spanish troops had, the day before, been followed by a force of Cubans under General Castillo. In the firing which ensued sixteen Spaniards were reported next day as wounded, and one killed, left in Cuban hands. The Cubans reported the Spaniards as halted at a point known, from a number of trees of the name, as Las Guasimas, some three miles from Siboney.

General Shafter had written June 22 from on board the *Segurança* to Admiral Sampson:

> . . . It is my intention to proceed from Daiquiri to Santiago as rapidly as I can and take some of my land transportation. The animals are in absolute need of some rest, and for that reason I may not

get very far to-day. I request you to keep in touch during the advance, and be prepared to receive any message I may wish to transmit from along the bluffs or any of the small towns,[1] and to render any assistance necessary.

On June 23, nearly half the force being ashore, the following order was sent to the three division commanders and to General Bates, commanding an independent brigade:

The commanding general begs me to say it is impossible to advance on Santiago until movements to supply troops can be arranged. Take up strong positions where you can get water and make yourself secure from surprise or attack. Lawton's division will be in front; Kent's near Siboney; Wheeler's near Daiquiri; and Bates's command where it will be in support of Lawton.

General Wheeler's dismounted cavalry division had, however, been landed during the 22d and 23d, and he, being the senior officer ashore and the specific instructions above not having yet been issued, was personally anxious to be in the advance. He thus ordered General Young's brigade of the First (white) and Tenth (colored) Regular Cavalry and the First Volunteer Cavalry (Colonel Wood) forward, in the hope of striking the Spaniards in their retreat. The First and Tenth in leaving Daiquiri were in the advance, with some of Lawton's infantry regiments which had already marched. "It was a hard march," says Colonel Roosevelt, "the hilly jungle trail being so narrow that often we had to go single file." The cavalrymen, it should be remembered, were throughout the campaign afoot, and, continues Roosevelt, "it was long after nightfall when they tramped through the darkness into the squalid coast hamlet of Siboney. . . . We simply drew up the men in column of troops and let each man lie down where he was. Black thunder clouds were gathering. Before they broke the fires were made and the men cooked their coffee and pork, some frying the hard-tack with the pork. The officers, of course, fared just as the men did. Hardly had we finished eating when the rain came down, a regular tropic downpour. We sat about, sheltering ourselves as best we could, for

[1] These were but some huts which here and there were given the dignity of a name.

the hour or two it lasted; then the fires were relighted and we closed around them, the men taking off their wet things to dry them, as far as possible, by the blaze."[1]

This fitly describes the life of the next fortnight. With the advent of the army had come the rains which, curiously, had held off heretofore, and now regularly in the afternoon could be seen from the ships of the blockading force the heavy clouds gather over the mountains, and while scarcely ever reaching the squadron the men aboard knew that their brothers ashore were experiencing to the full the discomforts of such weather, bad enough with the shelter of a good deck, but wretchedness itself when there is but one suit to one's back, no shelter, and only mud to lie in for those who were improvident enough to throw away their rolls in the marches to come.

Wheeler, accompanied by some Cubans, on the afternoon of the 23d had made a reconnaissance in person, and after a consultation with Young and Wood, gave orders to start at sunrise. The Cuban General Castillo who had reported the action with the Spanish and the stand of the latter at Las Guasimas, had given Young a full description of the country in front, and had promised the aid of 800 Cubans, who, however, had had apparently enough of fighting the day before and did not appear until all had ended. Young, with a squadron of the First Cavalry under Major Bell, and one of the Tenth under Major Norvell, 464 in all, and two Hotchkiss mountain-guns under Captain Watson, of the Tenth Cavalry, started at 5.45 in the morning by the main and only road. Wood, with the 534 men of his regiment, left at 6 by a path which led up the portentously steep and barren hill which rose immediately to the west of the Siboney landing, and which joined the main road on the plateau above at a distance of about three miles. The two trails (for the road taken by General Young was but little more) were from half a mile to a mile apart. There was a valley between; the bushes were so thick that neither of the columns was visible to the other until Las Guasimas was reached. Wood's men advanced in single file, the thick brush allowing no other formation. The Spaniards were discovered by Young's aide, Captain Mills,

[1] Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders*, 77 (ed. 1900).

who went in advance at 7.30 with a patrol of two men. Some were in pits, some in the heavy jungle; on their extreme right was a large ranch also occupied by the Spanish. There were some stone breastworks flanked by block-houses on that part of the ridge where the two trails came together.[1]

While Young was waiting to allow Wood to come up, General Wheeler arrived. The latter, however, after being informed of the dispositions made, left General Young a free hand. The fight began at 8 by opening with the Hotchkiss one-pounder guns, the fire of which was returned by the Spaniards with musketry, and two light guns. As the latter used smokeless powder only, it was very difficult to place them.

The action, which followed, of the right column is well told in General Young's report:

> After having carefully examined the enemy's position I prepared to develop his strength. Canteens were ordered filled; the Hotchkiss battery was placed in position in concealment at about 900 yards, and Bell's squadron was deployed and Norvell's in support.
>
> On discovering the enemy I had sent a Cuban guide to warn Colonel Wood, and knowing that his column had a more difficult route, and would require a longer time to reach the position, I delayed the attack some time in order that the development on both flanks should begin simultaneously. During this delay General Wheeler arrived and was informed of my dispositions, plan of attack, and intentions. After an examination of the position by him, and his approval of my action, I ordered the attack, and it was executed in a manner winning the admiration of the division commander and all present who witnessed it.
>
> The Spanish forces occupied a range of high hills in the form of an obtuse angle, with the salient toward Siboney and with an advance party on the trail on which I had been moving. The attack of both wings was simultaneous, and the junction of the two lines occurred near the apex of the angle on the ridge, which had been fortified with stone breastworks flanked by block-houses.
>
> The Spaniards were driven from their position and fled precipitately toward Santiago. The attacking force numbered 950 men, while that of the enemy, at first estimated at 2,000, has since been learned from Spanish sources to have been 2,500. The Cuban military authorities claim the Spanish strength was 4,000. It has also been reported that Lieutenant-General Linares, commanding the Spanish forces in eastern Cuba, and two other general officers were present and

[1] Roosevelt, 82.

witnessed the action. The fire of the enemy was almost entirely by volleys, executed with the precision of parade. . . .

The ground over which the right column advanced was a mass of jungle growth, with wire fences, not to be seen until encountered, and precipitous heights as the ridge was approached. It was impossible for the troops to keep touch along the front, and they could only judge of the enemy from the sound and direction of his fire. However, had it not been for this dense jungle, the attack would not have been made against an overwhelming force in such a position. Headway was so difficult that advance and support became merged and moved forward under a continuous volley firing, supplemented by that of two rapid-fire guns. Return firing by my force was only made as here and there a small clear spot gave a sight of the enemy. The fire discipline of these particular troops was almost perfect. The ammunition expended by the two squadrons engaged in an incessant advance for one hour and fifteen minutes averaged less than 10 rounds per man. The fine quality of these troops is also shown by the fact that there was not a single straggler, and in not one instance was an attempt made by any soldier to fall out in the advance to assist the wounded or carry back the dead. The fighting on the left flank was equally creditable and was remarkable, and I believe unprecedented in volunteer troops so quickly raised, armed, and equipped. . . .

Finding, when the ridge was carried, that many of my men had become exhausted by the excessive heat and exertion, I ordered a halt and occupation of the captured position. Had I had at hand at the time of the assault a force of mounted cavalry, the fruits of our victory would have been more apparent.

General Castillo did not appear on the field, nor did any of his troops come to the front until the firing had ceased. No other troops than those mentioned were engaged in the action. Three troops of the Ninth United States Cavalry arrived on the left after the firing had stopped and were posted as pickets until relieved by General Chaffee's brigade of General Lawton's division, which then took the advance.

The action of all officers and men, so far as my personal observation extended, was superb, and I can only at this time mention the names of those whose conduct was personally observed by me as being highly conspicuous in gallantry and daring, and evidencing a firm intention to do everything within the power and endurance of humanity and the scope of duty. Captain Knox, after being shot through the abdomen, and seeing his lieutenant and first sergeant wounded, gave necessary orders to his troops and refused to allow a man in the firing line to assist him to the rear; Lieutenant Byram, after having his scalp wound dressed, and knowing his captain (Knox) to be wounded, assumed command of his troop, but fell fainting while pushing to the front; Captain Mills, the only member of my staff present with me on this

part of the field, was most conspicuous for his daring and unflagging energy in his efforts to keep troops in touch on the line and in keeping me informed of the progress made in advancing through the jungle.

Colonel Wood, describing the advance of the left column, says:

At 7.10 our advanced point discovered what they believed to be signs of the immediate presence of the enemy. The command was halted and the troops deployed to the right and left in open skirmish order and the command ordered to advance carefully. The firing began almost immediately, and the extent of firing on each flank indicated that we had encountered a very heavy force. Two additional troops were deployed on the right and left, thus leaving only three troops in reserve. It was soon apparent that their lines were overlapping us on both flanks. Two other troops were rapidly deployed, one on the right and one on the left, which gave our line a length about equal to their own. The firing about this time was exceedingly heavy, much of it at very short range, but on account of the heavy undergrowth comparatively few men were injured at this time. It was about this time that Captain [Allyn] Capron was mortally wounded. The firing on his immediate front was terrific. The remaining troop was sent to the front and the order given to advance very slowly.

Men and officers behaved splendidly and advanced, slowly forcing back the enemy on the right flank. We captured a small block-house and drove the enemy out of a very strong position in the rocks. We were now able to distinguish their line, which had taken a new position about 800 or 1,000 yards in length and about 300 yards in front of us. The firing was exceedingly heavy here again, and it was here that we had a good many men wounded and several officers. Our men continued to advance in very good order and steadily forced the Spanish line back.

We now began to get a heavy fire from a ridge on our right, which enfiladed our line. This ridge was the position which was being attacked by two squadrons of the regular cavalry, and was held in very strong force by the Spanish in small rock forts along its entire length, supported by two machine-guns.

Having cleared our right flank, we were able to pay some attention to the Spanish on the above-mentioned ridge, and centred upon it the fire of two troops. This fire, with the attacking force on the other side, soon completed the evacuation of this end of the ridge, and the regular assault completed the evacuation along the entire length of the ridge. Of the Spaniards who retreated from the ridge some few fell into line, but apparently only remained there a moment, when large masses of them were seen to retreat rapidly, and we were able to distinguish parties carrying litters of wounded men.

At this time my detached troop had moved out to the left to take the right end of the Spanish line in flank. This was successfully accomplished, and as soon as this troop gained its position "Cease firing and advance" was ordered. Our men advanced within 300 yards of the enemy, when we again opened heavy fire. The Spanish broke under this fire and retreated rapidly. We advanced to the last position held by them and halted, having established before this a connection on our right with the regular troops, who had successfully carried the ridge before mentioned. This left us in complete possession of the entire Spanish position.

Our troops were too much exhausted and overcome with heat and hard work of the two preceding days to continue the pursuit. Had we had any mounted men or even fresh foot troops, I think we could have captured a large portion of their force, as they seemed completely disheartened and dispirited.

About thirty minutes after the firing had ceased three troops of the Ninth United States Cavalry, under Captain Dimmick, reported to me, and I advanced them, forming a heavy line of outposts, covering our entire front, at a distance of about 800 yards from our line. About two hours after the fight was over a number of Cubans came up and made a short reconnaissance as far as Cevitas, and reported that the Spanish had apparently fled into Santiago, as they found no evidence of them. They reported a quantity of blood along the trail and a quantity of abandoned equipments and every evidence of a complete rout from the point of their break in our front to the above-mentioned town Cevitas.

In regard to the conduct of the officers and men, I can only say that one and all behaved splendidly. Captain Capron died shortly after the termination of the fight . . . an irreparable loss to the regiment.[1]

The commanders of both columns praised the conduct of officers and men in highest terms, General Young saying:

In connection with the conduct of the officers, attention is called to Colonel Wood's report on the conduct of Captain Capron, Major Brodie, Captain McClintock, Lieutenant Thomas, Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, Captain McCormick (Seventh United States Cavalry), and my personal aids Lieutenants T. R. Rivers and Smedberg. I cannot speak too highly of the efficient manner in which Colonel Wood handled his regiment, and of his magnificent behavior on the field. The conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, as reported to me by my two aids, deserves my highest commendation. Both Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt disdained to take advantage of shelter

[1] Allyn K. Capron, who was the son of Captain Allyn Capron of the artillery, and who commanded the battery attached to Lawton's division.

or cover from the enemy's fire while any of their men remained exposed to it—an error of judgment, but happily on the heroic side. I beg leave to repeat that the behavior of all men of the regular and volunteer forces engaged in this action was simply superb, and I feel highly honored in the command of such troops.

I desire to express my admiration of the fine soldierly qualities and conduct on the march and after meeting the enemy, of Major Norvell, Tenth Cavalry, and Major Bell, First Cavalry, commanding squadrons. Their quick and rapid execution of orders and instructions were admirable and gratifying. Major Bell received a serious wound in the early part of the engagement and was succeeded in the command of his squadron by Captain Wainwright, whose management of the right wing of the advance firing line was all that I could desire or hope for, and more than I could, under such opposing conditions, confidently expect. Captains Beck and Galbraith and Lieutenants Wright and Fleming also deserve equal praise for the manner in which they manœuvred and controlled their troops in attacking the precipitous heights before them.

Captains Ayres and Watson and Assistant Surgeons Fuller, Delgardo, and Church were also highly commended. Dr. Church had himself gone out to the firing line during the fight and carried to the rear some of the worst wounded on his back or in his arms.[1] Edward Marshall, correspondent of the *New York Journal*, was shot through the body near the spine. "When I saw him," says Richard Harding Davis, who was also on the field, and gave an admirable account of events, "he was suffering the most terrible agonies and passing through a succession of convulsions. He nevertheless in his brief moments of comparative peace, bore himself with the utmost calm and was so much a soldier to duty that he continued writing his account of the fight until the fight ended."[2]

Among the wounded was a trooper, Rowland, who with a wound in the side and a broken rib, was ordered to the rear. After some grumbling he went, but fifteen minutes later he was back on the firing line with the statement that he could not find the hospital. When examined at Siboney it was decreed that his wound was so serious that he must return to the United

[1] Roosevelt, 104.

[2] Davis, *The Cuban and Porto Rican Campaigns*, 163. It is pleasant to know that Mr. Marshall recovered.

States. "This was enough for Rowland, who waited until nightfall and then escaped, slipping out of the window and making his way back to the camp with his rifle and pack, though his wound must have made all movement very painful to him." He was naturally allowed to stay, distinguishing himself again at San Juan Hill.[1]

Of the 74 officers and 1,067 men of the American force in this action, one officer and 17 men were killed and 6 officers and 44 men wounded. Of the killed, 8 were volunteers, and of the wounded, 34.[2] Majors Bell and Brodie, Captains McClintock and Knox,[3] and Lieutenants Thomas and Byram were wounded.

The Spanish forces engaged under General Rubin were about 1,500, though some 2,300 were available; their losses, by official statement, were 3 officers and 9 men killed and 24 men wounded.[4] The whole force was at once withdrawn toward the city.[5]

[1] Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders*, 108.

[2] Among the volunteers killed was one bearing the honored historic name of Hamilton Fish. He was a grandson of the distinguished secretary of state of the Grant administration, and was a sergeant in the Rough Riders, an instance of the quality of the blood which volunteered during the war.

[3] Captain Knox's wound was of so serious a character that it was thought impossible that he should recover, and a message was sent to the fleet asking that his son, a midshipman, should be sent to him. Mr. Knox, however, was out of reach in a ship on the north side of Cuba. It may be said that most of the regimental surgeons had left their medicine chests and supplies aboard the transports; these were brought ashore the 26th. (Lieutenant Miley, p. 95.)

[4] This is an official statement by the Spanish government. (See Sargent, II, 62.) Colonel Roosevelt states that he "went over the ground very carefully and counted 11 dead Spaniards, all of whom were actually buried by our burying squads." (Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders*, 102.)

[5] Linares's reasons for falling back to San Juan Hill are given in a general order of June 26, which was as follows: "Soldiers, we left the mineral region because I did not wish to sacrifice your lives in vain, in unequal battle, with musket fire, against the pompous superiority of the enemy who was fighting us under cover of his armored ships, armed with the most modern and powerful guns.

"The enemy, rid of our presence at the points referred to, has already landed his troops and proposes to take the city of Santiago.

"The encounter is at hand and it will take place under equal conditions.

"Your military virtues and your valor are the best guarantee of success.

"Let us defend the right, ignored and trampled upon by the Americans, who have united themselves with the Cuban rebels.

"The nation and army look to us.

The engagement at Las Guasimas, besides inspiring the Americans, augured well for the conduct of the volunteers, from whom had to come any further re-enforcements, for almost the whole of the regular army was now in Cuba. There could be no question as to the character of the regular troops, but the volunteers in this action showed their mettle to be quite as good; officers and men were equally commended.

A well-known writer upon military subjects says: "There were several excellent reasons why Linares should have fought the decisive battle of the war at this point." These reasons, given in detail, were based upon the facts that the position was naturally very strong and strategically important; and that the American forces, until the decisive action should have been fought, would have been obliged to occupy a cramped position around Siboney.[1]

The thesis would be sound had the *terrain* not been so exposed to the fire of the fleet. It would have been impossible to hold in position a force occupying such an extent of ground as would have been necessary for the utilization of, say, 9,000 men, but two and a half miles from the sea occupied by a fleet in which there were over one hundred guns which could have been brought to bear upon the position. There was, in fact, no point between Siboney and Santiago where such a stand could be taken without exposure to the fire of, at least, the heavier guns, of which there were forty-six 8-inch, six 12-inch, and twelve 13-inch, a total of sixty-four such guns with a range of from four and a half to six sea-miles. The cathedral of Santiago, in the centre of

"More than a thousand sailors disembarked from the fleet will assist us. Volunteers and firemen will take part in the task of repulsing and defeating the enemies of Spain. The other division of this army corps is hastening toward us to re-enforce us. I make no recommendations, because I feel sure that all will vie in the defence of their posts with firmness and resolve; but I will say that those assigned to any positions, be it in the precincts of the city or at the foremost points, must stand firm at any cost, without vacillating, without thinking of retreating, but only of saving the honor of our arms.

"I shall comply with my duties, and in conclusion I say with all, Long live Spain!"

[1] Sargent, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, II, 71 *et seq.*

the city itself, was but 7,200 yards from the sea (a little over three and a half nautical miles), and, as will be seen later, every part of the city was reached by the guns of the fleet with destructive effect. Moreover, it may be said that had the admiral been informed of the situation before the battle to come later, these guns could even have been used against the Spanish position on San Juan Hill, which was not more than four nautical miles (four and a half land-miles) distant from the sea, and the situation made untenable. Had this been done, it is probable that no action would have taken place outside of Santiago, and that the Spanish forces would have become so demoralized that the American troops could have entered the city at once with little or no difficulty.

These remarks necessarily indicate a want of correlation between the army and navy. But this arose, not from want of good will, of which there was plenty, but from the want of any general staff system in both the war and navy departments, which prevented that intimate understanding and mutual study of conditions as they arose: the army went its own gait with no idea but of getting forward and attacking the enemy wherever found, and finally did by brute force and much loss that which might have been much more quickly accomplished and with little loss, had operations been carried on with the assistance of a trained staff and with the co-operation which the navy was only too anxious to give.

Two days after the action at Las Guasimas on June 25 General Shafter wrote:

My dear Admiral:

Thanks for your kind wishes and congratulations. We have been doing splendidly to-day. I hope to have everything up to where my advance is now, within about six miles of Santiago, beyond the town of Sevilla. I have been thinking of sending Garcia if I can get him to go along the railroad and across the trestle you mention at Aguadores. This will bring him in close to the Morro and will cut any troops that are along the bay off from the town. For that reason and also as we may want it to bring supplies in that we now have on the line of the road, I wish you would not destroy it, but simply knock these fellows out who are there now. I think it will give them the impression we

think the place strong and intend to make our attack there, whereas we shall do it several miles to the north and some distance above the iron pier.

Very respectfully,

WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General Commanding.

Garcia was, however, not sent. The armed yacht *Gloucester* and the armed light-house vessel *Mangrove* were kept in the vicinity of Aguadores bight, alternating their duty there by day, with watch off the harbor entrance at night. On the west side of the river mouth was a small picturesque seventeenth-century castle, from which was kept floating a large Spanish flag. The castle up to this time had not been disturbed, as it was of no military value. There was a small Spanish post at hand, a few of the men of which, undisturbed, came from time to time to wash their clothes in the little river which stood in the shallow pools under the high railway bridge which crossed the ravine from which the little stream emerged. The scene now, however, began to change. Small parties were observed throwing up entrenchments on the hillside. The *Eagle* and *Gloucester* had shelled the position on June 22, and from thence on the Spanish detachment had but little quiet. What was done is best given in a few extracts from the *Gloucester's* log, which also show the varied duty of the smaller vessels of the fleet:

June 24.—8 A. M. to noon. . . . Proceeded with two steam launches (*New York's* and *Massachusetts'*) to Acerraderos [17 miles west]. . . . Noon to 4 P. M. . . . Hove to by transport *Alamo* off Acerraderos at 1 o'clock, and sent Lieutenant Wood aboard in launch of U. S. S. *New York* with messages for General Ludlow. On Lieutenant Wood's return, coaled and watered launch and leaving her and launch of U. S. S. *Massachusetts* in charge of Cadet Theleen with instructions to report to General Ludlow, we shaped our course to return to flag-ship at 12.15 [1.15?]. Off Daiquiri [error for Siboney] at 4 o'clock.

6 to 8 P. M. Moved in to night position off Morro at dark.

June 25.—4 to 8 A. M. . . . In answer to signal from flag-ship went alongside and reported as to situation at Aguadores. Received orders to return and prevent enemy from working on fortifications or railroad.

8 A. M. to noon. Went over to *New Orleans* with message, and made reconnaissance of Aguadores, returning to flag-ship at 9 o'clock.

Carried orders and information to *New Orleans* and took position off Aguadores. Shelled earthwork and railroad cut when work was being carried on, driving enemy to shelter. Fired a few shells later when groups of men were seen. Anchored in nine fathoms of water distant 1,000 yards from bridge and fortifications.

Noon to 4 P. M. After crew's dinner, took up subcalibre practice with points on shore and the enemy for targets. Enemy then opened on us from fort with rapid-fire machine-gun and rifles, several shots passing through deck-houses and upper works but without doing injury to any one aboard. Drove them from their position, battering down some battlements and silencing their fire. Weighed anchor. Were visited by *Suwanee*. Later left position and reconnoitred to the eastward. Returned at four o'clock.

The next day, June 26, was Sunday, and all was quiet until in the evening one shot was fired at 7.45 at a light ashore. The next morning, June 27, at 3 A. M., the western end of the bridge was blown up by the Spaniards.

CHAPTER IV

THE ARMY'S ADVANCE ON SANTIAGO—(CONTINUED)

GENERAL BATES, on the 25th, was placed in command at Siboney, with orders to place all the men possible, with all available tools, as a repair force on the road to Sevilla. Captain Best's battery was sent forward the same day to join General Wheeler, followed the next day by those of Captains Parkhurst, Grimes, and Capron. The four troops of the Second Cavalry, with their horses, were sent with three days' forage and four days' rations on the saddle, the troopers leading their horses. All troops as they left the landing carried three days' rations, which, with the weight of the equipment, caused many to throw away articles later badly needed.[1] Hawkins's brigade of General Kent's division joined Wheeler on the 24th and the two other brigades on the 26th. Garcia's force of Cubans took position in rear of the main body at Sevilla. On June 27 the Thirty-third Michigan Volunteers and one battalion of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, under Brigadier-General Duffield, arrived in the *Yale* but were held at Siboney.

On June 26 General Shafter wrote Admiral Sampson:

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD S. S. *Segurança*,
OFF DAIQUIRI, CUBA, *June* 26, 1898.

SIR: The last of my men will be on shore to-night, but it will take until Tuesday to get them up to where the advance guard is at this time. In addition to my own force of about 15,000 men I will have a little over 4,000 Cubans. I mean to advance on the road from Sevilla Wednesday, without fail, toward Santiago.

I hear the main Spanish force is outside the city, and is entrenching itself to prevent my reaching the bay south of the city. I shall, if I can, put a large force in Caney, and one still further west, near the

[1] Miley, 90–91.

pipe line conveying water to the city; the ground in that vicinity being less brushy than that between the bay and the San Juan River; making my main attack from the north-east and east. If I can get the enemy in my front and the city at my back, I can very soon make them surrender, or drive them toward the Morro. You will hear my guns, of course, and can tell about where the action is taking place. I will be obliged if you can prevent any re-enforcements crossing the railroad at Aguadores, but without destroying the bridge, as I may need it.

I wish to express to you again the many obligations the army is under for your assistance.

I have not, as yet, as much forage or rations ashore as I would like to have, but cannot delay for them any longer. Staff officers will continue putting off stores; and if you will let Captain Goodrich continue to help you will greatly assist in the campaign. I think I should have ten days' full rations and forage on shore, so as to cover accidents by storm, or rough weather. To-day I have not more than half that amount, but now that the men and animals are out of the way, I think these stores can be discharged faster.

The army was entirely ashore by the 27th and in a region with a character wholly unlike that of any in its experience. Nearly the whole of the regular force of which it was composed had been accustomed to harrying Indians over treeless plains or arid mountains. In this case, however, it found itself in a country covered with brush so heavy that, almost impassable to the individual man, it was altogether so to troops in formation. The only path which even courtesy could call a road, and which led from Guantánamo by way of Siboney to Santiago, about nine miles away, was distinguished on maps as a "Camino Real" (royal road). Over this wagons could be taken. Near El Pozo (the well) a branch which was much less of a road even than the Camino Real led north to the little village of El Caney, about four miles distant from El Pozo and the same from Santiago, where were posted some 520 Spanish infantry under the personal command of General Vara de Rey. The main road from a point about five miles from Siboney was crossed and recrossed by the small trickling stream here known as the Aguadores. It was some twelve or fifteen feet wide, the bed of the stream frequently being the road itself. There was cleared ground here and there, which became more frequent toward El Pozo and Santiago. From El Pozo one looked across a pleasant cleared

rolling ground in the distance to a hill a little more than a mile and a half away in a straight line, and about one hundred and twenty-five feet above the general level, known as San Juan Hill.

General Wheeler reporting that there was not sufficient convenient ground near Sevilla for the large force now gathered, was directed to move nearer Santiago, but to bring on no engagement. General Lawton, with the dismounted cavalry division close behind, thus moved forward June 26, two miles, between the points known as La Redonda and Los Mangos, where a foot trail ran north to El Caney. General Kent's division occupied Sevilla. The advance was now within a mile and a half of San Juan Hill in a straight line, and three miles from the outskirts of Santiago. Between here and Sevilla, the whole force remained until July 1, a period of five days. "While at no place along the road was there any extent of open ground, by putting a brigade in one open place and a second brigade in another place to be found not very far away, and thus utilizing every bit of open ground, the different divisions were comfortably camped."[1] There was grass in abundance for the animals, and several small streams afforded a fair water supply so long as the men could be prevented from using it for bathing at points above the encampment. The only shelters were small canvas tents known by the army as dog tents, each giving protection to two men.

By this time the cable from Guantánamo to Santiago had been found and cut, the end taken ashore at Siboney, and communication established with Guantánamo station. Telephone lines were run to the front by the chief signal officer, Major Greene, and the headquarters at the front were thenceforward in communication with the office at Siboney, much time thus being saved in communicating with Washington.

All energies, for the moment, were turned to the important question of supply. Says Lieutenant Miley:

> Some of the troops had now [June 25] been off the transports three days, and the rations carried with them were nearly consumed. As the transportation was not ready for use, details were ordered to go into Siboney, one to two miles, and carry out as many rations as possi-

[1] Miley, 92.

ble. The pack-trains, however, were completely fitted out on the 25th and began carrying food from Daiquiri and Siboney to the troops.

Orders had been given on the 24th that the transportation, as fast as unloaded, should be distributed as follows:

Twenty-five wagons and one pack-train to each division; five wagons to the independent brigade; fifteen wagons and one pack-train as an ammunition train; one wagon to each troop of the mounted cavalry; one wagon to each battery of artillery; and the remaining wagons and one pack-train as a corps train.

While it was an easy matter to prepare the pack-trains for work, much delay was experienced with the wagons, for they had been taken apart in loading at Tampa, and now must be set up. As the troops were close to Siboney, it was thought the pack-trains alone could carry sufficient rations, and during the 24th and 25th attention was directed to taking off troops and supplies, rather than wagons. On the 26th it was found that the pack-trains were insufficient, especially as 4,000 re-enforcements were expected the next day, and urgent orders were given Colonel Humphrey to put off sixty six-mule wagons without regard to anything else. These wagons were put together at Daiquiri, loaded with rations and forage, sent to the front, and assigned in equal numbers to the three division commanders.

In two days more all the wagons were off, but the plan of assigning them to divisions soon proved unsatisfactory. All the teaming, as well as packing, had to be done on the single road, and with the transportation divided into independent wagon and pack trains, directed by as many different heads, confusion and delay resulted.

Two additional pack-trains had come with the re-enforcements, and a reassignment of the transportation was soon made, two pack-trains to each of the three divisions and all the rest of the transportation, wagons, ambulances, and one pack-train, were placed under one competent head, Captain Edward Plummer, Tenth United States Infantry. This arrangement continued until the capitulation, and probably was the most satisfactory one that could be devised under the circumstances. With the exception of the pack-trains assigned to divisions, all the transportation was kept at headquarters, where communication could be had in every direction, and where sub-depots for forage, rations, and ammunition were established. Captain Plummer received his orders direct from the commanding general, and the transportation was sent where it was most needed. Each morning as many wagons as could be spared were sent back to the main depot at Siboney, and also to Daiquiri, until that place was abandoned, for supplies to stock the sub-depots at headquarters, about two miles in the rear of the firing line. The wagons for Siboney would reach there in time to be loaded and return to headquarters before night, but the trip to Daiquiri took two days. By this arrangement all empty wagons were going toward Siboney in the morning, and in the opposite di-

rection, loaded, in the afternoon. The rest of the transportation was engaged in supplying the troops at the front with food, and [later] when any could be squeezed out for the purpose, the poor, starving refugees, at El Caney.

If this scheme for supplying the command had worked as smoothly as might be expected with macadam roads to travel over, the troops would have had full supplies of every kind and description. But the road to the rear became blocked by wagons stalled in the mud or breaking down, delaying the entire train into the night and sometimes so as to interfere with the next day's trip. There were barely enough wagons and pack-trains for the command under favorable circumstances. Then the streams toward the front would often rise after a rain, so they could not be forded until the next day, and loaded trains would have to pass the night in the road. The teamsters and packers as well as the troops contracted fevers, and this condition was sometimes so serious as to impair the efficiency of the transportation very much. The sick teamsters were generally replaced by soldiers, who could handle six-mule teams fairly well, but to supply the places of the sick packers was not so easy. On several occasions some of the pack-trains were laid up for lack of packers. After the untrained men began to take the places of the experienced men who came with the expedition, the delays arose more frequently, in spite of the fact that the men were doing their best.

The mules, as well as the horses, were affected very much like the men. Day by day these animals sickened and became unserviceable, but often kept going until they dropped in their tracks.

It was very soon evident that only the coarser components of the rations—bread, meat, coffee, and sugar—could be supplied to the troops with any certainty. Whenever it was possible, the rest of the ration—potatoes, onions, canned tomatoes, and other things—were, of course, carried to them; but often it was impossible to provide a full supply of the four principal components. There were instances where individual regiments were without rations for a day or more. These cases arose, not from any fault in the general system, but from the failure on the part of the immediate commanders properly to carry out orders given them. Two regiments, for example, had been ordered to march from Siboney to the front, each man carrying three days' rations. One of these regiments drew one day's rations, and the other little or none. It took nearly two days for these regiments to reach the front, and their condition was desperate; but as soon as it was known, food was sent to them as quickly as possible.[1]

Of salt pork, hard bread, coffee, and sugar there was enough, but the want of other food, with the heat and woollen cloth-

[1] Miley, 84–89.

ing,[1] began to tell. Especially were wanting those three primal necessaries for the well-being and contentment of both troops and seamen: onions, potatoes, and tobacco; on these, with bacon, the soldier and sailor can live and be happy. Perhaps the last mentioned may be ranked first. Men should never be called upon to undergo the nervous strain of a campaign without a full supply of this most essential element of their content and well being. The want of almost anything else would have caused less grumbling. Correspondents observed this well-known fact. Says one most competent observer: "Two days after leaving the coast the American army had exhausted its tobacco. When the thousands of insurgents who had landed at Siboney filed up the road to the front, the soldiers sat by the wayside and demanded tobacco. 'Tobacco, Tobacco,' they said all along the line. The Cubans might have taken the words as a welcome; smiling, they waved back their salutations and continued to smoke their cheeroots."[2] The failure to put tobacco ashore among the first things landed, was a weighty misfortune.

"It needs," says the excellent observer just quoted, "only a few days for soldiers to adapt themselves to strange conditions. At first the campaigners fell into every trap laid for them by fortune and the weather. A little later a colonel observed with a fatherly eye, how his men dried their blankets in the morning sun and rolled them tight and packed them away, against the afternoon rain or the soaking evening dew; how they divided their rations into portions; how they kept watch like sailors on the sky and dug out the trenches round their tents when the black clouds rolled up that held the afternoon deluge. Unripe mangoes, it was soon discovered, make capital mango-fool . . . finally the mad Anglo-Saxon wisely used the daily rain as a shower bath, and walked the country-side naked with a bit of soap."[3]

The road to Santiago led through a dense growth of small wood which continued until within half a mile of the San Juan hills,

[1] "Exactly what I would have used in Montana in the fall." (Roosevelt, *Investigation of the Conduct of War with Spain*, V, 2263.)

[2] John Black Atkins, *The War in Cuba*, 107.

[3] *Ibid*, 109.

when the ground became clear. "So quiet and sunny and so well kept" were these hills, "that they reminded one of a New England orchard."[1]

Here, and without any disturbance from the Americans, the Spaniards, since June 27, had been employed in throwing up the entrenchments from which was to come the murderous fire of July 1. It was now, as has been mentioned, that the fire of the fleet would have been invaluable. Day and night from the easy distance of 8,000 yards half a hundred guns could have dropped a continuous shower of shell upon the position, making it absolutely untenable. It was impossible, of course, for the admiral, in his ignorance of the situation and even of the existence of such a hill, to take such action without information from the general. Nor, probably, had the possibility of such long-range fire, with any degree of accuracy, occurred to the latter. But given the position of the hill, and the admiral knowing his distance, the fleet could have fired over the intervening heights, with, to the enemy, uncomfortable accuracy.

The reason for the short delay which now ensued is explained in the following letter:

ON BOARD S. S. *Segurança*,
OFF DAIQUIRI, CUBA, *June 27th.*

MY DEAR GENERAL WHEELER: I had intended to make an advance to-morrow, with the troops that I have, but, in view of the telegram received yesterday, that a large number of re-enforcements (about 4,000) are on the way, and the further fact that one of the ships has arrived this morning, I shall not feel justified in advancing until I get them on shore. The government seems to be very solicitous about us, and it is possible they have information of which we know nothing. I hope your scheme of sending spies into Santiago has worked. I also understand that a large number of poor people came out yesterday and are within the lines. Of course they will be received, as we cannot drive starving people back, at least not at the present time. Question them carefully and get as good an idea as you can of the condition of affairs there, and of the location of the forces that are said to be on the road to oppose us. I am shipping out stores as fast as possible; ammunition, forage, and rations, and will direct it all sent to you, to avoid confusion. Will you have your quartermaster take charge of it and pile it where we can get at it conveniently? The forage please issue to the artillery horses and cavalry, as well as horses of officers;

[1] R. H. Davis, 178.

and issue subsistence stores to any troops that require it, but not more than three days at a time for any command.

. . . . . .

I hope you will look up the subject of finding if there is any means of moving a division off to your right, bringing it out at El Caney, a point from which I do not believe we shall be expected, which is only about four and a half miles from the city. My engineer officer tells me there is a wide road leading off to the left on the high ground generally in the direction of the San Juan River and which will be on Kent's left. From the fact that I hear Spanish troops are evidently working down toward the Morro, it is possible they may try, or be thinking of attempting, to flank us on our left flank; so send at least a regiment of Kent's out that road, a couple of miles I should say, to pretty near opposite the left of where Lawton is to be placed this morning, and establish a picket line connection with him, if practicable. I am going to have Garcia keep men well to the front on our left. I am coming out to see you this afternoon.

. . . . . .

Very truly yours,
WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General U. S. V., Commanding.

On the afternoon of the 27th, accompanied by some of his staff officers, General Shafter inspected the camps at the front, and after spending some time at General Wheeler's headquarters, returned to Siboney the night of the same day. Final preparations were made on the 28th, and on the 29th [General Shafter left the *Segurança*, and] the headquarters of the expedition was established in advance of all the troops.[1]

The interval until June 30 of rest for the army was taken up by reconnaissance and repair of the road. Colonel Derby, the chief engineer on General Shafter's staff, with six junior officers, was charged with the work of reconnaissance, in which, however, all the superior officers, particularly Generals Wheeler, Lawton, and Chaffee, took part. Lawton became convinced of the desirability of attacking El Caney. He says:

I caused it to be carefully reconnoitred, then consulted my brigade commanders, and determined it was an important position which was necessary to be occupied. I then, in company with General Chaffee,

[1] Miley, 100.

visited General Shafter on his headquarters boat at Siboney [June 28], laid our plans before him, which he approved, and authorized us to make our preliminary dispositions; said he would be at the front the next day, and instructed me not to make an attack until he arrived. Under General Shafter's instructions trails were cut out over the ground which the troops would have to move over [and] places were prepared for the battery. . . .[1]

In justice to Lawton it should be mentioned that the position was thought to be very weakly defended and that in a few hours the force thus diverted could join the main body. The result was to be very different from Shafter's and Lawton's expectancy.

"On the 28th, 29th, and 30th of June," says General Chaffee (commanding the third brigade of Lawton's division), "I did considerable reconnoitring. One thousand two hundred Cubans had been reported to me for outpost duty and for reconnoitring service. A battalion of that 1,200 had been reported in the vicinity of Santiago and there were men there who knew every trail in the country and they were of great service to me. On the 28th and 29th of June I opened the road, conducting 50 Cubans and four companies of infantry on the road toward Caney about two and a half miles in such manner that the artillery could pass that way.

"[We] had to get out the brush and use picks and shovels and everything of that kind. The road was simply a mule track, and a difficult mule track at that, to get through the brush. I also cleared a position for the artillery. This position was about 2,400 yards from the town of El Caney and south-east of it."[2]

Early on June 30, General Shafter, who had established his headquarters with the advance the day before, went, with his staff, toward Santiago about a mile and a half, to El Pozo. From here there was an excellent view of the Spanish position on San Juan Hill and of El Caney in the distance. The general went forward until stopped by Cuban pickets, who warned him of the enemy's pickets but about 200 yards beyond. Shafter returned to headquarters about noon.

The situation may be thus described:

At El Pozo a passable road branched from the main road to Santiago and went due north to the hamlet of Marianaje, whence

[1] Lawton, *Investigation of the Conduct of War with Spain*, IV, 946.
[2] *Investigation of the Conduct of War with Spain*, IV, 901.

it turned north-west and joined the road from Santiago to El Caney, near what was known as the Ducoureau house. From Marianaje ran a mere trail, due north in general direction to El Caney. This could be passed, in the greater part of its length, only in single file. The distance from El Pozo to El Caney was four miles; the latter was the same distance from Santiago.

El Caney was but a small hamlet of the usual Cuban type of low palm-thatched houses on a moderately elevated hill. There were six wooden block-houses to the west and north in the immediate neighborhood, and a stone church and a stone fort called El Viso on a hillock about five hundred yards south-east of the village. Deep trenches and rifle-pits with barbed-wire protection combined with the fort and the church which had been loop-holed for infantry fire, and a naturally strong position, to form a very strong defence, a powerful offset to the meagreness in numbers of the defenders—but 520 men. It was a situation in which the characteristics of the Spanish troops were to be shown at their best.

The one known road leading directly toward Santiago, followed the Aguadores brook and frequently the bed itself, and going a little north of west, ran south of Kettle Hill [1] and across the northern end of San Juan Hill into Santiago, less than three miles from El Pozo.

A mile west of El Pozo the Aguadores joined a stream from the north-east called Las Guaymas, and the combined brooks continuing the south-west course of Las Guaymas thence on to its mouth at the railway bridge was called the San Juan River. Five hundred yards below the first fork came, skirting Kettle Hill, another small stream from the north. This had steep banks and, from the heavy rains, was waist-deep at points, as was also the San Juan below the first fork.

The whole vicinity of the river was covered with dense brush, through which ran the narrow main road mentioned and a few narrow paths not yet known to the Americans. Crossing the rivers near the forks one came to cleared ground through which ran the slightly sunken road to Santiago. The road was bor-

[1] Later so named from a large sugar-boiling cauldron found at the ranch houses on top.

dered on the left by a six-stranded barbed-wire fence, made fast, at most points, to growing trees. On the right of the road was Kettle Hill, on the left San Juan. The former was a little to the north and advanced eastward about 400 yards from the latter. Between the two was a small valley in which was a pond. The easterly (Kettle) hill began to rise almost immediately after crossing the westerly "branch," as the stream would be termed in the Virginia mountains; a broad field, covered with knee-high grass and enclosed, as said, by barbed wire, led up to San Juan, the summit of which was about 125 feet above the general level.

On San Juan Hill was a heavy loopholed brick block-house; on the neighboring and more advanced Kettle Hill were the buildings of the ranch. San Juan had in the past few days been heavily entrenched; both hills had elaborate wire entanglements.

A second entrenched line was on some rising ground some 1,000 yards west of San Juan Hill. A thousand yards and across a slight valley, began the outskirts of the city. Entrenched points with occasional batteries, mostly of antiquated guns, extended from the head of the bay around by the east to the bay again. Throughout this line were multitudinous entanglements of barbed wire.

At the moment of Shafter's reconnaissance on June 30, the distribution of the Spanish troops in the immediate vicinity of Santiago was as follows:[1]

At Dos Caminos, a mile north-west of the city, four companies of men of the squadron under Cervera's chief of staff, Captain Bustamante	500
On the north front and at El Sueño, a half mile to the north-east, four companies of the Talavera Regiment and two mobilized companies	822
North of the junction of the main road to El Caney and the Aguadores branch road, one company of the Talavera, one of the Puerto Rico Regiments, and two Krupp field-guns	324
On San Juan Hill and Kettle hills one company of the Talavera Regiment	137
At Fort Canosa a half mile west north-west of San Juan Hill 140 mounted guerillas	140

[1] Mainly as given by Sargent (II, 99,) from Spanish authorities.

At Forts Santa Ursula and Las Cañadas (ravines) a mile and a quarter west by south from San Juan, three companies of the Puerto Rico Regiment and one mobilized company . . . 548
A half mile in front of these last positions, and on the crests of the slight hills (some eighty feet high) on the road to the lagoons formed by the Aguadores (here known as the San Juan River), three companies of the San Fernando Regiment . . 411
At Aguadores (railway bridge) two companies 274
Between Aguadores and San Juan Hill and along the line of railroad from Aguadores to the bay, six companies of the Cuba Regiment 822
At El Caney three companies of the Constitution Regiment and one company of dismounted guerillas 520
At Las Cruces on the bay, a company of engineers and a company of men of the squadron 262

In the city:

The first battalion of volunteers, Colonel Manuel Barrueco . . 630
The second battalion of volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel José Marimón 485
Firemen: Colonel Emilio Aguerrizábal 324
Company of guides, Captain Frederico Bosch 200
Company of veterans, Captain José Pratt 130
Troop of cavalry 100

This made a total of 6,629 men within easy reach of the city. Besides these there were west of the bay at El Cobre, Punta, Calavera, and Mazamorra to Socapa:

Eight companies of the Asia Regiment and one mobilized company 1,233
Between Mazamorra and Monte Real, two companies of men of the squadron 250
At Socapa one company of the Cuba Regiment, one mobilized company, and one company from the *Reina Mercedes* . . . 399
At various points along the bay and in the mountain passes, six mobilized companies and five companies of the Cuba Regiment 1,507
At the Morro, three companies 411

or 3,800 men additional, making a total force within a radius of twenty miles of 10,429 men.

Of such a distribution there can be but one opinion. It violated all rules of war. It attempted to cover every point of at-

tack which imagination could suggest, instead of concentrating against the advance of an enemy who, it should now have been clear, was to attack from the east, and whose advance could be but over one or, at the most, two roads, if that from El Pozo by way of Marianaje to the Santiago-El Caney road be considered. Linares, it is true, was unaware of the transfer of Garcia's men to the eastward, but he was well acquainted with the manner in which the Cubans fought, and could well have afforded to diminish his western defence in view of the character of the army now on his eastern front, particularly as he was now expecting hourly the arrival of Escario's column of 3,700 men from Manzanillo, which had left there on June 22.

Early on July 1 the Spanish commander established his headquarters near Canosa, sending two companies and his two Krupp guns, under command of Colonel José Vaquero, to re-enforce the weak force on the San Juan hills. Later sixty volunteers from the city were added, making a force at San Juan and Kettle Hills of 521 men. "Three companies of the Talavera Regiment from the vicinity of San Antonio and Santa Inés were ordered to take the place of the troops that had been sent forward from the junction of the El Caney and El Pozo roads. One company was placed to the right of the El Pozo road, one to the left of the El Caney road, and one at the junction of the two roads. These three companies, together with the 6.3-inch gun and the 4.7-inch gun that had been mounted there on June 13, formed the second line. The troops of this line, numbering about 411 men, were commanded by General Linares in person. One hundred and forty mounted guerillas, protected by a hillock near Canosa, formed the third line. Back of this line, within the city and surrounding it from the cemetery on the north-west side to Las Cruces on the bay on the south-west side, there were about 4,352 regular soldiers, sailors, volunteers, and firemen. Of this number probably about 800 or 1,000 were sick in the hospital." [1]

Later in the day Captain Bustamante, with a company of sailors, was brought from the north-west end of the line, and took position in the second line of the easterly defence, where this gallant gentleman was to lose his life.

[1] Sargent, 109.

Shortly after the return of Shafter to his headquarters the division commanders were called together for instructions. Wheeler, as he was ill, and his doctor advising against his being informed, was not present, and Sumner, his next in rank, took his place. General Young, also severely attacked by fever, was obliged to relinquish his command, and Colonel Wood, of the Rough Riders, took over Young's brigade, thus promoting Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt to the command of Wood's regiment.[1] Lawton, accompanied by his brigade commanders, Chaffee, Ludlow, and Miles, had already, during the forenoon, gone over the roads by which El Caney might be approached, and had assigned to each the place at which he was to arrive that night.

It was arranged that the attack should begin at El Caney at daybreak the next day (July 1), Bates's brigade, now at Siboney, to be added for this purpose to Lawton's division. Capron's Battery E of the First Artillery, of four guns, was to accompany Lawton's force.

As soon as El Caney should be taken (which Lawton promised should be in two hours), Lawton's command was to come by the road leading from El Caney to Santiago, and assist the first and cavalry divisions in a general attack upon the Spanish position to the east of the city.

Kent and Sumner—the latter now in charge of the cavalry division through Wheeler's illness, the command of his own brigade being turned over to Colonel Carroll—were ordered to go as far as El Pozo, where gun-pits were to be prepared during the night and Grimes's battery take position.

Moving in the morning by the Santiago road as soon as Lawton was well engaged, Sumner, with Wheeler's division, was to cross the two "branches" which united with the Aguadores, turn to the right, and deploy in front of Kettle Hill, his left resting on the Santiago road. Kent, following Sumner, was to turn to the left and deploy with his right on the same road.

Bates, with his brigade of the Third and Twentieth Infantry at Siboney, was ordered to report to General Shafter with a view to joining Lawton. Duffield, who was left in command at

[1] General Young, too ill to remain, was ordered home.

Siboney, was directed to send the Thirty-third Michigan at four o'clock the next morning (July 1) along the railroad to Aguadores and make "a vigorous attack" against the 500 Spaniards supposed to be there and prevent their leaving that point. Major Rafferty, commanding the mounted squadron of cavalry, was to remain in camp near headquarters until the next morning, then move forward to El Pozo and await orders. Major Dillenback, in command of the artillery, was directed to hold the two remaining batteries ready to move. Garcia, who on the 29th had been placed in the advance, was requested to move along the Caney road, and passing between El Caney and Santiago, take position north of the city and prevent the entrance of the column from Manzanillo, news of which, through the Cubans, had reached General Shafter on June 28. Part of Garcia's men were sent with Lawton, and a small number were sent with the troops toward San Juan Hill.

"We all," says Chaffee, "moved out between 3 and 4 o'clock to the positions and bivouacked for the night. General Lawton gave instructions on the occasion when we were viewing the ground that my brigade should attack Caney from the eastward."[1]

Shafter wrote Sampson as follows:

CAMP NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER,
June 30, 1898.

SIR: I expect to attack Santiago to-morrow morning. I wish you would bombard the works at Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry which I shall send there early to-morrow, and also make such demonstration as you think proper at the mouth of the harbor, so as to keep as many of the enemy there as possible.

The interjection of an attack upon El Caney into the general plan of what was intended to be a simultaneous attack upon Santiago itself by the whole force of the army was very unhappy. The proposition was, as a beginning, to carry a fortified place mainly with infantry; as well said by General Ludlow, one of the most difficult of military operations and usually attended by disaster. It was to cost us dear.

[1] Chaffee, *Investigation of the Conduct of War with Spain*, IV, 901.

Behind this apparently smooth-running disposition of troops, such as would be carried out easily enough in cleared and cultivated country, lay the enormous difficulties of a *terrain*, as ill adapted to the movements of an army as could well be found. The preliminary move was to El Pozo, but about two and a half miles, over the single, rough, and narrow road. It began at 4 P. M., but apparently simultaneously on the part of all. "After three hours it seemed as though every man in the United States was under arms and stumbling and slipping down that trail. The lines passed until the moon rose. They seemed endless, interminable; there were cavalry mounted and dismounted, artillery with cracking whips and cursing drivers, Rough Riders in brown, and Regulars, both black and white, in blue. Midnight came and they were still slipping forward."[1] It was well into the early hours of the next day before the last troops were able to lie down in place and get a short rest before beginning the serious, and to so many the fatal, work of the day. Why the late afternoon should have been awaited, thus assuring a march of such difficulties, and a minimum of rest to officers and men, is difficult to say.

The difficulties of the conditions were well expressed by General Chaffee, who spoke with the feeling of experience. He says:

> The army was forced to operate in a sea of brush that was thicker, more dense, more difficult to penetrate than any place I had ever seen in my life. This brush is high and so thick as to exclude the circulation of air. There is no road, properly speaking, in Cuba, mere trails, called roads, that would not permit of a column marching any distance except by file. The men marching along these trails were, as it were, melting. Vegetation is very rank there, and after the rain set in the tramping of the men simply made it muck. They had to sleep in this brush and a few small openings that here and there existed, and in the tall grass, which was on the average, two feet high where grass existed.[2]

Lawton's column moved at the same time as the rest, and over the same road as far as El Pozo, where it turned to the right. It went that night to the points previously selected, which were as far as they could go without being observed. The three bri-

[1] R. H. Davis, 190.

[2] Chaffee, *Investigation of the Conduct of War with Spain*, IV, 907–908.

gades were made up, the first, under Brigadier-General Ludlow, of the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry and Second Massachusetts; the second, under Colonel Miles, of the First, Fourth, and Twenty-fifth Infantry; the third, under Brigadier-General Chaffee, of the Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Infantry. The artillery was Battery E of the First Regiment, four guns and 82 men, under Captain Allyn Capron. General Bates's separate brigade of the Third and Twentieth Infantry, which could not join Lawton until noon of July 1, and Troop D, 68 men, of the Second Cavalry, and a few men of the Signal and Hospital Corps, made finally a total, under Lawton, of 6,653 men.[1]

[1] Perhaps to these should be added Garcia's men, but the English author John Black Atkins, says: "About 1,500 Cubans (I had almost forgotten to bring them into the fight) were posted on a hill above the village. Like Thessalian or Epirot peasants, they fired at a long range against stone walls and entrenchments, and did not advance. They revelled in the plentiful supply of ammunition, and about the middle of the day they sent to General Chaffee for more. But General Chaffee was unsympathetic." (Atkins, *The War in Cuba*, 114.)

The total of the American forces of the army near Santiago on June 30, 1898, was 858 officers and 17,358 men, Duffield's Brigade of about 2,500 men on June 27 being now added. In detail the forces were as follows:

First Division (Kent), 272 officers, 4,924 men; *Second Division* (Lawton), 242 officers, 5,145 men; *Independent Brigade* (Bates), 47 officers, 1,038 men; *Duffield's Brigade*, 119 officers, 2,424 men; *Cavalry Division* (Wheeler), 146 officers, 2,591 men; *Light Artillery Battalion* (Dillenback), 11 officers, 313 men; *Siege Artillery*, 3 officers, 118 men. Attached to the headquarters were 14 officers of General Shafter's staff; four squadrons (mounted) of the Second Cavalry, 9 officers, 257 men; *Engineers*, 8 officers, 192 men; *Signal Corps*, 4 officers, 58 men; *Balloon Detachment*, 3 officers, 23 men; *Hospital Corps*, 275 men, the whole making a total of 18,216 officers and men.

CHAPTER V

THE BATTLES OF EL CANEY AND SAN JUAN HILL

Lawton, on June 30, had gone with his brigade commanders over the ground he expected to occupy, and had assigned the several positions to be occupied that night. Moving between 3 and 4 p. m. by a path bordered by brush, much of it fifteen feet high and which men could scarcely penetrate,[1] the division was in bivouac between 8 and 9 o'clock. Next morning, having but a mile or so to go, they began, between 4 and 5 o'clock, to move into position. Chaffee's brigade was to the east near El Viso; Ludlow's on the Santiago road and to the south-west of the village; Miles, with the Fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry, at first in reserve on the south near a country place known as the Ducoureau house, was later to move to Ludlow's right; the First Infantry, and the troop of cavalry, were in support of the battery of artillery, which was placed on a hill a little more than a mile south of the town. Bates's brigade had not yet arrived.

It was some hours after this that the main body of the army was put in motion with intent to advance upon the direct road to Santiago, and with the expectancy that by the time it should reach the point of attack it would be joined on its right by Lawton, who it was thought would make such quick work of El Caney. It was not yet in movement when at 6.30 a. m. Lawton's artillery opened upon the fort at Caney with a range of about a mile and a quarter (too distant in this case to be effective),[2] followed almost at once by the fire of the infantry, at from 600 to 800 yards. The Americans had the protection of the brush

[1] Lawton, *Investigation of the Conduct of the War with Spain*, IV, 946. Lawton was asked by the Committee of Investigation:

Q. How high were these bushes? *A.* Fifteen or twenty feet.

Q. The men could easily get lost in them? *A.* They could get lost if they could get through.

[2] General Ludlow's report.


SAN MIGUEL
Block House
EL CANEY
EL CANEY
Ducoureau or Ducrot House
LAWTON'S DIV.
MILES
BATES
CAPRON'S BATTY.
Lawton's retreat
Lawton's advance and return
San Juan River
Block House
MARIANAGE
SAN JUAN HILL
ADVANCE OF MAIN ARMY
Aguadores River
SHAFTER'S HDQRS
LOS MANGOS
EL POZO
LA REDONDA
1/4 0 1/4 1/2 3/4 1
Statute Miles.
EL CANEY.

alone; the Spaniards that of the fort and church and carefully prepared trenches. The duel was one to the death; the attack ever aggressive, and the defence unyielding. The Spaniards showed the tenacity under such conditions which, nearly a century earlier, made the defence of Gerona and Saragossa famous. It was an all-day story of a greatly superior force, under tremendously adverse conditions, gradually killing off the much inferior but well-sheltered one.

Bates's brigade had left Siboney, ten miles away, at 8.30 the preceding evening, and had reached the place just vacated by the cavalry division at midnight. Here he rested until 6.30 A. M. of July 1, when he continued his march to Shafter's headquarters, and was directed thence at 10.05 upon El Caney, taking position, by Lawton's direction, about noon on the right of Miles's brigade.

The Americans gradually closed in, in a semicircle, on the Spanish position. On the right, under Chaffee, and well north of the stone fort, were the Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Infantry; Bates's brigade, of the Third and Twentieth Infantry, was on Chaffee's left; then curving to the west and north-west was Miles with the First, Fourth, and Twenty-fifth Infantry; and finally Ludlow, whose attack was principally against the block-houses, with the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry and the Second Massachusetts Volunteers, which last, armed with the old Springfield rifle and using smoky powder, were mainly held in reserve.

General Shafter, convinced by the long delay in Lawton's movement to his right that affairs had begun to assume a somewhat ominous aspect in the direction of San Juan Hill, recognized that a mistake had been made and sent the following:

LAWTON: I would not bother with the little block-houses. They can't harm us. Bates's brigade and your division and Garcia should move on the city and from the right of the line, going on the Sevilla road. Line is now hotly engaged.

This, however, which reached Lawton about 1.30, was too late. It was impossible to withdraw from the final assault which was pending, when the note was received.

About 3 o'clock, the artillery, which had been brought to within half a mile of El Viso, began to tell against its walls, whereupon Chaffee ordered the Twelfth Regiment to charge. This regiment, followed by a simultaneous rush up the hill of men from Bates's and Miles's brigades, drove out the Spaniards and the fort was won. The contest, however, still continued against the block-houses, the church, and a number of entrenched positions. It was not until 5 o'clock that all was over and the Americans in complete possession, after a display of courage and heroism on both sides beyond praise. No men, victors or vanquished, ever played better their parts. Small as were the military results, ill-advised as was the attack itself, the battle of El Caney should be held in pride by both peoples as an unsurpassed example of manly courage and military devotion.

The Spanish had lost their commander, General Vara de Rey, who, wounded in both legs about noon, was killed as he was being carried to the rear. Two of his sons fell with him. The general, whose heroic defence filled the Americans with admiration, was buried with every honor. The total Spanish killed and wounded was some 235. Lieutenant-Colonel Punet, in command at the close of the battle, escaped into Santiago with some 100 men; another 120 were captured; the remainder were dispersed.

The Americans lost 4 officers and 77 men killed, and 25 officers and 335 men wounded; a total of 441, or about 7 per cent. of the force engaged. By far the heaviest loss in any regiment fell to the Seventh Infantry, which lost over 14 per cent.[1]

The battle now over, Bates's brigade, with scarcely a rest, took the route back over the jungle trail by which it had advanced, and which was the same which had been taken by Lawton the previous night, and turned toward Santiago by the wretched road from El Pozo which had been cut into mire by the advance of the main force in the morning, and by midnight was on the extreme left of the American line in front of Santiago. Honor to the officers who led such a march and to the men whose pluck and endurance accomplished it! Only those who have known the fatigue of battle can appreciate the heroic endurance of

[1] The table on page 82 shows the strength and losses by organizations as given in the adjutant-general's office at Washington:

troops who had been continuously marching and fighting in dense tropic growth, for nearly twenty-eight hours, with but six and a half hours' rest, and with nothing in the way of food to support this immense expenditure of energy but hardtack gnawed in the short intervals of a halt. The tendency of men who have ended a battle is at once to lie down and sleep; the immense expenditure of nervous energy demands food and rest. To have added, immediately after action, another seven hours of march (six of it at night), to the twelve already taken since 8 o'clock the evening before over a rough and unknown region, shows an energy and endurance which call for unstinted admiration and deserve unstinted praise.

Obeying Shafter's directions to move on Santiago and take position on the right of the line, Lawton, after giving the men an opportunity to make coffee, and after collecting the wounded and dead, for the care and burial of whom a detachment was left, put his division in movement at from 7.30 to 8 o'clock P. M. on the direct road for Santiago, the Ducoureau house, about half-

AMERICAN FORCES AT EL CANEY	STRENGTH JUNE 30	KILLED JULY 1	WOUNDED JULY 1
Lawton's division, headquarters and staff	8	..	..
Ludlow's brigade, headquarters and staff	11	..	..
Eighth U. S. Infantry	506	6	46
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry	496	7	42
Second Massachusetts Infantry	907	5	40
Miles's brigade, headquarters and staff	13	..	..
First U. S. Infantry	452	..	1
Fourth U. S. Infantry	465	7	35
Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry	527	8	25
Chaffee's brigade, headquarters and staff	20	..	..
Seventh U. S. Infantry	916	33	99
Twelfth U. S. Infantry	584	8	31
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry	506	4	27
Bates's brigade, headquarters and staff	11	..	..
Third U. S. Infantry	485	2	3
Twentieth U. S. Infantry	596	1	8
Capron's battery	82	..	..
Troop D, Second Cavalry	68	..	..
Signal Corps and Hospital Corps	Few men	..	3
Total	6,653	81	360

way to Santiago, being made the point of assembly. General Chaffee reports having arrived there about 11 o'clock P. M., officers and men so exhausted that they were hardly able to walk.

Major Webb, of Lawton's staff, sent ahead to discover Wheeler's line, on the right of which Lawton had been ordered to take position, was fired upon by Spanish pickets. In the interval taken to report the situation to General Shafter, the men laid in the road and rested until 3 A. M., when word coming to retrace the road to El Pozo and pass over the route used by Kent and Sumner in the morning, the march was resumed and these troops (who after a night march had gone into action the day before with no breakfast "except a cracker and a drink of cold water," had fought all day until late into the afternoon, had a scant supper of little but coffee, and a march of many miles during the night over the roughest of paths) arrived before Santiago, some as early as 7.20 in the morning of July 2, in their position on the right of Sumner's command but a mile from the point from which they had started.

One can but express surprise that so terrible and so unnecessary a call should have been made upon the endurance of the men. They should have rested for the night at their midway halt between El Caney and Santiago, where they could not have been in a better situation for their next advance, and which, as just mentioned, was but a mile from the lines they next day occupied. As it was, an extreme call was made upon human endurance; a call splendidly met.

Again comes into mind the question: why was this large force, but slightly less in numbers than the main body, diverted to the attack of the little isolated post which it had spent all day in taking with terrible loss?

Had it been directed in the first instance to the point it was intended to occupy in the operations against the city; had it debouched near the Ducoureau house, into the main road leading from Santiago to El Caney, it would have been in an admirable position to have assisted the left, which simultaneously could have made its attack at an early hour in the morning, thus escaping, in large part, the heavy losses which occurred in the hours of waiting for the finish at El Caney.

It is much more than merely probable that had the American army assaulted the Santiago entrenchments with its whole force, it would have found itself, with much less loss and greatly less effort, the possessor, on the evening of July 1, of Santiago City and of the Spanish force within it. It was impossible for the latter to withdraw; for retreat to the hills meant starvation. There was no danger to be apprehended within the city from the Spanish squadron, for the squadron would not have fired upon its own, among which was also a large body of its seamen. It is difficult to surmise what Cervera could have done, short of surrendering with the surrender of the city.[1]

It was, of course, within Lawton's power, after the closer observation of the Spanish position in the morning, and its evident strength, to pass it by. But Lawton himself gave way to a natural combativeness. He was moved apparently by the desire for an independent fight, and once engaged, his bulldog tenacity of character would not allow him to let go. The fight had to be fought to a finish, but it cost the American army dear, both on this and later days.

While Lawton's fierce fight was going on four miles to the north-east, an action of much greater importance, but less difficult in character, was in progress in front of Santiago.

Early in the morning of July 1 Lieutenant Miley had been sent by General Shafter to observe and report upon the disposition of the 8,000 men detailed for the attack on Santiago. [2]

[1] The following telegram was sent from Washington July 3 at 1.56 A. M. (to be forwarded at once to headquarters in the field):

"The following is just received (midnight) from sources unofficial: 'Cervera has been ordered to shell the town (Santiago) when Americans get possession. All foreign consuls have been notified to retire at that time to places of safety outside the city.' This information may or may not be correct, but is sent for your information. We are awaiting with intense anxiety tidings of to-day. R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*"

This (from Key West, signed Sawyer) had been received by Captain Montgomery, the signal service officer on duty at the White House, at 12.50 A. M.

It is almost needless to say that this was wholly incorrect.

[2] This was made up as follows:

FIRST DIVISION, Brigadier-General Kent.—*First Brigade*, Brigadier-General Hawkins: Sixth Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Egbert; Sixteenth Infantry, Colonel Theaker; Seventy-first New York Volunteers, Colonel Downs.

Miley had returned to headquarters about 7, shortly after the firing had begun at El Caney. Grimes's battery, on the hill at El Pozo, opened at about 8. It had nothing but black powder, and the first gun over which hung its white cloud of smoke marked the position with complete accuracy. The dismounted cavalry division and the body of Cubans mentioned had been unwisely stationed nearby, and the third shell fired in return by the Spaniards burst among these, killing and wounding a number, and completely demoralizing the Cubans, the survivors of the latter scattering like "Guinea hens."[1] "I at once," says Colonel Roosevelt, now in command of the Rough Riders, "hustled my regiment over the crest of the hill into the thick underbrush, where I had no little difficulty in getting them together again. Meanwhile the firing continued for fifteen or twenty minutes and gradually died away."[2]

The whole army, less the nearly 7,000 with Lawton, was now in movement toward the city. To bring 8,000 men into action in face of an entrenched enemy, by one very rough and narrow road, bordered by impenetrable brush, was a proposition which was of staggering difficulties. General Chaffee's suggestion that trails should preliminarily be cut parallel to the front of the wood bordering the open ground half a mile in front of the San Juan hills, with a number of "little trails leading into the open"

Second Brigade, Colonel Pearson: Second Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Wherry; Tenth Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Kellogg; Twenty-first Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel McKibbin. *Third Brigade*, Colonel Wikoff: Ninth Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers; Thirteenth Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Worth; Twenty-fourth Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum.

Cavalry Division, Brigadier-General Sumner (temporarily).—*First Brigade*, Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll (temporarily): Third Cavalry, Major Wessells; Sixth Cavalry, Captain Kerr; Ninth Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton. *Second Brigade*, Colonel Wood: First Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Viele; Tenth Cavalry, Major Norvell; First Volunteer Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt.

[1] Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders*, 118.

"We were drawn up *en masse* in the rear of Grimes's battery, which had been put in position. We all laughed—I am speaking now about that military genius that put us at the rear of a battery *en masse*. As to how the order was brought about I know nothing, but we received orders to go to the rear under a hill, and finally marched in columns of fours around a road and down toward Santiago, or what was known as the San Juan Hills." (Captain George K. Hunter, *Investigation of the Conduct of the War with Spain*, IV, 1200.)

[2] *Ibid.*, 118.

so that the whole army could debouch at the same moment,[1] might have been adopted. Instead of acting upon Chaffee's suggestion, the whole force was brought into this single road which ran at right angles with the enemy's position and was thus perfectly enfiladed.

After the first ford, which had to be crossed almost at once on leaving El Pozo, the troops, of every arm, became a congested mass on which the enemy, though the men were invisible, kept a desultory fire. "First came the Cubans in the order of formation (a little further down the lane they branched off to the right and disappeared for the day); then came the cavalry (nearly all dismounted); then the balloon led by a rope, then the infantry. . . . Two men were in the car of the balloon;[2] two men held it down by a cross-bar, and two men walked in front holding stays or guy-ropes, like the stays of a Foresters' banner." [3]

In the beginning of the movement Kent's division of infantry, led by the Sixth Infantry of the First Brigade, had moved into the road but a short distance from El Pozo sugar-house, when he received orders to give the dismounted cavalry (as had been prearranged) the right of way, "but for some unknown reason they moved up very slowly, thus causing a delay in [Kent's] advance of fully forty minutes." [4] With what has been generally characterized as great want of judgment, this balloon, of most unhappy memory, had been sent up in the midst of the advancing troops. Being the one thing the Spaniards could see, it naturally became a target. They fired shells and volley after volley of bullets at it, "just above the trees, as savages might fire in a frenzy at a portent in the sky. Gradually the fire crept down the rope. The enemy realized what was at the bottom of it. The loss round it was disastrous. Still the column moved on. Men were dropping. To the private soldier the whole thing was mysterious, unnerving, baffling. Where was the fire coming from? The enemy were invisible, were they on a hill which could not be seen? Were they entrenched? Was it a front or

[1] R. H. Davis, 182.
[2] One was Colonel Derby, chief engineer, Fifth Corps.
[3] John Black Atkins, *The War in Cuba*, 123.
[4] Kent, *Annual Report of War Department*, 1898 (Part 2, 1164).

enfilading fire, or were the enemy already in the rear? The pop and ping of the Mauser were near at hand, but it is as difficult to tell where a rifle shot is fired in the bush as to tell where pennies are being clicked when your eyes are shut."[1]

When about three-quarters of a mile from El Pozo, says Sumner, now, as mentioned, commanding the division of dismounted cavalry, in Wheeler's absence through illness, "my command was halted to await orders, and for nearly an hour subjected to the effects of heavy artillery fire from the enemy's batteries passing over the command in column of twos. I then received verbal instructions to move to the San Juan Creek and hold it. When the advance guard crossed the creek a small volley was fired upon it by the enemy, who retreated to a high hill about 1,200 [800] yards to my right front. After crossing the creek . . . I received verbal orders to move by the right flank to connect with Lawton's left,"[2] an impossibility, as this was now heavily engaged four miles away to the north.

The country had become more open and the target which the Americans now offered naturally increased the intensity of the Spanish fire. As it was impossible to obey the order to connect with Lawton, the men who had crossed the creek, but could do nothing, returned and took such shelter as they could find. One of the first effects was the destruction of the balloon. It "was drilled with as many holes as a pepper-box; it began to grow flabby, to curl up, to lose its shape. Then it came down limply, having rendered enough disservice for the day.[3] At last the brook was crossed for the second time. Men fell and splashed in the water, and the water itself was spitting with the bullets. Under the shelter of one bank some surgeons were already busy with the wounded. Men being carried back through the lane, on litters, with streaming faces or bodies, called on the men advancing to get even with the enemy for them."[4]

[1] Atkins, *The War in Cuba*, 123–125.

[2] Sumner's Report, *Annual Report of War Department*, 1898, 1 (Part 2), 571.

[3] "The last we saw of the balloon was when it was being fished out of the creek by some members of the Signal Corps. It was a relief to know that it was crushed to the earth never to rise again." (Captain J. G. Goe, *Annual Report of War Department*, 1898, 1 (Part 2), 423.

[4] John Black Atkins, *The War in Cuba*, 125.

Here, at what was to be known by the men as the "Bloody Angle," came a wait for want of a directive force of nearly an hour under a most galling and destructive fire. "There was not a single yard of ground for a mile to the rear which was not inside the zone of fire. Our own men were ordered not to return the fire but to lie still and wait for further orders. Some of them could see the rifle pits of the enemy quite clearly and the men in them, but many saw nothing but the bushes under which they lay, and the high grass which seemed to burn when they pressed against it. It was during this period of waiting that the greater number of our men were killed. . . . Behind the lines hospital stewards passed continually, drawing the wounded back to the streams, where they laid them in long rows, their feet touching the water's edge and their bodies supported by the muddy bank."[1]

The use of the unfortunate balloon had had, however, one good result. Colonel Derby was able to report a trail to the left, a short distance back, leading to a ford lower down the stream. Its discovery promised a way to relieve the congestion and bring the left wing into position. Says Kent:

I hastened to the forks made by this road, and soon after the Seventy-first New York Regiment of Hawkins's brigade came up. I turned them into the by-path indicated by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, leading to the lower ford, sending word to General Hawkins of this movement. This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the leading battalion of this regiment [the Seventy-first New York Volunteers][2] was thrown into confusion and recoiled in disorder on the troops in rear. At this critical moment the officers of my staff practically formed a cordon behind the panic-stricken men and urged them to again go forward. I finally ordered them to lie down in the thicket and clear the way for others of their own regiment who were coming up behind. This many of them did, and the second and third battalions came forward in better order and moved along the road toward the ford. One of my staff officers ran back, waving his hat to hurry forward the Third Brigade, who, upon approaching the forks, found the way blocked by men of the Seventy-first New York. There were

[1] R. H. Davis, *The Cuban and Porto Rican Campaigns*, 206–207.

[2] This disorder was due to the smoky powder used by this regiment, which made it a special target; it should have been kept in reserve.


SAN JUAN
BATTLEFIELD
Scale of Feet
Road to El Caney
to Santiago
Block House
Block House
Block House
SAN JUAN HILL
SAN JUAN
SAN JUAN
Las Guasimas Creek
BLOCK HOUSE
MARIANAGE
Aguadores River or Rio
EL POZO
Rio San

other men of this regiment crouching in the bushes, many of whom were encouraged by the advance of the approaching column to rise and go forward.

As already stated, I had received orders some time before to keep in rear of the cavalry division. Their advance was much delayed, resulting in frequent halts, presumably to drop their blanket rolls, and due to the natural delay in fording a stream. These delays under such a hot fire grew exceedingly irksome, and I therefore pushed the head of my division as quickly as I could toward the river in column of files or twos paralleled in the narrow way by the cavalry. This quickened the forward movement and enabled me to get into position as speedily as possible for the attack. Owing to the congested condition of the road the progress of the narrow columns was, however, painfully slow. I again sent a staff officer at a gallop to urge forward the troops in rear. The head of Wikoff's brigade reached the forks at 12.20 P. M. and hurried on the left, stepping over prostrate forms of men of the Seventy-first. This heroic brigade, consisting of the Thirteenth, Ninth, and Twenty-fourth United States Infantry, speedily crossed the stream and were quickly deployed to the left of the lower ford. While personally superintending this movement Colonel Wikoff was killed,[1] the command of the brigade then devolving upon Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, Thirteenth Infantry, who immediately fell, severely wounded, and then upon Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, Twenty-fourth Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the withering fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Ewers, Ninth Infantry. Meanwhile I had again sent a staff officer to hurry forward the Second Brigade, which was bringing up the rear.

[1] The following account of the situation, and of the death of this valuable officer, is from a private letter from Lieutenant Wendell L. Simpson, aid to Colonel Wikoff:

"At 7.30 A. M., July 1, we received orders to break camp and move forward on the Santiago road, overtaking and following the First Brigade. We were under way very soon, and plodded along for hours, marching a few hundred yards at a time, and then halting to allow the congestion of the road to be relieved. . . . After enduring this for some time, however, and reaching a point where further progress seemed hopeless on account of the road being completely blocked by troops in front, Colonel Wikoff directed me to ride rapidly to the rear, find the division commander if possible, report to him the existing conditions, and request instructions as to position that would enable the brigade to form line and return the fire. I did not find the division commander, but at El Pozo I found Colonel McClernand, the adjutant-general of the corps, who informed me that the division commander was somewhere in our front, and who sent by me an order to the division commander relative to placing our brigade.

"Upon my return to the front Colonel Wikoff had received orders from General Kent, the division commander, and at the head of the brigade had turned on a trail to the left and proceeded toward the lower ford of the river.

The Tenth and Second Infantry, soon arriving at the forks, were deflected to the left to follow the Third Brigade, while the Twenty-first was directed along the main road to support Hawkins.

It was impossible, by a narrow roadway filled with men, to get word from Sumner, at the more northern ford, to the commanding general, who, in ignorance of the real situation, and trusting to a quick disposal of El Caney by Lawton, was at the headquarters several miles in the rear. Officer after officer, in the attempt to carry information, was struck. The situation was desperate, the only wonder being that troops could be held in hand, and without movement quietly submit to be slaughtered in such fashion. There could be no greater test of *morale*. Something had to be done; retreat could not be thought of; to remain quiet and await orders from headquarters was mad sacrifice; it was clear that the only safety lay in attack.

Lieutenant Miley was on the ground, and, at General Sumner's instance, Miley, as representing General Shafter, authorized an advance. The men were more than ready; they swarmed forward at the first word of action. The Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry, led in the most gallant manner by General Hawkins, took the advance on the left, supported on the right by the First and Ninth Cavalry and the Rough Riders, the latter now under Colonel Roosevelt. Many men of the New York Volunteers, led by Captain Rafferty, joined simultaneously with this movement.

Having delivered the order to General Kent, I received from him orders for the formation and advance of the Third Brigade for transmittal to Colonel Wikoff, and rode rapidly forward to overtake the head of the column.

"When I reached Colonel Wikoff with the orders he had crossed the creek and was giving directions to three companies of the leading regiment—the Thirteenth—which were already across. Upon hearing the orders brought by me, he at once took personal supervision of their execution, and in a remarkably short time had the entire Thirteenth Infantry in line, through the wire fence, and in good position about one hundred yards from the bank of the creek, and delivering a deadly fire upon the enemy in the trenches of Fort San Juan.

"During this time Colonel Wikoff advanced into the open field, personally superintending this first line, and fearlessly exposing himself without the slightest cover or protection. . . .

"After the formation of the Thirteenth was completed, Colonel Wikoff walked back toward the ford, evidently to direct other troops of the brigade to position as they crossed the stream," and a few moments later was mortally wounded, dying before he could be taken to the rear.

There was, as has been mentioned, a sunken lane with a wire fence which led straight on and upward between the two hills and into Santiago. Kettle Hill, which bore to the right of Sumner's advance, was naturally the first objective of the right wing. Says Colonel Roosevelt:

> The Ninth Regiment was immediately in front of me, and the First on my left, and these went up Kettle Hill with my regiment. The Third, Sixth, and Tenth went partly up Kettle Hill (following the Rough Riders and the Ninth and First) and partly between that and the block-house [San Juan] hill, which the infantry were assailing. The three regiments went forward more or less intermingled, advancing steadily and keeping up a heavy fire. Up Kettle Hill Sergeant George Berry of the Tenth bore not only his own regimental colors, but those of the Third, the color-sergeant of the Third having been shot down; he kept shouting, "Dress on the colors, boys, dress on the colors," as he followed Captain Ayres, who was running in advance of his men, shouting and waving his hat. The Tenth Cavalry lost a greater proportion of its officers than any other regiment in the battle —eleven out of twenty-two.[1]

By the time that the assault reached the top, the hill was practically deserted by the Spaniards who had occupied the buildings of the ranch. One Spaniard was captured in the buildings; another, trying to hide, was shot, and a few others were killed as they ran.

During the assault on Kettle Hill, Hawkins's brigade, the general himself in the lead, cheering on his men, was going up the difficult slope of San Juan, a quarter of a mile beyond, and where the enemy were strongly entrenched.

While the men of the brigade were advancing as rapidly as knee-high grass and barbed wire would permit, a battery of three of the four Gatling guns (calibre .30) under Lieutenant John H. Parker, of the Thirteenth Infantry, which had been patiently waiting since noon, took position across the brook and at once (1.15) opened fire, using ranges of from 600 to 800 yards. The men on Kettle Hill joined in the fire. Says Roosevelt: "The infantry got nearer and nearer the crest of the hill. At last we could see the Spaniards running from the rifle-pits as the Americans came on in their final rush." "The very audacity of the

[1] Roosevelt, 128.

assault," says Hawkins in his report, "seemed to demoralize the enemy." There can, by general consensus, be little doubt that the fire of the Gatlings, though lasting but eight and one-half minutes (from 1.15 to 1.23½) did much toward this demoralization. Says Lieutenant Parker in his report:

Inspired by the friendly rattle of the machine-guns, our own troops rose to the charge, while the enemy, amazed by our sudden and tremendous increase of fire, first diverted his fire to my battery and then, unable to withstand the hail of bullets, augmented by the moral effect of our battery fire and the charging line, broke madly from his safe trenches and was mercilessly cut by the fire of these guns during his flight.

I at once limbered up and took stock of my losses. One man was killed, one badly wounded, one mule hit twice, but not badly injured, and several men were missing.

Suddenly the fire was resumed at the front. I moved my three pieces forward at a gallop and went into action on the skirmish line on top of the captured position with two pieces to the right and one to the left of the main road from El Pozo to Santiago.

The forces on Kettle Hill, under the orders and inspiration of Sumner and Roosevelt, now started down the west slope of the hill and up the slope which formed the northern extension of San Juan. By the time they reached the trenches, in which were many dead, the forces which had occupied them were, except a few who surrendered or were shot, in full flight, one falling by a shot from Roosevelt's revolver.

It is fortunate that there were some few officers whose reports were not merely bald statements of a beginning and end. Among those who had a gift of expression was Captain Leven Allen, commanding Company E of the Sixteenth Infantry. His graphic official account says:

Throughout the movements in the jungle we were in single file, and my commands were only "Forward, C Company," or "Come on, C Company." No other commands were possible or necessary.

The companies of the regiment soon became more or less mixed. Other regiments, the Sixth United States Infantry and the Seventy-first New York, were jumbled up with us, and there was much confusion. We were under fire from an unseen enemy, and there were some casualties. After struggling for some time in the jungle (where

I saw General Hawkins endeavoring to direct the movements), I found myself and my company in a slightly sunken road bordering a broad open field, on the far side of which was a block-house on the crest of a steep hill about 200 feet high. This was the San Juan work. The enemy were firing at us from trenches on the crest. I got no orders. I directed the fire of the company on the enemy, superintending the raising of the sights and giving the men the range, as nearly as I could guess it—about 700 yards. Here other troops crowded in upon us, and I had great difficulty in keeping my men together. Other companies of my regiment joined on my right and left. I saw Captain Noble on my left, Captains Palmer and Lassiter on my right. They were diligently directing the fire. I directed my men to tear down the six-strand barbed-wire fence which bordered the road. I heard other captains of the regiment giving the same orders. After frantic efforts the fence was partially borne down in several places about the same time. At my position the wires were nailed to the trees of an overgrown hedge and was a most formidable obstacle. We had only our bayonets to cut the wires, and they were not suitable. As the wires were partly beaten down, I climbed up and placing my foot on the top wire sprang into the field, calling to my men to "Come on." The men followed in driblets as they could get through or over. I observed that others of my regiment were also out in the field, Captains Noble, Palmer, McFarland, and Lassiter, each leading his men to the front. I dashed forward, followed by my company, and we five captains led the charge. We were in plain view of the enemy, and our men were falling. The men insisted upon firing as we proceeded, and I could not prevent it. The advance continued steadily and without a pause until we were on the steep slope near the crest, two-thirds the way up, when our artillery fire coming from our rear became dangerous. I was not disposed to stop for this, because I thought the fire would cease in time. Some shells struck the slope between me and the crest, but I urged my men forward and they were responding most nobly. We had seen the enemy leave their trenches, and I was anxious to press home our victory. But at this time there arose at the foot of the slope and in the field behind us a great cry of "Come back! Come back!" The trumpets there sounded "Cease firing," "Recall," and "Assembly." The men hesitated, stopped, and began drifting down the steep slope. The enemy having been ousted and on the run, there was nothing to interrupt our advance save the loud mouths of those in the rear who became suddenly fearful for our safety.

Precious time was lost. As for myself and my company we reluctantly drifted back downward about twenty yards, and I hurled at the wretches below all the oaths I have learned in thirty years' life in the army. I ordered the men to lie down and get their breath, which they did. Just then I noticed Captain McFarland with some of his men still on the slope on our original front line. He was waving his hat.

I took it to be a call for support. He was about twenty yards to my right. I called out, "Look at Captain McFarland and E Company! Who of C Company will go with me to the top of that hill in spite of hell and the battery?" I hoped that we might yet break over the unfortunate check. The men near me sprang to their feet and we plunged up the hill once more only to find Captain McFarland wounded and his men coming slowly back. The cry of "Come back!" once more filled the air. My following became too small to advance further, and once more I fell back toward my overanxious friends below. I believed then, and I believe now, that if those in rear had kept their mouths shut, we five captains could and would have led our men straight to the crest, and that the battery would have ceased firing as soon as we had occupied the works, and that the victory, so dearly won, would have been more fruitful. When the battery ceased we again went up. The Sixteenth Infantry colors passed to the crest and were planted there.

The delay on the slope enabled other troops to come up on our flanks and rear, and some of them were with us on this final advance, but they had nothing to do with dislodging the enemy. They merely overtook us, because we had been checked by our friends. The enemy had been whipped and driven from his works by the Sixteenth Infantry.

The gallant captain undoubtedly claims too much for the Sixteenth Regiment, for, as he himself intimates, it was a tangle of organizations which ascended the hill together, exception being made not even of the Cubans, of whom one, a large, powerful man armed with a machete, showed perfect courage and was of greatest service in destroying with his heavy weapon the barbed-wire fencing which so impeded the advance toward the field in front of San Juan. It is melancholy to add that this exception among his fellows lost his life.

For the picture of the assault, we turn to a gifted writer who, being present, says:

There were a few men in advance, bunched together and creeping up a steep, sunny hill, the tops of which roared and flashed with flame. The men held their guns pressed across their breasts and stepped heavily as they climbed. Behind these first few and spreading out like a fan, were single lines of men, slipping and scrambling in the smooth grass, moving forward with difficulty as though they were wading waist-high through water, moving slowly, carefully, with strenuous effort. It was much more wonderful than any swinging charge could have been. They walked to greet death at every step, many of them,

as they advanced, sinking suddenly or pitching forward and disappearing in the high grass, but the others waded on, stubbornly, forming a thin blue line that kept creeping higher and higher up the hill. It was as inevitable as the rising tide. It was a miracle of self-sacrifice, a triumph of bulldog courage, which one watched with breathless wonder. The fire of the Spanish riflemen, who still stuck bravely to their posts, doubled and trebled in fierceness, the crests of the hills crackled and burst in amazed roars, and rippled with waves of tiny flames. But the blue line crept steadily up and on, and then, near the top, the broken fragments gathered together with a sudden burst of speed, the Spaniards appeared for a moment outlined against the sky and poised for instant flight, fired a last volley and fled before the swift-moving wave that leaped and sprang up after them. The men of the Ninth and the Rough Riders rushed to the block-house together, the men of the Sixth, of the Third, of the Tenth Cavalry, of the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry, fell on their faces along the crest of the hills beyond, and opened upon the vanishing enemy. They drove the yellow silk flags of the cavalry and the Stars and Stripes of their country into the soft earth of the trenches, and then sank down and looked back at the road they had climbed and swung their hats in the air.[1]

These words accurately epitomize the many cold official accounts. The hour was half-past one.

Lieutenant Miley, in ending his own account of El Caney and San Juan, truthfully says: "Much has been written about them, but no description can convey to the reader a just appreciation of the gallantry and heroism displayed by officers and men alike."[2]

The attack under such circumstances was indeed one of high heroism. There was utter ignorance both as to the numbers and preparedness of the enemy. It was known to all that there were some 12,000 Spanish troops in and about Santiago. For all that our men knew, they were faced by nearly the whole of this very considerable army, greater by many thousands than the advance of the column which had so wearily crawled through the mud and brush into visibility. They had every reason to expect a great force rather than the few hundreds who fled the trenches as the Americans climbed the hills. It was in fact as gallant a deed in spirit as was ever done, and were America as fortunate as is another Anglo-Saxon country in turning her

[1] R. H. Davis, *The Cuban and Porto Rican Campaigns*, 220–223.
[2] Miley, *In Cuba with Shafter*, 118.

deeds to poetic account, the poet would find in this as fitting an episode for his gift as any of those which have been sung into lasting fame.

The first trenches were now won, but the situation was critical. The new Spanish position was but 500 yards away. A constant spitting fire was kept up by the retreating men. The skirmish line mentioned as sent forward by General Sumner had cleared the flat surface to the west of the captured entrenchments; the American line, now being steadily re-enforced, extended itself north to the northern spur of the San Juan Hill and across a small valley to the high ground a half mile south-west from the San Juan summit and at once began to entrench. They were now on the highest ridges in the immediate vicinity of Santiago to the east, with the Spanish lines distant from 400 to 1,000 yards. From these came during the afternoon and well into the night a desultory fire, of musketry and artillery, at times of great intensity, and which caused some loss. A 6.3-inch rifled bronze gun was brought into action about sunset. After firing three shells it was silenced by the Gatling battery, which used a range of 2,000 yards. Battery K, Captain Best, of the First Artillery, had come from El Pozo, and taken position on the right of the line, but the vigorous fire of the enemy caused it to withdraw to Kettle Hill, Sergeant McCarthy being killed at the moment of withdrawal. The battery was in action but some ten or fifteen minutes. It was, however, at 2 A. M. (July 2) again in the advanced position on the high ground north-east of Fort Canosa, with Battery F of the Second Artillery (now under command of Lieutenant Hinds, Captain Parkhurst having been wounded) on Best's right, and Battery A of the Second (Captain Grimes) on the right of F. Hasty cover was constructed and fire opened, but the position was both too advanced and too exposed, and all were withdrawn, after being subjected to a heavy fire, to the first position at El Pozo.

General Wheeler, so ill that he had to be carried in a litter, had started to the battle-field and was near the advance lines at the time of the forward movement, though not able to take part in it. To Sumner and Hawkins must be given the credit of deciding the advance and of personally leading. Wheeler, one of the

most gallant of men, but always in appearance of the most delicate physique, and with the added drawback of the malarial fever with which he was suffering, was, however, not to be denied the triumph of actually taking part, and was shortly on the heights, the senior officer present, and in command.

Orders were given to entrench on the advanced line now occupied by the Americans, and wagons were sent over the road of the advance to collect the entrenching tools cast aside by the men; throughout the evening and night the work was kept up by the tired and hungry troops, who had no shelter and most of them no food. The one thing which was prompt to arrive was ammunition; much needed, as the return fire to that of the Spanish was incessant. During the advance, everything which it was possible to leave had, under the influence of the stifling heat, been discarded by the men, even to the whole of their three days' rations with which they had been supplied the evening before. In many cases this was done by orders, and men were detailed from the several organizations to guard these belongings. But the necessity of aiding the constant stream of wounded going to the rear caused the guards to be impressed for the service; the left articles, which strewed the side of the road for two miles, were thus the property of the first comer, and particularly of the Cubans who were straggling in the wake of the advance. Every effort was made to get food forward, and though it began to arrive during the evening, the long fast was not ended for many until well into the next day, July 2.

The record of the events of July 1 is not complete without mention of the demonstration at Aguadores by General Duffield, with the Thirty-third Michigan Volunteers.

In expectancy of the event, Admiral Sampson, with the *New York*, *Suwanee*, and *Gloucester*, took position off Aguadores at 6 A. M., and awaited the arrival of the troops. These did not come, however, until 9.20 and then disembarked from the train a mile and a half east of the bridge instead of coming very near, as they might have done under the protection of the ships. There were two rifle-pits on the hill above the railway bridge, at which a few men had shown themselves at various times, numbering from sixteen to twenty. These disappeared as the firing


SIERRA MAESTRA
To Bayamo
Cobre Road
Caney Creek
Dos Caminos
Cemetery
Sabanilla
Santiago
Santa Ines Road to Cuabitas
Gascon Creek
Perro Pt.
Caimanes Creek
COAL DEPOT
Buena Vista
Duan Pt.
3 Fathom Line
BAY OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA
Punta de Sal
Jardin Pt.
Iron Pier
LA CRUZ
Cocos Pt.
Cuhera Bay
Cayo Ratones
POWDER MAGAZINES
Road to Morro
Road to Laguna
ABBREVIATIONS
M. L. R. Muzzle Loading Rifle
B. L. R. Breech Loading Rifle
B. H. Block House
Inf. Infantry
Cav. Cavalry
Approx. difference in Elevation between Contours is 40 feet.
Trail
Wide trail or road in bad condition
Wagon road
1320 2640 3960 5280
1 Statute Mile.
Americans
Spanish
N.
W.
E.



SANTIAGO DE CUBA AND VICINITY

SHOWING

INTRENCHMENTS AND POSITIONS OF BOTH ARMIES EVENING OF JULY 1 1898

COMPILED UNDER DIRECTION OF
LT COL G. McC. DERBY. CHIEF ENGR.

began. A corner of the fort was knocked off and the flag-staff shot away by the *Suwanee*. The Michigan regiment was loosely distributed about the east side of the little river, and desultory firing was kept up by the few Spanish in the steep woody hill on the other side and north of the gorge through which the railway ran. About noon the Spanish brought a small field-piece down the gorge and fired this four or five times. The *New York* then shelled the gorge with 4- and 8-inch shells, after which there was no firing by the enemy. The troops then returned to the train and left for Siboney at 1.30, making no attempt to carry or hold the position. The *New York* and *Oregon* then took position and fired a number of 8-inch shells over the hill in the direction of Santiago and the ships in the bay, using a range of four and four and one-half miles. A few of these seemed to have fallen farther east than was intended, as General Shafter sent the following to Admiral Sampson: "A few shells of large size fell some distance behind our lines to-day. It is hardly possible that they come from your ships, but I cannot account for them unless they come from the enemy's navy." The following is from the flag-ship's official account of what happened:

At 6.47 we had made signal to the forces ashore: "Are you waiting for us to begin?" They answered: "General is ahead with scouts."

At 6.50 we asked: "When do you want us to commence firing?" which was answered: "When the rest of the command arrives, of which I will signal you."

At 7.20 we were asked by signal: "Can you see western end of bank near bridge?" to which we answered: "Yes," and sent the *Suwanee* inshore as near as possible in order to explain the situation by megaphone.

We had observed a few men in one of the rifle-pits, the number varying from sixteen to twenty, which was the whole of the Spanish forces discoverable by us.

At 8.20 we were signalled: "Repeat the message about the bridge sent by the other boat (*Suwanee*)."

At 9.18 we received signal: "This is General Duffield's headquarters."

At 9.25: "Will be ready soon. When I signal to begin, direct attention first to rifle-pit, next to fort and block-house, unless you can do both at once.—Duffield."

The fort, ravine, and rifle-pits were then shelled by all three of our ships present, the enemy disappearing immediately, the troops advancing from the position where they had debarked from the cars to the eastern side of the ravine. The fort was much knocked about by our shells, the flag-staff being shot away by the *Suwanee*, and many shells were planted in the rifle-pits.

At 11.30 we were signalled: "Scouts report no damage to rifle-pits; can you reach them?—Duffield." To which we replied: "Yes, with ease, but there is no one in them."

At 11.40 we received signal: "Fire a few shots at rifle-pit on the hill."

At 11.48 we signalled: "There are no Spaniards in the rifle-pits."

As it was a useless expenditure of ammunition to fire shell into rifle-pits where there was no enemy, we ceased firing for a time against these and began firing with 8-inch shells in the direction of Santiago, with an elevation of 8,500 yards.

At 12.28 we received signal: "What is the news?" to which answer was made: "There is not a Spaniard in the rifle-pits."

At 12.30 we were sent: "Re-enforcements for the enemy reported," to which reply was made: "Tell us where they are and we will shoot at them."

At 12.40 signal received: "Reported marching into old fort." We replied: "The *Gloucester* will take care of them. There is not a man in that fort." This we could plainly see.

Shortly after the enemy opened fire in the ravine with a small field-piece, which had evidently been brought down from Santiago, and our troops retired, having, as was later heard, lost two men killed and several wounded.

The *New York* took position and enfiladed this ravine. . . .

At 12.50 signal was made to the *Oregon:* "Fire one 8-inch shell every five minutes in the direction of Santiago at extreme elevation."

This firing was carried on by the *New York* and *Oregon* until 1.45, when we ceased firing and stood back to station on blockade.[1]

Shafter telegraphed in the evening of July 1 to Washington: "Our casualties will be above 400." But he was soon to find that they were far greater. By the evening of July 3, the total losses had footed up 225 killed, 1,384 wounded. Of these, 9 were killed and 125 wounded in the fire upon the trenches on July 2 and 3. The whole loss was almost exactly 10 per cent of the total force of 15,065 men engaged. The loss in officers had been especially heavy; 22 had been killed, and 94 wounded. Colonel Wikoff, commanding the Third Brigade of the First Division,

[1] *Report, Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 616, 617.

and Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, commanding the Ninth Cavalry, were among those deeply regretted, as were, too, Lieutenant Orr, General Hawkins's aide, who was slain by a revolver-shot from a wounded Spanish officer as, among the first, he leaped into the trenches, and young Michie, also of Hawkins's staff, who was mourned both for himself and as the only son of his honored father.

The following were the losses, in detail, in the attack on the San Juan Hills:

FIRST DIVISION

ORGANIZATION	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING
	OFFICERS	MEN	OFFICERS	MEN	
First Brigade:					
Sixteenth Infantry	2	13	5	82	6
Sixth Infantry	1	13	7	92	....
Seventy-first New York Volunteer Infantry	2	12	1	47	43
Total	5	38	13	221	49
Second Brigade:					
Tenth Infantry	1	4	5	21	....
Twenty-first Infantry	....	5	1	25	....
Second Infantry	....	1	4	16	....
Total	1	10	10	62	....
Third Brigade:					
First Brigade commander	1	....	....	....	....
Ninth Infantry	1	3	....	23	1
Thirteenth Infantry	2	16	5	81	1
Twenty-fourth Infantry	2	10	4	73	7
Total	6	29	9	177	9
Grand total	12	77	32	460	58

DISMOUNTED CAVALRY DIVISION

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		AGGREGATE	STRENGTH	
	OFFICERS	MEN	OFFICERS	MEN	OFFICERS	MEN		OFFICERS	MEN
First Brigade:									
Third Cavalry .	..	3	6	45	..	3	57	22	420
Sixth Cavalry .	..	4	4	51	..	..	59	16	427
Ninth Cavalry .	1	2	2	17	..	1	23	12	207
	1	9	12	113	..	4	139	50	1,054
Second Brigade:									
Brigade staff .	1	..	4	..	..	..	5	9	14
First Cavalry .	1	12	..	47	..	1	61	21	501
Tenth Cavalry .	2	5	8	61	..	5	81	22	450
First Vol.Cavalry	1	14	5	67	..	..	87	25	517
	5	31	17	175	..	6	234	77	1,482
Total loss . .	6	40	29	288	..	10	373	127	2,536

The Spanish losses were even more severe, the total casualties being 593, of which 235 were at El Caney. Sixteen officers had been killed. Among the wounded were General Linares himself, and Captain Bustamante of the fleet, the latter soon to succumb to his injuries, mourned by Spaniards and Americans alike. Colonel Ordoñez of the artillery and Colonel Caula of the engineers were also wounded. Shafter wrote Sampson that evening, "May I ask the assistance of your surgeons in the hospital at Siboney. I have 385 wounded there and many more than that here, and medical officers are much needed." Sampson complied at once, sending the Fleet Surgeon Gravatt and several assistants, and rendering such aid from the fleet as was possible.

Nor in this exigency can the noble work of the Red Cross go unmentioned. Miss Clara Barton was in personal direction aboard the chartered ship *State of Texas* and went herself, with her assistants, to the field. The supplies aboard the *State of*

Texas were an invaluable adjunct in the unfortunate conditions about to be described.

Ample hospital supplies had accompanied the expedition, but confusion and want of organization made finding them and getting them ashore slow and harassing. The transports had wandered at will over a great expanse of sea; the masters, unaccustomed to handling their ships in a crowd of other vessels, dreaded an approach to the only available anchorage; they "proceeded to sea from five to fifteen miles, where they remained hove to indefinitely. . . . The one carrying the reserve hospital, in obedience to its orders [?], proceeded to join the naval blockading squadron off Morro Castle, where it remained five days and nights, the other transport [carrying the first divisional hospital] disappearing, if I was correctly informed, an entire week."[1]

Seventeen ambulances had now arrived from Tampa, though only three seem to have been got ashore in time for the emergency of the battle. Fifty or more had been left for want of transportation, it being thought more necessary to bring the army wagons which could "do the double duty of transporting supplies and also the wounded and sick,"[2] and in these the great mass of wounded men were finally taken to Siboney, jolted over the nine miles of a road which made the journey a trial for one in fullest health.

The only field hospital with the advance was that of the First Division, which, by the personal exertions of the medical staff and the use of the horses of the officers, had been hurried forward. On the morning of the 29th it was moved "with our own things wetted, to a new wet camp . . . in advance of all troops except outposts, 1,200 yards in rear of where many of the casualties occurred. It seemed an almost ideal camp but for the daily rains and the polluted water supply. . . . The site was an oblong, separated from the main highway by a strip of heavy timber and

[1] E. L. Munson, captain and assistant surgeon, report to surgeon-general, July 29, 1898, *Investigation of the Conduct of the War With Spain*, VIII, 137. This officer adds in the same report: "I feel justified in saying that at the time of my departure large quantities of medical supplies urgently needed on shore, still remained on transports, a number of which were under orders to return to the United States."

[2] Miley, *In Cuba with Shafter*, 44.

dense underbrush from thirty to fifty feet wide and in a bend of the creek. . . . On each side of the creek were large trees and an almost impenetrable thicket."[1] "In this location," says Major Wood, "we received and cared for the wounded from the entire army who needed attention beyond the first-aid dressings applied on the line and at the dressing stations."[2] "The resources and supplies of the hospital, outside of instruments, operating tables, and medicines, were very limited. There was tent shelter for about one hundred wounded men; there were no cots, hammocks, mattresses, rubber blankets, or pillows for sick or injured soldiers; the supply of army woollen blankets was very short and was soon exhausted; and there was no clothing at all except two or three dozen shirts. In the form of hospital food there was nothing except a few jars of beef extract, malted milk, etc., bought in the United States by Major [Surgeon] Wood, taken to the field in his own private baggage and held in reserve for desperate cases."[3] To the energy of this officer was due the only field-hospital established at the front. "Why," says Major Wood, "none of the hospitals of the other divisions put in an appearance until long after hostilities had ceased I have not learned, but so far as I am aware, up to the time of the surrender of Santiago there had been no hospital within ten miles of the front but the First Division hospital and its offshoots."[4] Further on in his report, Major Wood says: "The poor wounded men were in a pitiable condition. Some, absolutely without clothing save the dressings on their severe wounds, had little but the wet ground for their bed and the sky for cover throughout that first terrible night, but we did the best we could in utilizing every scrap of canvas or bedding, and before very long could shelter, bed, and cover them. They were hungry, nearly famished, and with parched throats."[5] "All that a litter squad could do with a man when they lifted him from the operating

[1] M. W. Wood, major and surgeon, report to surgeon-general, June 30, 1898, *Investigation of the Conduct of the War with Spain*, VIII, 142.
[2] Report July 31, *ibid.*, VIII, 143.
[3] George Kennan, *Campaigning in Cuba*, 132.
[4] Major [Surgeon] Wood, report to surgeon-general, July 31, 1898, *Investigation of the Conduct of the War with Spain*, VIII, 143.
[5] *Ibid.*, 144.

table on Friday night was to carry him away and lay him down, half-naked as he was, on the water-soaked ground under the stars. Weak and shaken from agony under the surgeon's knife and probe, there he had to lie in the high wet grass, with no one to look after him, no one to give him food and water if he needed them, no blanket over him, no pillow under his head. What he suffered in the long hours of the damp chilly night I know because I saw him, and scores more like him; but the reader who can get an idea of it only through the medium of words can hardly imagine it."[1]

Terrible as were these conditions, they exhibited the men of the army in a noble light. "Not a single American soldier," says Mr. George Kennan, who had accompanied Miss Barton, "in all my experience in that hospital ever asked to be examined or treated out of his regular turn on account of the severity, painful nature, or critical state of his wound. On the contrary, they repeatedly gave way to one another, saying: 'Take this one first —he's shot through the body. I've only a smashed foot, and I can wait.' . . . If there was any weakness or selfishness, or behavior not up to the level of heroic manhood, among the wounded American soldiers in the hospital during those three terrible days, I failed to see it."[2]

The wounded were taken to Siboney as rapidly as possible. The houses built by the Spanish-American Iron Company, large, fairly well built, one-story wooden structures, with zinc roofs, were occupied, the men being transferred as rapidly as possible to the hospital ship *Olivette*, and work carried forward transforming the transports *Cherokee* and *Breakwater* into hospital ships. July 4 General Shafter wrote Admiral Sampson: "Our sick and wounded have to be moved at once on shipboard and we have no facilities for doing it. Will you kindly furnish us a launch and four boats to carry them from shore to hospital ship and continue the work until all are transferred. The officer in charge of boats will please report to Dr. La Garde, surgeon in charge of hospital at Siboney. The work should begin to-day," a request that was gladly complied with.

[1] Kennan, 135–136.

[2] Ibid., 137–138.

The next two were critical days. During July 2 the firing was almost continuous; its severity may be measured by the fact that though the Americans were now also entrenched, they lost 150 killed and wounded. Among the latter was General Hawkins.

"The enlisted men had been without a night's sleep since 4 o'clock of June 30. For the greater part of that time they had been under constant fire. They had not been fed. They had no tobacco, which is much more necessary to the nerves than is food to the stomach. To avoid the enemy's fire they were forced to move about on their hands and knees. Their clothing was as wet as constant perspiration and dew and rain and fording of streams could make it. Through sitting bent double in the trenches their limbs and backs were stiff and cramped and they were weakened by the fierce tropical sun." [1]

General Shafter had been deeply moved by his heavy losses, and being ill had become despondent. He wrote Sampson, July 2:

> Terrible fight yesterday but my line is now strongly entrenched about three-quarters mile from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already very heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can. Please telephone answer.
>
> W. R. Shafter, *Maj.-General.*

This was replied to by telephoning the following to the army headquarters:

> To General Shafter:
>
> Admiral Sampson has this morning bombarded forts at entrance of Santiago, and also Punta Gorda Battery inside, silencing their fire. Do you wish further firing on his part? He began at 5.30, finished at 7.30.[2] Your message to him here. Impossible to force entrance until we can clear channel of mines—a work of some time after forts are taken possession of by your troops. Nothing in this direction accomplished yesterday by the advance on Aguadores.
>
> Lieut. Staunton.

[1] R. H. Davis, 249–250.

[2] Besides the usual blockading force, the *Newark*, flag-ship of Commodore Watson, took part in this bombardment. Being at close range, many of the heavier shell, passing over the batteries, fell in the bay near the Spanish ships.

General Shafter answered:

It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance to harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those which we have been pitted against it will be some time and a great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men. By all means keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished. I expect, however, in time and with sufficient men to capture the forts along the bay.

SHAFTER.

Sampson now wrote:

July 2, 1898.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

I have your note of this morning; just received at 11.20.

2. An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this morning, but I must say, in addition to what he told you, that the forts which we silenced were not the forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they cannot fire except to seaward. They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago. Our trouble, from the first, has been that the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempt to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of the attempt to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part.

3. It was my hope that an attack, on your part, of these shore batteries, from the rear, would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.

4. If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance, I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.

5. We have, in our outfit at Guantánamo, forty countermining mines which I will bring here with as little delay as possible, and, if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use, I will enter the harbor.

6. This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.

7. It is not so much the loss of men as *it* is the loss of ships which has, until now, deterred me from making a direct attack on the ships within the port.

In this view Commodore Watson concurred, in a telegram next day to General Duffield, though then the Spanish ships had been

destroyed, saying: "Commodore Watson does not know Admiral Sampson's intentions since the destruction of the Spanish squadron, but does not himself think fleet should try to go into harbor of Santiago."

Admiral Sampson, convinced that the Spanish positions at the entrance could be easily taken by an attack from the flank and rear, was eager to do the work on the west with the marines of the fleet, and the chief of staff went late in the afternoon of July 2 to Siboney to arrange a consultation looking to combined action. The general, stating that his condition of health did not enable him to come aboard ship or go to Siboney, requested the admiral to visit him in camp; a conference at his headquarters was thus arranged for the morning of July 3.

There can be no question of anxiety at the moment among the senior officers of the army. The idea that a withdrawal was being considered was everywhere afloat. Colonel Roosevelt mentions a visit from Captains Morton and Boughton, who came to him "to say that some one had spoken of retreating, and to beg me to protest. I had not heard of it and I did not believe it was true."[1] Nevertheless it was so.

"About 6 o'clock on the evening of July 2, General Shafter summoned to El Pozo Generals Wheeler, Lawton, Kent, and Bates to obtain their opinion as to the advisability of withdrawing his line from San Juan Heights and taking up a position farther back nearer his base of supplies at Siboney. The four officers did not agree upon the question of withdrawal, and after an hour's discussion Shafter expressed his intention of making no change in his position until he had considered the matter further."[2]

That excellent but often mischievous faculty, imagination, had been at work. "Pando," said General Shafter, "is reported to have been sixteen miles out yesterday with 8,000 men. A large force of troops is at San Luis, twenty-five miles in our rear; 10,000 men are at Holguin; and 7,000 more are

[1] Roosevelt, testimony, *Investigation of the Conduct of the War with Spain*, V, 2264.

[2] Sargent, II, 129.

in my rear at Guantánamo. If they come down we shall have to get back."[1] The difficulties of transport experienced at the moment by the American army should have been assurance of the impossibility of concentrating 25,000 men by way of the mountain trails of Cuba. "The conference," says Secretary Alger, "lasted two hours."

Next day, July 3, Shafter sent the following telegram:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *July* 3, 1898.
(Received Washington, 11.44 A. M.)

THE SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington:*

CAMP NEAR SEVILLA, CUBA, 3.—We have the town well invested on the north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of such a character and the defences so strong it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about five miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, so as to get our supplies, to a large extent, by means of the railroad, which we can use, having engines and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date will aggregate 1,000, but list has not yet been made. But little sickness outside of exhaustion from intense heat and exertion of the battle of the day before yesterday, and the almost constant fire which is kept up on the trenches. Wagon road to the rear is kept up with some difficulty on account of rains, but I will be able to use it for the present. General Wheeler is seriously ill and will probably have to go to the rear to-day. General Young also very ill; confined to his bed. General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot during sortie enemy made last night, which was handsomely repulsed.[2] The behavior of the regular troops was magnificent. I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the harbor, and will have consultation with him this morning. He is coming to the front to see me. I have been unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days, but am retaining the command. General Garcia reported he holds the railroad from Santiago to San Luis, and has burned the bridge and removed some rails; also that General

[1] Alger, 175.

[2] Says Roosevelt: "We frequently hear of the Spaniards 'attacking' us on the nights of the 1st and the 2d. In a way they did, but it was not an attack that was pushed home. It simply consisted in the skirmishers becoming more active and in the trenches redoubling their fire. I think that they rarely came out of their trenches even a little way. I never saw them make what could be properly called an offensive movement. They never pushed us in any way to jeopardize our position." (*Investigation of the Conduct of the War with Spain*, V, 2265.)

Pando has arrived at Palma, and that the French consul with about 400 French citizens came into his lines yesterday from Santiago. Have directed him to treat them with every courtesy possible.

SHAFTER, *Major-General.*

To this, before the news of the destruction by the fleet could have reached Washington, was sent in reply the following:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
July 3, 1898, 12.10 P. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

Your first despatch received. Of course you can judge the situation better than we can at this end of the line. If, however, you could hold your present position, especially San Juan Heights, the effect upon the country would be much better than falling back. However, we leave all that matter to you. This is only a suggestion. We shall send you re-enforcements at once.

R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

Shafter's telegram was undoubtedly due largely to the general's physical state. He was an unusually corpulent man, weighing over 300 pounds, and could mount a horse with difficulty even when well. He was now suffering from malarial fever, a disease always accompanied by mental depression. In addition he was 63 years of age. The climate was of the most enervating and trying character and it is not surprising that personally, under the harassment of an important command, he should in such conditions have been despondent. Better counsels prevailed, however, and the result was a demand during the forenoon of July 3 upon General Toral, in command since the wounding of Linares, for surrender.

Shafter's letter, carried, under a flag of truce, by Colonel Dorst, was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA,
July 3, 1898—8.30 A. M.

To the Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba.

Sir: I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. R. SHAFTER, *Major-General, U. S. A.*

To this Colonel Dorst brought reply at 6.30 P. M.:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July* 3, 1898—3 P. M.

His Excellency the General Commanding Forces of United States near San Juan River:

Sir: I have the honor to reply to your communication of to-day, written at 8.30 A. M. and received at 1 P. M., demanding the surrender of this city; on the contrary case announcing to me that you will bombard this city and that I advise the foreign women and children that they must leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message.

Very respectfully, JOSÉ TORAL,
Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Corps.

By the time that General Shafter's demand had been received by General Toral, the former had news which placed a very different aspect upon affairs, for at 1 o'clock he received word of the exit of Cervera's squadron;[1] the result, however, was not known until several hours later.

This information, as telegraphed to Washington by Shafter, was as follows:

CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO, 3.—Lieutenant Allen, Second Cavalry, is just in from my extreme right, which is on the railroad running north from Santiago, and which overlooks the entire bay. Lieutenant Allen states that Cervera's fleet was in full view until nearly 10 o'clock this morning, when it proceeded down the bay, and shortly after heavy firing was heard. Duffield, at Siboney, has just telephoned me that Captain Cotton, of the *Harvard*, just sent him word that Admiral Sampson had signalled Cervera had come out and had escaped, and that he was in pursuit.[2] The *Harvard* immediately left. The French consul informed General Garcia, into whose lines he went yesterday, that Admiral Cervera had stated that he would run out at 10 A. M., and that was the hour Allen witnessed the departure. Cervera told such (said?) consul it was better to die fighting than blow up his ships in the harbor.

Word of the result soon came; the general's spirits naturally rose, and a little later he sent a short but satisfactory telegram

[1] "It was thought the navy was simply shelling the batteries." Miley, 127.

[2] This was an error; the signal referred to was from the *Resolute*.

which left the Playa at Guantánamo at 1.16 A. M. of July 4: "I shall hold my present position," a determination which had the additional support, besides that of the destruction of the Spanish squadron, of a telegram from Washington, sent July 3 at 5 P. M.:

You can have whatever re-enforcement you want. Wire what additional troops you desire and they will be sent as rapidly as transports can be secured. In addition to the 2,700 troops now *en route* from Tampa, the *St. Paul* and *Duchess* will leave Newport News not later than Wednesday, with 3,000 troops of Garretson's brigade; the *St. Louis, Yale,* and *Columbia* will probably sail from Charleston carrying 4,000 more, and others will be sent from Tampa as you may request.

The next day, July 4, in telegraphing his correspondence with the Spanish commander to Washington, Shafter added to that already given:

The British, Portuguese, Chinese, and Norwegian consuls have come to my line with Colonel Dorst. They ask if noncombatants can occupy the town of Caney and railroad points, and ask until 10 o'clock of 5th instant before the city is fired on. They claim that there are between 15,000 and 20,000 people, many of them old, who will leave. They ask if I can supply them with food, which I cannot do for want of transportation to Caney, which is 15 miles from my landing. The following is my reply:

"JULY 3, 1898.

"*The Commanding General Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba:*

"In consideration of the request of the consular officers in your city awarded the delay in carrying out my intention to fire on the city and in the interest of the poor women and children who will suffer very greatly by their hasty and in forced [enforced] departure from the city, I have the honor to announce that I will delay such action solely in their interest until noon on the 5th, providing during the interval your forces make no demonstration whatever upon those of my own.

"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

"W. R. SHAFTER,

"*Major-General, United States Volunteers.*"

I do not know that these extreme measures which I have threatened be justifiable under the circumstances, and I submit the matter for the consideration of the president. The little town of Caney will not hold 1,000 people, and great suffering will be occasioned to our friends, as we must regard the people referred to, and it is now filled

with dead and wounded, the dead still unburied. The consuls tell Dorst that there are not to exceed 5,000 troops in the city. I can hold my present line and starve them out, letting the noncombatants come out leisurely as they run out of food, and will probably be able to give such as are forced out by hunger food to keep them alive. I await your orders.

W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, United States Volunteers.

CHAPTER VI

THE SORTIE OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON

HOWEVER depressing, in the view of the American commander-in-chief, were the difficulties of his own army, the situation in Santiago was now regarded by the Spanish officers as desperate. The food supply of the army and the population was reduced to rice; it had become evident by the fire of the *New York* and *Oregon*, July 1, that the city was subject at any time to destruction by the guns of the American fleet; it was clear to the sensible mind of Cervera and his officers that they were quickly reaching the point of capitulation.

The day of the arrival of the American army off Santiago Governor-General Blanco had telegraphed the Spanish minister of war in terms which led to the final fatal action of the sortie by placing Cervera under Blanco's orders:

HAVANA, *June* 20, 1898.

It is to be regretted independence which Cervera's squadron enjoys has prevented me from aiding in his operations, although the results are weighing on my mind, because the entrance and stay of the squadron at Santiago has completely changed the objective and aspect of the campaign, the existence of provisions and coal, and provisioning of certain places. If an attempt had at least been made of consulting with me, General Linares, and the commandant-general of the navy yard, perhaps between us we might in the beginning have found a better solution than those now awaiting the squadron, namely, either to await the result of unequal battle in the harbor, or break hostile line to go to some other harbor, Hayti or Jamaica, where it would again be closed in. It would perhaps be preferable to go to Cienfuegos or Havana, which is still possible; or, if not, re-enforce and proceed to Spain, which would be the best; anything rather than remain closed in at Santiago with the prospect of having to surrender from starvation.

The situation is extremely serious, and I have no doubt that the government under these critical circumstances would order what is

best for the good of the country and the honor of our arms. I therefore respectfully suggest the expediency of uniting military action in the present war under one head, ordering that I be invested with the command in chief of all the land and naval forces assigned to these waters.[1]

Blanco's suggestions of supreme command and of the squadron's leaving Santiago harbor were approved, the news reaching Cervera June 24 in telegrams from Madrid of the 23d and 24th, one of which stated that an expedition would be sent overland to Santiago and that "auxiliary cruisers will be sent to hostile coast."

Cervera had himself telegraphed to Madrid, June 23:

As it is absolutely impossible for squadron to escape under these circumstances, intend to resist as long as possible, and destroy ships as last extreme. Although others are responsible for this untenable situation into which we were forced in spite of my opposition, it is very painful to be an actor therein.

On the reception of the approval of Blanco's request, Cervera called a council of war, June 24, which unanimously agreed that the sortie "is now and has been ever since the 8th instant, absolutely impossible."

The minister of war in Madrid was informed of this finding by a telegram of the same date, and Cervera next day (June 25) telegraphed Governor-General Blanco the existing conditions:

Minister of marine commands me to place myself under orders of your excellency in conformity with regulations of royal order of November 13, 1872, which I do with the greatest pleasure. I believe it my duty to set forth condition of squadron. Out of 3,000 rounds for 5.5-inch Hontoria guns, only 620 reliable, rest have been pronounced useless, and were not replaced by others for lack of stores when we left. Two 5.5-inch Hontoria guns of *Vizcaya* and one of *Oquendo* defective, and had been ordered to be changed for others. Majority of fuses not serviceable. We lack Bustamante torpedoes. *Colón* is without heavy armament. *Vizcaya* is badly fouled and has lost her speed. *Teresa* does not have landing guns, and those of *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* are unserviceable. We have little coal; provisions enough for month of July. Blockading fleet is four times superior; hence our sortie would be positively certain destruction. I

[1] Cervera, *Collection of Documents*, 106, which see for all the Spanish telegrams of this chapter.

have a number of men ashore re-enforcing garrison of which I consider myself a part. . . .

Repeating to Blanco the telegram sent to Madrid on June 23, he added:

The foregoing telegram expresses my opinion as well as that of the captains of the ships. I await instructions from your excellency.

General Linares had the night before received from Blanco a telegram in which the latter asked for Cervera's opinion and plans, and gave his own opinion that Cervera "should go out from Santiago as early as possible whenever he may deem best, for the situation in that harbor is, in my judgment, the most dangerous of all. Last night there were only 7 war-ships there, 3 at Cienfuegos, and 9 here, yet the *Santo Domingo* and *Montevideo* had no trouble in running the blockade, going out at 2 o'clock A. M. If we should lose the squadron without fighting, the moral effect would be terrible, both in Spain and abroad."

Cervera answered the note from Linares, which conveyed this telegram, by a letter which does honor to both head and heart:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *June* 25, 1898.

His Excellency ARSENIO LINARES.

My Dear General and Friend: I am in receipt of your interesting letter of this date, which I hasten to answer. The captain-general is kind enough to want to know my opinion, and I am going to give it as explicitly as I ought to, but will confine myself to the squadron, as I believe that is what he asks for. I have considered the squadron lost ever since it left Cape Verde, for to think anything else seems madness to me, in view of the enormous disparity which exists between our own forces and those of the enemy. For that reason I energetically opposed the sailing of the squadron from Cape Verde, and I even thought that I would be relieved by some one of those whose opinions were opposed to mine.

I did not ask to be relieved, because it seems to me that no military man should do so when he receives instructions to march against the enemy. You are familiar with the history of the squadron since its arrival here. If I had gone to San Juan de Puerto Rico when a telegram from the government caused me to change, my situation would be the same, only the scene would have been a different one and the avalanche which has fallen upon this island would have come down upon Puerto Rico instead. I believe the mistake was made in sending

the squadron out at all. The captain-general says that the blockade at Havana has been run, and I will add that I myself with a 7-knot vessel entered Escombreras and remained there an hour and a half, although it was occupied by the provincial (cantonal) squadron.

But is there any similarity to the present situation? Certainly not. The sortie from here must be made by the ships, one by one. There is no possibility of stratagem nor disguise, and the absolutely certain result will be the ruin of each and all of the ships and the death of the greater part of their crews. If I had thought there was even the remotest chance of success I should have made the attempt, although, as I have said before, it would only have amounted to a change of the scene of action unless we had gone to Havana, where things might, perhaps, have been different. For these reasons, and in order that my forces might make themselves useful in some manner, I proposed to you to send them ashore. just at the time when the captain-general made the same suggestion.

To-day I consider the squadron lost as much as ever, and the dilemma is whether to lose it by destroying it, if Santiago is not able to resist, after having contributed to its defence, or whether to lose it by sacrificing to vanity the majority of its crews and depriving Santiago of their co-operation, thereby precipitating its fall. What is best to be done? I, who am a man without ambitions, without mad passions, believe that whatever is most expedient should be done, and I state most emphatically that I shall *never* be the one to decree the horrible and useless hecatomb which will be the only possible result of the sortie from here by main force, for I should consider myself responsible before God and history for the lives sacrificed on the altar of vanity, and not in the true defence of the country.

As far as I am concerned, the situation has been changed to-day from a moral standpoint, for I received a telegram this morning which places me under the orders of the captain-general in everything relating to the operations of the war. It is therefore for him to decide whether I am to go out to suicide, dragging along with me those 2,000 sons of Spain. I believe I have answered your letter, and trust you will see in this letter only the true and loyal expression of the opinion of an honorable old man who for forty-six years has served his country to the best of his ability.

Yours, etc.,
PASCUAL CERVERA.

Cervera, in addition, telegraphed Blanco directly:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *June* 25, 1898.

. . . It is incorrect that the blockading fleet has ever been reduced to seven vessels. The six principal ships alone represent more than

three times the power of my four. On account of the lack of batteries to keep the hostile squadron at a distance, it remains constantly near harbor entrance, illuminating it, which makes any sortie except by main force altogether impossible.

In my opinion the sortie will entail the certain loss of the squadron and majority of its crews. I shall never take this step on my own account, but if your excellency so orders I shall carry it out. The loss of the squadron was, in my judgment, decreed when it was ordered to come here. Therefore its painful situation is not a surprise to me. Your excellency will give instructions whether we are to go out to this sacrifice, which I believe fruitless.

Blanco replied to this:

HAVANA, *June* 26, 1898.

Your two telegrams received. I thank you for the satisfaction you express over being under my orders. I consider myself greatly honored thereby and trust that you will see in me a comrade rather than a superior. It seems to me you somewhat exaggerate difficulties of sortie. It is not a question of fighting, but of escaping from that prison in which the squadron is unfortunately shut in, and I do not believe it impossible, by taking advantage of favorable circumstances in dark night and bad weather, to elude enemy's vigilance and escape in whichever direction you deem best. Even in case you are discovered, fire is very uncertain at night, and although it may cause injuries it would mean nothing compared with safety of the ships.

You say that loss of Santiago is certain, in which case you would destroy ships, and this is an additional reason for attempting the sortie, since it is preferable for the honor of arms to succumb in battle, where there may be many chances of safety. Moreover, the destruction of the ships is not certain, for the same thing might happen that occurred at Havana last century when the English included in the capitulation the surrender of the squadron which was enclosed in the harbor.

For my part, I repeat I do not believe that the hostile fleet, no matter how strong, can do so very much damage if our squadron, choosing a dark night and favorable opportunity while part of enemy's ships are withdrawn, steams out at full power in a direction agreed upon, even if discovered. This is shown by the running out of the *Santo Domingo* and *Montevideo* from this harbor with nine ships in the blockading line, the *Purísima* from Casilda with three, and the entering of the *Reina Cristina* into Cienfuegos, also blockaded by three ships. I am very well aware that the situation of your squadron is a very difficult one. Still, the preceding cases bear comparison.

If your cruisers are in some manner captured in Santiago harbor, the effect in the whole world will be disastrous and the war may be

considered terminated in favor of the enemy. The eyes of every nation are at present fixed on your squadron, on which the honor of our country depends, as I am sure your excellency realizes. The government is of the same opinion, and to my mind there can be no doubt as to the solution of the dilemma, especially as I have great confidence in the success.

I leave entirely to the discretion of your excellency, who are so highly gifted, the route to be followed and the decision as to whether any of the ships should be left behind on account of slow speed. As a favorable item, I will tell your excellency that the captain of German cruiser *Geier* has expressed the opinion that the sortie of the squadron can be effected without running great risks.

The Spanish minister of marine, Admiral Auñon, now telegraphed from Madrid, June 26:

Government thinks in extreme case referred to in cablegram of the 23d, before ourselves destroying our squadron in harbor, should attempt to save it, in whole or part, by sortie at night, as was opinion of some of the officers of your squadron in meeting May 26 and June 10, and as you stated on May 28. Advise me whether landing of crews was at request military authority and whether they were re-embarked after rendering assistance. . . .

This Cervera answered June 27:

. . . With the harbor entrance blockaded, as it now is, the sortie at night is more perilous than in daytime, on account of ships being closer inshore.

Landing of crews was at request of military authority, through captain-general. I have asked for re-embarkation, but doubt much if it can be effected before re-enforcements arrive. Your telegram of the 24th, the same as all acts of your excellency, has for object the best service, but inure, nevertheless, to my benefit, because I will not be the one to decide upon the useless hecatomb which is being prepared.

Cervera also, on June 27, telegraphed Blanco:

I am in receipt of your cable, and thank your excellency very much for kind words in my behalf. I have to respect your excellency's opinions without discussing them, especially after having given you my own opinion formed after mature consideration. I have always believed that there are many sailors more able than I am, and it is a pity that one of them cannot come to take command of the squadron,

and under whose orders I would be placed. I construe your excellency's telegram as an order to go out, and therefore ask General Linares for re-embarkation of forces which were landed at your excellency's suggestion. I beg that you will confirm the order of sortie, because it is not explicit, and I should feel very sorry if I did not interpret your excellency's orders correctly.

Cervera's telegram evidently called a halt in Blanco's mind, and the latter telegraphed Linares the same day:

Tell me candidly your opinion on squadron, whether you believe it can go out and what solution seems best to you.

The answer to this appears only in a reply, June 28, from Cervera to Blanco, that he was informed by the general that it was not possible to re-embark his forces until the re-enforcements expected from Manzanillo should arrive. Blanco telegraphed the same day that he was making every effort to forward rations, continuing:

If I succeed I shall be able to send more re-enforcements, thus prolonging the defence, perhaps raising siege, salvation squadron. If I do not succeed it is necessary, as you will realize, for squadron to leave that harbor in spite of difficulties, which I appreciate.

Therefore my plan, which I desire your excellency to carry out, is as follows: The squadron will remain in harbor, and without precipitation, provided it has provisions left, it will watch for a favorable opportunity to go out in whatever direction your excellency may deem best. But in case the situation should become aggravated, so that the fall of Santiago is believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as best it can, entrusting its fate to the valor and ability of your excellency and the distinguished captains commanding it, who no doubt will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy. Acknowledge receipt.

Cervera's reply, next day, June 29, stated that the scant supply of coal rendered it difficult to keep in readiness for instant movement. Explaining, he said:

It takes these ships twelve hours to get up steam, and if the fires are kept going and the ships in readiness to take advantage of opportunity each uses fifteen tons a day. But I think I understand meaning your

order: If favorable opportunity presents itself, to avail ourselves of it; and if not, to go out at the last hour, even though loss of squadron be certain. Difficulties might also arise by enemy taking possession of harbor entrance.

On June 30 Blanco telegraphed the minister of marine at Madrid the main part of the text of his telegram sent Cervera on the 28th, and requested to be informed if it met the government's approval. The next day, July 1, a telegram was sent him through Admiral Manterola, the naval commandant in Cuba, approving his instructions.

Cervera wrote Linares, June 30, requesting to be informed when the latter should think the situation referred to by Blanco should have arrived, in order that he might re-embark his men. The attack by the American forces had not yet taken place, when Linares, July 1, replied:

This being an open city, for whose defence earthworks have been thrown up on the heights and lines of trenches dug along its wire enclosure, it is not possible to determine the moment when to notify your excellency, for as soon as an attack is commenced there is danger that the powerful column will break through the outer line, along which all my scant forces are deployed, without reserves to be sent to the points which may be threatened the most. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to keep your excellency posted as to the course of the battle, although, if the battle should be unfavorable, the moment would not be propitious for effecting the re-embarkation of your forces.

Cervera telegraphed this the same day, to Blanco, stating that circumstances might then arise which would make it impossible to carry out the latter's orders, and called a council of war, which, meeting at 7 P. M., was faced by the new situation which had arisen through the events of the day:

Upon being asked for their opinions as to whether they thought that the case had arisen in which the captain-general had ordered the sortie, the officers assembled stated unanimously that they thought the case had arisen in which the captain-general ordered the sortie, but that it is absolutely impossible to effect it without the re-embarkation of the men now ashore for the defence of the city, being at present more than two-thirds of the total forces of the squadron, and that at the same time the chief of the army corps, in an official communication, had stated that he cannot do without their aid, being absolutely without reserves

and forces with which to relieve the men on the extensive lines to be defended. As the result of the foregoing, it is the opinion of the undersigned that, in order to co-operate in the most effective manner and with some prospect of success in the defence of the city, it would be necessary to obstruct the harbor entrance.

José de Paredes.
Juan B. Lazaga.
Fernando Villamil.
Víctor M. Concas.
Antonio Eulate.
Emilio Díaz Moreu.

Upon this, Cervera telegraphed Blanco:

Santiago de Cuba, *July* 1, 1898—*At night.*

Through General Toral your excellency knows of the events of this day. He believes it certain that the withdrawal of my landing forces will entail the immediate loss of the city. Without them the sortie cannot be attempted. My opinion is the same as Toral's, and our sortie would look like flight, which is repugnant to all. My captains are of the same opinion. I entreat you will send instructions I have asked for.

The instructions quickly followed:

(Very urgent.—Key L.)

Havana, *July* 1, 1898—10.30 p. m.

In view of hostile progress in spite of heroic defence garrison, and in conformity with opinion government, you will re-embark crews, take advantage of first opportunity, and go out with the ships of your squadron, following route you deem best. You are authorized to leave behind any which on account of slow speed or circumstances have no chance of escaping. I will tell your excellency for your information only, not in the nature of instructions, that there are only three ships at Cienfuegos and nine here, none of them of great power.

How great the anxiety of the Spanish commanders now was, and how complete the certainty that the city must quickly fall, is shown by Blanco's sending another telegram, but fifteen minutes later:

Havana, *July* 1, 1898—10.45 p. m.

In addition to my former telegram of this evening, ask you to hasten sortie from harbor as much as possible before enemy can take possession of entrance.

This was followed by still another early next morning:

(Very urgent.)

HAVANA, *July* 2, 1898—5.10 A. M.

In view of exhausted and serious condition of Santiago, as stated by General Toral, your excellency will re-embark landing troops of squadron as fast as possible, and go out immediately.

This last was the outcome of the desperate view of the situation taken by General Toral, now in command ashore, through the wounding of Linares, as shown by the following from Blanco to Toral:

HAVANA, *July* 2, 1898.

Your cablegram of 1.30 A. M. received, and I reiterate the instructions which I gave your excellency in my last telegram of this morning. It is absolutely necessary to concentrate the forces and prolong the defence as much as possible, preventing the enemy from taking possession of the harbor entrance before sortie of squadron, for which orders have been issued to Admiral Cervera, in view situation of city as reported by you, to obviate surrender or destruction of ships.

If your excellency and valiant troops can hold out until arrival of Escario or Pareja brigade, situation would be much improved; but if it is so critical as to make continuation of defence impossible, you will gather all troops and loyal citizens, try to open a path, and fall back upon Holguin or Manzanillo, destroying what cannot be taken along and burning everything left behind, so that not the least trophy of victory will fall into the enemy's hands. At all events, I trust to your excellency to adapt compliance with my instructions to condition of city and forces.

The two following telegrams conclude the correspondence respecting the squadron:

The Commander-in-Chief of Army Corps Santiago (Toral) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July* 2, 1898.

At daybreak the enemy renewed attack upon city, which is still going on, simultaneously with attacks upon Cuebitas, railroad line, and El Cobre, the latter being made to believe that Escario's column has been held up by landing forces at Aserradero. At request Admiral

Cervera have ordered immediate re-embarkation troops of squadron, thereby weakening defence by 1,000 men, as Asia battalion, arrived this morning, and remnant of Battalion Constitución, are hardly sufficient to fill places of killed and wounded yesterday. Situation becoming more and more untenable.

Blanco to Toral:

HAVANA, *July* 2, 1898.

Your telegram of 1.30 A. M. received. I understand situation difficult, but not desperate. Would be much improved by incorporation Escario[1] or Pareja. In any event maintain city at any price, and before capitulation make attempt to join either of said forces, leaving wounded and sick at hospitals with assistance Red Cross. City must not be destroyed, in spite of what I said last night. Main thing is that squadron go out at once, for if Americans take possession of it Spain will be morally defeated and must ask for peace at mercy of enemy. A city lost can be recovered; the loss of the squadron under these circumstances is final, and cannot be recovered. Be sure to telegraph and keep me advised of events and your opinions.

The commanding officers were called aboard the flag-ship at early daybreak on July 2, and informed of General Blanco's decision. The admiral said the time for discussion had passed and that they had but to obey. It was agreed that the sortie should be made with all haste lest news of the movement should reach the American fleet. The hour for leaving was set for 4 P. M. in case the men could be got aboard; otherwise the next morning, July 3.

The measures taken for re-embarkation are shown in the letter from General Toral, now in command ashore on account of the wounding of Linares:

HONORED SIR:

Upon being informed of the cablegram from the captain-general to your excellency, ordering the re-embarkation of the forces of the squadron, I immediately issued instructions for the company at San Miguel de Parada to proceed to San José for re-embarkation; the company at Mazamorra to go to the Socapa; that at Las Cruces to the pier of that name; the company between the forts of the gasometer and furnaces

[1] The commandant of the Manzanillo column.

to go to Punta Blanca, and the remainder of the landed naval forces to the Rozal Pier. . . .

The difficulties of the attempt are well set forth by Captain Concas, of the *Maria Teresa*, who, now that Captain Bustamante was in the hospital mortally wounded, was also acting as chief of staff. He says:

> The entrance to the harbor of Santiago is a narrow channel 1,100 yards in length, which is made still narrower near its outlet by the location of the Diamond Bank (on the west side) which reduces its width to about 76 yards for large ships.
>
> Near this narrow part it is necessary to make a turn in direction of forty-five degrees, in coming out, which, it is indispensable, should be made at moderate speed in order not to run upon the rocks on the opposite shore. Consequently this want of breadth forbids the occupancy of the channel by more than one ship at a time if collision is to be avoided; for if by chance any accident happened to detain the ship ahead, or if she should ground, a thing by no means singular when we consider the difficulty of the manœuvre, it would be the same as if one of the guns of a regiment of artillery leaving by the gate tunnel of a fort should get stuck, and the others crowd upon it in case there should be no room to turn round between the walls of the gateway. This natural difficulty was aggravated by the obstruction caused off Smith Key by the sunken *Merrimac*, which the ships had not only to scrape by, but they had to turn before clearing it; so dangerously near that the port screws passed but three or four metres from the sunken hull, with great danger of entanglement in the hull or rigging.
>
> . . . The ships were thus obliged to go out at a considerable distance from one another, and though this in itself was not prejudicial to our fire, there was on the other hand the very grave drawback that the one which should go out first would suffer *alone the fire of all* the enemy's ships, and so successively; the result thus being a force of two effective guns against more than two hundred. This was the problem which presented itself, which there was no means of avoiding and which is the tactical reason why the fight took the course it did; calling anew attention to the fact that foreign writers have fixed upon a distance from ship to ship, but not upon the time, which was the important matter.[1]

The ships' companies ashore were rapidly embarked, except those of the *Vizcaya*, which were at El Cobre, "which arrived at 4 in the afternoon completely exhausted." The admiral thus

[1] Concas y Palau, *La Escuadra del Almirante Cervera*, 134, 135. (*Cf.* N. D. translation, 69, 70.)

decided to wait for the next day, to give all the men a much-needed rest.

Says Captain Concas:

The order of battle was based upon the knowledge of the usual movement of the enemy observed during the many days of the blockade. His ships resting against Daiquiri on the east and near the land, formed a great arc; on the east was the *Indiana*, and thence toward the west, the *New York*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, and *Texas*, which latter was accustomed to stay about south of the entrance. Near the shore to the west was usually a yacht, the *Vixen*, which, we supposed, communicated constantly with the insurgents, and supporting the yacht was the *Brooklyn*, in the middle of this interval and far away from the other ships; having always, in short, a large space open to the south-west between the *Texas* and the shore. Supposing, then, that the *Brooklyn* would be in her usual position when we should go out, the *Maria Teresa* was to bring on the action with her, trying to ram her; and while the rest of the enemy's squadron were grappling with our flag-ship, the other ships, led by the *Vizcaya*, without delaying to succor the *Teresa*, were to pass in column between her and the coast and try to escape; the destroyers were to place themselves under the protection of the larger ships and as soon as they could, making all speed, attempt to get away, not taking part in the fight unless a good chance should offer." [1]

The objective was Cienfuegos or Havana.

In preparation for the sortie, Captain Concas had gone, at 7 o'clock the morning of July 3, with the gunboat *Alvarado*, a small craft of 150 tons, toward the entrance to reconnoitre. He noted the absence of one of the battle-ships (the *Massachusetts*), that the *Indiana* was closer inshore than usual,[2] "and the *Brooklyn*, contrary to her position of the preceding days, perhaps because it was Sunday and she could not communicate with the land, was close to the *Texas*, and in the intermediate space which she before occupied, there was a small yacht (the *Vixen*)." His observations are of value as a corrective of later estimates of distances. He says:

I measured that of the *Brooklyn*, which was over 7,656 yards [3] the

[1] Concas, 132–133. (*Cf.* N. D. translation, 68, 69.)

[2] She moved out after 9 o'clock to fill the interval left by the *New York* at that hour.

[3] 7,000 metres. Metres are used by Captain Concas throughout; their translation into yards explains what would appear too definite a measurement.

maximum which the instrument measured. So that I calculate that she was more nearly 9,843 yards than 7,656; since from an elevation of some 40 feet above the level of the sea, her water line could scarcely be seen.[1] On this question of distances, the report of Admiral Sampson is not correct and it is enough to look at the official chart[2] published in the United States to understand this. In it the *Brooklyn* is placed at about 5,468 yards from the entrance, which would make the course of the *Teresa* pass about 328 yards from the flag-ship of Admiral Schley, which is what we would have wished for our torpedoes and heavy artillery; the *Gloucester* at 875 yards from the Moro, from which the Mausers of the garrison would have dislodged her; the *Vixen* at 1,640 yards from the only good gun of Socapa, which would instantly have given account of her; lastly the *Indiana*, at about 3,826 yards from the entrance, and it is sufficient to remember that the last of our big ships (*el ultimo buque nuestro*) came out thirty minutes after the first, in order to comprehend that if the *Indiana* had been stationed at 3,826 yards from the entrance and hugging the shore, she would have awaited the *Oquendo* at the sortie, which she could have done with impunity, since a speed of four knots an hour would have been enough to have enabled her to be abreast of the Morro, before the *Oquendo* [the last ship] came out; that is, on the supposition that she was in the position in which her admiral places her. It is true that the position of the *Indiana* was near the coast; but she could not have been less than two and a half miles from it, and about 8,746 yards from the entrance."[3]

Concas returned, made his report, and orders were given to weigh anchor. He continues:

With the battle-flag hoisted the *Infanta Maria Teresa* advanced ahead of the other cruisers, which for the last time gave the honors due their admiral, saluting him with hurrahs that manifested the spirit of the crews, worthy of a better fate. The *Maria Teresa* continued to advance rapidly without being detected until she was abreast the Estrella battery; signals, evidently hurried, and an alarm-gun from the *Iowa* showed that the hostile ships were taking position for battle.

We had just finished making the turn at Diamond Bank, amidst death-like silence, everybody awed by the magnificent spectacle of the ships issuing from the narrow passage between the Morro and Socapa. It was a solemn moment, capable of making the calmest heart beat

[1] An elevation of 40 feet gives a distance of 7 sea-miles to the horizon, or 14,186 yards.

[2] Captain Concas refers to the chart prepared by a board ordered by Admiral Sampson at New York shortly after the squadron's return north. This plan is, unfortunately, notably incorrect.

[3] Concas, 138, 139.

faster. From outside the conning tower, which I did not want to enter, in order, if I should fall, to set an example to my defenceless crew, I asked leave of the admiral and with that gave the order to fire. The bugle gave the signal for to begin the battle, an order repeated by those of all the batteries and followed by a murmur of approbation from all those poor sailors and marines who were anxious to fight; for they did not know that those warlike echoes were the signal which hurled their country at the feet of the victor, since they were to deprive Spain of the only power still of value to her, without which a million soldiers could do nothing to serve her; of the only power which could have weight in a treaty of peace; a power which once destroyed would leave Spain, the old Spain of Europe, not Cuba, as so many ignorant persons believed, completely at the mercy of the enemy.

My bugles were the last echo of those which history tells were sounded in the taking of Granada; it was the signal that the history of four centuries of greatness was ended and that Spain had passed into a nation of the fourth class.

"Poor Spain," I said to my beloved and noble admiral, and he answered by an expressive motion, as though to say he had done everything to avoid it, and that his conscience was clear.

As for myself, what a strange coincidence. It had been but a few years when the honor had fallen to me to represent in the archaic caravel an exact copy of that of Columbus, all the glories of the fifteenth century, and on the 3d of July it fell to me to give the signal for the end of that greatness. But the first was a representation and this was the dreadful reality.

The second gun of the deck battery was the first to open fire and brought us back to this reality, too dreadful to allow us to think of other things. Giving the cruiser all her speed we poured out a frantic fire with our whole battery except the forward gun, which we reserved to fire at close quarters.[1]

[1] Concas, 141–143. (*Cf.* original; 72–74 of translation.)

CHAPTER VII

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO

In the early night of the 2d of July several of the mountain-peaks about Santiago were lighted up with the burning of block-houses established on prominent points by the Spaniards. Some of these were on elevations of four or five thousand feet, and were so placed as to command a view down the more important valleys, in which ran the trails dignified by the Cubans with the name of roads. We of the blockading fleet came to the conclusion that the garrisons were being withdrawn, in order to re-enforce Santiago. The rest of the night passed without event, and the morning of the 3d of July dawned with less wind and a smoother sea than usual. The day was Sunday; it was somewhat hazy in the early morning, but becoming bright and clear and with even a smoother sea than usual. The armed yacht *Hist* had come alongside the flag-ship to arrange for an additional 3-pounder gun. Her commander, Lieutenant Lucien Young, had come aboard the *New York*, the carpenter's force of which was busy in getting out the material for the gun's emplacement. It was finally got into a boat, and a few minutes before 9 the *New York* started at easy speed to Siboney, which was but eight miles east from her position, the purpose being to land the admiral and some of his staff for the consultation arranged with General Shafter, the *Hist* and torpedo-boat *Ericsson*, Lieutenant Usher, which had come the day before from Guantánamo, accompanying her. The commander of the former remained for the moment aboard the *New York* looking after his material. Captain Taylor, of the *Indiana*, had been invited by the admiral to accompany him, as Taylor had been associated with General Shafter's expedition and would thus probably have weight in the expected conference. Taylor, however, was kept by some special work and did not go.

The ships were arranged as follows: The *Gloucester* well inshore, a little to the west of Aguadores, which is three miles east of the entrance; the *Indiana* was next to the *Gloucester*, then the *New York*, which was about south-east of the Morro; the *Oregon* a little east of south; next in succession came the *Iowa* about due south; then the *Texas*, both these in a position to look directly up the first reach of the harbor entrance; then the *Brooklyn* and the armed yacht *Vixen*. Well off shore was the *Resolute*, Commander Eaton, which had arrived with a number of mines. The *Massachusetts* and *Suwanee*, usually present, were at Guantánamo, forty miles east, the former having gone for coal only that morning at 4 o'clock (the time chosen by Captain Higginson), when she was relieved at the end of her usual tour of search-light duty at the mouth of the harbor by the *Indiana*.

The ships were in an irregular arc of a circle, about eight miles from end to end, the centre of which was the Morro, from three to four miles distant. The current setting to and fro along the coast, following the tide, made it very difficult, without the too frequent use of the engines, to keep accurate position. Some had thus drifted out of place and before the *New York* started it was suggested to the admiral to call their attention to this by signal, but this, it happened, was not done. As the *New York* left there was some readjustment of positions, the *Indiana* coming somewhat south to partially fill the interval.

On getting under way, the admiral had made the signal usual when it is desired that other ships should not follow the flag officer's movements: "Disregard motions of commander-in-chief." The officer of the deck had been ordered to go at an easy gait, and the ship was thus moving at about eight knots an hour. The signal to the engine-room to start the engines was made at 8.50. It had taken some twelve to fifteen minutes to turn east (as the ship had been heading north-west), and get full headway. The flag-ship had thus proceeded but about five miles toward Siboney, which is distant from the harbor entrance ten miles and from the *New York's* usual blockading position between seven and eight. She was thus about seven miles from the entrance (less than the distance usually between the eastern and western ends of the squadron and much less than was frequently

this interval), when, at about 9.35 o'clock, the admiral, who was on the quarter-deck, seeing the smoke of a gun at the entrance, gave the order to put the helm hard-a-port, and turn. This order was given before any of the Spanish had appeared. The horizon was eight miles from the elevation of the *New York's* bridge; the harbor entrance was well within this, and thus all the Spanish ships as they emerged were in plain view, as were all those of the blockading fleet.[1] Both the *Indiana* and the *Gloucester*, which were at the easterly end of the blockading arc, were nearer to the *New York* than to the *Brooklyn*, the former being now distant from the *New York* about five nautical miles and the latter a little less.

Ships of war carry on their routine in war much as in peace. Being Sunday, there was at 9.30 the usual Sunday quarters and inspection, with, as it was the first Sunday of the month, the reading of the Articles of War, followed by a muster of the crew, and divine service. The *New York's* call to quarters had been sounded, the men had fallen in; the officers had begun to report their divisions. The same was happening, or about to happen, allowing for small variations of time, in all the other ships. "The division officers," says Captain Taylor, of the *Indiana*, "were reporting their divisions to the executive officer while the commanding officer stood on the quarter-deck awaiting the final report of the executive."[2] This time may be taken, as near as may be, as 9.35.

The writer, who was in command of the *New York*, was, while the same procedure was in progress aboard, in his cabin preparing to go ashore when the ship should arrive at Siboney. He heard the gun mentioned of which the admiral saw but the smoke,[3] the report of which was followed by a scurry on deck, and the call to "general quarters." He at once went up and found the ship

[1] The *New York* being to the east, one looking west toward the fleet was looking "down the sun," which makes a great difference in visibility. Signals, when looking "against the sun," may be difficult to read at a mile or even less; whereas if one looks toward them "down the sun" they may frequently be read at a very great distance.

[2] Taylor, "Story of the Captains," *Century Magazine*, May, 1899, 64.

[3] Sampson had been somewhat deafened a few days before by the firing of an 8-inch gun, which was trained under him, he being on the bridge.

turning. Thin smoke was still rising from the harbor entrance; the crew was already at quarters for action. A few minutes after reaching the bridge, the chief quartermaster, Squires, called out, "There comes another ship," the *Maria Teresa* having already appeared. The chief engineer was ordered to do all possible to make speed; all eyes, which could be so employed, were fixed upon the narrow chasm from which, at intervals of some six or seven minutes, and in full view, were coming the Spanish ships.

The gun heard aboard the *New York* was that fired by the *Maria Teresa*. The *Iowa*, whose position enabled her to look directly up the "reach" of the entrance, and thus see her first appearance as she rounded Smith Key, still more than half a mile within, hoisted the signal, kept bent on by all the blockading ships, "The enemy is attempting to escape," and a six-pounder gun was fired by Lieutenant Hill, both of which actions were duplicated practically at the same moment by the *Oregon*, the shots being fired as signals rather than offensively against the enemy. The same signal now flew from all the ships, and in addition from the *Brooklyn* "Clear for action"; a signal scarcely needed, as the ships had been in readiness for instant battle since the beginning of the war, and had been in action but the day before.

The distance, in sight from the American ships, necessary for the *Teresa* to pass over before she reached the sea, gave time for the former to move and start to close in, "with the determination," as expressed in Captain Clark's report, "of carrying out to the utmost your [the admiral's] order, 'If the enemy tries to escape the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore.'" [1]

Time is, of course, an element in all things. The American ships at the moment of discovery were, with the exception of the *New York*, motionless. To get "way" on a ten-thousand-ton ship and begin to move with any speed through the water, requires about ten minutes. Eager as were the men for action, it took a few minutes, at least, to get to quarters, particularly in the case of the powder division, which had to be in complete readi-

[1] Clark, *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 526.

ness to continue the supply of ammunition. Says Captain Taylor, of the *Indiana:*

Lieutenant Henderson, who commanded the powder division (whose men, in getting below to their stations, were obliged to pass through one or two narrow hatches, or scuttles), told me that it seemed an hour to him getting his 170 men below to their stations, but that it was really less than two minutes. To hurry them he shouted, "They will all get away; two of them are outside the Morro already!" At which, desperate at the thought of such a thing, his men simply "fell below," throwing themselves down the steep ladder in their eagerness to reach their posts, until the ammunition deck was swarming with bruised and bleeding men, staggering to their feet and limping to their stations. Less time was needed for the men who manned the guns, and as they crowded toward the scuttles and ports of the 13- and 8-inch turrets, their clothes seemed to fall from them, and by the time they had reached their stations, they were, for the most part, naked to the waist.[1]

Following the *Maria Teresa,* with a considerable interval of time between each, came, in the order named, the *Vizcaya, Cristóbal Colón,* and *Oquendo.* Later came the *Plutón* and *Furor.* It was some ten minutes after 10 o'clock before the last two had emerged.

Here a word needs to be said (and the praise cannot be too high) for the coolness and courage with which the Spanish ships were handled in perhaps a more difficult situation than any in which a naval battle was ever ventured. Not only did the excessive narrowness of the channel require, as already mentioned, a moderate speed, but all of the big ships slowed in the entrance[2] and put their pilots into boats which they towed alongside, an evidence in itself of the low speed used, as one higher than six or seven knots would have towed these under.[3]

[1] Taylor, "Story of the Captains," *Century Magazine,* May, 1899, p. 65.

[2] Personal information from Admiral (then Captain) Concas.

[3] Miguel Lopez, the pilot in the *Maria Teresa,* gives the following account: "I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, who was as calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin, and was observing the channel and the hostile ships, and only said these words: 'Pilot, when can I shift the helm?' He had reference to turning to starboard, which could only be done after we had passed Diamond bank. . . . A few moments later I said, 'Admiral, the helm may be shifted now.' In a moment the admiral, without shouting, without becoming excited, as calm as usual, said, 'To starboard,' and the next minute, 'Fire!' At the same moment, simultane-

All this, of course, gave time for the American ships to begin to close, and thus before the *Maria Teresa* was much more than well clear of the entrance she was, for an appreciable time, under the fire of the whole blockading fleet. "After the *Teresa* came out of the harbor," says Captain Concas, "she was entirely alone for about ten minutes, during which time she had to suffer the fire of all the batteries of the enemy."[1]

Captain Evans, of the *Iowa*, gives 5,000 yards (two and a half nautical miles) as the first range ordered, which, as the Spanish flag-ship stood well out from shore, may be taken as about the true distance at which the real action began. The *Brooklyn*, occupying a south-westerly position and lying at the moment with her head about W.N.W.,[2] started in that direction, hoisting shortly (at 9.45) a signal, "Close up." With her helm aport she soon turned and stood north-eastward, opening with her port battery. A little later, putting her helm hard aport, she turned to starboard. As already mentioned, this ship, on account of her speed and her position to the westward, in which direction Cervera's course lay, was the one which, from the Spanish reasoning, it was thought most important to get out of the way. It was thought if the *Brooklyn* should be placed *hors du combat* and the Spanish squadron escape the fire of the slower battle-ships comparatively unharmed, a free road would be opened toward Cienfuegos and there would be but the *New York* to pursue them with any such speed as they supposed themselves to possess. Of this last ship they would have a fair start, even if in her usual south-easterly blockading position. The reasoning was in a general way sound. Things worked otherwise through the defective speed of the Spanish ships and through their failure, while in Santiago, to tear out and throw overboard all

ously; the two guns of the turret and those of the port battery fired on a ship which seemed to me to be the *Indiana*. I thought the ship was sinking. . . . By this time there were already many dead and wounded in the battery, because they had been firing on us for some time, and I believe that in spite of the water that was in the ship, she was already on fire then. The admiral said to me, 'Good-by, pilot; go, and be sure you let them pay you, because you have earned it well.'" (Muller y Tejeiro, 103, 104.)

[1] Concas, 74 (translation).

[2] Lieutenant Hodgson, navigating officer, *Court of Inquiry*, I, 571.

woodwork which it was possible to destroy. Thus, says Captain Concas:

In compliance with the order received, I put our bow toward the armored cruiser *Brooklyn*, which, putting to starboard, presented her stern to us and fired her two after-turret guns, moving toward the south (*alejandose hacia el Sur*). . . . The position of that ship and her being close to the others, which came forward as she receded, was such that the *Texas* and *Iowa* were interposed between the *Teresa* and *Brooklyn*, so that as we were in danger from the rams of these two, the admiral consulted me, and as of common accord we agreed that it was impossible to follow, he ordered me to take the direction of the coast; the *Brooklyn* was then at about 5,416 yards, and the *Texas* and *Iowa* at about 3,250.

The situation caused by the *Brooklyn's* turn to starboard, is best described by Captain Philip:

The first shots of the *Texas*[1] were directed at the *Teresa* at long range[2] as we were steaming almost direct for the harbor entrance. . . . Every one of the Spanish vessels fired as she came broadside on, rounding the western point of the harbor entrance, and the whistle of shells passing over our heads became unpleasantly frequent. Occasionally I saw a column of water shoot straight up in the air, geyser-like, where one of their shells had struck near the ship, but, as nearly as I could tell, most of their shots had too great elevation and were harmlessly passing over us.[3]

I had altered the *Texas's* course to the westward, seeing that was the direction in which the Spanish squadron was going. Then oc-

[1] Fired at 9.40. Captain Philip's official report. (*Annual Report Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix 529.)

[2] "The first range that I sent to our twelve-inch," says Philip, "was forty-two hundred yards. At a quarter to 10, or ten minutes after the alarm was sounded, the range was given to me as thirty-four hundred yards by naval cadet Reynolds, who was manipulating the range-finder on the bridge. This was for the Spanish flag-ship." (Philip, "Story of the Captains," *The Century Magazine*, 89.)

[3] This is the general testimony. Says Captain Evans: "A torrent of projectiles was sailing over us harmlessly exploding in the water beyond." The ships in closer action escaped with but three hits, whereas the *Brooklyn*, at the greater distance by reason of her turn to the southward, was struck many times. That the Spanish fire was necessarily very wild, follows from the statement of Captain Concas (p. 129), that they "went into battle under the awful condition of *not having fired a shot from the 5.5 inch guns until they were fired against the enemy.*" ("*En la condicion tremenda de que el primer tiro que tiraban los canones de 14 centimetres fuera al enemigo.*") This was due to the small number of these charges and their very defective condition. (*Ibid.*)

curred the incident which caused me more alarm than anything Cervera did that day. As the *Texas* veered westward the *Brooklyn* was ploughing up the water at a great rate in a course almost due north,[1] direct for the oncoming Spanish ships, and nearly a mile away from the *Texas*. The smoke from our guns began to hang so heavily and densely over the ship that for a few minutes we could see nothing. We might as well have had a blanket tied over our heads. Suddenly a whiff of breeze and a lull in the firing lifted the pall, and there, bearing toward us and across our bows, turning on her port helm, with big waves curling over her bows and great clouds of black smoke pouring from her funnels, was the *Brooklyn*. She looked as big as half a dozen *Great Easterns* and seemed so near it took our breath away. "Back both engines hard," went down the tube to the astonished engineers, and in a twinkling the old ship was racing against herself. The collision which seemed imminent, even if it was not, was averted, and as the big cruiser glided past all of us on the bridge gave a sigh of relief.[2]

This was an exciting moment aboard the *New York*, before whose men the scene was spread as a panorama. The American guns had already raised a vast cloud of smoke in which every ship for a time was lost to sight. Suddenly the *Brooklyn* emerged from this great white bank, standing apparently directly south, the sun shining brightly against her four hundred feet of lofty side. Shouts of lamentation, "The *Brooklyn's* hurt," came from the men; the admiral exclaimed more than once with deep concern, "What can be the matter?" and a murmur of relief, followed by a cheer, went up from all when she again turned westward and took the course of the fleeing ships.

By this time three of the Spanish ships had made their exit,[3]

[1] This is erroneous. Captain Cook says "all the ships were carrying out the instructions of the commander-in-chief, which were to head in for the entrance. We held to the north-east." (*Court of Inquiry*, I, 1895.)

[2] Philip, "Story of the Captains," *The Century Magazine*, May, 1899, pp. 90, 91. Captain Philip also says: "Had the *Brooklyn* struck us then it would probably have been an end of the *Texas* and her half thousand men. Had the *Texas* rammed the *Brooklyn*, it would have been equally disastrous; for the *Texas* was not built for ramming, and she would have doubled up like a hoop." (*Ibid.*) The range given at this time against the second Spanish ship (the *Vizcaya*) was 3,100 yards.

[3] "9.50 A. M. Reported to the admiral on the bridge by the chief quartermaster, that the *Cristóbal Colón* was coming around Morro Point." (Official notes taken on the bridge of the *New York* by Chief Yeoman F. J. Buenzle, admiral's writer. Time by the bridge clock.)

the *Teresa* having had, however, as mentioned, some ten minutes precedence of either, had borne the gun-fire of every ship except possibly the *Indiana*, whose position was so far east of the Morro that she had not yet had time to close in to close range, though her captain reports one of his 13-inch shells taking effect.[1]

The turn of the *Brooklyn* had brought the *Texas* to a dead stop for fear of collision. The *Maria Teresa*, says Concas, was now "standing along the coast; the *Brooklyn* ran parallel with her."[2]

The *Oregon*, all of whose main boilers were on, and, of the battle-ships, had the best speed, and the *Iowa*, which had less distance to go than any other of the ships except the *Brooklyn* and *Texas*, came into the space made vacant by the *Brooklyn's* turn south and that which the *Texas* would have occupied but for the unfortunate necessity of stopping.

Says Concas:

[The *Iowa*] was now about 2,166 yards from the stern of the Spanish flag-ship when she lodged in us two 12-inch shells, which, exploding in the stern, burst the steam pipe of the main pump, must have disturbed or broken some of the engine piping, and were the decisive cause of the loss of that ship. . . . When the decks were strewn with the dead and wounded and the gun crews had been relieved repeatedly; when various fires had broken out, some of which had been extinguished; when it seemed apparent that the *Brooklyn* alone would be able to keep up with us, as we could easily keep ahead of the battle-ships, the distance from which we had had to shorten on account of the configuration of the coast, it was then that the two 12- or 13-inch shells which burst in the stern, or some other projectile, breaking one of our big steam pipes, caused our speed to be diminished immediately and visibly, and we knew that we were hopelessly lost. The steam permeated the after part of the ship, cutting it off completely, and invaded the turret, rendering it untenable. The fires increased, as we could not reach them. The crew of one of the small-calibre ammunition hoists was asphyxiated; a number of brave men who attempted to pass through the stern passage, led by a valiant officer, perished, suffocated by the steam.[3]

[1] Captain Taylor's report. *Bureau of Navigation Report*, 1898, Appendix, 531.

[2] Concas, 145, in original; 75 in translation.

[3] Concas, 145–147 original; 75–76, translation. Captain Concas is very emphatic that neither the *Oregon* nor *Indiana* fired either of these projectiles. He says: "What the captain of the *Indiana* says about the bursting of one of

At this time Captain Concas and the two officers on the bridge with him were wounded, and it being impossible to communicate with the second in command, the admiral himself took personal charge and decided to beach the ship. As seen from the *New York* at 10.30,[1] heading for the shore, a towering mass of smoke was ascending from the stern, and the first thought in the mind of the writer was that she was purposely destroyed, it seeming impossible that in so short a time so great a conflagration could have been produced by exploding shell. She was run ashore near Cabrera Point, 6½ nautical miles from the harbor entrance.

Says Admiral Cervera himself in his official report: "There was no doubt in my mind as to the outcome, although I did not think our destruction would be so sudden."[2]

He continues:

> One of the first projectiles burst an auxiliary steam pipe on board the *Maria Teresa*. A great deal of steam escaped, which made us lose the speed on which we had counted. About the same time another shell burst one of the fire mains. The ship made a valiant defence against the galling hostile fire. Among the first wounded was our gallant commander, Captain Victor M. Concas, who had to withdraw, and as we could not afford to lose a single moment, I myself took direct command of the ship, waiting for an opportunity when the executive officer could be called. But this opportunity never arrived, as the battle became more and more fierce and the dead and wounded fell all around us, and all we could think of was to fire as much as possible.
>
> In this critical situation fire broke out in my cabin, where some of the 2.24-inch projectiles stored there must have exploded. At the same time I was informed that the after deck and chart house were burning, while the fire that had commenced in my cabin was spreading with great rapidity to the centre of the ship, and, as we had no water, it made rapid headway, and we were powerless to fight it. I realized that the ship was doomed, and cast about for a place where I could run her

his shells in the *Maria Teresa*, I believe cannot be sustained, since the same captain states that he fired on the destroyers from a distance of 4,500 to 3,000 yards, and as these had come out of the harbor more than half an hour after the flag-ship of Admiral Cervera, the latter could not have been at a distance where the injuries inflicted by the last ship in the enemy's line could be seen. . . . It was at the moment the *Maria Teresa* received her death-blow that the *Oquendo* [the last large ship] came out of the harbor." (Concas, 145, original; 75 translation.)

[1] Official time taken aboard the *New York*.

[2] Cervera, 123.

aground without losing many lives and continue the battle as long as possible.

Unfortunately the fire was gaining ground with great rapidity and voracity. I therefore sent one of my aids with instructions to flood the after magazine, but it was found impossible to penetrate into the passages owing to the dense cloud of smoke and on account of the steam escaping from the engine hatch, and it was impossible to breathe in that suffocating atmosphere. I therefore steered for a small beach west of Punta Cabrera, where we ran aground just as the engine stopped. It was impossible to get down the ammunition and other things below the armored deck, especially aft of the boilers, and under these circumstances all we could do was to save as many as possible of the crew. This was also the opinion of the officers whom I was able to convene, and who, when I asked them whether they thought the battle could be continued, answered "No."

In this painful situation, when explosions commenced to be heard in the ammunition rooms, I gave orders to lower the flag and flood all the magazines. The first order could not be carried out on account of the terrible conflagration on the poop, which was soon completely burned. The fire was gaining rapidly. When it had reached the forward deck we hardly had time to leave the burning ship, assisted by two United States boats, which arrived about three-quarters of an hour after we had run ashore.[1]

Continuing the account by Captain Philip:

The hottest part of the battle was at about this period. The *Oregon* and the *Iowa* had come up with a rush. Both, from their starting positions, came inside of the *Texas*, the *Oregon*, by reason of her superior speed, gradually forging ahead of us. We found ourselves warmly engaged with a Spaniard, which subsequently proved to be the *Oquendo*.[2]

The supreme disadvantage was the smoke from our own guns. It got in our ears, noses, and mouths, blackened our faces, and blinded our eyes. Often for minutes at a time, for all we could see, we might as well have been down in the double bottoms as on the bridge. One had the sensation of standing up against an unseen foe, the most disagreeable sensation in warfare. As the shells were screaming about our ears in uncomfortable frequency, I decided—for the sake of the

[1] Cervera, 123–124.

[2] The last to come out, about 10 o'clock. Philip's account is somewhat in error as to times. He makes the *Texas* to fire upon the *Oquendo* (the last large ship) "about a quarter to 10." This was impossible, as shown by Concas, and also by its giving but ten minutes for all four ships to emerge from the narrow channel, which had to be done at considerable interval and at low speed.

men exposed with me on the flying bridge, as well as for myself—to go to the lower bridge, which encircled the conning-tower. There one could see as well, and some of the bridge contingent, at least, would have the protection of being on the lee side of the tower. In addition to the executive officer, navigator, and range-finder, I had with me on or near the bridge a corps of messengers. I found the messenger system more advantageous than the sole use of telephones and speaking-tubes. For each watch-officer there were special messengers who answered the call of the officer's name. For instance, when I wished to give a direction to Lieutenant Haeseler, in the starboard turret, I called "Haeseler!" and instantly a messenger was at my side. I gave him the message, and in an instant it was repeated into the ears of the officer. These messengers, mostly apprentice boys, I found in every case, alert, eager, and fearless. After the first few moments of nervousness, they entered into the spirit of the fight with a marvellous zest. I remember hearing one of these boys, a youngster, surely not over sixteen, in the very hottest of the battle, remark to another: "Fourth of July celebration, eh? A little early, but a good one!"

That we left the flying bridge was extremely fortunate or providential. Within a minute—in fact, while we were still on the bridge, making our way down the only ladder—a shell struck the jam of the starboard door of the pilot-house, and exploded inside, wrecking the panelling and framing, and carrying away the after bulkhead. Had we not gone below, the wheelman must have been killed, and probably some of the others standing on the bridge. This was the first of the three times we were struck.

The *Texas* fired from her main battery only when a good target could be plainly seen. I gave explicit orders to that effect, and they were carried out faithfully. When the smoke lifted and the enemy could be seen, the gunners took careful aim and fired deliberately. It seemed better to fire a few shells and place them, than a great many and lose them. Had it been necessary, thanks to the improvements made in the turret appliances by Lieutenant Haeseler, we could have pumped a shell every minute and a half from each of our 12-inch guns.

In the course of our fight with the *Oquendo* a shell exploded over our forward superstructure. The concussion lifted the bridge contingent off their feet. I remember pitching up in the air, with my coat-tails flying out behind me, as if I had been thrown by one of Roosevelt's broncos. No one was hurt except Cadet Reynolds, one of whose ear-drums was split. Our port cutter was blown into kindling, the woodwork of the superstructure was torn to bits, and the ship took fire. But the *Texas* was ready for just such an emergency, and in a twinkling a score of willing men were playing the hose upon the blaze, regardless of danger.

A few moments later the Spaniards got in a luckier shot. A shell about six inches in diameter struck the forward ash-hoist; and after

passing through the outer plating of hammock-berthing, exploded, the mass of pieces penetrating the bulkhead and casing of the starboard smoke-pipe. This shot, fortunately, hurt nobody, but it caused considerable excitement in the fire-room. Fragments of the shell dropped down there, the hammocks and portions of the sailors' clothing stored in the berthing caught fire and also fell below, causing such a gush of smoke in the fire-room that some of the men thought the ship had blown up. That there was no panic there, nor anything like one, speaks volumes for the discipline of the men and the efficiency of the engineer officers.

Soon after 10 o'clock we first observed the so-called destroyers, and at once turned our secondary battery upon them. The *Iowa*, *Oregon*, and *Indiana* also devoted their attention to the much-dreaded little craft. The hammering they got from the four ships must have been terrific. As we passed on down the coast, leaving the destroyers in the rear, we saw the *Gloucester* was pounding them to a finish at close range. The *Furor*, the leading destroyer, blew up with a crash that sounded high above the roar of battle. There was a great gush of black smoke, and a sheet of flame seemed to leap above the tops of the hills under which the doomed craft lay. The men of the *Texas* have always insisted that this was caused by a shell from Ensign W. K. Gise's 6-inch gun.

About a quarter past 10 the *Teresa*, which had been in difficulties from the moment she left the shelter of the Morro, turned to seek a beaching-place. She was on fire, and we knew that she was no longer a quantity to be reckoned with. Five minutes later, our special enemy, the *Oquendo*, also turned ashore. The *Vizcaya* was then in the lead, with the *Colón* not far away and inside. It seemed to us as if the *Colón* were trying to shield herself, and that was undoubtedly the reason why she gave us so long a chase. When her sister ships were blown up she was uninjured.

At twenty-five minutes to 11, as the *Texas* passed the *Oquendo*, that ship ran up a white flag, and I gave the order, "Cease firing." The *Oregon* and the *Brooklyn* were in the lead, the *Oregon* considerably farther inshore, hammering at the *Vizcaya* and the *Colón*.

The first pursuit of the *Maria Teresa* had drawn all the American ships except the *Indiana*, the *Gloucester*, and the *New York* west of the harbor entrance. Captain Taylor, of the *Indiana*, an officer of extreme coolness and correctness of judgment, though closing up as quickly as possible to the mouth of the harbor and even firing upon the *Teresa*[1] was at 10 a mile east.

[1] For Captain Concas upon Captain Taylor's claim to having struck the *Teresa*, see *ante*, 138.

The *Gloucester*, though under way, was held in check with bottled steam for the advent of the destroyers. The flag-ship *New York*, well started on her westward course, was still about four miles away. Both sides of the entrance were thus well covered and even had there been a sudden change of mind on the part of any of the Spanish captains to steer south or east, there was ample force to meet them in those directions. That the wise course of the last three of the Spanish vessels, had the three American ships not been to the east, was directly seaward instead of running in the wake of their own squadron toward the main body of the Americans, and thus into the very jaws of death, is self-evident. Each, however, turned west as Admiral Cervera had first arranged. All the Spanish ships (at 10.10) were in the six-mile bight between the Morro and Cabrera Point.

The attention of the American ships had been so completely given, in the first instance, to the Spanish flag-ship, that the second and third, the *Vizcaya* and *Cristóbal Colón*, were able in the smoke to get away to the westward without material injury, the latter particularly, with higher speed and by hugging the land, suffering but very slightly. It was not until later, when the smoke had cleared, and the *Maria Teresa* and *Oquendo* were standing in for the beach with colors down, that the *Vizcaya* was vigorously attacked by all four of the more westerly ships, the *Colón* being by this time too far ahead to be greatly troubled.

The passing of these two ships, and the cessation of fire upon the *Maria Teresa*, after she had started in for the shore, had allowed a concentration of fire upon the unfortunate *Oquendo*, which had not had time to reach a position midway between the harbor entrance and Cabrera Point, before she found herself in the midst of a fierce fire from most of the ships of the American squadron. This fact accounts for her quick destruction and her beaching at Cabrera Point, but a half mile from the flag-ship, instead of farther west.

The *Oregon*, as mentioned by Captains Philip and Evans, had passed ahead of the *Texas* and *Iowa*. The *Brooklyn*, favored by the trend of the coast (somewhat south of west), was again farthest west, but, as mentioned by Captain Philip, considerably off shore. Says Lieutenant Eberle, of the *Oregon:*

As we swept past the *Iowa*, Captain Clark was standing in his favorite place, on top of the forward 13-inch turret, when word came to him that the torpedo-boats were coming out. The 6-pounder crews were immediately ordered to their guns, and in less time than it takes to write it they were peppering away at the two destroyers. As the leading vessel, the *Plutón*,[1] came out she appeared to hesitate for a moment, and then turned to the westward and followed in the wake of the others. Our after guns were also turned upon the torpedo-boats and the fire of these guns, together with the fire of all the ships astern of us, simply overwhelmed them.[2]

The *Indiana*, now to the westward of the entrance, and which had been actively engaged in firing upon all the large Spanish ships, was admirably placed for assisting against the destroyers, as was also the *Iowa*. "Surely," as well says Captain Evans, "no braver sight was ever seen than when these gallant little paper shells actually returned the fire of the battle-ships." [3] The *Gloucester*, whose gallant commander had awaited their coming, with bottled steam, following a signal from the *Indiana*, "Enemy's torpedo-boats coming out," but which, mistaking the number by reason of the smoke, was misread by the *Gloucester* for "Gunboats close in," now sprang ahead at full speed. All, *Oregon*, *Texas*, *Iowa*, *Indiana*, and *Gloucester*, poured a torrent of fire into the unfortunate little ships. Their end was as speedy as their courage was fine. Despite the terrible fire of the American ships, the crews fought their guns as long as fighting was possible. Says Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, whose frail craft, in her sudden rush through the smoke, came near being fired upon by both the *Indiana* and *Iowa*:[4]

As we closed in on the destroyers, and our firing grew more rapid, it became necessary at times to cease firing, as the smoke from the six-pounders hung about the ship. The three-pounders had smokeless powder, so that they were allowed to fire whenever they could see the enemy; but the six-pounders were shut off until the smoke cleared away. We were fortunate in having officers who were all excellent shots, and

[1] This is an error; the *Furor* was in the lead.

[2] Eberle, "The Story of the Captains," *The Century Magazine*, 106. Concas cannot understand the delay of the destroyers in coming out, the intention of the admiral being that they should put themselves under the protection of the larger ships (p. 77, N. D. translation).

[3] Evans, *ibid.*, 55.

[4] Taylor, *ibid.*, 68.

as they had only a few guns to control, they were able to relieve the gun-captains and fire the guns themselves. Lieutenant Norman [1] had charge of the forward three-pounder and the two starboard six-pounders. Ensign Edson had the two port six-pounders, and Lieutenant Wood the three three-pounders aft. Dr. Bransford had charge of one of Edson's six-pounders, and fired other guns at times. Since his resignation from the service he had had ample opportunity to indulge his propensity for shooting small game, and this practice, with his remarkably strong eyesight, made him an excellent shot. Assistant Engineer Procter was my aide on the bridge, and when I thought a gun was not being fired rapidly enough or a gun-captain was not shooting straight, I sent him to take a hand in the firing.

As we neared the destroyers, the shot and shell began to whistle about us in a lively fashion. I can remember my astonishment at not seeing any wounded or any sign of blood when I looked about the decks. The shell from the batteries on shore also fell about us. A shot from any one of them would have ended our usefulness.

I did not see a man who was not doing his best to serve the guns, or one who wasted any time watching the enemy's shot. Bond, the chief boatswain's mate, fired the forward three-pounder, and it was a cheering sight to see how coolly he took aim, and what beautiful shots he made. Green, a young quartermaster, who steered the ship during the action, was as cool as at drill, and never made a mistake. When the firing-pin of one of the six-pounders dropped out in the heat of the action, the breech-lock was removed and the pin replaced by Bee, chief gunner's mate, as rapidly as if at drill.

The Maxim automatic one-pounders from the *Plutón* and the *Furor* appeared likely to be our most dangerous enemies. When we came within three thousand yards of the destroyers these guns began to play rapidly in our direction. Their fire could be traced by the splashes of the projectiles coming closer and closer to us. When they began to fall about twenty yards from us, and the water was stirred up as if a hail-storm was raging, the fire suddenly ceased. Had these guns secured our range, the execution on board would have been terrible, and the *Gloucester* would have been disabled if not sunk. When within 1,200 yards, I ordered two small Colt rifles to open fire. Paymaster Brown had been given charge of these guns at the beginning of the cruise and had worked over and fired them until they became formidable weapons in his hands. He with one gun and Chipman with the other kept a stream of small bullets pouring on the enemy. After the action our prisoners spoke of the deadly effect of these guns. Toward the end of the action we were making over seventeen knots and closing

[1] Lieutenant George Norman. All four of the Norman brothers, of Newport, R. I., George, Guy, Bradford, and Reginald, were volunteers in the navy throughout the war.

in on the destroyers rapidly. The remainder of the enemy's vessels had rounded the point ahead, and our rear vessel, the *Indiana*, was just rounding this point. Huse [the executive officer] called my attention to the *Teresa* and *Oquendo*, heading in toward shore. We thought they were attempting to escape our vessels by running inside them and making for the harbor. Should they do this, we would be exposed to their rapid-fire battery at close range, and would be destroyed. There was only one thing to do: close in with the destroyers, so that they would be sunk with us by their own vessels. As we found out later, the ironclads had turned in to run ashore. Shortly after this I could see that the *Plutón* was slowing down, as the distance lessened between her and the *Furor*, and it soon became apparent that she was disabled. Up to this time the forward guns had been firing on the *Plutón* and the after guns on the *Furor*. I now ordered the battery to be concentrated on the latter boat. We were within 600 yards of her and every shot appeared to strike. And now came the most exciting moment of the day; the *Plutón* was run on the rocks and blew up, and at the same time the *Furor* turned toward us. It appeared to be a critical situation. She might succeed in torpedoing us or she might escape up the harbor. But as she continued to circle, it was evident that she was disabled, and her helm was jammed hard over. Our fire had been too much for her. As the *Furor* turned toward us, the flag-ship *New York*, coming up from the east, under the fire of all the batteries, let drive two or three shots at her.[1] I hoisted the signal, "Enemy's vessels destroyed." She gave us three cheers and kept on under high speed after the big vessels.[2]

A vivid memory of the swiftly changing scene was the *Gloucester* in the earlier part of her action, projected against a vast cloud of smoke from the firing of the ships ahead, and engaged apparently alone with, to her, these formidable adversaries. The dramatic character of the scene was intensified a little later,[3] by the penetration of one of the *Plutón's* boilers by a shell and the sudden rise, vertically, into the air of a vast silver-like column of steam, hundreds of feet in height; a geyser of unapproachable magnificence.

Says the commander of the *Furor*, which carried Captain Fernando Villaamil as commodore of the little flotilla, and who was

[1] This time was noted aboard the *New York* as 10.40. (Official notes taken on the bridge of the *New York* by F. J. Buenzle, the admiral's writer. Time by the bridge clock.) The *New York* fired four 4-inch shells at this boat.

[2] "10.50 A. M., abreast of the torpedo-boats and the *Gloucester*." *Ibid.*

[3] 10.35 by time taken aboard the *New York*.

unfortunately among those lost and specially mourned by his comrades:

From the very first we received an enormous amount of fire from the majority of the hostile ships and were struck by shells of every calibre. We soon commenced to have casualties from the galling fire and many injuries to the ship, which occurred in the following order: Bursting of the steam pipe of the engine; destruction of the starboard intermediate cylinder; flooding and submersion of the stern; bursting of a boiler; further injuries to the engine; destruction of the three remaining boilers; fires in different parts of the ship, one of great intensity in the engine-room, below which was the shell-room, and finally, breaking of the servomotor of the helm and tiller. All these accidents occurred one after another in a very short space of time, but we never ceased firing, although the deck was already strewn with a large number of wounded and some dead.

About 10.45 the commander of the flotilla, in view of the foregoing facts, which he had either witnessed or which had been reported to him, gave orders to run ashore, which could not be carried out. As the ship was known to be doomed, having neither rudder nor engine left, the fire, no longer controllable, having invaded the stern and waist, and more than one-half of the crew having been put out of action, the commander ordered the flag and the boats to be lowered, and the men who could do so to get ashore in the boats or with the assistance of life-preservers. . . . When the hostile fire had ceased, two United States boats came alongside and the few of us who still remained on board got in. The enemy did no more than just step on deck, and upon realizing the situation, returned hastily to the boats, fearing an explosion, which, indeed, occurred soon after we had sheered off from the ship, and she sank about a mile from the shore.[1]

Says the commander of the *Plutón:*

After I emerged from the harbor I was greeted by a hail of projectiles. This was the beginning of the battle and the fire increased as I advanced and got into the midst of the hostile fleet. About 10.45 a large-calibre shell entered the orlop, which rapidly filled with water and the ship pitched forward. Almost at the same time other projectiles hit the forward boilers, which burst. Another entered the ammunition-room of my cabin, and besides causing a leak, started a fire in that quarter.[2]

The *Plutón,* now unmanageable but fortunately heading shore-

[1] Lieutenant-Commander Diego Carlier, *Report* in Cervera's *Documents,* 132.
[2] Lieutenant-Commander Pedro Vázquez, *Report* in Cervera's *Documents,* 133.

ward, struck the rocky shore, her bows remaining out of the water; her after body sinking.

The fact that all except the *Brooklyn*[1] fired upon the destroyers, fixed in a decisive way the general situation of the ships of the American squadron. None at 10.15 could have been west of Cabrera Point, toward which the Spanish admiral had just turned in, nor for some little time thereafter. At 10.15 the destroyers had been but about five minutes in the open sea; it was a half hour later that one was sunk but three miles from the entrance and three miles east of Cabrera Point; the other ashore a mile west of her sunken companion. For much of this time the well advanced ship, the *Oregon*, was using against them her 6-pounders, as were also, nearer by, the *Texas*, *Iowa*, and *Indiana*. The use of their 6-pounders by all of these, indicates a moderate range, which during the firing from 10.15 to 10.20 would place the *Oregon* about two miles east of Cabrera Point, or four from the harbor entrance.[2] By 10.30, however, the destroyers were left to the *Gloucester*, the battle-ships, all of which had meanwhile been steadily going west, hurrying after the armored cruisers.

Says Lieutenant Eberle:

> While our after-guns were firing on the torpedo-boats, our forward guns were hammering away at the third and fourth armored vessels, which were now on our starboard bow, in a broken column. The *Brooklyn* was on our port bow, engaging the two leading ships. The *Teresa* was farther offshore than the other three vessels, and was being passed by them. We brought her sharp on our starboard bow, and as we gained on her our forward guns engaged her at two thousand yards' range when (about ten minutes after 10) we discovered her to be on fire. The *Teresa* was soon left behind by the other vessels. Smoke and flames were pouring from her upper works, and the sight of her hopeless condition served to double the energy of our ships, for their fire became more rapid and deadly than ever. The *Oregon*, *Texas*, and *Iowa* hurled their terrific broadsides into her as she turned inshore and steamed slowly for the beach at Juan Gonzales, six miles

[1] Says Captain Cook, of the *Brooklyn:* "I have no personal knowledge of the movements of the torpedo-boats, as they were too far away and obscured by smoke, and I was intent upon the main fleet." "Story of the Captains," *The Century Magazine*, May, 1899, p. 97. Commodore Schley says: "The smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This doubtless was better seen from your flagship." (*Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, App., 517.)

[2] The *Oregon's* speed record would also give her this position.

from Santiago. Only forty minutes had elapsed since the stately *Teresa* had led the column out of the harbor. She boldly went to her death, fighting her guns until overwhelmed by fire and shell.

The *Oregon* now charged on after the *Oquendo*, and opened on her with the forward guns, and also with all the guns of the starboard battery as soon as they could be brought to bear. For a while the enemy's vessels appeared badly bunched. The *Colón* was just passing inshore of the *Vizcaya*, and the *Oquendo* was in a direct line between us and those two ships. We closed rapidly on the *Oquendo*, and, at a range of nine hundred yards, poured into her the hottest and most destructive fire of that eventful day. Each gun-captain fought his gun as if victory depended upon him alone, and within twelve minutes after the *Teresa* had given up the fight the *Oquendo* was burning fiercely. She too turned inshore, with port helm heading slightly to the eastward; and as we drew her abeam, our guns raked her unmercifully. The *Oquendo* made the pluckiest fight and suffered the most severe punishment, as is attested by her torn and battered hull, which rested upon the beach half a mile west of the *Teresa*. When flames burst from the *Oquendo*, and she turned inshore, Captain Clark, who was standing on top of the forward thirteen-inch turret, called out to me, "We have settled another; look out for the rest!" This was answered by a mighty cheer, which was repeated through the ammunition passages and magazines, and down among the heroes of the boiler and engine rooms.

"At twenty-five minutes to 11," says Captain Philip, "as the *Texas* passed the *Oquendo*, that ship ran up the white flag, and I gave the order 'Cease firing.' The *Oregon* and *Brooklyn* were in the lead, the *Oregon* considerably farther inshore, hammering at the *Vizcaya* and *Colón*. The two Spanish ships (*Maria Teresa* and *Oquendo*) were ashore, burning fiercely. We could see boatloads of men leaving them."[1] Some had leaped overboard before reaching the shore, and the *New York* in passing, twenty minutes later than the time noted by Captain Philip of the *Oquendo's* surrender, threw life-buoys to one, and a little after, nothing else being available, the ship's pulpit, which had been got up for the usual Sunday service, was thrown by the captain's coxswain to a man of powerful physique, stripped to the skin, who cried for aid.[2]

[1] Captain Philip, "Story of the Captains," *Century Magazine*, May, 1899, 93.

[2] 10.55 A. M. Threw life-preserver to a Spaniard in the water. Now abreast the two burning ships, the *Maria Teresa* and *Almirante Oquendo*. At 11.10 A. M. threw life-preservers to a second Spaniard in the water." (Official notes taken on bridge of *New York*.) The second man had probably leaped overboard from the *Vizcaya*.

The situation of the crews of the burning ships could not but wring the hearts of all witnessing it, but the fact that two other ships were ahead made it impossible for the flag-ship to do otherwise than leave the immediate duty of rescue to the *Gloucester* and *Hist*, a duty nobly performed, in which the *Ericsson*, *Iowa*, and *Harvard* later joined.

The *Indiana*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, *Oregon*, and *Brooklyn* were now on the *New York's* port bow, from east to west, in the order named. All the five were firing upon the *Vizcaya;* the *Brooklyn* also, while in range, upon the *Colón*, which was rapidly increasing distance. The *Oregon* "opened with her forward guns" upon the *Vizcaya*, "now two miles away." "The *Brooklyn*, still on our port bow, was apparently about two miles off the *Vizcaya's* port beam, and all three vessels were firing furiously. The *Colón*, now far ahead and close inshore, was increasing her lead."[1] The *Vizcaya* at a quarter to 11 "was still firing; occasionally and at long intervals our ships took a well-aimed shot at her. We could see that she was afire and that her surrender was only a question of time. Just after 11 o'clock she veered toward the shore."[2] Her worst punishment had been received from the *Oregon* as she turned in.[3] The *Oregon*, *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *New York*, and *Vixen* continued on after the *Colón*.

Says Philip:

As we drew up to the *Vizcaya*, a moment or two later, her stern flag came down on the run. There were colors still flying from her truck, however, and as she displayed no white flag some of our officers thought she might not yet have surrendered, and that the stern flag might have been shot away. But we could not fire on her even if she had not surrendered.[4] Flames were shooting from her deck fore and aft, and as

[1] Lieutenant Eberle, "Story of the Captains," *Century Magazine*, May, 1899, 108.

[2] Philip, *ibid.*, 94.

[3] See Lieutenant Eberle, *ibid.*, 107, 108.

[4] The *Vizcaya* [Biscay] carried a beautiful silk flag, the gift of the historical society of the ancient province of the same name, and knowing the ship lost, Eulate had it lowered and burned, hoisting another one to the main truck, and this one was never lowered until the fire caused the whole mast to fall into the flames." (Concas, 78). This latter statement is an error; there was no flag flying aboard, as the *Vizcaya* crossed the bows of the *New York* at close hand. The mainmast stood until long after her grounding. (F. E. C.)

her nose touched the beach two tremendous explosions in succession literally shook her to pieces. The *Iowa* had been signalled by Admiral Sampson to go in to her. I determined to push on with the *Texas* to render assistance, if any were needed, in capturing the last survivor of the squadron.[1]

The *New York* hailing the *Iowa* asked if she had had any losses. Says Captain Evans: "As she passed, my men gave Sampson cheer after cheer, and I shall never forget the yell that came from her deck, as in reply to the commander-in-chief's hail, 'How many men have you lost?' I answered, 'Not a man hurt aboard the ship.'"

Captain Philip's account condenses events somewhat; the *Vizcaya* had headed in for shore at 11.15,[2] moving very slowly; the flames were not yet visible, for as she crossed the bows of the *New York* at the distance of much less than a mile smoke only was ascending at the mainmast. Fire undoubtedly was raging below, for the men were rapidly hurrying forward and assembling at the bows, "the crews were face to face, and we looked at each other—victors and vanquished—the former without a cheer, the latter huddled forward, clear of the flames, without sound or movement, but with emotions of the sort for which no dictionary has a transliteration. We were abreast of her almost at the moment of her striking on the reef, inside of which is the little harbor of Aserraderos, and above which, on the hill, was the Cuban camp where, on the 20th of June, Garcia had met our admiral and General Shafter. After we had gone miles to the west of her, we saw a cloud of smoke, mounting straight into the air, quite a thousand feet in height, from the explosion of her forward magazine."[3]

The signal from the *New York* to the *Iowa* mentioned by Captain Philip was "Blockading vessels will return to their respective stations," and was recorded as made at 11.43. The *Indiana* had

[1] Philip, "Story of the Captains," *Century Magazine*, 94.

[2] "At 11.15 the *Vizcaya* reported as heading in for the beach." Official times taken on the bridge of the *New York*. *Schley Court of Inquiry*, II, Appendix, 109.

[3] Captain Chadwick, "Story of the Captains," *Century Magazine*, 113. The time of the explosion was noted in the official notes taken aboard the *New York* as 11.35; a second explosion as at 11.56.

been signalled at 11.27 by the *New York* some time after passing her, to return to her blockading position, it being feared that the *Alvarado* and *Reina Mercedes* in the harbor might take advantage of the absence of all the ships to raid the transports off Siboney. As the *Indiana* apparently had not understood, she was again signalled at 11.36, "Go back to entrance of harbor." The *Indiana* returned, but the *Iowa*, seeing the explosions of the *Vizcaya*, remained and turned to the rescue of the *Vizcaya's* men, aided by the *Hist* and the torpedo-boat *Ericsson*, which latter had signalled asking permission to continue in the chase, but had been refused.

The *Cristóbal Colón* was at noon steaming some 14¼ knots, but from 12 to 1 her pursuers were all gaining. The *Brooklyn* in this hour made an average of 90.5 turns with the starboard engine, and 93 with the port, which gave her a speed of 14.6 knots. The *Oregon's* steam log shows 113 turns on the starboard and 108.5 on the port, equivalent to 15.42 knots; the *Texas* was making 95.2 turns on the port engine; the starboard not noted; if both were alike she was making 13.8 knots. The *New York* made for the hour an average of 86.9 turns on the starboard and 86.5 on the port screw, the equivalent of 13.92 knots. The last of the latter's six boilers, however, was connected at 12.40 and the engines were "making thereafter from 96 to 104 revolutions per minute,"[1] the average of which, 100 turns, gave 16.05 knots.

Says Captain Concas:

The situation of the *Cristóbal Colón* could not possibly have been more critical. She was closely pursued by the *Oregon*, which could sink her without herself receiving the least injury, and the *Brooklyn*, an armored cruiser of more speed and better armament, and the *New York* and *Texas* steadily gaining on her—a powerful combination from which it was impossible to escape; and to make the situation still more difficult, the *Oregon* was located in the dead angle on the upper deck. As already stated, the *Colón* did not have her 30-ton guns. Thus she could not fire without lying to, thereby losing her only chance of safety.[2]

[1] Steam log of the *New York*, July 3, 1898.
[2] Concas, 78. Navy Department translation.

The *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Texas*, and the little *Vixen* were well seaward, the *New York* close in under the high mountains, which here rose directly from the shore.[1]

At ten minutes to 1 Captain Clark gave orders to "Try a 13-inch shell." Fired with the range of 8,500 yards, the shot fell short; as did to a much greater extent the 8-inch of the *Brooklyn*, which now followed suit; two 8-inch, fired by the *Oregon*, had the same fate. The splash of each shell in the water was noted with intense eagerness by the men of the *New York*, gathered forward, and as the *Oregon* increased the range of her 13-inch, cheers went up as each shot went nearer the mark. The fifth shot at 9,500 yards (nearly five and a half land-miles), fell considerably over; the sixth, at 9,000 yards, fired at 1.15 went slightly beyond the *Colón*. It was clear that the chase was won; the *Colón* wavered a few moments, hauled down her colors, and turned inshore.[2] Says Commodore Paredes, the second in command of the squadron, whose broad pennant was in the ship:

At 1 o'clock P. M. the pressure of the boilers began to go down, decreasing the revolutions from 85 to 80, and the *Oregon* commenced to gain on us and soon after opened fire with her heavy guns, which I could only answer with gun No. 2 of the battery, while the distance between us grew constantly shorter. In view of this fact, and the absolute certainty of being captured by the enemy, I acted with your Excellency's [the admiral's] sanction, as it was not expedient to call any of the officers from their posts, which in view of the structure and arrangement of the hatchways would have meant a loss of very precious time. Animated by the desire to take advantage to the last moment of any opportunity to fire which might present itself, and in order to prevent being captured, I decided to run ashore and lose the ship rather than sacrifice in vain the lives of all these men who, as your Excellency is aware, had fought with brilliant heroism and great discipline and coolness. I therefore shaped our course for the mouth of the Turquino River

[1] It is very difficult to see a ship, particularly when painted a dull gray, under high land, even at a very moderate distance. The *New York* thus escaped observation from the other ships, which, with the background of a clear sky, were so plainly visible from the *New York*.

[2] 1.15 P. M. The *Oregon* fired a 13-inch shell which fell very close to the *Colón*, and it was thought the latter had been struck, as thick black smoke arose. This was a few moments before it was reported that she was heading for the beach. (Official times taken from the bridge of the *New York*.)

and ran aground on the beach at 2 o'clock P. M. at a speed of 13 knots.[1]

The distance of the *Oregon* at the moment of the *Colón's* surrender is fixed by her range as about 4¼ nautical miles; that of the *Brooklyn* some little distance seaward, on the *Oregon's* port side, was about the same; the *Texas* and *Vixen* were some six miles farther east; the *New York* was 8 miles north-east by east of the *Oregon*, and, as mentioned, close under the land. The

[1] Report of Commodore Paredes to Admiral Cervera. Cervera, *Documents*, 27. The commodore, it should be observed, makes no mention of hauling down his colors. It is certainly not clear what he could have meant by "taking advantage to the last moment of any opportunity to fire which might present itself," if the colors were down and the ship surrendered. No colors were observed from the *New York* as flying, when the ship turned inshore. The various reports are, however, curiously conflicting in regard to this. The *Brooklyn's* record of signals gives:

"1.15 P. M. *Colón* fired a lee gun and hauled down her flag.
"1.25 P. M. *Brooklyn* to *Oregon:* 'The enemy has surrendered.'
"1.26 P. M. Cease firing.
"1.26 P. M. Keep your guns loaded and trained on the enemy."

At this time the *Colón* had not yet covered the at least two miles from the point of turning to the shore.

The *Oregon's* log notes: "At 1.20 *Brooklyn* to *Oregon*, 805 (The enemy has surrendered), but no mention is made of the *Colón* in the log from 12 to 4 P. M., until the remark: "At 3 stopped ship two cables length off shore of the Spanish ship *Cristóbal Colón*, which had hauled down her flag and run ashore."

The log of the *Texas* says: "At 1.20 the chase hauled in toward shore and ran bow on beach, hauling down colors."

Admiral Sampson's account says: "Only a few shots were fired when the *Oregon* placed a shell beyond her, whereupon she ported her helm, hauled down her flag, and made for the beach." (Sampson, "The Atlantic Fleet in the Spanish War," *Century Magazine*, 910.)

Commodore Schley in his report says the *Colón* "fired a lee gun and struck her flag at 1.15 P. M." (*Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 518.)

Captain Cook: "The *Colón* ran into a bight of land, beached, fired a gun to leeward, and hauled down her flag." (*Ibid.*, 523.)

Captain Clark: "As she struck the beach her flag came down, and the *Brooklyn* signalled 'Cease firing.'" (*Ibid*, 526.) As noted above, this signal was made from the *Brooklyn* at 1.26, before the *Colón* could have been ashore.

Captain Philip gives the hour as 1.20 "when the *Colón* sheered in to the beach and hauled down her colors, leaving them on deck at the foot of the flagstaff." (*Ibid.*, 528.)

If the *Colón's* colors were down when she turned in (as has always been the recollection of the writer), the nearer ships would have been fully justified in bringing her to by a shot across the bows and in firing into her had she not stopped. They would have been equally justified under any circumstances in firing until the colors were lowered, and particularly so when seeing it was

Colón was between two and three miles from the shore. She stood in at a moderate speed,[1] and she grounded within a very few feet of the beach, upon a steep shelving bank, shortly after half-past 1. The *New York*, passing the *Texas* and *Vixen*, stopped at 2 o'clock, near the *Colón*, the *Oregon* somewhat seaward, the *Brooklyn* further out. At 1.45, the *Colón* now ashore, the *Brooklyn* signalled the *New York:* "We have gained a great victory. Details will be communicated." The *New York* made general signal, five minutes later, "Report casualties."[2]

the intention of the Spanish commander to destroy his ship by running her ashore. Captain Concas (*The Squadron of Admiral Cervera*, 79) says: "The ship being lost beyond human help, as Admiral Sampson states in his official report, Commodore Paredes and the captain of the *Colón*, inspired by a high sense of duty, and before the enemy was able to prevent it, ran the cruiser at full speed against the shore, ordered the valves to be opened, and prepared for the bitter task of lowering his flag—the last brave act in that bloody and fruitless drama." The captain is mistaken in saying that the running ashore was done "before the enemy was able to prevent it." There was ample time, as just mentioned, to have fired many shots during the interval, and it is at least to the credit of American humanity that they were withheld, if Captain Concas's statement is correct.

The opening of the valves had been arranged before leaving Santiago, not only aboard the *Colón*, as mentioned by her captain, Moreu, at Toulon, but for the *Maria Teresa*. Captain Concas himself mentions this, saying: "I had arranged with the two principal engineers everything necessary for sinking the ship" (p. 79). It may be taken for granted that it was the same in the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo*. Admiral Sampson was very insistent with the navy department that the commodore and captain aboard the *Colón* should be brought before a court of investigation. It is difficult to see how the destruction of the ship, after the lowering of the colors, whether this was at 1.15 or 1.20 or after grounding, can be reconciled with the Spanish sentiment of *pundonor*.

[1] Certainly not the 13 knots mentioned by Commodore Paredes.

[2] The times of these signals appear in the *Brooklyn's* signal record as 1.45 and 1.50; in that of the *New York* as 2.00 and 2.05. As the *New York* stopped (at 2), the *Brooklyn's* time may be taken to be correct.

The time notes aboard the several ships were in many cases memories. One of the most extraordinary mistakes appears in the record of times made in the log aboard the *Vixen*, viz.: that "at 2.25, the *Vixen* stopped off Rio Tarquino (Turquino) in the neighborhood of the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*. The *New York* arrived from three to five minutes later." The photograph reproduced, and which could only have been taken from the *Texas*, shows the *New York* (with the signal noted, flying) passing the *Vixen* at a very high speed. Commander Alexander Sharp, then in command of the *Vixen*, has stated to the writer that seeing this photograph recalled to his recollection the fact of the *New York's* passing. The mistake is but an example of the fact that in cases of great excitement, it is difficult to form a true mental picture.

The *New York* and *Vixen* about 1.50 p. m., July 3, 1898

Captain Cook, of the *Brooklyn*, had already reached the *Colón*, and a few minutes after 2 o'clock reached the *New York* and reported having received her surrender. Captain Chadwick, captain of the *New York* and chief of staff, left at 2.10 for the *Colón*, taking with him an engineer officer and several others to examine and secure the ship. He found Commodore Paredes and Captain Moreu in the cabin taking a plate of soup, and the crew quietly standing about. The ship was lying with her bows in seventeen feet of water but a few feet from the shore, which shelved so rapidly that there were sixty feet of water at the stern. An examination revealed considerable water in the ship, but as the captain declared everything tight, that there was nothing open, it was at first supposed this was the result of injuries either received during the action or from running ashore. A number of men were sent from the *New York* and signal was made to the squadron at 2.43 to hoist out all boats and send for the prisoners. At 2.45 Captain Clark, of the *Oregon*, was signalled for, it being the admiral's wish to place the *Oregon* in charge and have her furnish the prize crew as a compliment to the ship whose gunfire had brought the *Colón* to. It was still believed that the *Colón* could be floated and that her valves were secure, and preparations were made for hauling her off. Despite the assurances of the captain later to Admiral Sampson on the quarter-deck of the *New York* that all valves were closed (an answer made to the admiral's direct inquiry in the presence of the writer), the increase of water and the evidence of the after torpedo-port into which the water began to lap, showed that facts were otherwise. The bulkheads had been secured and every effort was made by the *Oregon's* men, in charge of the executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Caldwell, supplementing the work already done, to keep the ship afloat by the force of machinists and firemen which had been sent from the *New York*. Her bows only were grounded. At 6.10 a signal was sent from the *Colón:* "Six feet of water in the hold; it is up to the cylinders"; and at 7.45: "*Colón* is afloat and leaking badly. Should not boats and *Vixen* be close in case she founders?"[1]

It was clear that the ship, if left where she was, would sink in

[1] *Oregon's* log.

water of great depth. Both anchors were therefore let go and the *New York*, steaming close inshore, and with the light of her search-lights, put her bows against the starboard quarter of the *Colón* just forward of one of the six-inch guns, which gave a fixed support, and pushed the ship's stern to port and then inshore, so that she was bows seaward, with both anchors down and chains paid out to the bitter ends. The flag-ship, backing, now placed her stem by that of the *Colón*, secured the two together by a hawser, and pushed the latter in on the beach until the stern took the ground. This was all that could be done, beyond running a hawser to some trees on the hillside, which, by the admiral's orders, was done later by the *Texas*. The only thing remaining was to get our own men and the prisoners off the ship. All were safely removed, and at 10.30 the ship sank, turning on her side, as was unavoidable in such conditions. Had the water been shoal, and she had thus not sunk so deeply, she would have remained upright and could have been easily recovered. She rested for two-thirds of her length on the shelving bank, the remainder of her length hanging over into very deep water, wholly submerged for two-thirds of her length.

Commodore Don José de Paredes y Chacon, Captain Don Emilio Diaz Moreu, the commodore's aide, Lieutenant Don Pueblo (Pablo) Marina y Bringas and their servants were received aboard the *New York*, and the remainder, 14 officers and 494 men, were sent aboard the *Resolute*, Lieutenant Lane and 25 marines being sent from the *New York* as a guard. At 11 the *Resolute* left for Guantánamo.

At 11.30 the flag-ship left for Santiago, leaving the *Texas* and *Oregon* near the *Colón*. For the first time since the blockade had begun, the interior lights of the ships were turned on; a relief which can only be appreciated by those who have undergone a night-watch of many weeks in the gloom of darkened "between decks."

DISCUSSION OF THE CHART OF THE SHIPS' POSITIONS.

The initial positions of the ships on the accompanying chart have been laid down after a very careful comparison of all the evidence on the subject. The distances of the larger ships are thus put from three to four and a half miles from the harbor entrance.

The general distance established by the admiral's order was, during the day, not to exceed four miles; that at night was less.

The starting-points in the present chart are those of the *Oregon* and *Iowa*, both of which are placed a little short of four miles out; the *Iowa*, due south of the entrance, the *Oregon* somewhat east of it. Lieutenant (now Rear-Admiral) Reginald Nicholson, the navigator of the *Oregon*, gives this as the usual distance of his ship, with the *Brooklyn* distant from her usually four miles. (*Schley Court of Inquiry*, I, 1115.)

The positions of the other ships (except that of the *New York*) are naturally and necessarily, in the circumstances of the very conflicting evidence, somewhat of a compromise. It is, however, reasonable to suppose that they would not differ in any remarkable way from those of the *Iowa* and *Oregon*, regarding which there is little or no dispute. The navigator of the *Iowa* stated the *Brooklyn* to be just abeam of the *Iowa* at the time of the exit of the *Maria Teresa*, the *Iowa* then heading directly toward the entrance.

It should be premised that there were two elements of inaccuracy in the establishment of the positions of the blockading ships: one in that the stadimeter of the time was not dependable for distances over 4,000 yards; the other in the want of accuracy in the charts of the period both as to heights and distances. One officer stated (though, it should be said, on recollection only) (*Schley Court of Inquiry*, I, 581) that 168 feet were taken as the height of the Morro light-house. The plateau on which the light-house was built, is itself 210 feet. Using the lesser height would of course put the ship much nearer than it should be.

Captain Taylor, of the *Indiana*, regarded his ship at the time of the sortie of the Spanish ships as 4,300 yards from the Morro. Captain Concas, of the *Maria Teresa*, who, as mentioned, went to the harbor entrance on the fateful Sunday morning with the special view of determining the positions of the American ships, places the *Indiana* at 8,746 yards away. The compromise position of 6,000 yards from the middle of the entrance has been taken, as, while nearer than the distance mentioned in the admiral's standing order, it is not unduly in disaccord with the situations of the *Iowa* and *Oregon* and of the *New York* before she moved eastward. Lieutenant (now Commander) Mark Bristol, of the

Texas, by sextant measurement, using the Socapa and Cabañas Bay as a base line and the light-house as a vertical point of measurement, placed the *Texas* 5,100 yards away. The fact that this would place the *Texas* nearly half-way in from the fairly acknowledged positions of the *Iowa* and *Oregon*, and also that the charts as mentioned were so extremely inaccurate as to the coast-line, prevent a full acceptance of the distance stated, and 6,800 yards are taken as more probable. Even so, she is thus nearer the harbor than any others except the *Indiana* and *Gloucester*.

The distance of the *Brooklyn*, usually given by her officers as from 6,000 to 6,300 yards, is established on the present chart at 8,500 yards by taking the position given the *Texas* on the chart as a point of departure, and placing the *Brooklyn* at the distance and on the bearing which were established, by observation, by Lieutenant Bristol, and which appear upon the chart prepared by him (*Schley Court of Inquiry*, I, 802), and by her bearing from the *Iowa* stated by Lieutenant Schuetze. Captain Concas mentions 9,843 yards as an approximate distance of the *Brooklyn*, adding that "from an elevation of about forty feet [the *Brooklyn's*] water line could scarcely be seen." Such a height puts the horizon at over 12,000 yards. Concas gives 9,483 yards as about the radius of the semicircle of ships. In the indefiniteness of most of the authorities it would be quite unfair to put aside entirely the findings of Captain (now Admiral) Concas. His scientific and general reputation; his deliberate reconnaissance under circumstances of the weightiest moment possible; his personal interest in accuracy, constrain one in all fairness to give at least some weight to what he has said.

Assuming the *New York's* blockading position to have been as shown (and it is as nearly correct as can be determined), the engines began to move at 8.50. She was turned from her heading of about W.N.W. to E.½N. and stood for Siboney "making about 54 revolutions" (*steam log*). She ran thus until 9.35, when she turned westward.

While thus striving for accuracy in these positions, extreme accuracy in such a situation cannot be of any real importance. Given the circumstances of a narrow stretch of water in which were a waiting line of ships and an advancing enemy, the question whether this strip of sea was three or five miles broad can

have but little moment; practically none in the fifty miles of distance to be run between Santiago entrance and the Rio Turquino. The main question is in the speeds and consequent positions of the ships after the action was well on. Of the correctness of these there can only be such doubt as any standard is subject to. Short of actual cross bearings, that taken, *viz.*, the turns of the screws, is the best.

The short distances made by all the ships between 9.40 (which may very properly be taken as the time when the engines were fairly started) will be a surprise to many. It should be said that there is even a very appreciable interval between starting the engines and getting any real movement on the ship at all. From ten to twelve minutes were usually taken as the time necessary to acquire full speed from rest.

The following tabulation[1] gives the data on which the speeds of the ships are based:

TAKEN AT TIME OF ACTION

NAME OF SHIP	REVOLUTIONS PER KNOT	AVERAGE REVOLUTIONS PER MINUTE				
		FROM 9.30 TO 10 A.M.	FROM 10 TO 11 A.M.	FROM 11 TO 12 A.M.	FROM 12 TO 1 P.M.	FROM ONE TO 2 P.M.
New York	6.2	68.25	73.	76.75	86.75	94.[2]
Brooklyn	6.3	52.5	81.	90.	91.75	no record[2]
Oregon (below 14 knots)	7.0	27.25	107.1	107.25	110.75	no record[2]
Oregon (above 14 knots	7.5					
Iowa	7.44	26.25	58.50	40.75	....	....
Texas	6.89	no record	82.	82.	95.3	89.25
No data for starboard engine; assumed same as port engine.						
Indiana:						
slow speed. for 100 turns at	8.57		71.	65.9[3]		
13½ knots	7.39					

[1] Supplied by the Bureau of Steam Engineering, U. S. Navy Department.

[2] The *New York* and *Oregon* slowed at 1.30. The *Brooklyn's* steam log says: "Half speed at 1.17 and stopped at 1.19, after which engines were worked several times to signals." At the times noted, however, the *Brooklyn* was at least five miles from the place of the *Colón's* grounding. The note in the log is thus necessarily an error.

[3] The *Indiana's* revolutions for these two hours are from her steam log.

This gives a rate of speed up to 10 o'clock: for the *Brooklyn* of 8.33 knots; for the *Oregon*, 3.88; for the *Iowa*, 3.53. They were presumably actually under way from 9.40, so that in the intervening twenty minutes from that time to 10, and disregarding any question of time necessary to rise to full speed, the *Brooklyn* made 2.78 knots; the *Oregon*, 1.29; the *Iowa*, 1.18; the *Indiana*, 1.06. There is no record in the hour 9 to 10 for the *Texas*, but she was slow in getting headway.

The *Maria Teresa*, first sighted at 9.35, cleared the entrance at 9.40 and headed in the direction of the *Brooklyn*. The *Iowa* fires her first shot (12-inch) at "about" 6,000 yards (three nautical miles). The *Brooklyn* heading W.N.W. starts first in that direction, then turns to the northward and eastward, fires an 8-inch gun on the port bow, and at "about" 10.00 turns with port helm, causing the *Texas* to stop and back. The time used on the chart for this is 10 o'clock, as more fully satisfying all conditions, than any other. With the turn completed (this completion, being taken as at 10.05), and the *Brooklyn* again heading westward, the *Vizcaya* bore, according to Lieutenant Hodgson, her navigator, 2,400 or 2,500 yards on her starboard bow, the *Colón* "probably on the beam or a little forward of the beam, the *Oquendo* abaft the starboard beam." (*Court of Inquiry*, I 572.)

The *Maria Teresa* had received two 12-inch shells, stated by Captain Concas as from the *Iowa*, and, badly injured, had turned, toward the shore, heading slowly for her point of grounding, still nearly four miles away.

The *Vizcaya* (the second ship to come out) turned, about now, somewhat to the southward, soon resuming her westerly course. The *Oquendo*, the last of the large ships, and subjected to the fire of all except the *Brooklyn*, suffered heavily, but preserving her speed, passed the *Maria Teresa* and grounded at nearly the same time.

At 10.05 the first torpedo-boat, the *Furor*, came out, followed by the *Plutón*.

The *Vizcaya* escaped the earlier damage of the *Maria Teresa* probably by the fact that attention was first fixed upon the latter. The time of her starting to turn in was taken aboard the *New York* as at 11.15. Lieutenant Hodgson gives the same time. As

mentioned, she crossed the *New York's* bows at a very short distance from the latter. Smoke was then rising about the mainmast but flames did not appear until after she grounded on the reef a half mile from shore and 14¾ miles west of Santiago entrance. The first explosion aboard was noted by the *New York* as at 11.35. The *New York* was then some distance to the westward.

The chase was now reduced to the *Colón*. The positions of the ships which followed are noted on the chart by their speeds, determined by the recorded revolutions of the engines, in the cases of the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and *New York;* in those of the *Texas* and *Vixen*, chiefly by observation and notes.

The *Brooklyn*, heading for Cape Cruz (report of Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Cook (*Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, *Appendix*, 523), and the *Oregon*, were, as a rule, considerably further offshore than the *Colón*.

The position of the *Colón* at 1.15 is of course practically accurate, as it is fixed by the range (9,000 yards) of the shot fired at that time by the *Oregon*. This shot went just beyond her. The fall of each shot fired toward the end of the chase was observed with considerable precision aboard the *New York*, as from the position, inshore, of the latter, she was at quite an angle with the *Oregon's* course. The men of the *New York* were of course excited observers of these shot and cheered each which fell near the *Colón*.

From 10 o'clock to 1.15 (the hour taken as that of the surrender of the *Colón*) the hourly runs were, by the data of the tabulation given above, as follows:

	10 to 11	11 to 12	12 to 1	1 to 1.15
Oregon	14.29	14.3	14.76	3.69[1]
Brooklyn	12.86	14.29	14.56	3.64
New York	11.77	12.38	13.98	4.03
Texas	11.9	11.9	13.83	3.46

[1] The average revolutions of the previous hour are used for this, as all ships slowed about 1.30, except that 100 turns are used from 1 to 1.15 for the *New York*, she having connected her last boiler at 12.40, "making thereafter," says the steam log, "96 to 104 turns." About 1, word was brought from the engine-room to the captain that they were making 108 turns. This last would give 17.4 knots.

The *Oregon* thus made the best speed in this interval of three and a quarter hours, making 47.04 knots at an average of 14.47; the *Brooklyn*, in the same period, ran 45.35 knots, at an average of 13.95; the *New York*, 42.16, at an average of 13.22; the *Texas*, 41.09, at an average of 12.64.

While the averages of the *Oregon* and *Brooklyn* are higher than that of the *New York*, the last largely exceeded the speed of either toward the end of the chase.

The *New York* in the beginning had steam on three boilers and banked fires on a fourth. This latter was connected for steaming at 10.10, a fifth at 11.50, and the sixth at 12.40.

The *Brooklyn* had steam on three boilers, a fourth was connected at 11.40, and a fifth at 12.43. Two others were not ready for use until after the *Colón* surrendered.

The *Oregon* had steam on all her four main boilers from the beginning, as also the *Texas* and *Indiana*.

The *New York* and *Brooklyn* had two complete sets of engines, a great disadvantage. As the ships were capable of high speed with a single set (over 17 knots) and keeping them coupled caused a greater expenditure of coal on account of the increased friction during the very frequent movements at low speed which were necessary to keep position, they were uncoupled and only the after set used. To stop and couple was practically out of the question in such a chase.

The *Colón*, taking her time of coming out as 9.48, made an average of 14.78 knots up to the time of turning in, having run 51 miles in 3 hours and 27 minutes. Her speed of about 16.3 knots between her 10.05 and 11.15 positions enabled her to gain the distance on the other ships shown on the chart. Her average speed after 11.15 (leaving aside her several changes of course) was 14.25 knots. The interval began to be shortened at noon.

CHAPTER VIII

AFTER THE BATTLE

THE *Resolute*, which but the morning of the battle had arrived off Santiago with the mines proposed to be used in countermining the entrance, had appeared at 3.45 at the Rio Turquino, and signalled that she had sighted a Spanish battle-ship off Daiquiri; had been chased by her; that fifteen vessels at Daiquiri had been warned off by the *Harvard*, and that she had communicated with the *Indiana* and *Iowa*, which were going east. The "Spaniard" was described as having a superstructure, armored tops, and as low fore and aft.

The *Resolute*, with her cargo of high explosives and unarmed but for her two 6-pounders, had, as the Spanish ships came out, very properly steamed eastward out of danger; the flag-ship on meeting her had signalled her to return to Guantánamo, and when off Daiquiri, five miles east of Siboney, she sighted, in the words of Commander Eaton's report, "a large man-of-war, painted a dingy white, with two funnels and two military tops, standing to the westward. On proceeding nearer, made out what I took to be the Spanish flag, together with a signal which I could not read."[1] The stranger, as the *Resolute* turned seaward, followed the latter. Without waiting to read the signal, and apparently without weighing the extreme improbability of an enemy coming singly to a port known to be blockaded by a powerful fleet and signalling his arrival, the *Resolute*, deceived by the similarity of the Spanish and Austrian flags, started westward at full speed, warning the transports at Siboney, which at once scattered many miles seaward. The *Harvard*,[2] which had been lying at anchor

[1] *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 554.

[2] The American Line steamer *New York*, thus renamed for the war. One of the war "historians" gravely stated this ship to be the flag-ship *New York*, and that he had thus seen the latter lying at Siboney with her boats passing to and fro, while the battle was in progress.

at Siboney, seeing the new ship, fell into the same error as the *Resolute*. Both ships went westward blowing their whistles and warning all they met. The *Resolute* communicated her news to the *Indiana* at 12.45 and to the *Iowa* at 1.15. Both these ships prepared for action, the *Iowa* recalling her boats from the *Vizcaya*, where they had been employed in the rescue of the latter's crew, and proceeding eastward to meet the supposed enemy. On the report of Commander Eaton, of the *Resolute*, to the admiral, the *Brooklyn* and *Texas* were ordered to look after the stranger, and at 4.30 the *Brooklyn* left on this duty, the order to the *Texas* being annulled on account of all her boats being engaged in the transportation of prisoners from the *Colón*, and, besides, on account of the great improbability that the strange ship was an enemy; even if she were, two of our heaviest ships were already in the strange ship's vicinity, of themselves much more than ample to look after her.

The *Harvard* and *Resolute*, however, were not the only ones to be deceived by the likeness of the Austrian to the Spanish colors. The *Vixen*, with the assistant chief of staff aboard, had left at 3 P. M. for Siboney to send news of the victory, carrying the following telegram:

"*July* 3, 1898.

"SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, *Washington:*

"The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July present the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9.30 this morning. At 2 the last ship, the *Cristóbal Colón*, had run ashore seventy-five miles west of Santiago and hauled down her colors. The *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya* were forced ashore, burned, and blown up within twenty miles of Santiago. The *Furor* and *Plutón* were destroyed within four miles of the port.

SAMPSON."

At 6.35 the *Vixen* was back, with the signal flying, "I have seen the enemy," and on her report, which for a moment shook the admiral's disbelief, the *Texas* was signalled, "Prepare to chase." The admiral, however, quickly decided that the ship was the Austrian, *Maria Theresa*, whose advent had been announced June 14 by a telegram from the navy department with a suggestion to call attention to the similarity of the Austrian

and Spanish man-of-war flags. It proved as Sampson supposed.

The *Indiana* had met the stranger and had gone again to quarters. "We had already," says Captain Taylor, "been three hours at the guns, preceded by several days of excessive fatigue; but the tremendous cheer with which our crew responded to this call for more fighting was additional and most convincing proof of the instinctive love of battle which has ever distinguished the American seaman. . . . We read her signals, 'I am Austrian,' just in time, at a distance of three miles."[1] An officer came aboard, who presented a request for permission to pass through the blockade and bring out Austrian subjects desiring to leave Santiago. He received the news of the action with a surprise well described by Captain Taylor in his personal account of the day.[2] The torpedo-boat *Ericsson* was sent westward to inform the other ships.

The work of rescue was almost coincident with that of destruction. The *Gloucester*, after the passing of the *New York*, *Hist*, and *Ericsson*, was exposed alone to the fire of the Socapa battery. Says Wainwright:

> But I felt sure that as soon as those in charge of it saw that we were rescuing their own people they would cease to fire at us. So I ordered the boats lowered, and as soon as they cleared the ship the Spanish shells ceased to fall. Every one appeared to wish to engage in the rescue work. Wood and Norman took two boats to the *Furor*, and Procter one to the *Plutón*. Wood, in his report, says:
>
> "On reaching the *Furor*, a scene of horror and wreck confronted us. The ship was riddled by three- and six-pound shells, though I observed no damage by larger projectiles. She was on fire below from stem to stern, and on her spar-deck were the dead and horribly mangled bodies of some twenty of the officers and crew. One of her boats was at the davits, smashed to atoms. Another I afterward found a short distance away, bottom up and stove, but sustaining two survivors, whom I rescued. In the meantime another of the *Gloucester's* boats arrived, and boarded the wreck, in charge of Lieutenant Norman, and between us we saved some ten or twelve of the crew who remained on board. Finding it impossible to save the ship, and fearing damage to our own crew from explosion, I directed our two crews, with the survivors of

[1] Taylor, "Story of the Captains," *Century Magazine*, 71.
[2] *Ibid.*, 62–76.

the *Furor*, to abandon the ship and return to the *Gloucester*. This was done, and I was so fortunate as to find and take with me the *Furor's* ensign."

Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright continues:

When Wood returned with his boat-load of wounded, they were taken on board, and he went back to rescue those in the water and on shore. I picked up Norman's boat, and, leaving Wood and Procter behind, went around the point ahead, where we had last seen the *Teresa* steaming toward shore; for we could see smoke arising over the point in that direction. As we left the *Furor* she was sinking slowly by the stern. A heavy explosion took place, and her bow began to rise rapidly. For a short time she stood on end, and then disappeared from sight, about two hundred yards from the shore.

Procter speaks of his rescue of the *Plutón's* people as follows:

"I made for the *Plutón*, picked up a boat-load of people, and returned. I then went back to the *Plutón*, and attempted to board her; but the surf was too heavy, breaking over her deck. I picked up a boat-load, and then landed in a cove near the wreck. In the meanwhile the other boats were picked up, and the *Gloucester* steamed out of sight. I tried, and finally succeeded with difficulty in boarding one half the *Plutón;* but the surf was so heavy and she was bouncing about at such a rate that I could not see much. The mortality was not great from our fire, but large numbers were drowned. I collected another full boat-load of half-drowned and wounded and sent a number aboard a press boat and started for the ship."

Wainwright, proceeding, says:

Rounding the point ahead the *Teresa* and the *Oquendo* came into full view. They were all aflame, and grounded near the beach, and white flags were flying from all parts of the burning vessels. The Spaniards could be seen crowded on the bows, the nearest point to the shore, and many were in the water. We first stopped for a minute to rescue an officer who was floating on a small raft, kneeling with his hands raised to heaven. He proved to be the fleet surgeon, and when taken on board he collapsed from exhaustion. We steamed at full speed close between the burning ships, lowered all our boats, and made every effort to save life. . . .

Norman had already risked his life in rescuing the men from the *Furor*. He reports as follows:

"After the *Gloucester* had steamed to the westward to a point a mile beyond where we had driven the destroyer *Plutón* on the rocks, I went away in charge of the gig to the rescue of the crew of the *Teresa*, who

could be seen crowded on the bows of their ship, the after-part and the waist being afire and burning fiercely. The *Teresa* had been run aground, and lay two hundred yards from the shore. As I approached I could see some of her crew, about a dozen, already upon the beach and surrounded by a little band of Cubans. Mr. Edson, in charge of another of our boats, having carried a line from the bow of the *Teresa* to the shore, we immediately set about disembarking her crew, letting those who were badly wounded be lowered by ropes to our boats, but compelling the uninjured to come down and out on the life-line until they could drop into one of our boats, which we kept a few yards from the ship's side. By using one of our boats to receive the men, and the other to ferry them to the surf, we got ahead rapidly, and in less than three hours had landed all the living from the ship, to the number of 480.

Admiral Cervera was among those thus rescued. Says Wainwright:

I remember well when Norman brought the admiral on board. When I saw that gallant gentleman in his wringing wet underclothes, I felt like a culprit. . . . When the gallant old admiral came on board he was no longer an enemy. Not a man but remembered that he had sent us the news of Hobson's safety, and all felt that he was a brave seaman. His tactics may be questioned but his courage never. I felt proud of the privilege of being the first to congratulate him on his heroic fight.

Lieutenant Wood was doing the same duty for the crew of the *Oquendo*. He describes the conditions:

The burning cruiser, her plates many of them burst outward and red-hot, the roar of the flames, the constant explosions of small-arm ammunition from her guns or of her boilers—this, with the cries of the wretches on her bows for help, all made a scene which was indescribably impressive.[1]

Says Lieutenant Harry P. Huse, the *Gloucester's* executive officer:

When Admiral Cervera came on board the *Gloucester* after his surrender on shore to Lieutenant Norman, he was dressed in a flat white sailor cap, a wet sack-coat, an undershirt, and a torn pair of trousers which might have been discarded by a tramp. He climbed up the

[1] "The Story of the Captains," *The Century Magazine*, May, 1899, pp. 81–84.

rope ladder which was hanging down the ship's side, and as he stepped on board all of the *Gloucester's* crew were drawn up to receive him, and Captain Wainwright stood at the gangway. We had no bugle to sound the proper flourishes, and as our boatswain's mates were all out of the ship, we could not even "pipe the side." The captain held out his hand and congratulated the admiral on the heroic fight he had made. It was just the right thing to do, and perhaps from that moment dates Admiral Cervera's kindly feeling for this country. Captain Wainwright escorted him aft, and I showed him below into the cabin, where the captain's private quarters were placed at his disposal. His son, Don Angel, was with him in the capacity of flag-lieutenant. Captain Concas of the *Maria Teresa* was given my room, and, being wounded, was cared for by our surgeon.

The admiral had been on board only a few minutes when he expressed a desire to see the prisoners forward, especially those who were hurt. The captain gave his consent, and we went forward. The unwounded prisoners were all up in the bows, where a temporary awning had been rigged for them. As they equalled the crew of the *Gloucester* in number, and many of our people were away in boats, a dead-line had been stretched across the deck, and two sailors with loaded rifles stood one at each end, with orders to shoot any Spaniard who should start to pass it. As an additional precaution, a Colt automatic rifle was pointed just over the heads of the prisoners, needing only a touch of the hand from the man stationed by it to start a fire of four hundred shots a minute. As the admiral passed forward, barefoot and ragged, the crew saluted and the sentries presented arms, just as they would have done for our own commander-in-chief. He spoke a few words to his men, and asked if anything could be done for them. He seemed to be satisfied with their answers, and passed on down to the berth-deck, where the wounded lay. His cheery greeting brightened many faces. If I remember correctly, he spoke to each man a few encouraging words, and spent several minutes by the side of Lieutenant Arderius, who had been badly injured on the *Furor*. It was fine to see the gallant old gentleman taking steps to secure the comfort of his men before he allowed any to be taken for his own.

Not much attention had been given to preparations for luncheon. The officers' store-room was almost bare, and when the steward was told to get a meal ready as soon as possible for all the Spanish officers, as well as for those of the ship, he looked a little blank. However, he rose to the emergency, and about 2 o'clock announced that all was ready. The ward-room could not accommodate everybody at the same time, so it was decided that our guests should eat first, and the officers of the ship should wait. Captain Wainwright sent me below to represent him at the first table, and I asked Paymaster Brown to keep us company. Admiral Cervera sat at one end of the table, and I at the other, while the Spanish officers, at the request of the admiral,

seated themselves without regard to rank. Lieutenant Cervera was at my right. I think the admiral was flanked by the captains of the destroyers *Plutón* and *Furor*, Commanders Vazquez and Carlier. Most of the Spaniards were in very informal costume, several having on only a shirt and a pair of trousers, and these in some cases had been furnished from our wardrobes. There had been no opportunity to do more than supply the most urgent needs.

Far from being depressed, the admiral was in high spirits. He had done his duty to the utmost limits, and was relieved of the terrible burden of responsibility that had weighed upon him since leaving the Cape Verde Islands. Perhaps, also, he wished to cheer his fellow-prisoners, for he gave full rein to his naturally genial temperament. I referred to the meagreness of our fare. The admiral expressed his satisfaction at having a meal before him, as he had had only a cup of chocolate brought to him on deck by his servant, very early in the morning, before starting out. For a moment there was silence, and perhaps the same thought occurred to all of us: what great changes had taken place since breakfast! A comparison of notes among the Spanish officers showed that all had breakfasted lightly.

Mr. Brown asked his neighbor why the fleet had not come out at night, and several, hearing the question, turned toward him as if interested in the subject. The answer was that it was impossible to come out in the face of the search-light our battle-ships threw into the entrance. In this all agreed. "We could not," said young Cervera. "Your light was maintained continuously, without interruption, shining right up the channel." I understood from them that it was actually impossible to navigate the ships in the beam, and quite believed it, remembering an experience of my own when the *Brooklyn* threw her light upon us. When I asked why they came out in the face of such crushing superiority, I think it was again Don Angel who answered, shrugging his shoulders: "Your army surrounds the city, and can enter when it chooses; we were driven out." The admiral remarked that he acted under positive orders to come out. I said to Don Angel: "Nous avons remporté la victoire, mais la gloire est à vous." He called to his father at the other end of the table, and repeated the remark. "C'est très bien!" said the old admiral, and he nodded to me approvingly. The remark was repeated in Spanish to those who had not understood the French words, and a murmur of approbation rose from all sides. One officer, who showed signs of the terrible strain he had been subjected to, almost broke down, and tears rolled down his cheeks.

The officers naturally asked one another about their friends on the different ships, and all, especially the admiral, seemed distressed at the death of Dr. L'Allemand, the fleet surgeon. They could hardly believe it when told that he was safe in our sick-bay, having been rescued from a piece of floating wreckage by the dinghy. It is a strange

fact that this man owed his rescue to his religious fervor. From the bridge I had seen the wreckage, and, watching through a binocular for possible signs of life, saw him raise his clasped hands in prayer. But for this movement he would have been lost, for our boat reached him just in time.

Late in the afternoon, the admiral and a few of the higher officers were transferred to the *Iowa*, and all the rest of the unwounded prisoners to the *Indiana*. As far as our limited supplies allowed, they had been clothed and made comfortable. I gave the admiral the only suit of citizen's clothing I had on board. The wounded were taken to Siboney, where room was found for them on the army hospital steamer *Olivette*. One poor fellow had died, and about half-way between Siboney and Santiago, on our return trip, the pipes of the boatswain's mates were followed by the call, "All hands bury the dead." The officers and men mustered on the quarter-deck, the engines were stopped, and the body of the dead sailor, sewed in a hammock and covered with the flag of the *Furor*, was brought aft. The chief master-at-arms, a Roman Catholic, read the service. A sailor's funeral at sea is always impressive, and in this case it seemed a most fitting end to the events of the day. I heard a man say, as he went forward after the ceremony: "If they had hit us only once, there might have been a lot of us dropped overboard to-night instead of that Spaniard." And an answering voice said grimly: "Yes; and perhaps the funeral would have been in the forenoon, and with nobody to read the service."

Chaplain William G. Cassard, of the *Indiana*, says:

As soon as it was apparent that the fight was over, our commanding officer, Captain Taylor, hastened the organization and departure of two volunteer relief parties. Everybody not detained by duty was willing to go. The first party was in command of Lieutenant Benton C. Decker, and went in to the point where the destroyer *Plutón* had been run ashore and abandoned. Mr. Decker went in cautiously, with arms lying convenient for use in case of resistance, as the wrecked *Plutón* was within the Spanish lines to the westward of Santiago. But the few scattered Spaniards had neither means nor disposition to resist. In abandoning the *Plutón*, which lay in the terrific roll of the surf, they had been compelled to swim ashore, had thrown aside their clothing, and were entirely naked. They were, moreover, torn and bleeding from contact with the rocks, against which they had been hurled by the sea; and when Mr. Decker took them into his boat, they lay half dazed and utterly helpless. Seventeen were found at this point and brought off to the *Indiana*, where they were received and cared for with all possible kindness. Among this number was Lieutenant Nonval, a young officer from the destroyer *Furor*. In jumping from

his sinking vessel, his foot had been caught in the propeller and cut off above the ankle. He was in the water for quite a while, and when he finally got ashore improvised a tourniquet from a remnant of clothing which, fortunately, had clung to him, and thus stanched the flow of blood from his wound. He was exhausted and helpless, and Mr. Decker had the men of his party lift him carefully into the boat. When he arrived on board the *Indiana*, it was found necessary to amputate the leg at a higher point, as the bone had been left jagged and exposed by the accident. This operation was performed in the ward-room by our senior surgeon, Dr. Ferebee, and was borne with great fortitude. The lieutenant received the most sympathetic and considerate treatment from all our officers, Mr. Decker being particularly gentle and unremitting in his ministrations. He was sent north in the hospital ship *Solace*.

The second relief expedition went directly in to the shore, where the survivors of the *Teresa* and *Oquendo* were gathered. The officers of this party were Captain Waller of the marine corps, Ensign Olmstead, Assistant Surgeon Costigan, Cadet Helm, and the writer. It was known that many wounded would be found at this point, and we carried large quantities of medical and surgical supplies, in addition to water and hard bread. When we reached the shore we saw a sad and memorable spectacle. On each hand lay the burning ships *Teresa* and *Oquendo*. Explosions on board these ships were frequent, and the guns, which had been left loaded by the escaping crews, were being discharged by the intense heat. The forward magazine of the *Teresa*, with its tons of powder, was still intact, and the Spanish officers expected it to explode at any moment. The Spanish prisoners and our relief party were in great and constant danger from these sources. However, the work of relief went steadily forward, no attention being paid to the dangers of the situation.

We found about six hundred prisoners from the two ships. The large auxiliary cruiser *Harvard* was lying just outside the wrecks, and her boats were carrying off the uninjured. We had our steam-launch, and this was at once put in use towing the *Harvard's* boats. The surf was running high, and our men, in steadying the boats and assisting the prisoners into them, were most of the time in water up to their necks. Not a murmur of complaint was heard, and every one seemed to think of nothing save the work of relief. Before our arrival on shore, owing to the absence of surgeons and medical stores and appliances, nothing had been done for the wounded, of whom there were about forty. We saw only three dead on the beach, and these had been drowned in attempting to get ashore. The *Teresa* and the *Oquendo* were only a few hundred feet offshore, but their crews, having been exhausted by the dreadful ordeal through which they had passed, had been in no condition to battle with the surf, and it is surprising that so few were drowned. One of the bodies found was that of Captain Lazaga, of the *Oquendo*,

who was reported by several newspapers to have committed suicide. We examined his body carefully, and saw no marks of violence, and we were expressly informed that he had been drowned. Those who had been killed in action were burned where they fell, and doubtless many of the wounded who were in inaccessible parts of the ships shared a similar fate. Those of us who saw the quick and fierce destruction of these vessels were not surprised, when subsequently visiting the wrecks, to find charred bodies on every deck.

We began without delay to care for the wounded, some of whom were on rudely improvised palm-leaf litters, while more were lying in the sand, their wounds simply covered with rags. Dr. Costigan went to work with great vigor, and proved himself equal to this emergency of a lifetime. He displayed quick and accurate powers of discrimination in selecting the cases in most urgent need of attention, and great skill and sympathy in his work. Others of our party did all in their power to second the work of the surgeon in the relief of the suffering. One Spanish surgeon had escaped, but was so shattered in nerve and exhausted in body by the awful experiences of the day as to be of little assistance. Yet he said to Dr. Costigan, "We have surrendered; I follow your instructions." He was one of the few prisoners who spoke English, and I said to him, "War is a sad, sad business." "Yes," he answered; "but we have met a brave and kind enemy, and Spanish honor is well now. This will end the war." All the prisoners were parched with thirst, and we met first with pitiful appeals for water, and then with profound thanks as, with cup and canteen, we went about doling it out. It was 8 o'clock before the last prisoner, including the wounded, had been sent off to the *Indiana* and the *Harvard*. As darkness came on, the fire from the burning ships threw a pale and uncertain light upon the tragic scene, and this was re-enforced by the light of a large bonfire which our sailors had built; and in the sombre-shadowed background, against the black outline of dense undergrowth, stood a group of gaunt, half-clothed Cuban soldiers. When we got back to the *Indiana*, between 8 and 9 o'clock, we found that the care of over two hundred prisoners had fallen to our lot, at least overnight. They had been brought off by our own boats and by the gunboat *Hist*, and were only the *Indiana's* proportion of the entire number of prisoners. Many of these prisoners, like those rescued by Mr. Decker, were totally destitute of clothing, and the man who had a suit of pajamas or of underclothing was the envy of his companions. Our ship's stores were liberally drawn upon to meet the emergency. The Spaniards donned the new uniform with calm philosophy and without comment. After the terrible defeat of the morning, they had apparently come to regard everything as a matter of course. Among our prisoners were seven officers (not including the wounded Lieutenant Nonval), and these were entertained in the ward-room, and treated with every courtesy due their rank. They were a modest and gentlemanly

set of men, and seemed deeply touched by the consideration shown them. The enlisted men were treated to a bountiful supper, and were then given hammocks on deck, where they slept in peace.

The description of the *Gloucester's* and *Indiana's* work applies to all the vessels within reach. The *Harvard*, working from 4.40 to 9.45 P. M., rescued from the *Maria Teresa* and *Oquendo*, without accident, 35 officers and 637 men, 37 of whom were wounded. "Some of them came on board wholly nude, and many with only a shirt or trousers." The *Hist* removed 142 from the *Vizcaya*, all of whom, including 15 wounded, were transferred the same night to the *Indiana*, as the yacht was entirely too small for their proper care. The torpedo-boat *Ericsson*, Lieutenant Usher, took 11 officers and 90 men from the *Vizcaya* and transferred them to the *Iowa*, which latter received also Captain Eulate, of the *Vizcaya*, rescued by the *Iowa's* boats, and later, Admiral Cervera from the *Gloucester*. Captain Evans tells the story of their reception:

It was soon reported to me that the captain of the *Vizcaya* was coming alongside. A guard was paraded, and preparations were made to receive him with the honors due his rank. As the boat approached the gangway I saw that Captain Eulate was wounded, and a chair was slung and lowered for his accommodation. As the boat lay at the gangway she presented a spectacle that could be seen only in war, and rarely then, I imagine. There was a foot of water in her bottom, and in this rolled two dead men, terribly torn to pieces by fragments of shells; the water was red with their blood. In the stern-sheets sat Captain Eulate, supported by one of our naval cadets; and about his feet lay five or six wounded Spanish sailors. As the unfortunate captain was raised over the side, and the chair on which he sat placed on the quarter-deck, the guard presented arms, the officer of the deck saluted, and the Spanish prisoners already on board stood at attention. Captain Eulate slowly straightened himself up, with an effort unbuckled his sword-belt, kissed the hilt of his sword, and with a graceful bow presented it to me. I declined the sword, but accepted the surrender of himself, officers, and crew, as prisoners to Admiral Sampson, in command of the American fleet. The crew of the *Iowa*, most of them stripped to the waist, blackened with powder and covered with perspiration, crowded over the after-turrets and superstructure, and, as I declined the sword of the Spanish captain, broke out into ringing cheers. Taking the captain's arm, I conducted him aft on our way to the cabin, where the medical officers were waiting to dress his

wounds. He was evidently a man of great feeling, impulsive, and devoted to his profession. That he loved the ship he had lately commanded, and felt keenly his defeat, no one who saw him could doubt. His distress was most touching. As we reached the head of the cabin ladder, he turned toward his ship, and, stretching up his right hand, exclaimed, "Adios, *Vizcaya!*" As the words left his lips, the forward magazine of the *Vizcaya* exploded with a tremendous roar, and a column of smoke went up that was seen fifteen miles away. The scene was painfully dramatic, and must remain in all our memories as long as we live.

When Captain Eulate entered the cabin of the *Iowa* I offered him a cigar—a Key West, but the best I had. He accepted it courteously, and stood looking at it as he turned it in his hand; then he went down into the inside pocket of his drenched uniform coat, and brought out a beautiful but very wet Havana cigar. He bowed, and handed it to me with the remark, "Captain, I left fifteen thousand aboard the *Vizcaya.*"

We received on board the captain and twenty-five officers from the *Vizcaya,* together with two hundred and fifty petty officers and men, of whom thirty-two were wounded. There were also received on board the bodies of five dead sailors, who died in our boats after being taken from the water. These bodies were placed on the quarter-deck, covered with the Spanish flag, and preparations made to bury them with the same ceremony that would have attended the funeral of our own dead.

At this time I received word from two vessels that there was a Spanish battle-ship coming in from the eastward. The information was so positive that I felt compelled to leave the rescue of the remainder of the prisoners to the *Hist.* I at once cleared for action, and stood out to meet the supposed Spaniard, who was now in sight and rapidly approaching. She was preceded by fifteen or twenty American transports, all doing the best they could to escape from the supposed enemy. When they saw me standing out to meet her, they all rounded to, and in a group followed me slowly out to sea. The position in which I found myself was a very curious one. Two hundred and fifty prisoners about my decks, and on the eve of engaging an enemy's battle-ship! How to protect these prisoners from the fire of their own countrymen was a difficult problem to solve. I went to the cabin at once and asked Captain Eulate and three of his officers to give me their verbal parole against any act of treachery or violence on the part of any Spanish prisoner. This was willingly given, and at once relieved the situation. Captain Eulate at the same time assured me that he did not believe that there was a Spanish vessel of any size still afloat on this side of the Atlantic. I soon discovered that the supposed Spanish battle-ship was an Austrian cruiser, and I at once stopped my engines, called, "All hands to bury the dead," and consigned the Spanish dead

to their last resting-place, . . . the burial service conducted by their own padre in the presence of their own commanding officer and their own shipmates and the bodies launched overboard from under the folds of their own flag. . . .

About noon I resumed my blockading station, and immediately thereafter received on board, from Captain Wainwright of the *Gloucester*, Admiral Cervera, his son, and the commanding officers of the late Spanish torpedo-boats *Furor* and *Plutón*. All preparations were made to receive the admiral with the honors due his rank. The full marine guard of eighty men was paraded; officers mustered on the starboard side of the quarter-deck; the officers and crew of the *Vizcaya* were arranged on the port side of the quarter-deck; and the crew of the *Iowa*, just as they came out of battle, clustered over the turrets and superstructure. Captain Wainwright personally accompanied the admiral. The guard presented arms; the officers uncovered; the bugles rang out their flourishes; and as the distinguished officer, who had lost more in one hour than any other man has lost in modern times, stepped onto the quarter-deck, the crew of the *Iowa* broke out into cheers, and for fully a minute Admiral Cervera stood bowing his thanks. It was the recognition of gallantry by brave men, and the recipient of it was fully aware of its meaning. Though he was scantily clad, bareheaded, and without shoes, he was an admiral, every inch of him. With perfect composure and a manner of quiet dignity he received the plaudits of his late enemies and the silent sympathy of his conquered companions. After the reception was over I gave the admiral a seat under a small boat-awning aft, and a cigar, and for several hours discussed with him in a friendly way the incidents of this never-to-be-forgotten battle.

After receiving the salutations of his own officers, Admiral Cervera's first thought seemed to be for the dead and wounded men of his squadron. As soon as the wounded from the *Vizcaya* had been treated by the surgeons, he asked permission to visit them; and it was a touching sight to note the reverence with which those unhappy men greeted him as he passed through the sick-bay, speaking a word of encouragement to each. Everything was done by the officers and crew of the *Iowa* to make these prisoner guests as comfortable as possible. They were clothed and fed, and furnished with tobacco; in a word, we did what we could to render their position as bearable as possible.

The Spanish losses, as stated by Captain Concas (p. 162), were 323 killed and 151 wounded of the 2,227 in the squadron. Several small parties of men, numbering according to Lieutenant Müller about 150, wandered into the woods, despite the presence of the Cubans, and found their way to Santiago, led by Lieutenants Bustamante and Caballero and Midshipman Navia. The

American official reports give the prisoners as 1,720 men and 93 officers and servants. If as many as 150 returned to Santiago, the loss by gun-fire and by drowning was but 264 instead of the number stated by Captain Concas.

The Americans lost one killed; one seriously wounded.[1]

The shots fired in the action numbered 9,433; *Oregon*, 1,903; *Brooklyn*, 1,973; *Indiana*, 1,876; *Iowa*, 1,473; *Gloucester*, 1,369; *Texas*, 835; *New York*, 4. Of these 47 were 13-inch; 39, 12-inch; 319, 8-inch; 171, 6-inch; 473, 5-inch; 245, 4-inch; 6,553, 6-pounders; 780, 3-pounders; 466, 1-pounders, and 330, 37-millimetre.

The visible hits by the American projectiles found by the board of officers ordered to examine the condition of the ships, were as follows:

	12- OR 13-INCH	8-INCH	6- OR 5-INCH	4-INCH	6-PDR.	3-PDR.	1-PDR.	TOTAL
Teresa . .	2	3	4	1	12	..	3	25
Oquendo . .	..	4	2	9	53	a long area of the hull could not be examined.		68
Vizcaya . .	..	5	5	4	9			23
Colón . .	..	..	3	..	3	..	..	6
	2	12	14	14	77		3	122

The figures shown give the following percentage of hits for each calibre of gun:

13- and 12-inch	2.3 per cent.
8-inch	3.1 "
6- and 5-inch	2.6 "
4-inch	5.1 "
6-pounder	1.1 "

"As a contrast with these figures," says H. W. Wilson (*The Downfall of Spain*, 338), "it may be stated that 464 shot and

[1] The former was George Ellis, a chief yeoman aboard the *Brooklyn*, killed when reporting to the navigator the distance from the *Vizcaya* by the stadimeter which he had been detailed to use; the latter was J. Burns, a fireman, first class, stationed on deck in the fire brigade.

shell wounds were counted in the *Chen Yuen* after the Yalu; yet she fought to the bitter end and emerged from the action still battleworthy." The same writer, however, in an excellent discussion of the report of the board which the present writer prefers to present as coming from a recognized foreign authority, rather than deal with the subject himself, says:

We know that the *Philadelphia*, the crack American ship in 1897, had a percentage at target practice of 92, whilst several of Sampson's ships had records of 70 and 80 per cent, which were in advance of any in our navy [the British] in 1898. If guns which would make one hit in every five rounds in peace practice, only make one in fifty in actual battle, we may ascribe it in part to the disturbing influences of danger and excitement, in part to the longer and constantly changing ranges, in part to the dense smoke produced by eight or ten ships firing smoky powder from their main batteries. This is an accompaniment usually wanting at target practice.[1] As the Spanish ships were making every effort to get away, it was out of the power of the American captains to move in to closer and more effective ranges. The net result, that the Spanish cruisers were easily and rapidly destroyed, though never within 1,500 yards distance from the American ships, and rarely inside 3,000 yards, is sufficient proof of accurate shooting. There is some doubt as to the exact ranges, but no American report places any American ship nearer to a Spanish ship than 1,500 yards. From this statement the destroyers must be excepted.

There are further considerations to be taken into account before the figures of the American Board's report can be accepted. In the first place, fires and explosives must have destroyed the traces of many hits. Projectiles which struck the boats, for instance, in the Spanish ships, or burst just above the ships, would leave no trace when the woodwork of the boats had been consumed, yet they would probably cause fearful loss on deck. When the ships were end on, coming out of the harbor, or running from the Americans, there would probably be a good many hits on the upper deck, the projectiles landing with a high trajectory and ranging downward, and these, as the woodwork of the decks was consumed, would leave no trace, though they would spread the most terrific havoc. Shells, again, would come in through the gun-ports and openings of the shields, and explode inside the ship without placing their mark upon the structure. All the Spanish officers of the three belted cruisers agree that the hail of American projectiles was terrible and drove the men from the guns.

But it would need some strength of imagination to call—in the case

[1] This difficulty, of course, no longer exists, through the general use of smokeless powder.

of the *Vizcaya*—twenty-seven projectiles "a rain of shot and shell against which it was physically impossible to stand." For these reasons it seems certain that a good many hits above the water-line escaped the Board's notice. On and below the water-line there were also, doubtless, some unexamined hits; the *Oquendo*, in particular, had a very considerable portion of her side submerged, whilst of the *Colón's* port broadside one-third was under water. Under these circumstances it does not seem an overestimate if the number of hits is doubled.[1]

The writer regards the English writer's view as eminently fair. His opinions are supported by the statements of Captain Concas, who speaks of the boats as "literally nothing but splinters." Concas "roundly" denies that the Board's count could show the number of hits with any accuracy—

> Because the casualties were enormous in the upper batteries, where projectiles scarcely show, and it is certain that the number of hits made is perhaps more than double. . . . In order to give a convincing proof . . . we will state that on the bridge of the *Maria Teresa* all who were outside the conning-tower were killed or wounded, and I personally saw seven projectiles strike there, one of which, no doubt of large calibre, cut one of my orderlies in two, and another put me and my whole staff out of action.[2]

In the scene of ghastly devastation produced by the fire, nothing but an absolute hole in the ship's plating could be taken as an evidence of injury. Every testimony on the part of the Spanish goes to show how serious was the loss of life. The day after the action, a Spanish sailor of the *Oquendo* was found wandering on the shore and brought aboard the *New York*. When questioned in the captain's cabin, he described the conditions with dramatic earnestness. "The ship," he said, "was a slaughter-pen, everywhere you looked were dead men; there was a head here, an arm there; it was impossible to stay at the guns."

While fire was the main cause of so early a surrender by the first three ships, the evidence of the board of examination shows very serious injury by the gun-fire. In the *Maria Teresa* an 8-inch shell had entered just under the after barbette, passed through the skin of the ship, and exploded ranging aft. The damage done by this shell was very great. All men in that lo-

[1] Wilson, *Downfall of Spain*, 340–342.

[2] Concas, 81.

cality must have been killed or wounded. The beams were torn and ripped and the longitudinal bulkhead between the two cabins was badly damaged."[1] Two 12-inch shells entered just under the berth deck. They entered through almost the same hole, the holes slightly overlapping. They exploded in the stern torpedo-manipulating room, cutting the beams of the berth deck on the port side away from the frames; completely wrecking everything in that compartment, and made a large ragged hole about four feet square on the starboard side. They both entered at an angle of about 45° with the normal, ranging from aft forward. "An 8-inch shell struck the shield of the second 5.5-inch (14-centimetre) gun, passed through it ranging aft, and exploded. The effect of the explosion upon almost everything about the decks in that vicinity must have been terrific."[2] The structural solidity of the ship was not to any considerable degree injured. She laid about one hundred yards from the beach, grounded the greater part of her length, fairly protected against an easterly sea. The board was of the opinion that it was possible and desirable to float her.[3]

The *Oquendo*, grounded in a small cove a half-mile west of the *Maria Teresa*, was reported as a structural wreck. She had been struck by four 8-inch shells besides the sixty smaller ones observed. No doubt there were many more. "At the port after-broadside torpedo-tube a violent explosion had occurred, probably that of

[1] *Report of the Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 577. [2] *Ibid*, 576.

[3] The ship was placed in the hands of a wrecking company. She was floated and taken to Guantánamo, September 24, 1898; holes were patched; engines overhauled, an upper deck of sufficient strength to resist seas put on; steering engine put in order; pumps repaired, the two turrets secured together by chain cables tightly wrapped with wire rope, thus supplying a strong tension member to the structure. She left Guantánamo under her own steam, for Norfolk, Virginia, under convoy of the repair-ship *Vulcan* and the wrecking-steamer *Merritt*, and still the supreme court decided her no prize. She was abandoned by the men of the wrecking company in a gale, November 1, 1898, and drove ashore on Cat Island. A survey was held upon her, and she was finally abandoned November 20, 1898. She should have been sent through the Bahama Channel to Key West and have remained there until made thoroughly seaworthy. Her abandonment reflects no credit upon those in charge. The fact of her surviving to bring up on Cat Island is proof that she was able to stand the weather prevailing.

Cat Island is taken to have been Columbus's first landfall. It thus has been associated in a very remarkable way with the beginning and the end of Spain's empire in America.

one or more of the torpedoes located in that compartment. This explosion wrecked the torpedo compartment." An 8-inch shell had exploded in the forward turret between the gun and the shield, completely disabling the turret and killing all in it. The forward magazine had exploded after grounding, from the effects of the conflagration, "forcing the protective deck up several feet, detaching it from the fastenings to the side and blowing out both sides of the ship, especially on the starboard side. The after magazine apparently did not explode."[1] Both magazines were under water, the after one deeply submerged.

While serious, the effect of the gun-fire, alone, aboard the *Vizcaya* was not sufficient to cause her surrender. The fires from the woodwork of the ship were the controlling cause. The ship, however, was racked beyond repair by the explosion of both of her magazines after grounding upon the reef which makes the small harbor of Aserraderos.

In both cases the protective deck was blown open along an armor seam on each side, the plating in each case shearing the deck beams along the seam. The opening was greatest on the starboard side forward, where the armor plates were raised about five feet, making a wide breach through which the pressure relieved itself. The dislocation of the deck tore away the fastenings of the vertical armor, transverse and side, and tore away the heels of the frames above the protective deck, opening the ship's side along the joint of the protective deck. On the port side forward, the upheaval and the opening of the deck were small. After passing through the protective deck the effect of the gases in all cases was small, as the pressure was practically relieved, owing to the covering on the gun and the spar deck having been burnt away. Below the protective deck the gases on the starboard side cut away bulkheads still farther aft. There was no execution on the sloping protective deck forward, the transverse armor having interposed an effective limit, but there is every reason to believe that below this deck the cutting away of bulkheads propagated itself forward as well as aft.

The opening on the port side disclosed beneath a bulkhead folded *forward* as by a rush of gas from aft.

In the explosion aft the protective deck was raised amidships, shearing the beams on both sides at the seam of armor plates well out toward the sides. The middle portion was raised about a foot along a distance extending from the transverse armor to the glacis over engine, the after glacis plate being dislocated.

[1] *Report of the Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 578–582.

Beneath the deck the same cutting away of bulkheads took place as was found forward. This extended as far forward as could be seen, to about the forward bulkhead of the engine-room.

The openings in the deck have limited areas, and could give but partial relief to the gases, which, it would seem, advanced forward and aft, carrying down bulkheads as they went, till, on the port side, they reached the forward magazine. The protective deck, by its strong resistance, prevented the relief of pressure upward, and, in the progressive explosion, the gases relieved themselves by propagating fore and aft below the deck, breaking down the less resisting bulkhead obstruction. In the case of both magazine explosions the protective deck presents a more or less extended wave from being held down in place where weight and stiffness existed, as under conning-tower, turrets, upper coal-bunkers, etc., and being raised in portions without upward stiffening.[1]

Four torpedoes forward had been exploded by the heat. The berth-deck was wrecked completely in the immediate vicinity, but over a comparatively small area; rather singular, a bulkhead below held a small part of the deck up in place, the downward thrust crushing, straddling, as it were, this bulkhead. . . . In this explosion of gun-cotton, though everything in the immediate vicinity was wrecked, except a plate on end (the bulkhead below), yet, at a moderate distance, the armored protective deck gave effectual resistance, and beyond the gun-deck the effect was more or less that of a low order of explosion.[2]

The results of the magazine explosions aboard the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* are given thus somewhat in detail, as being so moderate in comparison with those of the explosions destroying the *Maine*. They go far to prove the correctness of the conclusion of the court of inquiry in the case of the latter. The marks of only seven shots were observed aboard the *Colón;* one 5- or 6-inch, two 5-inch, and three 6-pounders, and one the calibre of which was undetermined. She was lying on her starboard side, the deck quite vertical, the stern inshore about 150 feet from the beach, in from five to six fathoms of water; the bow overhung the bank in a depth of about sixteen fathoms. She was partially above water for about 200 feet of her length.[3]

[1] *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 585.

[2] *Ibid.* 584–588.

[3] Ineffectual efforts were made to recover the ship, which might have resulted otherwise had she been placed in the hands of a well-found salvage company, such as the Neptune, of Sweden. There was some correspondence with

The American ships escaped with slight injury, as the range of the Spanish ships made the shells pass over most of the American, which had closed to shorter range than had been expected by the Spanish. The *Brooklyn* was struck "twenty times by whole shot and many times by pieces of bursting shells and from small shot of machine-guns."[1] Of the whole shot two were 6-inch, three 4.7-inch, and nine 6-pounder shells. One 6-inch dented the 5-inch armor belt, the other entered the ship's side; two of the 6-pounder shells, striking the unarmored side, curiously enough, unless the effect of long range, made dents only. "No injury was done to the ship. . . . The smoke-stacks were hit in several places; the signal halliards, rigging, and flags were cut in many places. The flag at the main was destroyed, being much cut by shot and flying pieces of shells."[2]

A 6-inch shell entered the starboard side of the *Texas* near the top of the hammock berthing, and burst, destroying the doors of two air-shafts and adjacent bulkheads, the casing of the starboard smoke-box, making an irregular hole of about two by three feet, and badly damaging the ash-hoist. Much other damage was done, apparently chiefly by the effect of the concussion of the ship's 12-inch guns.

The *Iowa* was struck by seven small projectiles and by two 6-inch shells, both of which entered the ship almost on the line of the berth-deck, doing considerable damage, one of them starting a small fire.

The *Indiana* "was struck twice by fragments of shells or parti-

this company, in which the company said, March 28, 1899: "We would probably have undertaken such a contract as that of raising the *Colón* if we could have done it in connection with some less risky job, but as these [referring to the *Maria Teresa*] are already given out to other concerns, we do not wish to go to the great expense connected with the sending of steamers and appliances for salvage in case like the one in question." As the navy department's proposition was to pay only in case of success, the company was entirely justified in not undertaking the work. There was no company in America fitted to do it; there was apparently no great desire on the part of the navy department to pay largely for saving a ship the use of which would have been a standing thorn in the side of Spain, and she was thus abandoned.

[1] Captain Cook's report, July 7, *Report Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 525.

[2] *Ibid.*

cles of very small calibre,"[1] the *Oregon* three times, the *Gloucester* not at all.

The result was only what could have been expected from the superiority of the Americans in numbers, armor, and armament, but above all, in practice and preparedness. Some Spanish guns and ammunition were defective and the latter scant; there had been no target practice. The odds were large. There were six heavy ships against four; fourteen 12- and 13-inch guns against six 11-inch; thirty 8-inch against none on the Spanish side of that calibre; forty-four 6-inch, 5-inch, and 4-inch against thirty-six 5.5- and 4.7-inch; ninety-six 6-pounders against thirty-eight Spanish.

The superiority of the American ships in armor is equally obvious. The only superiority of the Spanish ships was in their speed, which, however, availed naught through bad coal, foul bottoms, their quick destruction by fire, and in the case of the *Colón*, through inability to make what she should have made, probably through want of training of her fire-room force.

Admiral Cervera was criticised by Governor-General Blanco for not leaving at night; had he been able to do so, some of his ships at least would have escaped and, had the destroyers been well handled, some of the American ships probably sunk by torpedoes. The firing by the Americans would have covered the sea with heavy clouds of smoke; it would have been impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and once beyond the line of blockade, with numerous transports near at hand to aid the confusion had the Spaniards turned eastward, such of the fleeing ships as escaped the first attack could almost certainly have got away.

Sampson's admirable tactics, however, prevented such Spanish action. All Spanish reports dwell upon the impossibility of a night sortie in face of the search-lights so near the entrance. Says Cervera in a letter to General Blanco, written after his return to Spain, commenting upon the latter's strictures:

> At night they always had one ship, relieved every three or four hours, less than a mile from the harbor entrance, maintaining the latter con-

[1] Report of Lieutenant-Commander John A. Rodgers, the second in command, *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 532.

stantly illuminated, and, as though this were not enough, they had other smaller vessels still nearer, and steamboats close to the headlands of the entrance. Once in a while these latter boats would exchange musketry fire with our forces.

Under these circumstances it was absolutely impossible to go out at night, because in this narrow channel, illuminated by a dazzling light, we could not have followed the channel and would have lost the ships, some by running aground, others by colliding with their own companions.

But even supposing that we had succeeded in going out, before the first ship was outside we should have been seen and covered from the very first with the concentrated fire of the whole squadron. Of the efficiency of that fire an idea may be gained from what happened to the *Reina Mercedes* during the night of July 3.

In daytime, on the other hand, the hostile squadron was more scattered and some of the ships were usually absent, as was the case with the *Massachusetts* on July 3.

Feeling sure, as I did, that the disaster was inevitable, all I could do was to see that we had the least possible number of men killed and to prevent the ships from falling into the enemy's hands, thereby complying, as we literally did comply, with an article of the Ordinances of the Navy which the minister of marine cited in a cablegram to me.

If Santiago de Cuba had been even reasonably well armed, the hostile ships would always have kept at a distance of five or six miles at least, in which case they could not have lighted up the harbor entrance so effectively, and we could then have manœuvred with some remote prospect of success.[1]

Admiral Sampson has expressed his own views as to what Cervera might have done, saying:

When we come to consider the strategy of Admiral Cervera in leaving the harbor, it must be said first of all that it would have been much better, if he could have done so, to leave by night. That he could not do so is the testimony of officers of his fleet. We know from what they said subsequently, while they were prisoners, that this plan had been considered by the admiral and his officers. Two advocated going out by night; the others were all in favor of the sortie by day. The great difficulty in a night attempt was our dazzling search-light. A search-light shining direct in one's eyes prevents him absolutely from seeing anything else; it is as though he were looking at the sun: and it was that effect upon them, taken in connection with the necessity of seeing their way out of the channel, that made them hesitate. This feeling was in itself a compliment to the efficiency of the blockade, but we did not

[1] Cervera, *Documents*, 145.

attach so much importance to the dazzling of the enemy as to the illumination of the channel so that we could see everything that was going on. It was a continual wonder to us why they did not fire at our search-light, which was always within range. To be sure, it would have required pretty good marksmanship to knock it out, but it would have made the man who was manipulating it quite uneasy to know that he was the centre of the enemy's fire.

The enemy had no search-lights at their defences. All the necessary machinery was in place for the establishment of one on Socapa, but they never got so far as to complete the plant and actually use it.

What appeared to us the most favorable chance for Cervera was to have been prepared to come out with a full head of steam, and then to have chosen a very cloudy, dark night, or one when a dense rain or squall was passing over the harbor,—when it would be very difficult to see in any circumstances,—and, guided by screened lights placed along the channel for the purpose, to have made for the open sea. His ships might have run out of such a storm in about an hour; so long as the squall continued they probably could have counted upon being invisible to a great extent. It would have been difficult to identify the particular ships, and in the confusion and darkness they would probably so far have escaped observation that they might have been out of sight by the time the weather cleared up or the squall had passed. There were several such nights, and very anxious ones they were for us.

Dismissing the question of a sortie by night, there were several things he might have done by day: (1) to take the course he did take alongshore to the westward; (2) to take a similar course to the eastward; (3) to divide his fleet between the two courses; and (4) to scatter through our fleet. When they all came out and started along the beach, our fire was easily concentrated on them. It would have been worse to go eastward, as he would have had to engage not only all the vessels he did, but the *New York* and the vessels at Guantánamo—the *Massachusetts*, *Newark*, and *Marblehead*, which could have been notified by telegraph. He might have made a feint to go in a certain direction. Two ships sent in one direction would probably have called out most of the strength of our vessels, and have given his others a better chance than they had. What would have happened if they had boldly attempted to dash through the fleet can be only a matter of speculation. There could hardly have been as much concentration of fire upon them, and in the smoke and confusion some of them might have got through. They had simply to encounter the same kind of fire; at the beginning it might have been heavier. I suppose the result would not have been different. If any one of them had succeeded in breaking through, her speed would have given her a chance of escape. We had only three ships that were faster than theirs. As it was, they left the *Indiana* and the *Iowa* behind in a short time, and if they had been running straight to sea, those ships could have followed them no longer than they did,—

the *Indiana* eight or ten miles, the *Iowa* eighteen,—so that they would have had only the same number of ships following them, *if* they had got through. The fact is, they hugged the shore as a possible means of rescue in case of disaster; they did not like to leave the land entirely.[1]

Captain Clark, of the *Oregon*, thought with Admiral Sampson that Cervera should have attempted his sortie at night "notwithstanding the search-light watch so rigidly maintained at the entrance. He could have placed as guides to the channel, along the shore and on the smoke-stack or mast of the sunken *Merrimac*, lights screened toward the sea, so that we could not have detected them. His best chance would have been to get up his anchors and begin to move about dusk, when he would have had light enough to see the shore and the channel marks, timing his movement so that he should dash out just as darkness fell. We could not then have closed upon him without great danger to ourselves. The firing would have had to be done virtually in the dark, for the search-lights (even supposing that others than the one regularly in use had been turned on) would soon have become ineffective on account of the smoke and the shattering force of the guns which probably would have extinguished them. The direction of the enemy could thus have been masked, and as each of our captains would have been concerned with the risk of his ship being rammed or torpedoed our onslaught would have had a far different result than it actually had when full daylight enabled every commander to see what all the others as well as the enemy were doing and exactly what was to be done. It was the difference between certainty and uncertainty."[2]

But such action was beyond Spanish initiative. On one hand was possibility of escape, or if not escaping, of comparative safety to the crews by running ashore. The unknown, the terrible, of a night action could not readily be accepted by men of a race whose passive courage, equal to any sacrifice, is beyond praise, but to whom a desperate leap into a void of uncertainty with no visible outcome, did not appeal.

It was Admiral Sampson's bold tactical stroke and his insistence in holding the battle-ships up to this work, most loyally and

[1] *The Century Magazine*, April, 1899, 910.
[2] *The Century Magazine*, May, 1899, 103.

perfectly carried out after a first night of failure, that brought the hour in which died Spanish sovereignty in America.

The ships were now back off Santiago, but with no enemy's ships, with the exception of the small gun-boat *Alvarado*, to watch. The Fourth of July was celebrated with the usual ceremonial of "dressing ship" and firing salutes, all the larger ships being present, a ceremony which no doubt was taken by the beleaguered force to be a celebration of the victory. Congratulatory telegrams came from the President and Secretary of the Navy:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, *July*, 4, 1898.

You have the gratitude and congratulation of the whole American people. Convey to noble officers and crews, through whose valor new honors have been added to the American navy, the grateful thanks and appreciation of the nation.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, *July*, 4, 1898.

The Secretary of the Navy sends you and every officer and man of your fleet, remembering equally your dead comrade, grateful acknowledgment of your heroism and skill. All honor to the brave. You have maintained the glory of the American navy.

JOHN D. LONG.

The British man-of-war *Pallas* had arrived during the night from Jamaica, and a young officer was sent aboard the flag-ship to request permission to communicate with the British consul, in order to take away any British subjects who desired to leave. His astonishment on hearing of the events of the day before gave a sad blow to the somewhat of "swagger" with which he had first appeared.

Preparations were carried forward to transfer the prisoners to the *Harvard* and *St. Louis*. Admiral Cervera, still aboard the *Iowa*, sent through Admiral Sampson the following telegram to Governor-General Blanco:

In compliance with your Excellency's orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday morning with the whole squadron, and after an unequal

battle against forces more than three times as large as mine my whole squadron was destroyed. *Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, all with fire on board, ran ashore. *Colón*, according to information from Americans, ran ashore and surrendered. The destroyers were sunk. Do not know as yet loss of men, but surely 600 killed and many wounded (proportion of latter not so large). The survivors are United States prisoners. Gallantry of all the crews has earned most enthusiastic congratulations of enemy. Captain of *Vizcaya* was allowed to retain his sword. I feel very grateful for generosity and courtesy with which they treat us. Among dead is Villaamil, and, I believe, Lazaga; Concas and Eulate wounded. We have lost everything, and I shall need funds.[1]

The Spanish prisoners, with the exception of 48 badly injured sent to the hospital-ship *Solace*, were transferred to the *Harvard* and *St. Louis*, Admiral Cervera and his staff being received by the latter. An unhappy incident occurred aboard the *Harvard* on the night of July 5, resulting in the death of six Spanish seamen and the wounding of a number of others. One had passed beyond the lines and refused to return. His altercation with the sentry caused a number to press forward, on which the sentry and the guard which had joined him fired. With nearly a thousand prisoners on board, the action of the guard precipitated by what was thought a rush, was not unnatural. The event was much deplored by the American officers as well as by the Spanish.

The *St. Louis* left Guantánamo July 5; the *Harvard* July 10; the former arrived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, July 10, the latter July 15. Here 20 officers (three of whom were surgeons and two chaplains) and 1,661 men were interned on Seavey's Island. Admiral Cervera, 78 of his officers, and 14 enlisted men taken as servants, were cared for at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, where they were treated with the consideration due their rank, their heroism, and their misfortunes. The 48 sick and wounded were taken to the hospital at Norfolk, Virginia. All except Captain Moreu, of the *Colón*, who sailed August 20 in the French mail steamer, left New York, September 8, in the

[1] Admiral Sampson, through motives of delicacy, did not go on board the *Iowa*, feeling that his visit might be painful to the defeated Spanish chief, and wishing to do nothing which might add to the grief of his situation.

steamship *City of Rome* for Spain. One flag-officer, 1 commodore, 8 captains, 70 officers and midshipmen, and 1,574 enlisted men were thus repatriated.[1]

[1]Admiral Sampson received the following from Admiral Cervera, before the latter left for the North:

A su Excelencia el CONTRAALMIRANTE SAMPSON, *comandante en jefe de las fuerzas navales de los Estados Unidos.*

Muy S^or mío:

Sus atenciones que tanto mis subordinados como yo, hemos recibido de los marinos americanos, desde que hemos tenido la desgracia de ser prisoneros, me ponen en el deber de manifestar nuestra gratitud, lo que hago con el mayor gusto escribiendo á V. E. esta carta en la que le ruego acepte esta expresion de gratitud, en nombre de todos.

Por mi parte uno á ella la expresion de la consideracion personal con que quedo de V. E. af^mo seg^o serv^or.

q. b. l. m. de V. E.,

PASCUAL CERVERA, *Contraalmirante.*

Guantánamo, 5 *de Julio de* 1898.

Translation:

To his Excellency, REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON, *Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the United States.*

My very dear Sir:

The attentions my subordinates as well as myself have received from the American sailors since we have had the misfortune of being prisoners, place me under the obligation of showing our gratitude, which I do with the greatest pleasure, writing to your Excellency this letter in which I beg you to accept this expression of gratitude in the name of all. On my part I join to it the expression of personal consideration, with which I remain your Excellency's affectionate and sincere servant.

q. b. l. m.[2] of your Excellency,

PASCUAL CERVERA, *Rear-Admiral.*

Guantánamo, 5th of *July,* 1898.

Received Flag-Ship N. A. Station, July 6, 1898.

[2]The initials of que besa la mano (who kisses the hand). "Who kisses your hand" is the usual Spanish termination of a letter to a gentleman.

CHAPTER IX

THE INVESTMENT OF SANTIAGO

General Shafter now demanded naval action, which, as always, looked to the seizure of the harbor entrance, the taking up of the mines which were still in place, and entering the harbor. Only the electric mines were still in place, but, so far as Sampson could suppose, the contact mines removed to allow the exit of Cervera's squadron were replaced. Firing had been suspended by mutual agreement of the commanding generals, and the American general was simply in an opportunist attitude of mind, hoping that something would turn up to relieve him from the responsibility of an assault probably with heavy loss.

Shafter had written Sampson on July 3:

> Through negligence of our Cuban allies, Pardo with 5,000 men[1] entered the city of Santiago last night. This nearly doubles their forces. I have demanded their surrender, which they refuse, but I am giving them some wounded prisoners and delaying operations to let foreign citizens get out, and there will be no action before the 6th and perhaps the 7th instant. Now if you will force your way into that harbor the town will surrender without any further sacrifice of life. My present position has cost me 1,000 men and I do not wish to lose any more. With my forces on one side and yours on the other, and they have a great terror for the navy, for they know they cannot hurt you, we shall have them. I ask for an early reply.

General Shafter had naturally hesitated, in view of the distress which the forced exodus of the population would cause, to carry out the threatened bombardment, and had thus, in his telegram

[1] An error; the officer in command was Colonel Escario, and the number was 3,752. They had left Manzanillo June 22. They had thus been eleven days in making the 160 miles over the very difficult mountainous trails. They had lost 27 killed and 71 wounded, including among the latter a colonel and two other officers. How many deserted or straggled *en route* is not known. Probably 3,300 is as many as arrived July 3. The march reflected great credit upon both officers and men.

of July 3, thrown the burden of acting upon the government. The latter was prompt in replying the next day:

Telegram containing demand made by you for surrender of Santiago, the Spanish commander's reply thereto, and your reply to him, received. While you would be justified in beginning to shell Santiago at expiration of time limit set by you, still under the conditions named in your despatch, and for humanity's sake, the postponement of the bombardment to noon of July 5 is approved. Telegraph me this evening just how matters stand. Have you received news of Hobson?

R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

General Shafter had received the following telegram:

WASHINGTON, *July* 4.

After conference with the president and the secretary of war, I am directed to say your continued illness brings sorrow and anxiety. In case you are disabled General Wheeler would of course succeed to command. His illness, which we also regret, is feared to be so serious as to prevent his assuming command. You must determine whether your condition is such as to require you to relinquish command. If so, and General Wheeler is disabled, you will order the next general officer in rank for duty to succeed you and to take up the work in hand. It is not expected that our forces will make assault until they are ready.

H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General.*

To this he replied:

PLAYA, *July* 4, 1898—9.30 A. M.

Your telegram inquiring about my health is just received. I am still very much exhausted, eating a little this P. M. [A. M.?] for the first time in four days. The good news has inspired everybody. When the news of the disaster of the Spanish fleet reached the front, which was during the period of truce, a regimental band that had managed to keep its instruments on the line played "The Star-Spangled Banner" and "There'll Be a Hot Time in the Old Town To-night," men cheering from one end of the line to the other. Officers and men without even shelter tents have been soaking for five days in the afternoon rains, but all are happy.

During July 4 Shafter had carried on a somewhat busy correspondence with the Spanish commander in Santiago, his first letter proposing, on account of inability to give them proper attention, to return all the wounded Spanish officers at El Caney

who could be carried and who would give their parole not to serve against the United States until exchanged; another proposing an exchange of prisoners, including those taken from the *Merrimac*, and, lastly, renewing his proposition to surrender. This last letter was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA, *July* 4, 1898.

The Commanding General, Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba.

SIR: I was officially informed last night that Admiral Cervera is now a captive on board the U. S. S. *Gloucester*, and is unharmed. He was then in the harbor of Siboney. I regret also to have to announce to you the death of General Vara del Rey at El Caney, who, with two of his sons, was killed in the battle of July 1. His body will be buried this morning with military honors. His brother, Lieutenant-Colonel Vara del Rey, is wounded and a prisoner in my hands, together with the following officers: Captain Don Antonio Vara del Rey, Captain Isidor Arias, Captain Antonio Mansas, and Captain Manuel Romero, who, though severely wounded, will all probably survive.

I also have to announce to you that the Spanish fleet, with the exception of one vessel, was destroyed, and this one is being so vigorously pursued that it will be impossible for it to escape. General Pando is opposed by forces sufficient to hold him in check.

In view of the above, I would suggest that, to save needless effusion of blood and the distress of many people, you may reconsider your determination of yesterday. Your men have certainly shown the gallantry which was expected of them.

I am, sir, with great respect,

Your obedient servant,
WILLIAM R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, Commanding United States Forces.

To these several letters General Toral replied as follows:

ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA,
FIFTH CORPS, GENERAL STAFF.

To His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to reply to the three communications of your excellency, dated to-day, and I am very grateful for the news you give in regard to the generals, chiefs, officers and troops that are your prisoners, and of the good care that you give to the wounded in your possession. With respect to the wounded, I have no objection to receiving in this place those that your excellency may willingly

deliver me, but I am not authorized by the general-in-chief to make any exchange, as he has reserved to himself that authority. Yet I have given him notice of the proposition of your excellency.

It is useless for me to tell you how grateful I am for the interest that your excellency has shown for the prisoners, and corpse of General Vara del Rey, giving you many thanks for the chivalrous treatment.

The same reasons that I explained to you yesterday, I have to give again to-day—that this place will not be surrendered.

I am, yours, with great respect and consideration,

JOSÉ TORAL,
Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Corps.

In Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 1898.

The return of wounded prisoners which took place early in the afternoon of July 5, naturally deferred hostilities. Four wounded Spanish officers and twenty-four wounded men were carried in ambulances, in charge of Lieutenant Brooke and Dr. Goodfellow, to a point near the Spanish lines, where they were met with every courtesy and military honor.

On July 4 telegrams advising of the despatch of re-enforcements and of vessels with supplies of fresh beef poured in from Washington, but the encouragement from these was offset by the entry of the Spanish column mentioned from Manzanillo, which weighed upon the American commander's mind, and, July 4, he telegraphed of its arrival, asking when he should expect troops from Tampa, following this with a despatch giving a more detailed statement of the situation.

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, in camp, near Santiago de Cuba, July 4.—There appears to be no reasonable doubt that General Pando succeeded in entering Santiago last night with his force, said to be about 5,000 men. This puts a different aspect upon affairs, and while we can probably maintain ourselves, it would be at the cost of very considerable fighting and loss. General Lawton reports that General Garcia, who was to block entrance of Pando, informed him at 10 o'clock last night that Pando had passed in on Cobre road. Lawton says cannot compel General Garcia to obey my instructions, and that if they intend to place themselves in any position where they will have to fight, and that if they intend to reduce Santiago, we will have to depend alone upon our own troops, and that we will require twice the number we now have. I sent message to Admiral Sampson, asking if he proposed entering the harbor so as to give us his assistance.

Commodore Watson replies that he does not know Admiral Sampson's intentions since the destruction of the Spanish squadron, but does not himself think fleet should try to go into harbor of Santiago. This, under the circumstances, is not very encouraging. Have been expecting a division from Tampa and Duffield's second brigade from Camp Alger, but only a small number of recruits has appeared so far. We have got to try and reduce the town, now that the fleet is destroyed, which was stated to be the chief object of the expedition. There must be no delay in getting large bodies of troops here. The town is in a terrible condition as to food, and people are starving, as stated by foreign consuls this morning, but the troops can fight and have large quantities of rice, but no other supplies. There will be nothing done here until noon of the 5th, and I suppose I can put them off a little longer to enable people to get out. Country here is destitute of food or growing crops, except mangoes. Men are in good spirits and so far in good health, though it is hard to tell how long the latter will continue. I am sorry to say I am no better and, in addition to my weakness, cannot be out on account of slight attack of gout, but hope to be better soon. Lieutenant Miley had interview with consuls this morning, and his report will be telegraphed immediately. I do not send this in cipher, as time is precious.

This report sent the next afternoon was as follows:

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near San Juan River, Cuba, July 4, 6 P. M.—In accordance with your order I send a despatch showing the situation at this time.

No firing on lines since 11 A. M. yesterday, and there will be none to-morrow; certainly not before 12 o'clock noon. I have quite a number of seriously wounded Spanish officers and I have proposed to send them in, which the Spanish general has apparently gladly accepted. Only the severely wounded will be sent. This will probably occupy to-morrow. I am told troop-ships are in sight; if so, I will get the men up to-morrow. Lieutenant Miley, of my staff, had an interview this morning with several of the consular officers. His report is telegraphed, so you may know all the circumstances, and is as follows:

Memorandum of an interview between Mr. Robert Mason, British proconsul; M. Isidore Augustine, Swedish and Norwegian consul; Mr. Modesmo Ross, Portuguese consul; Mr. Angel Navarro, secretary to Cuban governor of the province of Santiago, and first lieutenant of the Second Artillery, near Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 1898, at 9.45 A. M.

Lieutenant Miley met General Wheeler and Colonel Dorst on the American lines and proceeded with them, bearing a flag of truce, to a

point from 500 to 600 yards in front of the lines, where they met the four first above-named gentlemen. It was explained to the consuls that Caney had been badly shelled in the last few days and that many wounded were still in the houses at that place, and also some of the dead unburied, but that any person leaving Santiago could go there if he wished to a limited few—3,000 or 4,000. General Shafter could furnish the rougher components of the ration, namely, bread, sugar, coffee, and bacon. Left impossible at present to render assistance to a greater number. He did not expect there would be such a great number to leave the city. He also stated that General Shafter had submitted the question of bombardment to his home government and expected a reply to-day. The alternative being a very close investment and starving the garrison out, which could be easily done, as the Americans had a force several times stronger than the enemy. In the latter case the people who could get something to eat would probably stay in the city and come out gradually, as their provisions failed. By this time the general would undoubtedly be in a position to assist them, but not now, if all were forced out at once. The general therefore advised a short wait until he received orders from his home government, relying on the fact that he will not throw shells into the city.

The British proconsul, speaking for the others, then explained the dreadful condition now existing among the inhabitants of Santiago. The condition has been gradually growing worse for the last three years. For the past two years no crops of any consequence have been raised. It would entail a dreadful hardship upon every one if forced to leave the city, and day before yesterday the scenes in the streets and around the consulates were very distressing. It was then expected that the American fleet would attempt to enter the harbor and bombard the city. Mr. Mason and the other consuls insisted upon the importance of the use of the broad term noncombatants when designating the persons who could leave Santiago. They said that many inhabitants of Spanish birth and sympathies now engaged in civil pursuits would be glad to leave the city if given an opportunity by General Shafter and General Toral. He says there are about 15,000 or 20,000 women and children and foreigners and about 30,000 noncombatants. The secretary to the civil governor was also very anxious that the term noncombatants be used. The British consul submitted for the consideration of General Shafter the following proposition: First, whether the old and infirm and the sick could not be taken on board the Spanish merchant vessels now in and moored at a point not under fire; second, whether trains filled with noncombatants could not be run from Santiago through American lines and the empty trains returned; third, whether some guaranty of disposition of American troops could not be given for the safety of noncombatants who might leave the city for territory now occupied by the Cuban forces. The first and second propositions were accepted, the third General Shafter could not agree

to, as he could not afford to expose his troops in isolated places, where they will be forsaken by the Cuban forces when attacked.

At midnight, July 4–5, Santiago was aroused by heavy firing at the harbor entrance. The first of the guns which had thus broken the silence of the blockade and which startled into terror the inhabitants of Santiago, was fired by the *Texas*, stationed at the time as supporting ship to the *Massachusetts*, whose search-light was upon the entrance; several shots followed. The flag-ship and the *Indiana*, too far east to look up the entrance, moved closer in and a large ship was seen within on the eastern side of the channel, near the Morro. While moving in, a 6-inch mortar shell from the Morro battery struck the starboard side of the quarter-deck of the *Indiana*, perforated the deck, and exploded on the deck below, near the ward-room ladder, causing a slight fire, which was quickly extinguished. The ship, recognized as a man-of-war, and as the *Reina Mercedes*, she being known to be the only large man-of-war remaining in port, was seen to have already suffered from the shots, and she soon sank, canted over to port and with her port rail in the water, too far east of the channel to prevent its use. The firing, which did not arouse any response inland, ceased, and the usual quiet fell.[1]

Lieutenant Miley had arranged to meet the consuls again on the morning of July 5, but, says Miley, before he could do so, "the entire population had poured out of the city. The night of the 4th, near midnight, there was a terrific bombardment near the mouth of the harbor, and the population of Santiago thought it was the American fleet forcing an entrance. The consuls at the meeting in the morning had told me that the fleet was hourly expected to come into the harbor and that the inhabitants were pre-

[1] The *Reina Mercedes* was an iron cruiser of 3,090 tons and 3,688 horse-power, built in 1887, armed with 6-inch rifles, three Nordenfelt quick-firers of 57 mm.; two of 42 mm.; six Hotchkiss 57 mm. revolvers. Her machinery was hopelessly out of condition and her guns were used for defence ashore. She was struck by a 12-inch shell from the *Texas*, and by a 13-inch from the *Massachusetts*, a fact which shows the accuracy of fire under the search-light conditions, and supports the contention of Admiral Cervera and all the Spanish officers that the search-light made the exit of the squadron at night impossible. The ship was raised and is now used as a floating barracks at the Naval Training Station at Newport, Rhode Island.

pared to flee at the first indication of its approach. . . . The morning of the 5th the road to Caney was filled with women and children and old men. I went out to meet the consuls but not one of them came."[1]

Says Müller:

At daybreak, July 5, a compact crowd, composed for the greater part of old men, women, and children, though strong, robust men—some of them volunteers, now in civilians' clothes—were not wanting, started from the city toward El Caney, about four and a half miles distant, where they were going on foot, there being no carriages, nor wagons, nor vehicles of any kind, nor even horses, which the enemy, moreover, would not have allowed to pass. . . . Many of those who emigrated were people of wealth, not accustomed to such fatigues and hardships, which fear and terror alone enabled them to bear. Being convinced, though I do not know why they should have been, that their absence would not be for more than sixty or seventy hours at most, the majority had nothing with them but the clothes on their backs and a little underclothing, and no provisions but what they could carry themselves. I have been told, not by one person alone, but by many who were there and with whom I have talked, that there were no less than eighty people in any one house, and in some of them as many as two hundred. . . . and thus they were housed together—men and women, children and old people, white persons and black.[2]

All became at once dependent upon such bounty as the American commissariat could give and upon the Red Cross supplies in the steamer *State of Texas*, aboard of which was Miss Barton herself, with an efficient staff. This ship carried three thousand tons of material, among which were many delicacies for sick and wounded men in which, for the time at least, the army medical service was almost wholly wanting, and in addition there was a supply of blankets, clothing, tents, and tent flies, of which but little was yet ashore from the army transports.

The exodus was not only in the direction of El Caney. The British men-of-war *Pallas* and *Alert* had arrived from Jamaica and, by permission of Admiral Sampson, received outside the port a number of British subjects, under circumstances so trying for the small tug carrying them that all baggage had to be

[1] Miley, *In Cuba with Shafter*, 133.

[2] Müller, 146.

left behind. "On getting alongside the *Alert*," says the British consul, "more than a mile outside, the tug-boat with every sea smashed up against her, our chimney smashing a boat of the *Alert* on its davits, and the tug-boat's bulwark and wooden deck-roof and chimney breaking up." He himself remained at his post, and gives in his journal a graphic description of the suffering entailed by the cruel necessity of war. He says:

Tuesday, 5th July, at 5.30 A. M., I started with two carts . . . provisions and people for Caney, with flag. Three and a half hours on the road. The scene was terrible: people flocking out, sick carried in chairs or as they could, children getting lost by the way, etc. . . . I obtained a room, such a one, in a house just chock full of negroes, and put my wife's mother and sister in there while Willie pitched our tent in an empty piece of ground where a house had stood, and also managed to obtain a small room in a house close alongside. The entrance to Caney was stinking with the half-buried corpses of men and horses. . . . 6th July, about eighteen thousand to twenty thousand in Caney; houses, of which there are three hundred, full of people, in most of them not leaving room enough to lie on the floor, but having to pass the night in a sitting posture. . . . 8th July, . . . The people are starving. The Red Cross Society cannot get provisions up in time for want of means of transportation, nor can the army. . . . In some houses you will find fifty in a small room, and among them one dying of fever, another with diarrhœa, and perhaps a woman in the throes of childbirth, and all that with not a chair to sit on or a utensil of any kind and all in want of food. You cannot buy anything for money, though I know one man lucky enough to buy five biscuits of about two ounces each for a five-dollar piece. . . . The country is absolutely bare, and money will buy nothing and it is useless. Children dying for want of food; in fact, the situation is undescribable.[1]

Shafter's last inquiry in regard to the troops brought the following:

Re-enforcements are being hurried to you. Randolph leaves Key West to-night with fast convoy. He has about 3,500 men, including the six light batteries from Tampa. The *St. Paul* will leave New York Wednesday evening with the Eighth Ohio Volunteers. The *Yale* and *Harvard* will take all the troops they can carry, sailing from Charleston. The day and hour of their departure will be communicated to you as soon as known, probably the 6th.

[1] Frederick W. Ramsden, "Diary of the British Consul at Santiago During the Hostilities," *McClure's Magazine*, November, 1898, 67–68. Mr. Ramsden's death, soon to occur from overwork, was deeply lamented.

He, however, notwithstanding Admiral Sampson's explanation of the conditions, insisted upon naval action, telegraphing July 4:

I regard it as necessary that the navy force an entrance into the harbor of Santiago not later than the 6th instant and assist in the capture of that place. If they do, I believe the place will surrender without further sacrifice of life;

and quickly upon the heels of this:

If Sampson will force an entrance with all his fleet to the upper bay of Santiago, we can take the city within a few hours. Under these conditions I believe the town will surrender. If the army is to take the place, I want 1,500 troops speedily, and it is not certain that they can be landed, as it is getting stormy. Sure and speedy way is through the bay. Am now in position to do my part.

These were answered at 11.20 A. M., July 5:

Secretary of war instructs me to say that the president directs that you confer with Admiral Sampson at once for co-operation in taking Santiago. After the fullest exchange of views you will agree upon the time and manner of attack.

To this Shafter replied at 1.37 P. M., July 5:

Navy should go into Santiago harbor at any cost. If they do, I believe they will take the city and all the troops that are there. If they do not, the country should be prepared for heavy losses among our troops. After talking with the French consul myself and Lieutenant Miley, with several others, I do not believe that I will bombard the town until I get more troops, but will keep up fire on trenches. [Continuing on the impossibility of supplying refugees, he ended] I should very much like the secretary's views.

This was answered at 3.10 P. M.:

Your telegram has been submitted to the president. After consideration, the secretary of war directs me to say that it is evident from your several reports that you do not consider yourself strong enough to make a successful assault upon the Spanish army entrenched in Santiago. This being the case, it is the part of wisdom to await reenforcements . . . you must be judge of the time and manner of

assault. The president has directed that you and Admiral Sampson have a conference and determine a course of co-operation best calculated to secure desirable results with least sacrifice.

H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General.*

This was followed an hour later by another despatch from the war department:

Your telegram concerning the navy entering Santiago harbor is received and your action thoroughly approved. The secretary of war suggests that if the navy will not undertake to break through, take a transport, cover the pilot-house in most exposed points with baled hay, attach an anchor to a towline, and if possible grapple the torpedo cables, and call for volunteer officers from the army—not a large number—to run into the harbor, thus making a way for the navy. Before acting, telegraph what you think of it. One thing is certain; that is, the navy must get into the harbor and must save the lives of our brave men that will be sacrificed if we assault the enemy in his entrenchments without aid. This is strictly confidential to you.

Shafter at once sent the following to Sampson:

General Shafter's compliments to Admiral Sampson and he can see him out here at any time, but General Shafter is not able to go into Siboney. He desires very much to see the admiral and especially if an attempt is to be made to enter the harbor. General Shafter doubts his ability to keep his command in food through Siboney. Large reenforcements of light artillery and infantry are on the way. General Shafter congratulates admiral on his splendid success with Spanish fleet.

At 3.12 P. M.:

I am directed by the president to confer with you fully as to a joint attack on Santiago. I am unable to ride in to see you. Can you not come here to see me? If not, I will send two of my staff officers in to-morrow morning to represent me.

At 3.27 P. M., with a nervous anxiety as to weather conditions which had no foundation, he telegraphed Sampson:

The landing of Siboney is becoming very precarious on account of the heavy surf which is beginning to prevail. Is it not probable that the troops on the west side of Santiago Bay near Cabañitas have left and that place might be utilized as a landing-place for troops and sup-

plies? Will you kindly give me your views on the subject? I fear we can use Siboney but little longer.

The difficulty in the minds of the commanding general and of those who, in sending the last telegrams from Washington, were so insistent upon the ships forcing an entrance, with the mines still in place, was the failure to appreciate the strategic conditions of the war. They saw but Santiago, ignoring Camara's squadron now on its way to the East and which had to be dealt with. There was, of course, the underlying idea that the admiral was not doing what he should to meet the situation, anxious as he was to aid General Shafter in every sense. To the former the way seemed very simple: to take the exterior position itself and thus make entry certain. War is sacrifice—both of men and material. Of men there were plenty; of the all-important material—ships—there was but little; no number of men within reason could, in the circumstances, weigh against a battle-ship. The sending in of a vessel, equipped as suggested from Washington, even supposing that it might survive the fire of the rapid-fire guns at the entrance and the 6-inch guns of the Punta Gorda battery, might or might not have torn away some of the mine connections; it would surely not have torn away all. If followed by a man-of-war of sufficient strength to withstand the fire of the guns still available against it, and she should be sunk in the channel by a remaining mine, it would possibly have closed the channel to the entrance of others. Of this the general seemed to have no conception.

Sampson's views, as will be seen, were finally to be adopted, though the surrender, soon to come, prevented actual action. He meanwhile steadily continued preparations for countermining with a view to forcing an entrance should Shafter decline an attack on these batteries. That his attitude had the approval of the naval authorities in Washington is shown by the following, instigated by the transmission of Shafter's demands from the secretary of war to the navy department, sent at 2.30 P. M., July 6, and received in the afternoon of the same day:

You are instructed not to risk loss of any armored vessels by submarine mines unless for the most urgent reasons, as the duration and

result of this war will depend chiefly upon the superiority of our navy to that of the enemy. It has always been considered here that if you batter the Morro and the United States army will assail and take, they could hold the bank of the entry, driving away infantry of the enemy from the vicinity of mine fields, thus enabling your boats, supported by fire of the vessels, to clear a channel through which your ships could enter and take the place.

Admiral Sampson received at the same time a telegram from the navy department notifying him that the president had ordered the secretaries of war and of the navy to direct General Shafter and himself "to confer at once for co-operation in taking Santiago. After the fullest exchange of views they should determine the time and manner of attack. The department desires you to carry out these instructions."

Admiral Sampson, who was for the moment suffering from an illness which for the first time had obliged him to go to bed for a day, and feeling it would be unwise for him to attempt the strain of the seven-mile ride from Siboney to General Shafter's headquarters in the burning midsummer tropic sun, or its even worse alternative, a tropic downpour, directed his chief of staff to represent him, and next morning Captain Chadwick, accompanied by Lieutenant Staunton, the assistant chief of staff, landed at Siboney, where they were met by an escort and provided with horses, and left upon this duty.

The chief of staff was directed to place the admiral's views before the general as follows: That the marine battalion at Guantánamo, and the marine guards of the fleet, in all some 1,200 men, should be landed at Cabañas Bay, two and a half miles west of the entrance, under cover of the guns of the fleet, and supported by the very considerable body of Cubans still to the west, to carry the Socapa position. At the same time an assaulting force of the army was to attack the eastern side. As soon as the two positions should be carried and the adjacent *terrain* in possession, including the mine-firing stations on either side, the mine field would be cleared and the ships go in.

Captain Chadwick arrived at about 10 A. M. at the headquarters, which were still at the point occupied first on June 30. General Shafter was himself ill and evidently suffering. His

sick-room was a clump of trees in the pleasant glade in which the headquarters camp was established, and under which his cot was placed, the only person near being an orderly. After an extended review of the conditions, a marked fact in which was that the temporary truce was to cease that day, Captain Chadwick, acting upon the phase of Spanish character which lays immoderate stress upon a sentiment which goes by the name of *pundonor* and which is best defined by the Chinese expression of "saving one's face," suggested that a letter be written to the Spanish commander, which, while placing before him the completeness of the victory of the American fleet, its ability to destroy Santiago itself, and the uselessness of prolonging the sufferings of a defence which in any case could only end in surrender, should also embody a proposal to refer the question of surrender to the Spanish home government, and thus relieve the general of a responsibility which, as previously mentioned, under Spanish regulations it was very difficult for him to assume without subjecting himself to trial and probably severe penalties, which might include dismissal and imprisonment.

General Shafter expressed his willingness to sign and send such a communication; it was drafted by Captain Chadwick, and the general's clerk called in to write it carefully in script. It was signed by the general and sent in under a flag.

The letter was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER, CUBA, *July* 6, 1898.

SIR: In view of the events of the 3d instant, I have the honor to lay before your excellency certain propositions to which I trust your Excellency will give the consideration which, in my opinion, they deserve.

I enclose a bulletin of the engagement of Sunday morning, which resulted in the complete destruction of Admiral Cervera's fleet, the loss of 600 of his officers and men, and the capture of the remainder. The admiral, General[1] Paredes, and all others who escaped alive, are now prisoners on board the *Harvard* and *St. Louis*, and the latter ship, in which are the admiral, General Paredes, and the surviving captains (all except the captain of the *Almirante Oquendo*, who was slain), has already sailed for the United States. If desired by you, this may be con-

[1] Paredes was really a commodore. The writer used the title which Spanish usage gave him.

firmed by your excellency sending an officer under a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson, and he can arrange to visit the *Harvard*, which will not sail until to-morrow, and obtain the details from Spanish officers and men aboard that ship.

Our fleet is now perfectly free to act, and I have the honor to state that unless a surrender be arranged by noon of the 9th instant, a bombardment of the city will be begun and continued by the heavy guns of our ships. The city is within easy range of these guns, the 8-inch being capable of firing 9,500 yards, the 13-inch of course much farther. The ships can so lie that, with a range of 18,000 yards, they can reach the centre of the city.

I make this suggestion of a surrender purely in a humanitarian spirit. I do not wish to cause the slaughter of any more men, either of your excellency's forces or my own, the final result under circumstances so disadvantageous to your excellency being a foregone conclusion.

As your excellency may wish to make reference of so momentous a question to your excellency's home government, it is for this purpose that I have placed the time of the resumption of hostilities sufficiently far in the future to allow a reply being received.

I beg an early answer from your excellency.

I have the honor to be your excellency's most obedient servant,

WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, Commanding Fifth Army Corps.[1]

THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF COMMANDING THE SPANISH FORCES,
Santiago de Cuba.

A plan of action for the fleet, should the Spanish not surrender, was drawn as follows, the army of course to aid on the east:

That a long-continued bombardment of Santiago from the sea, with the heavier guns of fleet, the fleet firing slowly and continuously during, say, twenty-four hours, at the rate of one shell every five minutes, excepting one hour at the rate of one shell every two minutes. This refers to the 8- and 13-inch shells. If this be not sufficient to bring the enemy to terms, that an assault be arranged on the Socapa Battery, using marines and the Cuban forces under General Cebreco, and an effort made to enter the harbor with some of the smaller ships of the squadron. This attack to be made upon knowing the result of a second demand made upon the commanding officer of the Spanish forces for

[1] As the operations in progress were "combined operations," and as the propositions were the result of the conference ordered by the president, this letter should also have been signed by Admiral Sampson's representative, in the admiral's name. Such questions, however, were not "to the fore" at the moment.

the surrender of the place, stating to him the conditions that surround him, destruction of the Spanish fleet, etc., and the number of force opposed to him. To give him time to consider the matter, the bombardment is fixed at noon of the 9th, unless he positively refuses to consider it at all, when it will be begun at such time as is convenient to ourselves. General Shafter will furnish Admiral Sampson with correct map showing where his lines will be, surrounding the city, and also open telegraphic communication by the way of Siboney down to near Aguadores to give information as to falling of shots.

General Shafter was now informed that General Blanco at Havana had approved the proposed exchange of prisoners. Toral requested the names of the Spanish officers who were prisoners, to select one in exchange for Hobson; he also agreed to exchange the seven seamen of the *Merrimac* for seven soldiers. One Spanish first lieutenant and two second lieutenants had been captured and their names were sent. Two o'clock P. M. of the 6th was named as the hour at which the two parties were to meet between the lines, Lieutenant Miley having charge of those sent from the American lines and Major Irles those from the Spanish. The name to be selected by General Toral not arriving in time, Miley carried with him all three of the Spanish officers, blindfolding officers and men before they passed through the lines. On arrival at the designated point it was found that Lieutenant Arias had been selected by General Toral, and the other two officers remained prisoners.

The exchange occurred during the visit on this day of the officers of the flag-ship, whose stay had continued late into the afternoon and had included a visit by Captain Chadwick to the hill at El Pozo, whence there was a full view of Santiago and the now well-advanced American lines, a visit which gave an opportunity of seeing the enthusiastic greeting of Hobson and his men by the army.

The trail up which they came was a broad one between high banks, with great trees meeting in an arch overhead. For hours before they came, officers and men who were not on duty in the rifle-pits had been waiting on these banks, broiling in the sun and crowded together as closely as men on the bleaching-boards of a base-ball field. Hobson's coming was one of the most dramatic pictures of the war. . . . The waiting band struck up the "Star-Spangled Banner." No one cheered

or shouted or gave an order, but every one rose to his feet slowly, took off his hat slowly, and stood so, looking up at Hobson in absolute silence. . . . And then a red-headed, red-faced trooper leaped down into the trail and shouted "Three cheers for Hobson," and the mob rushed at him with a roar of ecstasy, with a wild welcome of cheers. Few men, certainly very few young men, have tasted such a triumph. . . . It was a comic relief to see six obstinate mules dragging an ambulance loaded with seven clean, smart blue-jackets, grinning and shouting and rolling over each other in glee.[1]

A few hours later, but long after dark, they received a like welcome from their shipmates aboard the flag-ship, which was now awaiting them off Siboney.

Shafter's account of the consultation of July 6, as sent to Washington, was as follows:

PLAYA, *July* 7, 1898—4.50 P. M.

Had consultation with Sampson. Navy disinclined to force entrance except as a last resource. They will bombard the city, which is within easy range of their big guns, beginning at noon of the 9th, and if that is not effective, after twenty-four hours, will then force entrance with some of the smallest ships. I still have hopes they will surrender. Made a second demand on them yesterday, calling attention to the changed conditions because of the loss of the Spanish fleet, and offering to give them time to consult their home government, which General Toral has accepted, asking that the British consul return to the city with employees of the cable company to permit him to do so. Meanwhile I hope my re-enforcements will arrive. Not one in sight yet except the two hundred recruits for the Second Infantry, who came a week ago. As a last resource I will try running in transports. I do not consider my force sufficient to warrant an assault on the city, though I believe it would be successful, but at a fearful loss. Of course it would be criminal to hope for the end to be gained, which is merely the capture of a few thousand men and when we see we are getting them by siege. Nothing has yet been seen of tugs, lighters, and launches promised ten days ago.

The next day, July 7, Admiral Sampson received from General Shafter the following, which not only announced the effect of the letter of the preceding day, but embodied the suggestion of the war department regarding the mine field:

[1] R. H. Davis, *The Cuban and Porto-Rican Campaigning*, 268–269.

The Spanish commander will consult his home government as suggested in my letter of yesterday. If it becomes necessary to run a ship into Santiago harbor, I can give you a double-screw transport. Would it be practicable to run such a vessel in, dragging an anchor to catch torpedo connections, manned by a force just sufficient to handle the boat? My men are getting sick very fast, and if the result of the first day's bombardment is not decisive it will be absolutely necessary for the navy to break into the harbor at once. I send herewith a map of Santiago upon which our positions are indicated.

General Shafter evidently placed his losses possible in an assault above those which were sure to occur by sickness among his troops. There was, however, no indication of an effort to assist in the attack agreed upon at the entrance, by preparations to assault the position of the Morro.[1]

The truce naturally continued. Says a looker-on:

The days that followed July 3 were filled with innumerable visits to the Spanish lines under flags of truce. To the men in the pits, who knew nothing of the exigencies of diplomacy, these virgin flags were as offensive as those of red are to the bull. The men had placed their own flags along the entire line of trenches; and though they afforded

[1] Certain of General Shafter's telegrams had been published in the *New York Herald*, which, coming to Sampson's notice, brought from the latter the following, which, though sent later (July 14) when the surrender of Santiago was assured, gives the admiral's views in full and which, in the writer's opinion, were, as previously mentioned so often, such as should have been adopted. That they were evidently those also of General Miles will appear later. The telegram was as follows:

"Published telegrams of General Shafter, *Herald*, on July 6th reflect on the navy. I wish the department and the president to understand that the first requisite to opening harbor of Santiago de Cuba is the occupation of forts and entrenchments at its entrance guarding mine fields, and that the general has never made a move to do this, although before his army landed that was the primary object of his operations. If the general chooses to ignore the sea approaches and to attack Santiago to the east and north that is his affair, but it should be clearly understood that this attack does not influence the situation at the harbor entrance from which his left flank is distant not less than four miles. I have been ready at any time during the last three weeks to silence works, to clear entrance of mines, and to enter harbor whenever the army will do the part which the proper conduct of war assigns to it. To throw my ships to certain destruction upon mine fields would be suicidal folly and I have not the force to form landing party strong enough to ensure the capture of forts. No disagreements mentioned by the paper have been brought to my notice by General Shafter."

the enemy a perfect target and fixed our position as clearly as buoys mark out a race-course, the men wanted the flags there, and felt better at seeing them there, and so there they remained. The trenches formed a horseshoe curve five miles in length, and the entire line was defiantly decorated with our flags. When they fluttered in the wind at full length and the sun kissed their colors, they made one of the most inspiring and beautiful pictures of the war. The men would crouch for hours in the pits with these flags rustling above them and felt well repaid for the service; but when they saw crawling across the valley below the long white flag of truce, their watchfulness seemed wasted, their vigilance became a farce, and they mocked and scoffed at the white flag bitterly. These flags were sent in so frequently that the men compared them to the different war extras of a daily paper, and would ask, "Has that ten o'clock edition gone in yet?" and "Is this the base-ball edition coming out now or is it an extry?"[1]

All the same it was better than the continual potting shots which would otherwise have continued, and would have cost a number of lives to no purpose.

Santiago was now completely invested by the American lines from the point south-east held by General Bates, to the shores of the bay on the north-west held by General Ludlow with the right brigade of Lawton's division. The American trenches occupied the sinuous ridges which looked down the slopes toward the city, distant from the Spanish lines at some points not more than a half to three-quarters of a mile. The right had been strengthened on July 10 by the First Infantry, which had been held in support of the light batteries posted at El Pozo, and by the Seventy-first New York Infantry, which had been at work repairing the road to Siboney. The First Illinois and the First District of Columbia, just arrived, were posted on the 11th to the right of the cavalry division under General Wheeler, whose headquarters were on San Juan Hill, due east of the city and but a mile from its outer limits. Two light batteries were on the high ground to the north of the city, two others remaining on the San Juan hills, where they had been placed on the 3d. Here also were posted the eight 3.5-inch field-mortars, manned by men of the heavy artillery, which had just arrived under General Randolph, it being found impossible

[1] R. H. Davis, 255–256.

to get their guns to the front on account of the state of the roads. The Cubans under Garcia were posted several miles to the northwest on the Dos Caminos road to guard the passes. The water supply of Santiago, except that from the cisterns, was now completely in the control of the Americans.

CHAPTER X

PREPARATIONS FOR THE EAST. IN FRONT OF SANTIAGO

While there was this lull in army operations, preparations were steadily going forward in the fleet for the expedition to the Mediterranean and the East first ordered by telegram from Washington June 18.[1] The arrival of the *Brooklyn* from coaling at Guantánamo, July 7, released the flag-ship, which went there to coal, now for the first time in a port and at anchor, except for an hour during her previous hasty visit to Guantánamo, since she left the reef off Key West, May 29, for Santiago. The upper part of Guantánamo Bay was still in possession of the Spanish, who oc-

[1] In chapter XVI, vol. I. They need to be repeated:

June 18.—Detail *Iowa*, *Oregon*, and *Brooklyn* full of coal and ammunition. They will be sent to coast of Spain in the event of Cadiz division passing Suez, Egypt, and *Harvard*, *Yale*, *Yosemite*, *Dixie* same service. If, in your opinion, these armored vessels are not in repair to make the above-mentioned cruise, which should you recommend?

June 25.—Have the *Oregon*, *Yosemite*, *Iowa*, *Yankee*, and *Dixie* full of coal and ammunition and hold them for speedy orders the coast of Spain. Camara's fleet was sighted off Pantellaria Island, Mediterranean, standing to the east. Spanish collier passed Suez, Egypt, bound for Perim Island, India. Department expects to send you from Commodore Howell more vessels to replace any cruiser that may be taken from you for Spain and East.

June 26 (to Commodore Watson).—As soon as Sampson gives the order, you shall sail with the *Iowa* and the *Oregon*, the *Newark*, *Yosemite*, *Yankee*, and *Dixie* for St. Michael, Azores, for orders, *en route* to Tangiers, Morocco. Colliers ordered to join you St. Michael. If they have not arrived when you have reached there, leave a cruiser to convoy them and to follow. Shift your flag to *Iowa*.

June 28.—You are authorized to detain the *Oregon* and the *Iowa* until the other armored vessels are coaled fully, so as to be able to hold out position at Santiago de Cuba, but you will hurry this to the utmost possible, as the department desires to get these vessels to the East, via Spain. Watson with *Newark* leaves to-day to join you to command division for Spain. Assemble at same time *Yosemite*, *Dixie*, and *Yankee* and coal them for same service.

casionally fired upon the picket launches, which sometimes ventured beyond the fort, but there were no casualties. No effort was made to dislodge them, as the fleet had no use for the shallow waters of the upper bay. Intercepted letters gave a melancholy account of the want at Guantánamo, the 6,000 men in which were absolutely isolated and from which there was an occasional deserter forced into the American lines by starvation. Surrender of the whole in any case was a mere question of days, and any movement to hasten it would have been but a waste of life and energy.[1]

As shown by the successive telegrams of June 25 (which announce Camara's fleet as sighted off the Pantelleria Islands standing east), June 28, and July 1, the navy department was greatly impressed with the idea of a necessity for an early movement. Sampson's telegram of June 26 regarding "it essential not to reduce this force too much for some few days in view of the fact that the weather may compel us to coal at Guantánamo . . . and we must be prepared to meet the Spanish fleet if they attempt to escape," closing with the words that the present force "ensures a capture which I believe will terminate the war," was heeded, and no steps were for the moment taken. Sampson was authorized to detain the *Oregon* and *Iowa* (the telegram of June 25 omitting the *Brooklyn* from the detail) until the other armored ships were fully coaled, "so as to be able to hold our position at Santiago, but you will hurry this to the utmost possible, as the department desires to get these vessels to the East, via Spain."

Another telegram from Washington on July 8 urged haste, and directed that the ships detailed be placed under Watson's command and assembled at St. Nicolas Mole, Hayti, supplemented by a second of the same date, mentioning the departure from Spain, June 6, of a heavy cargo of coal for Port Said, and the report from the American consul at Lisbon, that the *Lepanto*, *Cisneros*, *Vittoria*, and *Alfonso XII* were ordered to cruise in the Strait of Gibraltar. The *Yankee* was at New York taking aboard ammunition for the expedition; the *Yosemite* still off San Juan, despite the telegrams sent but not received by her to go to St.

[1] There were on July 8 at Guantánamo, the *New York*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Harvard*, *Marblehead*, *Dixie*, *Scorpion*, *Osceola*, *Resolute*, the hospital ship *Solace*.

Nicolas Mole and coal. The *Dixie* arrived on the morning of the 9th at Guantánamo from Cape Cruz.

Word was sent Commodore Watson, who at this moment was off Santiago in the *Newark:* "Please come to Guantánamo as early as possible with the *Newark* and *Massachusetts* and take charge of the vessels now here belonging to the Eastern squadron. . . . This ship will return to Santiago as soon as she takes a reasonable amount of coal. Certainly expect to arrive there by Sunday morning" (the 10th). A telegram of the same day from Washington authorized the dropping of the *Iowa* from this list on account of Sampson's recommendation to dock and overhaul her machinery, and the substitution of the *Massachusetts* on account of the latter's more efficient condition. Long telegrams, detailing ammunition and supplies needed for the squadron, were sent to Washington and all steps possible were taken to advance its departure, the only delay now being in the time necessary for coaling.[1]

On July 9, Commodore Watson hoisted his broad pennant on the *Oregon,* and took over the command of the division. Sampson on the same day informed the navy department that the squadron would be ready to leave in two days; he stated that he had not been able to communicate with the *Yosemite,* off San Juan, but suggested that she might be picked up at that point. He renewed a suggestion of July 7, that the *New Orleans,* now about arriving from Key West, should be added to the force.

In anticipation of a possible refusal to surrender Santiago, Sampson on June 8 telegraphed Shafter, "We have a number, I think not less than ten, 3-inch rifle rapid-fire guns, shrapnel, with 85 rounds ammunition for each gun. Would you like to have them? They are light and easily transportable and I think would do you good service," an offer which was at once accepted, with the request that they should be at Siboney as early on the 9th as possible with detachments to serve them, as all the artil-

[1] The secretary of the navy telegraphed on July 9 to Sampson, complaining in strong language of the telegraph service, saying, in part, "many messages from you are forty-eight hours old when received; the ciphers are so mutilated as to be almost unrecognizable and take hours to decipher." The difficulty in such a juncture was a very serious one.

lerymen of the army were "behind guns." Later it was requested to send but half the number, but their delivery was held up by a despatch the next morning, from army headquarters:

Spanish commander proposes to abandon Santiago if permitted to march out to Holguin and not be attacked *en route*. The truce will continue for the moment and I will notify you of its discontinuance.

This news was the result of the action of General Toral, who had telegraphed Madrid in accord with the suggestion of General Shafter's letter of June 6, employees of the English cable company being, on his request, sent in to him for this purpose, the line to Jamaica still being uncut. General Shafter had received Toral's letter containing such proposal during the morning of July 8. The Spanish general declared that notwithstanding that the water supply had been cut off, he had water in cisterns in abundance; that he was well supplied with ammunition and rations for a reasonably long time (!) counting on those of the inhabitants who had fled; that the bombardment would be felt by those only whom the Americans had come to protect, as his troops were outside the city; that the Spanish troops were acclimated while the Americans would succumb to the diseases of the climate. He urged that his proposition be accepted, but if not, the suspension of hostilities would cease next day.[1] Shafter at once communicated the proposal to Washington, adding:

I have replied that while I have submitted the matter to my home government I did not think his terms would be accepted. He makes this proposition to avoid danger to the city and useless shedding of blood. This will give me another day to get troops from Siboney, the first transports of re-enforcements having just arrived. In my opinion they will have to surrender unconditionally very soon after I open fire upon them.[2]

The general re-enforced this optimistic opinion by telegraphing the same day:

The general health of the command is good; one hundred and fifty cases of fever, which runs its course in four or five days and is not serious. I am feeling much better.

[1] Miley, 144.

[2] Though this telegram was written by General Shafter July 8, it did not arrive at Washington until the 9th.

In view of these reports, it was scarcely possible that any other reply could be received to Toral's proposal than an emphatic negative; Shafter's telegram announcing it was answered immediately upon its reception (July 9, 1.50 P. M.):

Your telegram setting forth terms on which the enemy will evacuate Santiago has been submitted to the president by the secretary of war, who instructs me to say that you will accept nothing but an unconditional surrender, and should take extra precautions to prevent the enemy's escape.

But Shafter had changed his own opinion from that expressed in his previous message. He telegraphed:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, VIA HAYTI, *July* 9, 1898—9 P. M.

I forwarded General Toral's proposition to evacuate the town this morning without consulting any one. Since then I have seen the general officers commanding divisions, who agree with me that it should be accepted. First, it releases at once the harbor; second, it permits the return of thousands of women, children, and old men, who have left the town fearing bombardment and who are now suffering where they are, though I am doing my best to supply them with food; third, it saves the great destruction of property which a bombardment would entail, most of which belongs to Cubans and foreign residents; fourth, it at once relieves the command, while it is in good health, for operations elsewhere. There are now three cases of yellow fever at Siboney, in Michigan regiment; and if it gets started, no one knows where it will stop. We lose by this simply some prisoners we do not want and the arms they carry. I believe many of them will desert and return to our lines. I was told by a sentinel who deserted last night, that two hundred men want to come but were afraid our men would fire upon them.

This received a sharp and emphatic answer which ended consideration of the Spanish proposal:

WASHINGTON, *July* 9, 1898—11.15 P. M.

In reply to your telegram recommending terms of evacuation as proposed by the Spanish commander, after careful consideration by the president and secretary of war, I am directed to say that you have repeatedly been advised that you would not be expected to make an assault upon the enemy at Santiago until you were prepared to do the work thoroughly. When you are ready, this will be done. Your telegram of this morning said your position was impregnable and that you believed the enemy would yet surrender unconditionally. You have

also assured us that you could force their surrender by cutting off the supplies. Under these circumstances your message recommending that Spanish troops be permitted to evacuate and proceed without molestation to Holguin is a great surprise and is not approved. The responsibility of destruction and distress to the inhabitants rests entirely with the Spanish commander. The secretary of war orders that when you are strong enough to destroy the enemy and take Santiago that you do it. If you have not force enough, it will be despatched to you at the earliest moment practicable. Re-enforcements are on the way, of which you have already been advised. In the meantime nothing is lost by holding the position you now have and which you regard as impregnable. Acknowledge receipt.

There could be no mistaking the president's views; there was but one course—immediate and energetic action. "Immediately upon its receipt General Toral was informed that his proposition had not been favorably considered by the home government and that his unconditional surrender was again demanded. An answer was requested by 3 P. M. of the 10th, and if unfavorable he was informed that active operations would be resumed at 4 P. M. General Toral promptly declined to surrender and the truce was at an end."[1]

Re-enforcements had now begun to arrive in large numbers. There was no question of men, and now that some of the large ships of the American line under the navy and the *Columbia* were being used to transport troops there were, with the numerous other transports at its disposal, no difficulties as to transportation. Several thousands of men, the advance of the expedition under General Miles intended for Puerto Rico, but diverted for the moment to Santiago, were already on the way. The cruiser *Columbia* and the *Yale*, with 1,800 men of Garretson's brigade, left Charleston at midnight of July 8, General Miles being aboard the latter, with "instructions," however, as shown in a telegram from the war department, of July 8, to Shafter, "not to in any manner supersede" the latter "as commander of the forces in the field near Santiago, so long as" he should be "able for duty." The transports *City of Macon* and *Gate City* with the First Illinois Infantry; the *Specialist*, *Unionist*, and *Comanche* with the Fourth

[1] Miley, 147.

and Fifth Artillery under Brigadier-General W. F. Randolph, arrived at Siboney July 9, and the *Catania*, with the First District of Columbia Infantry, on the 10th. The supply of artillery was now ample; but the question was to get it to the front. Eight 3.5-inch mortars, with, however, a very limited supply of ammunition, were already in position, but only two of Randolph's guns were able to cover the seven or eight miles by the 14th.

The roads were getting worse from the heavy rains and the constant teaming. Little had been done to make them better. "Of the brooks that one crossed on the ordinary route between General Shafter's headquarters and the front, not one was bridged over; one would think that with so much timber handy they could have been bridged at the rate of one an hour. As it was, wagons were sometimes overturned in them, and the soldiers who had to wade through them were made unnecessarily wet." [1] In truth, it is difficult to understand why the whole road from Siboney to the front should not have been by this time turned into passable corduroy.

Facilities for discharging stores had not materially improved. A large and valuable lighter of 250 tons, lent by the navy department, and towed by the *Fern* from Key West, had arrived July 3; was turned over on the 4th to the army authorities at Siboney, and was next day ashore, a wreck. A steam-launch of the *St. Paul* left to assist in the work was also a few days later on the beach broken to pieces, and the coxswain with a broken leg. It was not surprising that there should be truth in General Shafter's complaint in a telegram of July 7 to the war department that it was "too much trouble to get things from the navy, and we have but partial control when we do get them." There was necessarily a limit to compliance with such demands. The result of sending such aid from the fleet, most of the boats of which in any case had been left at Key West, and only a very small number retained for absolute necessities, could only be destruction so long as they were under the direction of men unaccustomed to the sea and unable to handle such a situation.

[1] John Black Atkins, *The War in Cuba*, 178. "When I left the front for the last time" (after the surrender), says Mr. Atkins, "some of General Randolph's guns were still stuck in a mud pool."

The anchorage, though limited in extent, was a fairly good one, but the surf at times beat heavily. Had the *locale* been a smooth harbor, it would have been a wholly different question, but the successful handling of boats in the surf of an exposed coast is one demanding the most expert knowledge of the seaman, and this knowledge, to the great detriment of the army, to the detriment of its comfort, well-being, and even safety, was almost wholly absent. There was no control over the transports. These, says General Shafter in a telegram of July 7, "go miles from shore and there is no way of reaching them or compelling them to come in. It is a constant struggle to keep them in hand. Had it not been for the lighter *Laura* the army could not have moved. It is with the greatest difficulty that one day's food can be issued at a time."

A report by General Shafter to Washington, July 9, "If two lighters and tugs have arrived, navy must have them. They have not up to sundown reported at Siboney or Daiquiri," brought an order from the navy department to deliver them, which was sharply replied to by Sampson, who, with every wish to aid, had begun to lose patience. He answered:

> Lighters brought by *Fern* and *Niagara* were received and turned over to the quartermaster at Siboney and anchored. One the following day was ashore and destroyed. Until the embarkation, transport, and disembarkation of troops and supplies come under the control of the navy as in England this muddle will continue. We have done all we could for them, ruined many boats and worked many of our men beyond proper limit. Propose to give them the use of the new steel lighter captured recently as soon as it can be unloaded.[1]

This despatch went to the root of the difficulty; the work was a seaman's work and needed a seaman's handling, and no misplaced feeling, a feeling which never could have developed into an activity with such consequences had there been anything like a

[1] This was a decked lighter of about 100 tons captured off Manzanillo while in tow of a tug (which escaped), by the *Scorpion* and *Osceola* on July 5. It was loaded with American salt pork, flour, and corn, most of which was given to Cubans at Guantánamo and the remainder, later, to the Spanish troops. The lighter was turned over, as mentioned by Admiral Sampson, to the army quartermaster at Siboney.

proper organization for war, should have been allowed to stand in the way in such an exigency. If it had been desired not to employ naval officers, the merchant service no doubt could have been found equal to the duty, though with their unaccustomedness to handling a number of ships under way in a crowded space, they would not have been so efficient as men of the navy, trained to handle ships within a few hundred yards of each other. In nothing does the meaning embodied in the ancient phrase of "The shoemaker to his last" apply with more force than in matters of the sea.

On July 10 Shafter sent the following messages, somewhat inaccurate in so far as the length of the short bombardment which took place that afternoon was concerned, in each reiterating his intention not to assault:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, VIA HAYTI, *July* 11, 1898—1.30 A. M.

Headquarters Fifth Corps, camp near Santiago, 10. After twenty-four hours' bombardment navy promised to try and get in close the harbor with some of her large-draft boats. If to-morrow bombardment is not satisfactory I shall ask them to make the attempt. I will not sacrifice any lives. As soon as Henry reaches me the town will be surrounded and we can knock it to pieces with our light guns. The obtaining of launches from the navy was not satisfactory, and I prefer calling on them as little as possible. So Captain Goodrich assisted very ably in disembarking troops, but means were all kept in their control.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, VIA HAYTI, *July* 11, 1898—1.53 A. M.

Headquarters Fifth Corps, near Santiago, 10. My plans for to-morrow are to keep a bombardment of the trenches and city and to complete the investment on the north-west by the troops that have just arrived at Siboney, one regiment of which, First Illinois, has now reached me. Should the operation be light at any point will push line nearer city, but will not assault.

On the same afternoon, Sampson, before leaving Guantánamo, which was done as soon as the flag-ship had coaled, received from Shafter the following:

[Dated *July* 9.] Messages sent you yesterday and to-day have apparently not been received by you. I have just asked that you commence firing at 4 P. M., and sent you this morning our latest map of our

position. Can you begin bombardment to-morrow morning? If so please do so, and continue it as arranged with Captain Chadwick.

[Dated *July* 10.] I have the honor to inform you that it is expected that the bombardment of the city of Santiago de Cuba will begin this evening or to-morrow morning. I enclose you a revised chart showing position of the American and Spanish lines. I will communicate to you later in the day the exact hour when the firing should begin and it is respectfully requested that you be ready to begin at 4 P. M. to-day. The falling of the first shot will be observed and the results communicated to you by signal. It would be very disastrous for the *morale* of my men to have any of the shell fall near them, and I think it would be better, at first. to put your shots in the westward part of the city near the bay.

Commodore Watson having left the vicinity of Santiago on July 9 for Guantánamo in the *Newark*, a telegram was sent by Sampson to Siboney for Commodore Schley, who was now the senior officer off Santiago:

Begin firing as requested by General Shafter as soon as possible, using 12- and 13-inch guns of *Indiana* and *Texas*. Do not fire unless army is prepared to signal you fall of shots from Aguadores.

The flag-ship followed this telegram, reaching Aguadores that evening. Firing, with 8-inch shell only, had been maintained for an hour by the *Brooklyn* and *Indiana*. The next morning, July 11, the firing was resumed by these ships and the *New York*, the flag-ship now being close to the shore near the point where the army signal station had been established, this being in telephonic communication with Siboney and thence with the army headquarters.

Before beginning, an active interchange of signals took place with the shore signal station regarding the reporting of the fall of shot, and after an experimental shot at 8.25, the report of the fall of which was awaited, a vigorous bombardment began at 9.35, in which the *New York*, *Brooklyn*, and *Indiana*, using 8-inch shell, engaged, and was continued until 1 o'clock, when it ceased by request of General Shafter, signalled at 12.10.

The following were received and sent:

7.50 A. M. From shore to flag: "General Shafter's compliments to Captain Chadwick, and he wishes fire commenced early

this morning. Two maps have been sent to Admiral Sampson which give the distance to the Cathedral. A number of cable messages for the fleet are held at Siboney; no means of delivery."

8.10 A. M. From flag to beach: "We are about to commence firing; will fire very slowly, and wish every shot reported."

8.40 A. M. From flag to shore: "Where did that shot fall?"

8.45 A. M. From shore to flag: "We are waiting report from front."

9.00 A. M. From flag to shore: "Ask front if fall of shot was observed."

9.15 A. M. From flag to beach: "Next shot will be fired at 9.25; keep sharp lookout."

9.30 A. M. From beach to flag: "Your shot fell two hundred yards east of Del Loute Hospital; shot should be directed half mile farther west."

9.15 A. M. From flag to beach: "Give us the fall as quickly as possible."

9.50 A. M. From beach to flag: "Second shot was well placed. A vigorous bombardment until 12 noon requested."

10.20 A. M. From flag to *Brooklyn:* "Fire shot every five minutes; our shots are falling right, using range 8,500 yards, north-northwest from our position."

11.25 A. M. From flag to *Brooklyn:* "Please fire three shots every five minutes."

11.25 A. M. From flag to beach: "How is firing?"

11.32 A. M. From beach to flag: "Striking city with no apparent result. I think firing with big guns should begin."

11.40 A. M. From flag to beach: "Shall we cease firing at 12 o'clock?"

11.45 A. M. From *Brooklyn* to flag: "Do you know how shells are falling?"

11.50 A. M. From flag to *Brooklyn:* "Striking in city."

12 M. From beach to flag: "Please continue firing with heavy guns until 1 o'clock; then cease firing until further orders."

12.35 P. M. From beach to flag: "General Castillo reports that Santa Anna church has been turned into a powder magazine."

12.45 P. M. From beach to flag: "The church is west of Reina Mercedes Barracks. Discontinue at once. I am going to put up a flag of truce."

4.45 P. M. From *Brooklyn* to flag: "General Shafter states that fire from ships very accurate; shell falling in city. Lines have been advanced. Flag of truce went forward to demand unconditional surrender. Will communicate with you fully directly to Aguadores as to time of firing and result of truce."

The more complete despatch (sent July 11) was received the next morning, July 12:

> My lines are now complete to the bay north of Santiago. Your shots can be observed from there perfectly, at least those that fall in the town. Flames followed several shots fired to-day. A number of shots fell in bay very close to a small gun-boat lying near shore. At present they are considering a demand for unconditional surrender. I will notify you of the result. I think it advisable to put some heavy shots—say 10 to 13 inches—to-morrow, and see if we cannot start a fire. Be careful not to shoot beyond the town, as my troops are within one and a half miles of it, and you will be firing directly toward us.

In accord with General Shafter's desire for heavier shell, a message was sent to Commodore Watson at Guantánamo to send the *Massachusetts* and *Oregon*, and both were at hand early the following day, July 13.

The bombardment on the afternoon of the 10th had caused a vigorous fire of musketry and artillery to open at 4 P. M. from the Spanish lines, which, returned with like animation from the American, was kept up until 6 o'clock, when all the Spanish artillery except one gun was silenced. The firing during the heavier bombardment of the fleet on the 11th was slight and desultory. Early in the morning of this day Shafter had been informed by a telegram which had left Washington the day before:

> Should the Spaniards surrender unconditionally and wish to return to Spain they will be sent back at the expense of the United States government.

This had given a new basis for negotiation, which resulted in the demand mentioned in the signal to Sampson, and Shafter wrote:

CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July* 11, 1898.

To His Excellency, Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba:

SIR: With the largely increased forces which have come to me, and the fact that I have your line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seems fitting that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender of Santiago and of your excellency's army. I am authorized to state that should your excellency so desire, the government of the United States will transport the entire command of your excellency to Spain.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General Commanding.

Shafter's demand of July 11 was answered by the following, which, though dated the same day, was not received until daybreak of the 12th on account of the danger in passing the lines after dark:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July* 11, 1898.

To His Excellency, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, in Camp at the San Juan:

SIR: I have the honor to advise your eminence that your communication of this date is received, and in reply desire to confirm that which I said in my former communication; also to advise you that I have communicated your proposition to the general-in-chief.

Reiterating my sentiments, I am, very respectfully,

JOSÉ TORAL,
Commander-in-Chief Fourth Corps and Military Governor of Santiago.

During the bombardment of the 11th, the *Yale*, *Columbia*, and *Duchess*, with Garretson's brigade of General Miles's expedition, arrived. Orders were given almost at once on arrival to burn the village at Siboney on the score of infection of the habitations by yellow fever. At noon signal was made to the flag-ship from the *Yale* at Siboney by General Miles:

Admiral, I would like to land troops from *Columbia*, *Yale*, and *Duchess* to the west of the Bay of Santiago harbor and follow it up with additional troops, moving east against the Spanish troops defending Santiago on the west. I will be glad if you can designate the most available point for disembarking the troops and render all the assist-

ance practicable to the troops as they move east. Will notify you when troops are ready for the movement. If you have an officer conversant with the locality, will be glad to see him.

Immediate steps were taken to meet the general's wishes, so in accord with Admiral Sampson's own views, but at 4.45 P. M. all active preparations were held up by the reception, on the afternoon of July 11, of the messages announcing a suspension of hostilities. The last shot had been fired.

At 7.55 A. M. of July 12 a message was sent by Shafter to Sampson:

General Miles and I are going to have a conference with General Toral this morning about the surrender of the place. Please have no firing until due notice.

General Shafter's telegram of July 2, proposing withdrawing five miles to a position in the hills, had, as General Miles himself states, determined the latter to go to Santiago "with the reenforcements already *en route* and that were being moved as rapidly as possible. Before leaving Washington it was my purpose," says Miles, "to land sufficient forces on the west side of Santiago to either open the entrance to our fleet or enfilade the enemy's line and take their position in reverse." He left Washington on the evening of July 7, reaching Charleston in time to leave, as mentioned, in the *Yale*. The request mentioned above as signalled from the *Yale*, July 11, had been prepared before reaching Santiago, and came later to Admiral Sampson also as a letter. Says General Miles:

The admiral immediately came on board the *Yale*. I explained to him the purpose of my presence and told him I desired the co-operation of the navy in the plan above stated. He cordially acquiesced in the plan and offered every assistance of his fleet to cover the debarkation of the troops and also to enfilade the Spanish position with the guns of the ships. When this arrangement had been concluded, I went on shore and opened communication with General Shafter. I asked him if he had sufficient troops on the east side of the harbor to maintain his position and he replied he had. I then gave directions to General Garretson to disembark all the troops on the *Yale*, *Columbia*, and the other transports that were there or expected to arrive, viz., the *Duchess* and *Rita*, whenever he should receive orders. On the following morn-

ing I rode from Siboney to the headquarters of General Shafter. After consulting with him, he sent a communication to General Toral, saying that the commanding general of the American army had arrived in his camp with re-enforcements, and that we desired to meet him between the lines at any time agreeable to him. He replied that he would see us at 12 o'clock the following day. That evening I became apprised of the fact that negotiations regarding a surrender had been pending between the commanding general and the Spanish commander, but no definite conclusions had been reached.[1]

The communication mentioned by General Miles, as sent after consultation between himself and Shafter, was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July* 12, 1898.

To His Excellency, Commander-in-Chief Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba.

SIR: I have the honor to inform your excellency that I have already ordered a suspension of hostilities, and I will repeat that order, granting in this manner a reasonable time within which you may receive an answer to the message sent to the government of Spain, which time will end to-morrow at 12 o'clock noon.

I think it my duty to inform your excellency that during this armistice I will not move any of my troops that occupy the advanced lines, but the forces that arrived to-day, and which are debarking at Siboney, require moving toward this camp.

I wish your excellency would honor me with a personal interview to-morrow morning at 9 o'clock. I will come accompanied by the commanding general of the American army, and by an interpreter, which will permit you to be accompanied by two or three persons of your staff who speak English.

Hoping for a favorable answer, I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, Commanding.

Toral answered:

ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, FOURTH CORPS,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July* 12, 1898, 9 P. M.

To His Excellency, the General of the American Troops.

ESTEEMED SIR: I have the honor to answer your favor of this date, informing your excellency that in deference to your desires, I will be

[1] *Report of Major-General Commanding the Army*, 1898, 19.

much honored by a conference with his excellency the commanding general of your army, and your excellency, to-morrow morning at the hour you have seen fit to appoint.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSÉ TORAL,
Commander of the Fourth Army Corps.

Two messages were sent by General Shafter to Admiral Sampson, at an hour, however, which prevented their delivery until next morning (July 13).

July 12.—A truce exists and negotiations are now pending with the Spanish commander. All firing must be discontinued during the cessation of hostilities. Due notice of the commencement will be given you.

Headquarters near Santiago, July 12.—A truce now exists and will probably continue all day to-morrow, the 13th.

It was clear that surrender was imminent; that the main point at issue, in the minds of the Spaniards, was the sentiment of *pundonor*, which, if satisfactorily met, would at once bring surrender. This was shown in these communications to General Shafter, but more fully in the following telegram sent by Linares, the same day as the preceding (July 12), through Governor-General Blanco, to the minister of war at Madrid, which laid before the Spanish authorities in all its nakedness, the seriousness of the situation. This telegram was, of course, at the moment, not known to the American commander.

To the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of War:

Though confined to my bed by great weakness and sharp pains, I am so much worried over the situation of these long-suffering troops that I deem it my duty to address your excellency and the minister of war for the purpose of setting forth the true state of affairs.

Hostile positions very close to precincts of city, favored by nature of ground; ours spread out over fourteen kilometers [eight and a half miles]; troops exhausted; large numbers sick; not sent to hospitals because necessary to retain them in trenches; horses and mules without food and shelter; in heavy storms rain pours into trenches continuously for twenty-four hours; soldiers without permanent shelter; rice the only food, cannot change or wash clothes. Many casualties; chiefs and officers dead, wounded, and sick, deprive our forces of necessary direc-

tion in critical moments. In these conditions impossible to break through; to attempt it would take a third of our men who could not go; enemy would reduce forces still further; result would be a great disaster without accomplishing, as your excellency desires, the salvation of our wasted battalions.

To make a sortie protected by the division from Holguin, it would be necessary for the latter to break through the hostile line and then with combined forces to break through another part of the same line. This would mean an eight days' journey for Holguin division, bringing with them a great quantity of provisions which they would be unable to transport.

The situation fatally imposes itself; surrender is inevitable; and we can only prolong the agony; the sacrifice is useless and the enemy understands this, fully realizing our situation. Their circle being well established, they will exhaust our forces without exposing their own, as was done yesterday, cannonading by land from elevations without our being able to discover their batteries, and by sea from the squadron, which has a perfect range and bombards the city by sections with mathematical precision.

Santiago is no Gerona, a walled city, part of the mother country, defended inch by inch by its own children without distinction—old men, women, and children, who encouraged and assisted the combatants and exposed their lives, moved by the holy idea of independence, while awaiting aid which they received. Here is solitude; a total emigration of the population, insular as well as peninsular, including the public officials with rare exceptions. Only the clergy remain, and they wish to leave the city to-day headed by their archbishop.

These defenders are not just beginning a campaign full of enthusiasm and energy; they have been fighting for three years with the climate, privations, and fatigue, and now that the most critical time has arrived, their courage and physical strength are exhausted, and there is no means of regaining these. The ideal is lacking; for they are defending the property of those who abandoned it in their very presence and who have allied themselves with the American forces.

The honor of arms has its limit, and I appeal to the judgment of the government and of the entire nation, whether these long-suffering troops have not saved that honor many times since the 18th of May, when they sustained the first bombardment.

If it is necessary to consummate the sacrifice for reasons unknown to me, or if some one is needed to assume the responsibility of the result anticipated and announced by me in several telegrams, I offer myself loyally on the altars of my country for the one purpose or the other, and I will charge myself with the responsibility for the act of consenting to the surrender, for my modest reputation is of little value when it comes to a question of national interests.

LINARES.

Late in the evening of July 12, General Shafter had received from General Toral the following letter:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July* 12.

Esteemed General of the American Forces.

SIR: I have the honor to insist upon my proposition to evacuate the Plaza and the territory of the division of Cuba under conditions hereinafter stated, for the [honor of the] Spanish arms, trusting that your chivalry and sentiment as a soldier will make you appreciate exactly the situation, and therefore must a solution be found that leaves the honor of my troops intact; otherwise you will comprehend that I shall see myself obliged to now make defence as far as my strength will permit. I call the attention of your eminence to the advance of your troops by railroad, the movement of which I suppose you are ignorant, and I take that you will kindly order their return to their position during the time that the armistice is in existence.

Very respectfully,

JOSÉ TORAL,
Commander-in-Chief, etc.

This was forwarded to Washington, leaving Playa del Este July 13 at 2 A. M., with a suggestion of acceptance:

Will any modification of the recent order be permitted? I have been perfectly satisfied that he can be taken, but if he fights, as we have reason to believe he may, it will be at fearful cost of life; and to stay here with disease threatening may be as great loss from that cause. The suffering of the people who left the town is intense. I can only supply food enough to keep them from starvation, and if blue rains continue I do not know how long I can do that.

The reply came with startling promptness (a difference of but fourteen minutes appears between the hours noted of the despatch at Playa del Este and the return from Washington):

WASHINGTON, *July* 13, 1898.—2.14 A. M.—Telegram just received. No modification of former order permitting the Spanish army evacuating Santiago under such conditions as proposed by Toral will be made. The secretary of the navy will be consulted at once concerning the ordering of Sampson in to assist you.

The last sentence of this despatch was the outcome of a telegram from General Shafter which, in the circumstances, was of extraordinary character:

PLAYA DEL ESTE VIA HAYTI, *July* 12, 1898.—7.33 A. M.

July 12.—Rained very hard last night and so far to-day. If it continues long roads will practically be impassable. So far no attempt to enter the harbor by the navy. They should be required to make a determined effort at once. The slight bombardment has apparently had no effect upon the town. If roads become too bad to transport rations we will simply have to take the town by assault, without regard to what it costs. Refugees are suffering for food.

It is difficult to understand what was in General Shafter's mind in asking at this moment that the fleet should make an effort to enter the harbor "at once." He had established a suspension of hostilities the day before; he had just continued the truce until noon of the next day, with a request for an interview with the Spanish commander, with the evident expectation of continuing the negotiations, which, as he had telegraphed Sampson, will probably continue all day to-morrow (the 13th), and which were continued without a break until the final capitulation.

Nor had the general had any intimation from Sampson (whose every action of these days had been a compliance with Shafter's messages) of any unwillingness on Sampson's part to carry out the plan of action of July 6.

That the latter was ready to do so is plainly shown in a telegram sent by General Miles to Washington on June 14, saying: "kept the troops that came on *Yale*, *Columbia*, *Duchess*, and part of those on *Comanche* ready to disembark at Cabañas and on west side, where I had made all arrangements for putting the troops on that side of the harbor and opening the entrance to the bay in conjunction with Admiral Sampson." No action was taken, or could be taken because the truce remained unbroken. Meanwhile Toral, as shown by his letter of the 12th, was complaining of the movement of troops by Shafter, and requesting their return to their position "during the time the armistice is in existence."

The secretary of war having received Shafter's telegram, was now, with equal unconscious disregard of the existing truce and negotiations, writing the secretary of the navy on July 14: "I have the honor to request that you order the fleet off Santiago to force at once its way into the bay, if possible, to aid the army in the capture of Santiago and the Spanish army defending it;"

and follows with his reasons, which are, heavy rains; difficulty of food supply; trenches filled with water; danger from the yellow fever which existed, and the character of the enemy's works, to take which "by assault would require a terrible sacrifice of life." The navy department on this sent a telegram of a wiser and more conservative character to Sampson:

> The commanding general of the army[1] urges, and secretary of war urgently requests that navy force harbor. Confer with commander of army, wishing to do all that is reasonably possible to ensure the surrender of the enemy. I leave the matter to your discretion, except that the United States armored vessels must not be risked.

Shafter, in his telegram to Washington (though his messages to Sampson were sufficiently enthusiastic), underestimated the effect of the bombardment which had been carried out on the 10th and 11th in the manner laid down by his own explicit instructions, given moment by moment, the result being but forty-six shots; a vastly greater number could have been fired, and the admiral stood ready to execute, to any extent, the general's wishes in this regard. The fears of the latter for his lines had caused the moderate number of shells used, to be directed to the western edge of the town, and many thus had no result; but even so, fifty-seven houses had been struck, and some of these completely destroyed.[2] But there were forty-six 8-inch and eighteen 12- and 13-inch guns available, sixty-four in all, an armament sufficiently powerful to have razed the city in a few hours and have made its site absolutely untenable to any body of men whatever, had humanity and consideration for the homes of so many thousands allowed, or exigency have demanded, such action.[3]

[1] This title strictly belonged to General Miles, but General Shafter was meant.

[2] See Report of Board, ordered to report on effect of shell in Santiago, *Report of the Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, *Appendix*, 629.

[3] In his book, *The Spanish-American War*, Mr. R. A. Alger, secretary of war from March 5, 1897, to August 1, 1899, in dealing with the events of the period, which has just been noticed, devotes a good deal of space (p. 233 *et seq.*) to what the author supposes Sampson's failure to act in accord with the engagement of July 6. He says: "On the afternoon of the 10th and for a few hours on the morning of the 11th the navy threw some few shells into Santiago. Of the naval firing on these two days, General

General Miles had also sent a telegram concurring in General Shafter's views regarding terms:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, VIA HAYTI, *July* 13, 1898—2.40 A. M.

Camp near Santiago, July 12.—The Spanish general to-day asked that some conclusion be reached that shall save his honor. Offers to surrender Santiago province, force, batteries, munitions of war, etc., all except the men and small arms. Under ordinary circumstances would not advise acceptance, but this is a great concession, and would avoid assaulting entrenching lines with every device for protecting his men and inflicting heavy loss on assaulting lines. The siege may last many weeks, and they have the provisions for two months. There are 20,000 starving people who have fled the city and were not allowed to take any food. The fortitude and heroism of the army has been unsurpassed, and, under the circumstances, I concur with General Shafter and the major-general, and would request that discretion be granted as to terms, in view of the importance of other immediate operations in which both this part of the army and navy will participate. The very serious part of this situation is that there are one hundred cases of yellow fever in this command and the opinion of the surgeon that it will spread rapidly.

MILES, *Major-General, Commanding.*

Shafter reported that 'the bombardment has absolutely had no effect on the town' and General Wheeler says that many of the shots had too great a range and went over the city" (p. 235). Mr. Alger omits to say that the bombardment was held up on Shafter's own request at 1 P. M., July 11, and that Sampson was not to open again until he had word from Shafter; also that at 4.45 P. M. Sampson was informed of the truce which thereafter remained unbroken, no shot being fired thenceforward on either side; nor does he modify Shafter's statement that "the bombardment has had absolutely no effect," by the statement of the board which investigated the destruction, and which was printed long before his book was published.

Mr. Alger continued the words above quoted by saying: "Shafter was naturally disinclined to again request Admiral Sampson to force the harbor after he had received two promises, as he understood them, that such an attempt would be made after twenty-four hours bombardment," the fact being that there had been no twenty-four hours bombardment, for the reason just mentioned; *viz.*, Shafter's request to stop. Alger prints his letter to the secretary of the navy (p. 237) asking that the fleet "force at once its way into the bay, if possible," evidently wholly unconscious that such action would violate international law and military honor in the circumstances of a truce, which, while it might, by General Shafter's letter of July 12, end at noon of the 13th, was evidently, by the request for an interview on the latter date, so cordially acceded to by General Toral, not intended by General Shafter to be suddenly broken off, and which was continued unbroken to the end. It is clear that, in writing such an account as he has given, Mr. Alger did not know his subject.

This was answered the same day by a telegram signed by the secretary of war himself, and not, as was usual, in the case of other officers, by the adjutant-general; it distinctly placed the command in the hands of Miles, despite the instructions mentioned of the war department:

(Received 2.45 P. M.)

MAJOR-GENERAL MILES, *Camp near Santiago:*

You may accept surrender by granting parole to officers and men, the officers retaining their side arms, the officers and men after parole to be permitted to return to Spain, the United States assisting. If not accepted, then assault, unless in your judgment an assault would fail. Consult with Sampson, and pursue such course as to the assault as you jointly agree upon. Matter should now be settled promptly.[1]

Says Miles:

This left the matter to my discretion—to accept surrender, order an assault, or withhold the same. I sent a telegram to Admiral Sampson, again requesting him to be ready to cover the landing of the troops, in accordance with our previous arrangement, and fixing the time at 12 o'clock the following day:

"ADMIRAL W. T. SAMPSON, *Commanding United States Naval Forces, North Atlantic Squadron.*

"SIR: Please have General Henry's command, now on *Yale, Columbia,* and *Duchess,* ready to disembark at noon to-morrow at Cabañas. Telegraph notification will be sent you at flag station, also at Siboney, when to commence the debarkation.

"Very respectfully,

"NELSON A. MILES,

"*Major-General, Commanding United States Army.*"

I also sent the following telegrams to General Henry, whom I had placed in command of all the infantry and artillery then on board the transports:

[1] Another telegram had been sent from Washington on the 13th at 2.55 A. M. The telegram from Miles to which this was a reply apparently does not appear in the published correspondence. The reply was as follows: "Telegram received. If in the judgment of General Shafter and yourself it is best to postpone assault until secretary of the navy is consulted, you can do so. We will get the decision of the secretary of the navy as early as possible and telegraph you the result. ALGER."

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
"CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO, *July* 13, 1898.

"GENERAL HENRY, *Commanding Division:*

"Have asked Admiral Sampson to be prepared to cover your debarkation at Cabañas to-morrow after 12 noon, in case Spaniards do not surrender. Notification will be sent him by telegraph and signal when your troops should go ashore. Make the best use of your troops against the Spanish troops. Avoid surprise or exposing your troops to artillery fire.

"MILES, *Commanding.*

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
"CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO, *July* 13, 1898.

"GENERAL HENRY, *Siboney, Cuba:*

"Major-General Commanding directs me to inform you that all movements against the enemy are suspended until 12 noon to-morrow.

"J. C. GILMORE, *Brigadier-General.*"

There would now appear to have been a somewhat divided command at the front, a situation which the form of General Toral's replies recognized. General Miles, notwithstanding the instructions mentioned in the war department's telegram of July 8, would seem to have been in control. He says:

At the appointed time [July 13], accompanied by Brigadier-General J. C. Gilmore and Lieutenant-Colonel Marion P. Maus, of my staff, Major-General Shafter, two of his staff officers, and Major-General Wheeler and Lieutenant Wheeler, aide-de-camp, I met the Spanish General Toral, with two of his staff and an interpreter. After some conversation between General Toral and General Shafter, I informed General Toral distinctly that I had left Washington six days before; that it was then the determination of the government that this position of the Spanish forces must either be destroyed or captured; that I was there with sufficient re-enforcements to accomplish that object; and that if this was not the case any number of troops would be brought there as fast as steamers could bring them, if it took 50,000 men. I told him that we offered liberal terms, namely, to return his troops to Spain; and I also pointed out the fact that this was the only way in which his forces could return, they being on an island 3,000 miles away from their own country with no means of succor. He said that under the Spanish law he was not permitted to surrender as long as he had ammunition and food, and that he must maintain the honor of the Spanish arms. My reply was that he had already accomplished that; that he must now

surrender or take the consequences, and that I would give him until daylight the next morning [July 14] to decide. He appealed for a longer time, saying it was impossible for him to communicate with his superiors, and upon his request I granted him until 12 o'clock noon.[1]

General Miles telegraphed the secretary of war immediately after the consultation of the 13th:

(Received Washington 1.40 P. M.)

PLAYA, *July* 13, 1898.

At a meeting between the lines, at which Generals Shafter and Wheeler and Spanish General Toral were present, the latter claimed that he is unable to act without authority of his government, but has received authority to withdraw and surrender harbor ports, munitions of war, and eastern portion of Cuba. He urgently requests until to-morrow noon to receive answer from his government regarding offer of our government to send his forces to Spain, which was granted.

MILES, *Major-General, Commanding.*

General Shafter's report followed that of Miles:

PLAYA, *July* 13, 1898—2.12 P. M.

Headquarters, near Santiago, July 13.—Your telegram saying no modifications of orders allowed just received. Have had an interview of an hour and a half with General Toral and have extended truce until noon to-morrow. Told him that his surrender only will be considered, and that he was without hope of escape and had no right to continue the fight. I think it made a strong impression on him, and hope for his surrender. If he refuses I will open on him at 12 noon to-morrow with every gun I have, and have the assistance of the navy. Am ready to bombard the city with 13-inch shells. There is a good deal of nervousness throughout the army on account of yellow fever, which is among us certainly. Twenty-nine new cases yesterday and probably one hundred and fifty all told. Whatever happens, one or two immune regiments should be sent here to act as hospital guards and garrison for the town.

W. R. SHAFTER.

The secretary of war replied to Miles (we are still in July 13):

I telegraphed you an hour since in regard to the action of the army. Since then your despatch has been received conveying the result of the

[1] *Report of the Major-General Commanding the Army*, 1898, 20.

meeting between the lines, at which conference Toral requested until to-morrow noon to hear from his government regarding our offer, which you granted. Your action is approved. This government will send the Spanish prisoners who surrender home if they wish.

On the reception, on the 13th, of Shafter's message of July 12 that a truce existed which would probably continue through the 13th, Sampson had sent word:

As commander-in-chief of the naval forces engaged in joint operations, I expect to be represented in any conference held to arrange the terms of the surrender of Santiago, including the surrender of the shipping and the harbor. Questions are involved of importance to both branches of the service.

Signal came back from the shore at 2.40 P. M.:

I shall be glad to have you represented, but difficult to let you know; conference may take place at any hour. I should recommend that you send an officer for that purpose to remain at my headquarters. Should it not be convenient for you to do so, I will endeavor to give notice and see that an officer can be present when final terms are agreed.

At 3.15 P. M. Sampson signalled:

I am now prepared to shell the city of Santiago with three of my largest iron-clads, with 13-inch projectiles. Will await your signal.

This was answered by a despatch which reached the flag-ship at 6 A. M. of the 14th:

ADMIRAL SAMPSON: Message about being ready to open fire with 13-inch guns received. Thanks. I believe they will surrender before noon to-morrow. If not, I will want you to open fire. I will notify you.

SHAFTER.

Later came a message dated the 14th:

Apparently there is every prospect of capitulation. I will inform you earliest practicable moment.

SHAFTER, *Major-General.*

Says Miles:

On the morning of July 14, Admiral Sampson's fleet was in position to cover the landing of the troops from the transports, which were in the rear and in close proximity to the small harbor of Cabañas, about

two and a half miles west from the entrance of the harbor of Santiago. The ground between the harbor of Cabañas and the right flank of General Shafter's command on the north side of the Bay of Santiago, a distance of between six and seven miles, had been occupied by a small force of Cuban troops, and it was my purpose to occupy this ground with a strong body of infantry, and with some twenty-four pieces of artillery, where the latter could easily reach Morro Castle, as well as enfilade the Spanish lines in front of General Lawton's division. The Spanish commander was well aware of our designs, as the position and movements of the fleet had been in full view of the officers commanding his troops, and they had reported to him having seen fifty-seven vessels, some of them loaded with troops, menacing that part of his position.

Before the time, 12 o'clock on July 14, the following letter was received from General Toral:

"SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July* 14, 1898.

"HONORED SIR: His excellency the general-in-chief of the Army of the Island of Cuba telegraphs from Havana yesterday at 7 P. M. the following: 'Believing the business of such importance as the capitulation of that place should be known and decided upon by the government of his majesty, I give you notice that I have sent the conditions of your telegram, asking an immediate answer and enabling you also to show this to the general of the American army to see if he will agree to await the answer of the government, which cannot be as soon as the time which he has decided, as communication by way of Bermuda is more slow than by Key West. In the meanwhile your honor and the general of the American army may agree upon capitulation on the basis of repatriation [returning to Spain].' I have the honor to transmit this to you, in case you may [consider] the foregoing satisfactory, that he may designate persons in representation of himself, who, with those in my name, agree to clauses of the capitulation upon the basis of the return to Spain, accepted already in the beginning by the general-in-chief of this army.

"Awaiting a reply, I am, very respectfully, your servant,

"JOSÉ TORAL, *etc.*

"*General-in-Chief of the American Forces.*"

On meeting General Toral by appointment at 12 o'clock that day under a flag of truce, at the same place as before, he stated that he was prepared to surrender his command, and that such action was approved by Captain-General Blanco, who had authorized him to appoint commissioners to agree upon the clauses of capitulation, which he was prepared to do, but that before final action it was proper that the government at Madrid should know and approve what was


SIERRA MAESTRA
Where Cuban Forces GARCIA
CAPOTE
MINUET
LORA
CEBRECO
Creek
Cobre
D CASTILLO
Road
RAGU
Dos Caminos
SANCHEZ
LUDLOW
Cemetery
Fort
Perro Pt
Caimanera Creek
COAL DEPOT
Buena Vista
Duan Pt
3 Fathom Line
BAY OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA
Punta de Sal
Jardin Pt
Iron Pier
LA CRUZ
Cocos Pt
Cuhera Bay
Cayo Ratones
POWDER MAGAZINES
Juragua Iron Co
Road to Morro
Road to Siboney
CHAPARA
17 Inf
12 Inf
2 Inf
2 Sinf
Field
Sabanilla & Morro R.R.
Santa Ines Road to Cobre Mines
El Caney
2 GUNS
6" M.L.R.
3" M.L.R.
2-5" M.L.R.
6" GUN
3" B.L.R.
BARBETTE
6" M.L.R
3.3" M.L.R
4" M.L.R
ABBREVIATIONS
M. L. R. ..... Muzzle Loading Rifle
B. L. R. ..... Breech Loading Rifle
B. H. ..... Block House
Inf. ..... Infantry
Cav. ..... Cavalry
Approx. difference in Elevation between Contours is 40 feet.
Trail
Wide trail or road in bad condition
Wagon road
0 1320 2640 3960 5280
1 Statute Mile.
Americans
Spanish


CANEY
EL VISO
Stone Fort
Ducoureau House
Masonry Bridge
LAWTON
Hdqrs 2nd Div.
Road to Caney
Las Guamas Creek
MARIANAGE
Aguadores River
Rio Seco
LOS MANGOS
GEN SHAFTER
Hdqrs. 5th Army Corps
LA REDONDA
Hdqrs 1st Div.
KENT
SAN JUAN HILL
SANTIAGO DE CUBA AND VICINITY
SHOWING
INTRENCHMENTS AND POSITIONS
OF BOTH ARMIES
JULY 14 1898
COMPILED UNDER DIRECTION OF
LT. COL. G. McC. DERBY, CHIEF ENGR

done. He said, however, that he was sure that the government would not fail to endorse his action. His manner was so sincere and the language of General Blanco so positive, that I felt no hesitancy in accepting it in good faith, and stated that we would accept the surrender, under the condition that the Spanish troops should be repatriated by the United States. General Toral stated that he would surrender all the troops in the department of Santiago de Cuba, many of them from seventy to one hundred miles distant and against whom not a shot had been fired; yet the activity of the Cuban troops and their dispositions had been such as to render the Spanish positions exceedingly perilous. This desirable result I regarded as an accomplished fact, and sent the following telegram:

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, UNITED STATES ARMY,
"BEFORE SANTIAGO, CUBA, *July* 14, 1898—12.55 P. M.

"THE SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.:*

"*July* 14, 1898—12.55 P. M.—General Toral formally surrendered the troops of his army corps and division of Santiago on the terms and understanding that his troops would be returned to Spain. General Shafter will appoint commissioners to draw up the conditions of arrangement for carrying out the terms of surrender. . . . "

General Miles also wrote General Shafter authorizing him to appoint commissioners to draw the articles of capitulation upon the terms as he had understood them.

At 9.25 A. M. (the 14th), he had caused a signal to be sent to Sampson announcing the terms telegraphed from Washington (which had also been telegraphed the latter by the navy department) and asking his views as to the action of the army and navy in the immediate future. Sampson replied, suggesting as an addition to the terms, that the Spanish should remove or destroy all mines, and that the guns in the batteries facing the sea should be included.

At 1.15 a signal came from Miles: "I will be glad if you will send an officer to represent you during negotiations for evacuation." Reply was made asking when a horse could be had, but before any arrangement could be made, signal, at 2.23 P. M., was received from General Miles, who had returned to Siboney under the impression that all was arranged: "The enemy has surrendered. Will be down and see you soon." Upon this

Sampson telegraphed the navy department: "Santiago has surrendered."

But affairs were not yet settled. At 10.37 A. M., July 15, Sampson sent to Shafter: "What are the terms of surrender, and when is it proposed to occupy the city and harbor?"

Shafter replied at 3.40 in the afternoon: "Hitch in negotiations; we may have to fight for it yet."

CHAPTER XI

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO

Toral's willingness to capitulate, as soon as he should have approval from Spain, had been mistaken for actual surrender, the misunderstanding arising from the use of interpreters. Both Miles and Shafter had returned to the lines from their interview with General Toral confident that Toral had surrendered without waiting for any approval beyond that of General Blanco, expressed in the letter, just mentioned, sent to the American commander in the forenoon (14th). The mistake is not surprising. Toral was evidently willing to go as far as he could, and had asked that commissioners be named on the American side, he himself naming, in a postscript to his letter, those for the Spanish, but a more careful reading of his letter, had the American officers understood Spanish, would have made his position clear.

Shafter, on his return to headquarters, named as commissioners Major-General Wheeler, Major-General Lawton, and Lieutenant Miley. The Spanish whom they were to meet were Brigadier-General Don Federico Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel Don Ventura Fontan, and Mr. Robert Mason, the British vice-consul.

The commissioners met at 2.30 P. M. of the 14th at a point where all conferences had taken place, midway between the lines, marked by a large ceiba tree. Two Cuban gentlemen, Mr. Ramon Mendoza and Mr. Aurelius Mestre, volunteer aides-de-camp, the former attached to the staff of General Lawton, the latter to that of General Wheeler, acted as interpreters for the Americans. Mr. Mason, the British vice-consul, and a member of the Spanish commission, acted in like capacity for the Spaniards. The American commissioners had already drafted a form of capitulation of all the troops of the department of

Santiago, which included an immediate entry of the Red Cross ship *State of Texas;* the return of the population from Caney; the facilitating of the transport by rail of food for the refugees from Siboney; the return by the United States as soon as possible of the surrendered troops to Spain; the retention of side arms by the officers, and all, officers and men, to retain their private property; the removal of all mines at once by the Spanish authorities, or their assistance to the American navy in removing them; the delivery of an inventory of arms and a roster of the forces; the re-establishment by the Americans, without delay, of the water supply of the city.

The Spanish commissioners desired to add claims allowing the transport to Spain of records and documents, and permit to remain in Cuba the large number of troops known as volunteers, movilizados, and guerillas, recruited from the Spanish sympathizers of the native population, both of which were agreed to.

The question of the retention of arms was one strongly held to by the Spaniards. It was finally arranged that while the troops should march out of the city and deposit their arms, their final disposition should be left to the decision of the American government, the commissioners recommending to the war department, in a separate paper, their return to Spain.[1]

When the document was ready for signature the Spanish commissioners announced that they must return with a copy to Santiago to consult General Toral. An adjournment to 6 P. M. was taken, and preparations, by putting up a tent and providing candles, made for a night session. Returning shortly after 6, the Spanish commissioners made the unexpected request to delay to the following day, to consult General Linares, who it was understood was not in command on account of his wound. The American commissioners, unaccustomed to the intricacies of Spanish methods, which really in this case involved no suspicion of double-dealing, were determined not to adjourn. They offered to continue negotiations in the city itself, but this was refused, and it was finally arranged that General Escario should go in and bring General Toral to explain the situation. Both officers returned at 9.40 P. M. Toral stated that his position

[1] This was refused by the government.

was the same as mentioned in the morning; that he was willing to surrender, and had General Blanco's permission, but that he could not do so until he had approval from Madrid, which he felt sure would come. He said:

> Considerable time, two or three days, must elapse before the answer could be received, and both he and General Blanco desired that the points to be included in the formal surrender be decided upon while waiting. He was as anxious as the American commander for a speedy solution of the matter, but without the approval of Madrid, he would not surrender. He owed it to his army and to himself that this sanction be first obtained, and without it he would resume fighting.[1] With this sanction, he and his command would be permitted to return home; without it, there was much doubt. All this, he said, he had stated to General Shafter at noon through the interpreters, and now he wished it made plain to the commissioners. More than this, he had never conceded at any time.
>
> It was obvious to us now that General Toral had been misinterpreted at the meeting with General Shafter, and that while General Shafter had come away under the impression that General Toral had made an unqualified surrender, he really had not departed from his position set forth in the letter of the morning. Either this, or General Toral had news of re-enforcements and had decided to delay matters, if possible, until their arrival.[2]

The discussion had continued until after midnight, and at 12.30 A. M. adjournment was made to 9.30 the next morning (July 15), with the result that at 3 P. M. were signed preliminary capitulations, which, except in some slight changes of form, were those finally signed upon the reception by the Spanish commander of the authority asked from Madrid.

A separate recommendation was made by the American commissioners, in which, "recognizing the chivalry, courage, and gallantry of Generals Linares and Toral, and of the soldiers of

[1] This may be taken as coming under the head of very justifiable "blague." Says Mr. Ramsden, in his diary (Friday, 15th of July): "Went to see Toral, who was in his hammock, done up, just returned from the conference. He told me everything had been arranged and preliminary bases signed. Madrid approval to capitulation, asked for three days previous, is wanting, but he said, if not approved, he would capitulate even if court-martialled after." (*McClure's Magazine*, p. 70.)

[2] Miley, 172.

Spain who were engaged in the battles recently fought in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba," the commissioners unanimously joined "in earnestly soliciting the proper authority to accord to these brave and chivalrous soldiers the privilege of returning to their country bearing the arms they have so bravely defended."

Washington was anxious. At 9.36 A. M., July 15, the war department telegraphed that the delay was not understood; at 12.35 P. M.: "Have you received the absolute surrender of the enemy? We are awaiting the conditions with impatience;" at 4.45 the secretary of war "suggests is it not possible that Toral is gaining time to get re-enforcements that may be on the way to assist him?" At 5.59 Mr. Alger himself telegraphed:

It is not possible that you are entertaining the proposition of permitting the Spanish to carry away their arms. Such a suggestion should be rejected instantly. You have been instructed the terms of surrender acceptable to the president, and they must be concluded on those lines.

The adjutant-general telegraphed at 9.20 P. M.:

The president and secretary of war are becoming impatient with parley. Any arrangement that allows the enemy to take their arms had as well be abandoned once for all, as it will not be approved. The way to surrender is to surrender, and this should be fully impressed on General Toral. I send this as your friend and comrade, and not by authority, but you can be guided by it with entire safety. Forwarded your telegram last night as requested.

Shafter replied (from the Playa at Guantánamo at 9 P. M., the 15th) that he did not believe that Toral was trying to gain time in hope of re-enforcements, and at 11.20 P. M. (the time being also that of the Guantánamo office):

I do not entertain the proposition for the Spanish to retain their arms. They are to surrender them absolutely, immediately after articles of capitulation are signed, but they beg, as an act of consideration to them, that I will intercede with my government that they be shipped with them to Spain. I regard this as a small matter that in no way binds the government, but is one I would not let stand between clearing 20,000 Spanish soldiers out of Cuba or leaving them there to be captured later, and probably with much loss to ourselves.

At 2.20 A. M., July 16, Shafter telegraphed:

HEADQUARTERS NEAR SANTIAGO, 15.

Surrender was made by Toral yesterday afternoon absolutely on conditions of returning troops to Spain. Delay was caused by the commissioners on his part insisting on approval of Madrid. I think they fear death when they get home. We may have to fight them yet.

At 1.04 A. M., the war department telegraphed:

Telegram to you, 12.45 [?12.35] signed by the secretary of war, was the result of careful consideration by the president and most of the cabinet, and clearly sets forth what is expected. The only concession is that the prisoners taken shall be paroled and sent to Spain.

Nine hours later, at 10.15 A. M., July 16, General Shafter was able to telegraph: "Spanish surrendered. Particulars later," on the reception of which was at once sent from Washington:

The president of the United States sends to you and your brave army the profound thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops and territory under General Toral. Your splendid command has endured not only the hardships and sacrifices incident to campaign and battle, but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would have overcome men less brave and determined. One and all have displayed the most conspicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation. The hearts of the people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and wounded. May the Father of Mercies protect and comfort them.

Early in the morning of July 16, all doubts had been settled by the reception by General Shafter of the following:

ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, FOURTH CORPS,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July* 15, 1898—10 P. M.

To His Excellency, the General-in-Chief of the American Forces.

ESTEEMED SIR: As I am now authorized by my government to capitulate, I have the honor to so advise you, requesting you to designate the hour and place where my representative should appear to concur with those of your excellency, to edit the articles of capitulation on the basis of what has been agreed upon to this date.

In due time I wish to manifest to your excellency my desire to know the resolution of the United States government respecting the return of the arms, so as to note it in the capitulation; also for their great courtesy and gentlemanly deportment I wish to thank your grace's representatives, and in return for their generous and noble efforts for the Spanish soldiers, I hope your government will allow them to return to the Peninsula with the arms that the American army do them the honor to acknowledge as having dutifully defended.

Reiterating my former sentiments, I remain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOSÉ TORAL,

Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Army Corps.

General Shafter replied:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP, *July* 16, 1898.

To His Excellency, GENERAL JOSÉ TORAL, *Commanding Spanish Forces in Eastern Cuba.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter of this date, notifying me that the government at Madrid approves your action, and requesting that I designate officers to arrange for and receive the surrender of the forces of your excellency. This I do, nominating Major-General Wheeler, Major-General Lawton, and my aide, Lieutenant Miley. I have to request that your excellency at once withdraw your troops from along the railway to Aguadores, and from the bluff in rear of my left; also that you at once direct the removal of the obstructions at the entrance to the harbor, or assist the navy in doing so, as it is of the utmost importance that I at once get vessels loaded with food into the harbor.

The repair of the railroad will, I am told, require a week's time. I shall, as I have said to your excellency, urge my government that the gallant men your excellency has so ably commanded, have returned to Spain with them the arms they have wielded.

With great respect I remain,

Your obedient servant and friend,

WILLIAM R. SHAFTER,

Major-General, Commanding.

This was accompanied by a request that the meeting should take place at mid-day, but the time occupied in forwarding General Shafter's letter made this impossible, and General Toral wrote:

ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, FOURTH CORPS,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July* 16, 1898.

To His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the United States.

ESTEEMED SIR: At half-past 11 I received your communication of this date, and I am sorry to advise you that it is impossible for my representatives to come to the appointed place at mid-day, as you wish, as I must meet them and give them their instructions.

If agreeable to you, will you defer the visit until 4 P. M. to-day, or until 7 to-morrow morning, and in the meanwhile the obstacles to the entrance of the ship of the Red Cross will be removed from the harbor.

I beg your honor will make clear what force you wish me to retire from the railroad, as if it is that in Aguadores, I would authorize the repair of the bridge at once by your engineers; and if it is that on the heights to the left of your lines, I beg you will specify with more precision.

I have ordered those in charge of the aqueduct to proceed at once to repair it with the means at their command.

Awaiting your reply, I remain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,
JOSÉ TORAL,
Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Army Corps.

The commission thus met at 4 o'clock, and the capitulations were finally signed at 6, without change of the previous draft. During this interval Captain Chadwick arrived, having left as soon as the message of the surrender had reached the flag-ship, and going at the earliest moment from Siboney. Toral had announced to the commissioners his determination to destroy the gun-boat *Alvarado*, the only naval vessel now in the harbor, as Spanish regulations demanded that this be done. Captain Chadwick protested against such an act as dishonorable and against the usage of nations. His protest was effective, and the general yielded the point.

The formal document was as follows:

TERMS OF THE MILITARY CONVENTION

For the capitulation of the Spanish forces occupying the territory which constitutes the division of Santiago de Cuba, and described as follows: All that portion of the Island of Cuba east of a line passing

through Aserradero, Dos Palmas, Cauto Abajo, Escondida, Tanamo, and Aguilera, said troops being in command of General José Toral; agreed upon by the undersigned commissioners: Brigadier-General Don Federico Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel of Staff Don Ventura Fontan, and as interpreter, Mr. Robert Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, appointed by General Toral, commanding the Spanish forces, on behalf of the kingdom of Spain, and Major-General Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V., Major-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., and First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, Second Artillery, A. D. C., appointed by General Shafter, commanding the American forces, on behalf of the United States:

1. That all hostilities between the American and Spanish forces in this district absolutely and unequivocally cease.

2. That this capitulation includes all the forces, and war material in said territory.

3. That the United States agrees, with as little delay as possible, to transport all the Spanish troops in said district to the kingdom of Spain, the troops being embarked, as far as possible, at the port nearest the garrisons they now occupy.

4. That the officers of the Spanish army be permitted to retain their side arms, and both officers and private soldiers their personal property.

5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, or assist the American navy in removing, all mines or other obstructions to navigation now in the harbor of Santiago and its mouth.

6. That the commander of the Spanish forces deliver without delay a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish forces in above described district to the commander of the American forces; also a roster of said forces now in said district.

7. That the commander of the Spanish forces, in leaving said district, is authorized to carry with him all military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish army now in said district.

8. That all that portion of the Spanish forces known as volunteers, movilizados, and guerillas who wish to remain in the island of Cuba are permitted to do so upon the condition of delivering up their arms and taking a parole not to bear arms against the United States during the continuance of the present war between Spain and the United States.

9. That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba with the honors of war, depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon, to await their disposition by the United States government, it being understood that the United States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.

10. That the provisions of the foregoing instrument become operative immediately upon its being signed.

Entered into this sixteenth day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, by the undersigned commissioners, acting under instructions from their respective commanding generals, and with the approbation of their respective governments.

(Signed)

JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, U. S. Vols.
H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. Vols.
J. D. MILEY,
1st Lieut., 2d Art., A. D. C. to General Shafter.

FEDERICO ESCARIO,
VENTURA FONTAN,
ROB'T MASON.

No mention of the shipping was made in the capitulations, although Admiral Sampson had expressly mentioned the subject in a note sent July 13.

Captain Chadwick informed General Shafter that Admiral Sampson expected that as the admiral's representative, he should sign the capitulations, and demanded to do so, but Shafter refused to allow this to be done, giving as a reason not only at the time, but later in a letter to Admiral Sampson, "that no claim for any credit for the capture of Cervera and his fleet had been made by the army," probably the only instance known of so prominent a departure from usage in combined operations, and in marked contrast to the procedure soon to be taken at Manila under conditions so strikingly similar.

The two forces had been acting together, with (except that there existed differences of opinion as to procedure) the utmost cordiality and unity of purpose; the siege was by both sea and land. "Had the navy," as the admiral says in his report regarding a difficulty which almost immediately arose regarding the disposition of the vessels in the port, "been withdrawn after the action of the 3d—after which all the fleet's operations were to aid the army—all the shipping referred to would have escaped, and our army would have become the besieged instead of the besiegers, as of course the *Reina Mercedes* and the gun-boat *Alvarado* would have been free to destroy or drive off the transport fleet. I do not think the commanding general quite appreciates how necessary a part our forces were to the reduction of Santiago and the surrender of its garrison in any case, independently of the effect of our shell,

which latter was undoubtedly one of the principal causes of surrender at this time." [1]

Between the lines, at 9.30 the next morning, General Shafter, with the officers of his own staff and his general officers with their staffs, escorted by one hundred cavalry mounted, met General Toral and his staff, escorted by one hundred foot soldiers, and there General Toral formally surrendered the "Plaza" and the Division of Santiago de Cuba.

At the time all the regiments were drawn up in line along the trenches, from which nearly every one had a full view of the ceremony. General Toral then escorted General Shafter to the governor's palace in the city, and withdrew to his home. At the palace the civil officers of the province and of the town and the archbishop were waiting to pay their respects to General Shafter. Precisely at 12 o'clock the American flag was raised over the palace by Captain William H. McKittrick, aide-de-camp to General Shafter; Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., aide-de-camp to General Wheeler; Lieutenant J. D. Miley, aide-de-camp to General Shafter, while the escort of cavalry and the Ninth United States Infantry, which had been designated as the first regiment to occupy the town, presented arms. A salute of twenty-one guns was fired from Captain Capron's battery, and the regiments again drawn up in line at the trenches, while all the bands played national airs.

After saluting the Spanish flag General Toral had hauled it down before leaving the city to meet General Shafter between the lines. Since early in the morning the Spanish troops, by regiments and battalions, had been turning in their arms at the arsenal, a rambling stone structure which covered several acres in the heart of the town. Lieutenant Brooke, General Shafter's ordnance officer, with a troop of cavalry, received and inventoried them. As fast as an organization was disarmed, it was marched out of the city, and placed in the camp on the San Juan hills selected for the Spanish prisoners." [2]

Admiral Sampson immediately sent in a party under Lieutenant Capehart to lift the mines, a work in which every assistance was given by the Spanish naval officers who had laid them and had them in charge. The armed light-house steamer *Suwanee*,

[1] *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, Appendix, 628. Admiral Sampson's contention was most properly upheld by the government, but the lapse of time and the pressure of affairs caused the matter to drop.

[2] Miley, 185, 186. Neither the commander-in-chief nor any other officer of the fleet was asked to be present at the taking possession. This was probably a mere oversight, but one to be regretted.

Lieutenant-Commander Delehanty, which had anchor gear particularly fitted for lifting such weights (each mine weighing about a ton), was used in the work. The first series of three electrical mines, controlled from Estrella Cove, was found abandoned, and but two of the other four, operated from the Inner Socapa, could be exploded. The four contact mines to the west of the wreck of the *Merrimac* were also removed on the 17th,[1] thus leaving a clear passage for the Red Cross ship *State of Texas*.

Miss Barton, the president of the Red Cross Society, had arrived in the ship during the morning from Guantánamo. She sent a note to Admiral Sampson expressing a hope "that food would be allowed to go in with the forces," a request which was granted, as soon as the mine field was sufficiently cleared, at 4 P. M., the admiral sending Lieutenant Capehart, who as just mentioned had been charged with the work, to give information regarding still existing dangers. Prize crews were also sent in to take charge of the gun-boat *Alvarado* and of the Spanish steamers in the port.

General Shafter had been informed by Captain Chadwick, July 16, that all Spanish ships would be regarded by the admiral as property to be turned over to the navy. The general had somewhat demurred, saying that he would refer the matter to the secretary of war. This he had promptly done in the following telegram:

> Several ships in the harbor, one, very small gun-boat, and I think one Spanish ship. Shall I permit the navy to take them? They are disposed to claim them.

This was answered the next day, July 17:

> Be sure to take immediate possession of all ships and boats in harbor. They belong to the army. . . .
>
> R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

[1] For a detailed account of this mine field and its clearance, see article by Lieutenant Capehart, "The Mine Defence of Santiago Harbor," *Proceedings of United States Naval Institute*, XXIV, No. 4, December, 1898, 586 *et seq.* Lieutenant Capehart says: "What would have happened to a ship attempting to run the mine field is problematical, but the chances were that she would have been sunk, for notwithstanding the number of bad mines encountered, enough good ones were left to destroy her" (p. 603).

General Shafter thereupon sent a message to Admiral Sampson:

It is reported some detachments are being sent from the navy to guard the vessels captured in the harbor. In view of my instructions from the secretary of war, I ask that you recall them.

Dated Headquarters 5th A. C., July 17. I have orders of the secretary of war to retain all ships and shipping in the harbor of Santiago. I have just learned that Lieut. Marble of the navy, by representing to the officer in charge I have arranged with yourself for the transfer of a small gun-boat, obtained possession of it and took it out of the harbor. I have to request it be immediately returned and placed in my possession.

SHAFTER, *Maj.-Gen.*

The whole was but an expression of the want, at the period, of proper governmental organization, and could of course, as says the admiral in a report, "have no bearing upon what I considered my duty in the matter, particularly in the view of our late experience of Spanish perfidy in regard to injury of ships, which, in my opinion, made it necessary to look after their safety at once." There is no need to give in entirety the somewhat curt correspondence which ensued, and which has already been long published, but mention must be made of a letter from Sampson to Shafter on July 17, which recalled to the latter the fact that the army and navy were acting conjointly, a fact which apparently had altogether escaped the general's mind. Sampson's letter was as follows:

U. S. FLAG-SHIP *New York, July* 17, 1898.

SIR: Upon sending in an officer to take charge of the captured Spanish gun-boat, the *Alvarado*, it was found that one of your officers was on board, evidently with the expectation of taking charge of her. It should hardly be necessary to remind you that in all joint operations of the character of those which have resulted in the fall of Santiago all floating material is turned over to the navy, as all forts, etc., go to the army. I have been lying within 500 yards of the Morro, from which the Spanish flag was hauled down at 9 o'clock and upon which the United States flag has not yet, at 2 P. M., been hoisted. Although my forces have frequently engaged these forts and yours have not exchanged a shot with them, I await the arrival of a detachment of your troops to take possession, as they must eventually occupy them. I expect the same consideration.

I request that you will relieve Lieutenant Caruthers of the duty given him, as I have directed Lieutenant Marble to assume command of the *Alvarado*.

Very respectfully, etc.

Notice having been sent to Lieutenant Doyle, the officer sent in to take charge of the merchant-ships, that a tug would be sent to transfer him and those with him "to their respective ships," Sampson wrote saying:

I will not enter into any expression of surprise at the reception of such a paper.

No mention of the shipping was made in the articles of capitulation, though I specially requested that it be included by my message to you of July 13.

Our operations leading to the fall of Santiago have been joint, so directed by the president and so confirmed by their character. All propriety and usage surrenders the floating material in such cases to the naval force, and I have taken possession of it.

I am unable to recognize the authority of the secretary of war over my actions. I have telegraphed to the secretary of the navy and await his instructions.

In the event of a difference of opinion between the departments, the question will, of course, be decided by the president of the United States; until then my prize crews must remain in charge, and I have so directed.

Very respectfully, etc.,

W. T. Sampson,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

Maj.-Gen. W. R. Shafter, U. S. V.

On the same day, knowing the orders to destroy, and not surrender, ships, under which Spanish officers sometimes acted, a despatch was sent to Commander McCalla at Guantánamo:

Send flag to the gun-boat *Sandoval* and inform him that all the Spanish forces in Cuba east of a line passing through Acerraderos, Cauto Abajo, and Agualera have been surrendered, and it is expected that the *Sandoval* will be surrendered in good condition, that if any injury be done her the commanding officer and her crew will be regarded as outside the pale of ordinary prisoners of war.[1]

[1] Lieutenant Scandella, in command, came on board the *New York*, July 25, in Guantánamo Bay, and had luncheon very amicably with her captain. He had, notwithstanding, sunk his ship the night before, a fact unsuspected at the moment aboard the *New York*. She was raised by Commander McCalla, and is now in the American service.

It is needless to pursue a somewhat disagreeable incident, and which would not be mentioned but that it is part of the history of the period, and points the moral of the necessity of co-ordination in military action, and our almost absolute want of machinery at that time to effect this. General Shafter did not appear to understand that co-operation meant common action throughout, expressing his own view by saying in a letter of July 17: "The fact is that both personnel and material were surrendered to me, and I shall be obliged to hold them."

The difficulty, which should never have occurred, and could not have occurred had, as an ordinary course of duty, the overhasty secretary of war consulted the president and secretary of the navy in the matter, was settled by telegrams from Washington, July 19, in which both commanders were informed that it was held that such joint captures were not within prize law: "In view of this," said the secretary of war, "I suggest that the floating marine and naval property captured should be turned over to the navy, as the war department does not desire to be troubled with them, while the navy is better fitted to man and take care of them, or tow them to the United States, as the president may hereafter order;" a decision which might, so far at least as the gun-boat was concerned, wisely have been made in the first instance. The telegram to Sampson, besides dealing with this subject, announced that the navy department agreed with him in his views as to the propriety of his contention regarding the capitulations.[1]

There were turned in at the arsenal 16,139 rifles. Among these were 7,902 Spanish 7-mm. Mausers, with 1,500,000 rounds of ammunition; 6,118 Remington 11-mm., with 1,680,000, and 872 Mausers of 7.65 mm., with 1,471,000 rounds. The Spanish Mausers were, however, the only important weapons, and the ammunition for these was less than 200 rounds each. Of

[1] The captured ships were removed to Guantánamo Bay; the *Alvarado* was at once put into service, Lieutenant Blue being assigned to the command in recognition of his work in reconnaissance; the five merchant-steamers were, by an order of July 24, turned over to the army transport service; but little use, however, was made of them and they were shortly returned to the owners. The names of these ships were the *Mexico*, *Reina de los Angeles*, *Mortera*, *San Juan*, and *Thomas Brooks*.

food there was little but rice, of which there was still a plentiful supply. All difficulties as to food, however, were solved July 18, when the transports entered the harbor, and Spaniard and American, faring alike, were, for the first time since the landing of the expedition, well fed.

There were 2,100 Spaniards in the hospitals, of whom 58 were wounded officers and 556 wounded men.[1] There was, however, little or no yellow fever.

The health of the American forces was no better, but an alarming element was the appearance, though in a mild form, the first case being on July 6, of yellow fever, the most dreaded of tropical diseases, and that of which, at the time, the least was known. While there was a considerable proportion of typhoid, the great majority of cases were of the usual form of tropical

[1] Lieutenant Müller gives the following as the Spanish killed and wounded at Santiago from July 6 to July 11:

DATE	KILLED				WOUNDED				PRISONERS AND MISSING		
	Generals	Commanders	Officers	Men	Generals	Commanders	Officers	Men	Commanders	Officers	Men
June 6—Morro	..	..	..	2	..	1	4	25	..	..	..
Estrella	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cay Smith	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..
Socapa	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	..	..	..
Mazamorra	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	11	..	..	..
Cruiser *Reina Mercedes*	..	1	..	5	..	1	1	10	..	..	..
June 14—Socapa	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	6	..	..	..
June 16—Morro	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	10	..	..	..
Socapa	..	..	..	2	..	..	1	6	..	..	..
June 21—Morro	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	..	..	..
June 22—Socapa	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..
Aguadores	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	6	..	..	..
Daiquiri	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	5	..	..	..
June 23 and 24—Sevilla	..	..	..	9	..	..	3	24	.	..	..
June 25—Aguadores	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	1	..	..	..
June 26—Morro	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	..	..	..
July 2—Morro	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	31	..	..	..
July 1, 2, 3—Caney and Santiago	1	3	12	78	1	6	30	339	1	6	116
July 10—Santiago	..	..	..	6	..	1	2	45	..	..	..
July 11—Santiago	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	16	..	..	..
Total	1	4	12	107	1	9	49	556	1	6	116

malaria. The immediate necessity was to establish camps in sanitary situations until the men could be returned to the United States.

By July 22 General Shafter was telegraphing:

Surgeons report increase in fever cases. Wide difference of opinion as to how much of it is yellow fever. Every regiment has more or less fever cases. The Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth about 200 each; many others only 8 or 10 per cent, merely normal; so far, but 17 deaths from disease—2 of them dysentery and the rest fevers. Fresh beef has just arrived and we are issuing this morning, and we are unloading tents. The minute the prisoners can be disposed of will put troops 20 miles inland on railroad and hope for improvement.

He telegraphed next day:

The situation is not alarming, though there are many sick with fever—about 1,500. Exact number will be given in the morning. Only a small part of these sick are down with yellow fever—about 10 per cent. Slight changes of all the troops have been made to get them on fresh ground, and the artillery and cavalry have been moved about 3 miles. It is out of the question to move any more troops away until the prisoners are started for Spain and until the railroad is repaired. So far everything is very quiet, but the Cubans are feeling very sore because they were not permitted to take part in the conference leading to the capitulation and because I will not permit them to go into the city armed. They expected and claim as their right to take possession of the city and control affairs. General Garcia has left for the interior with their force. Reported he is to join Gomez.

and on July 25:

Number of new cases for the 24th instant about 500; at least 450 returned to duty. . . . Notwithstanding figures, the situation somewhat improving.

July 27 he telegraphed:

Reports for yesterday show total sick 3,770; total fever cases, 2,924; new cases of fever, 639; cases of fever returned to duty, 538. . . .

The sick were being returned in the transports as rapidly as possible. Already by August 2 twenty-nine steamers carrying always some, and in many cases a full complement of sick, had

left for the north. Several of the transports had after arrival at Santiago been specially fitted for this, though evidently so badly that severe criticisms were appearing in the American papers regarding the conditions. That they were not wholly unjust is shown by a telegram to Shafter from the war department, August 1:

Bellinger, quartermaster, Tampa, reports as follows:
"*Yucatan* arrived at quarantine last night. Have just heard from the quarantine surgeon that there are about 150 convalescent soldiers at quarantine who came on board the *Santiago*. Reports these men as being almost without clothing and nearly starving; says that he is doing everything he can to look after them, feed them, and get them proper nourishment, but desires to know what will be done about clothing. Surgeon states their condition is horrible, but we are doing everything in the world to help them."

Complaints were coming from Washington of transports with convalescents, sent north short of attendants, medicines and water. Shafter answered:

We did the best we could under the circumstances . . . from the time this expedition left Tampa . . . there have never been sufficient medical attendants or medicines for the daily wants of the command . . . the matter of shortage of water is inexcusable . . . there is no excuse for lack of food, as there has at all times been plenty of that. I have no doubt many more were put on the ship than should have been, owing to the great desire to get home, as they had the fear of yellow fever and were almost wholly without hospital accommodation. The sick and wounded had only the clothing on that they wore into battle, and of course that was ragged and worn out by the time they reached home. There was none to issue them at the time they left. . . . There never has been a case of suffering that could be remedied here by the means at hand that was not attended to. The surgeons have worked as well as any men that ever lived and their complaint has been universal of lack of means and facilities.

The general's blood was up and he closed with "I will not quietly submit to having the onus laid on me of the lack of these hospital facilities.

On August 2 a telegram was sent to Shafter:

After full consideration with surgeon-general it is deemed best to have you move your command up to end of railroad where yellow

fever is impossible. Then we will move them north as rapidly as possible. What do you advise? It is going to be a long job at best to get so many troops away.

to which next day he replied:

I have to say that under the circumstances this move is practically impossible. The railroad is not yet repaired, although it will be in about a week. Its capacity is not to exceed 1,000 men a day at the best, and it will take until the end of August to make this move, even if the sick-list should not increase. An officer of my staff, Lieutenant Miley, who has looked over the ground, says that it is not a good camping ground. The country is covered with grass as high as a man's head when riding a horse, and up in the hills there is no water and it will be required to pump water 2 miles. He also states that rainfall is twice as great as it is here and the soil is a black loam that is not suitable for camping. Troops that have been sent to that locality have been housed in barracks. In my opinion there is but one course to take, and that is to immediately transport the Fifth Corps and the detached regiments that came with it to the United States. If it is not done, I believe the death-rate will be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every medical officer present. I called together to-day the general officers and the senior medical officers and telegraph you their views. There is more or less yellow fever in almost every regiment throughout the command. As soon as it develops they are sent to hospital, but new cases arise, not very many, it is true, and it is of a mild type, but nevertheless it is here. All men taken with it will, of course, have to be left and have to take their chances. Some will undoubtedly be taken sick on the ships, and die, but the loss will be much less than if an attempt is made to move this army to the interior, which is now really an army of convalescents; at least 75 per cent of the men having had malarial fever, and all so much weakened by the exposure and hardships which they have undergone that they are capable now of very little exertion. They should be put at once on all the transports in the harbor and not crowded at all, and this movement should begin to-morrow and be completed before the 15th. All here believe the loss of life by doing this will be much less than if more time is taken. If the plan is adopted of waiting until the fever is stamped out, there will be no troops moved from here until the fever season is past, and I believe there will then be very few to move. There are other diseases which are prevailing—typhoid fever, dysentery, etc., and severe types of malarial fever which are quite as fatal as yellow fever. The matter of moving this army has been placed before you, and you have the opinions of all commanding officers and chief surgeons, who fully agree with me as to the only course left open for

the preservation of this army. There can be no danger to the people at home, and it seems to me that infected ships is a matter of small moment.

This was backed by a letter to the commander-in-chief, signed by the chief medical officers of the corps, and thus expressed:

SIR: The chief surgeon of the Fifth Army Corps and the chief surgeons of divisions consider it to be their imperative duty, after mature deliberation, to express their unanimous opinion that this army is now in a very critical condition. They believe that the prevalent malarial fever will doubtless continue its ravages and that its mortality will soon increase; that there is imminent danger that the yellow fever, now sporadic and of a mild type, may any day assume a virulent type and become epidemic. They unanimously recommend that the only course to pursue to save the lives of thousands of our soldiers is to transport the whole army to the United States as quickly as possible. Such transport they consider practicable and reasonably free from danger. The proposed move to the plateau of San Luis they believe dangerous and impracticable.

But still stronger was a letter signed by all the divisional and brigade commanders and transmitted to Washington at the same time with Shafter's own views on August 3.

To MAJ.-GEN. W. R. SHAFTER, *commanding United States forces in Cuba:*

We, the undersigned general officers commanding various brigades, divisions, etc., of the United States army of occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army must be at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point on the northern sea-coast of United States; that this can be done without danger to the people of the United States; that there is no epidemic of yellow fever in the army at present—only a few sporadic cases; that the army is disabled by malarial fever to such an extent that its efficiency is destroyed and it is in a condition to be practically entirely destroyed by the epidemic of yellow fever sure to come in the near future. We know from reports from competent officers and from personal observations that the army is unable to move to the interior, and that there are no facilities for such move, if attempted, and will not be until too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities in the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season without losses from malarial fever almost as badly as from

yellow fever. This army must be moved at once or it will perish. As an army it can be safely moved now. Persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are the result of careful personal observations and are also based upon the unanimous opinion of our medical officers who are with the army and understand the situation absolutely. (Signed) Jos. Wheeler, major-general, volunteers; Samuel S. Sumner, commanding Cavalry Brigade; William Ludlow, brigadier-general, United States Volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Second Division; Adelbert Ames, brigadier-general, United States Volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, First Division; Leonard Wood, brigadier-general, United States Volunteers, commanding City Santiago; Theodore Roosevelt, colonel, commanding Second Cavalry Brigade; J. Ford Kent, major-general, volunteers, commanding First Division, Fifth Corps; J. C. Bates, major-general, volunteers, commanding Provisions Division, Fifth Corps; H. W. Lawton, major-general, volunteers, commanding Second Division, Fifth Corps; C. McKibbin, brigadier-general, United States Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division.

General Lawton signed the letter with an explanation: "with the understanding that it has been seen and approved by the commander-in-chief;" he thought it should be signed by the "best medical authorities of the island," and "all the surgeons of the command." He thought the "mandatory language" "impolitic and unnecessary," and expressed his opinion, which was an undoubtedly just one, that "much of the fatal illness is due to homesickness and other depressing influences."

Though written with the approval of General Shafter, it had, without his authority, been given to the press before reaching him, a most inconsiderate and unwarrantable breach of discipline and of good sense. For on July 26 the following had been telegraphed:

> The French ambassador, on behalf of the government of Spain, and by direction of the Spanish minister for foreign affairs, presented to the president this afternoon at the White House a message from the Spanish government looking to the termination of the war, and a settlement of terms of peace.

It was thus not without reason that Shafter received a telegram sent August 4:

> At this time, when peace is talked of, it seems strange that you should give out your cable, signed by your general officers, concerning the condition of your army . . . without permission from the war department.

to which of course Shafter could only reply that it was without his knowledge, and that "it was a foolish and improper thing to do." "It would be impossible," says Secretary Alger, "to exaggerate the mischievous and wicked effects of the publications." [1] It did not "hasten the return of the Santiago army, as every possible effort had already been made, and was then making, for the speedy repatriation of our troops," . . . it "not only brought terror and anguish to half the communities and neighborhoods in the land, but it returned to Cuba in due time to spread demoralization among our troops. It did more than this —it threatened, and might have accomplished even, an interruption of the peace negotiations then in progress between the United States and Spain," through the French minister, and which just at this time had reached their most delicate stage.[2]

There was unquestionably a state of panic. The total sick, list (August 2) was now 4,290; "total fevers, 3,038; new cases of fever, 594; cases of fever returned to duty, 705. But a close examination of actual returns convinces one that the alarm, so far as immediate danger was concerned, had assumed wholly unnecessary proportions. In the month of July there had been but 13 deaths from malarial diseases in the whole army, which numbered this month 203,250 men. The total loss of the army by disease in Cuba to September 30, 1898, was but 427. Evidence was immediately at hand that the conditions were not due wholly to climate. The battalion of marines which had been since June 10 at Guantánamo, less than fifty miles away in an air line, had not lost a man by sickness, and had a ratio of sick as low as was usual in the marine barracks at New York. The conditions of course had been very dissimilar. The marines had had their tents, their food was plentiful and of excellent quality, their water supply was from the ships, and was thus distilled. But like conditions were now possible at Santiago, besides having

[1] Alger, *The Spanish-American War*, 273.

[2] Alger, 269, 270.

certain comforts only attainable in a considerable town. General Shafter's force was now but reaping the harvest of malaria sown in the weeks preceding the surrender. As was well said by Colonel (Surgeon) Greenleaf: "The long-continued and excessive daily heat of the climate, with rapid lowering of temperature at night; the necessary exposure to rain in the absence of tentage; the scarcity and poor cookery of food; the effect of prolonged physical exertion on the battle-field, inducing nervous exhaustion, are all factors which must be seriously considered in forming an estimate of the health of the troops if their continued residence in Cuba is contemplated." [1]

To this may be added the fact that the men had been brought into a tropical jungle from the high plains of the West, and even from Alaska, in the clothing which they had worn in these elevated and far northern regions. The marvel is not that so many were sick, but so few. We were but reaping the results of want of foresight and preparation; of the immense and egregious folly which disdains methodic legislation, study, and organization.

And while the conditions were thus serious, "it was not until the last week in July and the first week in August that regimental tents and camp equipage began to be unloaded from the transports and were carried to the camps, and up to the time of the embarkation many of the regiments were still protected only by their shelter halves." [2]

While there was no sound reason for such alarm for life, as existed, there were soundest reasons for the removal of the force which had undergone the campaign. It had been reduced to a condition of ineffectiveness which made it unfit for further service, by the mere fact that apart from any danger from yellow fever, the ordinary malaria of the region, once incurred, needs a long and careful convalescence to restore one to normal energy. Though discharged from hospital as recovered, the patient is not cured. An hour of sentry duty or exposure to a hot sun will almost surely bring a recurrence. The whole force was thus

[1] Greenleaf, Letter to adjutant-general, July 7, 1898, *Report of War Department*, 1898, 1, 740.

[2] Lieutenant-Colonel (Chief-Surgeon) Pope, *Report of War Department*, 1898, 1, 785.

surely tending to be an army of semi-invalids. Spain was now wholly cut off from the West Indies. Havana was the only important military *point d'appui* left to her in Cuba, and this could await events which, as any one could see, were now forecasting a peace. Puerto Rico was to be dealt with by new and healthy forces which were already at hand, or were *en route* for the island. The wise, the necessary thing was to return the men of the Santiago expedition to the United States, and this was immediately taken in hand. On August 4 came the order from Washington. It proposed to send five of what were called "immune" regiments to do duty as a garrison. The movement was to begin at once, using the ships present to their limit, but not to the extent of crowding. All were to go to the camp at Montauk Point, Long Island, called after Lieutenant-Colonel Wikoff (killed at San Juan Hill, July 1), a camp ideally placed, and which was to attain a melancholy celebrity from the unorganized administration which seemed to pursue the Fifth Corps as a fatality. The first troops left August 7, in the *Gate City*, and August 25 General Shafter himself sailed with the last of his men, leaving General Lawton in command of the province, and General Wood, formerly of the Rough Riders, as governor of the city.

The active work of the Santiago army ended July 17.[1] There remained but the reorganization of the government in the province occupied, the re-establishment of social conditions,[2] and the return to Spain of the troops in the surrendered region. The first step was to look after the six neighboring small garrisons,[3] the most distant of which was 22 miles; Lieutenant Miley, accompanied by Captain Rannes of Toral's staff, and with an escort of two troops of cavalry, carrying with him a Spanish pack-train with supplies for the hospital, in addition to his own train of supplies, left July 18 on this duty. The country in the direction of these nearer posts was devoid of either roads or passable

[1] For the casualties to this date, see Appendix B.

[2] For the president's order giving the rules governing the U. S. forces during the military occupancy of the Province of Santiago, and which were telegraphed to General Shafter on July 18, 1898, see *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, 1, 161.

[3] El Cristo, Songo, Moron, Dos Caminos, San Luis, and Palma Soriano.

trails, and most of the journey was made over the ties of the railroad which went as far as San Luis, or on the paths which bordered it. The region "travelled over," says Lieutenant Miley, "was almost entirely a wilderness. After passing over the mountains, which were about a thousand to twelve hundred feet in elevation, we found the interior to be a vast tableland on a level with the summit of the mountains. Before the war this tableland had been cut up into well-tilled plantations producing sugar, tobacco, coffee, and bananas. Now from El Cristo to San Luis, a distance of twelve to fourteen miles, all traces of these plantations had disappeared, except the ruins of dwellings in two places. The whole country was covered with a rank growth of grass as high as the back of a horse, and with a scrubby growth of guava. . . . Surrounding each of the towns which were visited, there was a little cultivated zone . . . planted mainly to corn and sweet potatoes. . . . I found all these towns surrounded by bands of insurgents, and the Spanish garrisons could not lay down their arms in safety unless I had American troops to leave as guard." [1]

The Spanish enlisted men were overjoyed at the prospect of returning home, nor were the officers far different. The men of the two armies cordially fraternized. The mutual respect for courage and endurance which had been established brought about a most friendly feeling. This feeling and the conditions under which the warfare of the insurrection had been conducted are nobly described in a letter from a Spanish enlisted man:

Soldiers of the American Army:

We would not be fulfilling our duty as well-born men in whose breasts there lives gratitude and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor and with all our strength, endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor or hate toward the American nation. We have been vanquished by you, so our generals and chiefs judged in signing the capitulation, but our surrender and the bloody battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for resentment against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in compliance

[1] Miley, 191–193.

with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent the power of our respective states. You fought us as men, face to face, and with great courage, as before stated—a quality we had not met with during the three years we have carried on this war against a people without a religion, without morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but shot their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled. This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this unfortunate land. You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations of the world; have given honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished; have cured their wounded with great humanity; have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort; and lastly, to us, whose condition was terrible, you have given freely of food and of your stock of medicines, and have honored us with distinction and courtesy, for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony.

With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all, there remains but to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in this land, which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours. You have conquered it by force and watered it with your blood, as your conscience called for under the demands of civilization and humanity; but the descendants of the Congos and Guineas mingled with the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers—these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized humanity. From eleven thousand Spanish soldiers.

(Signed) Pedro Lopez de Castillo,
Soldier of Infantry.

Santiago de Cuba, *August* 21, 1898.

Baraçoa and Sagua de Tanamo had to be visited by sea, both garrisons surrendering without making difficulties; such as were, only arose from the threatening attitude against the Spanish of the nearby insurgent forces. Posted on the wall just outside the door of the office of the commandant of the latter place was a very remarkable bulletin. "It invited attention to two telegrams, one from the Spanish admiral at Manila, in which he described a wonderful victory he had won in the battle with the American navy, and the other from Sagasta, sending the thanks of Spain to the admiral for his glorious victory." [1]

The American government had lost no time in arranging for

[1] Miley, 214.

the transport of the prisoners. The day after the surrender of Santiago, communication was opened with the Spanish government through the British ambassador with the result of the almost immediate acceptance of an offer from the Spanish *Trasatlantica* line for the transport of the Spanish prisoners. The passage, rations, and medical supplies were to be at the cost of the United States. The ships for the time being were to be regarded as neutral and given safe conduct.

The first Spanish transport to reach Santiago was the *Alicante*, on August 8. She left two days later with 38 officers and 1,000 men. The *Isla de Luzon*, *Prince de Satrustegui*, the *City of Madrid*, *Montevideo*, *Isla de Panay*, *Villaverde*, *Covadonga*, *St. Augustin*, *Leon XIII*, and *San Ignacio de Loyola* arrived in the order named, from August 10 to the 18th, some of them taking aboard more than 2,000 men, the *Montevideo* carrying 2,539. The total number transported was 22,864—1,163 officers, 20, 974 men, the remainder being the families of officers, priests, and sisters of mercy. Of the soldiers, 5,820 sailed from Guantánamo, 1,322 from Baraçoa and Sagua de Tanamo, the remainder from Santiago.

CHAPTER XII

THE EASTERN SQUADRON. PREPARING FOR THE NEW EXPEDITIONS

On June 6, the day before the Fifth Corps was ordered to sail from Tampa, General Miles had recommended the abandonment of the movement to Santiago until after the taking of Puerto Rico. In answer to a question asking how soon he could organize an expedition for the capture of the island, he replied as follows:

(Received 8.27 P. M.)

TAMPA, FLORIDA, *June* 6, 1898.

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.:*

Believe such a force can be ready as soon as sufficient transports could be gathered for 30,000 volunteers. Will inform you definitely as soon as reports can be received as to exact condition of regiments and batteries. This corps has been organized and equipped in part for that purpose, and I believe it sufficient. I offer the following merely as a suggestion: To leave No. 1 safely guarded. This corps, with the combined assistance of the navy, to take No. 2 first before it can be re-enforced. In order to make sure of this, have it followed by 10,000 additional volunteers as quickly as transportation can be secured, utilizing what transports are now engaged, and prize steamers now at Key West, and any Atlantic auxiliary cruisers that can be spared by the navy. Such a force ought to sail in ten days. Leaving sufficient force to hold No. 2, the capture of No. 1 [1] can then be easily accomplished, and the troops then landed at any point that might be thought advisable.

MILES, *Major-General Commanding Army.*

This met prompt and emphatic disapproval, the secretary of war telegraphing at once:

The president says No. He urges the utmost haste in departure of No. 1, and also of No. 2, as indicated by you, but that No. 1 must be taken first.

[1] Plan No. 1 was known at the department as that relating to Santiago; Plan No. 2 meant Puerto Rico.

The next evening, June 7, Miles was telegraphed:

As you reported that an expedition to Puerto Rico (with 30,000 troops) can be ready in ten days, you are directed to assemble such troops at once for the purpose. The transports will be ready in ten days or sooner, if you can be ready. Acknowledge receipt.

A month later, July 8, General Miles sailed from Charleston, with about 3,500 officers and men in the *Yale* and *Columbia*, touching, as we have seen, at Santiago. Santiago having surrendered, he was naturally anxious to proceed. Peace was soon to be in the air, Spain was already moving in the subject, and actual occupancy of Puerto Rico was important before the cessation of hostilities, in order to give support for insistence upon Spain's yielding entirely her dominion in the Antilles. The necessity of this for the avoidance of future dispute was patent.

On July 16, the surrender of Santiago now assured, General Miles, at Siboney, wrote Admiral Sampson:

I am ordered to equip an expedition of some 25,000 men immediately to occupy Puerto Rico in conjunction with the navy, and would be glad to consult you concerning the enterprise, and advise with you as to the best point of disembarkation and mode of accomplishing this object, in order that the army and navy may act in full concert.

The same day with General Garretson and Colonel Clous, he called aboard the flag-ship *New York*. The points of the expedition were discussed, and Fajardo, under Cape San Juan, the easternmost point of Puerto Rico, selected for a first landing.

While Sampson was thus still off Santiago, there was congregated at Guantánamo a very large part of the fighting-ships of the fleet, all of which were now destined for the voyage across the Atlantic. Every energy had been bent toward hastening the departure of Commodore Watson's squadron, on which the government was still laying great stress, despite the fact that Admiral Camara had re-entered the Suez Canal on July 8, on his return to Spain. Not only was the force under Commodore Watson to be got ready, but Sampson himself had now been ordered to prepare all the armored ships, and in command of the whole force to accompany Watson as far as Port Said, and return thence to the United States.

The telegram directing this preparation, sent from Washington July 12, and received July 13, was as follows:

The department intends to send all the armored vessels, except monitors, to accompany Commodore Watson's division, and to see it safely through the Strait of Gibraltar. You will, therefore, with utmost expedition, coal and fill with ammunition all of Watson's division, also *New York* and the *Brooklyn*, the *Iowa* and *Indiana*, the *Texas* and *Mayflower* and *Badger*, assigning publicly and to your captains as the reason, preparation for the expedition against Puerto Rico. Order monitors *Amphitrite*, *Puritan*, and *Terror* to proceed from Key West to Port Nipe, Cuba, and direct upon the latter place division of three or more small vessels under an enterprising officer, to arrive there three days before the monitors in order to reconnoitre to ascertain if mines exist, etc., and, if practicable, to enter the port. It is the intention to let monitors anchor there until expedition to Puerto Rico is ready. Empty *Southery* [collier] at once and send to Hampton Roads, where the fleet of colliers to accompany squadron for Gibraltar will be organized. The *Armeria* and the *Yankee* will probably be ready to sail to you from Hampton Roads at the end of this week, with ammunition to fill the vessels detailed for the service herein contemplated. It is proposed to confide to the monitors such services at Puerto Rico as will require armored vessels. Send *Dixie* or *Yosemite* to Hampton Roads as soon as practicable, to convoy colliers from thence. May reserve possibly the *Texas*, but prepare her.

On July 14, Sampson telegraphed:

The preparation of ships for foreign service is advancing with all speed, but I deem it my duty to lay before the department the fact that the heavy ships should have extensive overhauling before attempting a cruise far from any base. The *Iowa*, *Indiana*, and *New York* have been steadily under steam for seven months, and for six of these actually at sea, moving or ready to move at a moment's notice. They imperatively need docking, seriously need overhauling and refitting; many of their boats are at Key West, some destroyed. The speed of the *Iowa* and *Indiana* is much reduced. Two of the *Brooklyn's* five-inch guns and several five-inch mounts are disabled. The *Texas* is in bad condition. Of course I do not know the basis of the department's action. There may be overpowering reasons of which I am ignorant, but unless these exist I recommend the department to take this state of things into serious consideration. Our naval prestige, which is now great, would surely be impaired if our ships in foreign waters were unprepared for fighting or cruising. It is imperatively necessary to closely blockade Cienfuegos, which has just been entered

by a ship thought to be the *Alfonso XIII.* Adding Manzanillo, Batabanó, Jibara, Nuevitas, and Sagua la Grande will effectually cut off Havana. Jibara and Manzanillo control Holguin. Our ships are equal to a campaign against Puerto Rico, to which the monitors, in my opinion, are wholly unequal. They are unfitted for such duty, and should not be used for it. If all the armored men-of-war and three large auxiliaries are sent away and a Puerto Rico expedition starts, convoyed by monitors, I foresee that the demands of naval assistance will cause us practically to abandon a large part of our blockade.

This brought from Washington an anxious inquiry received July 16:

Do you mean to say that the armored vessels you mention cannot in your judgment successfully make a voyage across the Atlantic and back in view of the importance of re-enforcing Commodore Dewey?

Sampson, however, always direct in facing the actualities of any situation, had telegraphed the simple truth.

Next day, July 17, Sampson was able to transmit to the navy department the message from Commodore Watson at Guantánamo regarding the ships first detailed and to which his previous telegram did not refer:

Oregon, Massachusetts, Newark, and *Dixie* will be ready in all respects except ammunition to sail for East Tuesday (July 19);

and the same day replied to the navy department's inquiry:

My telegram does not say that these vessels cannot make voyage to Gibraltar and back. What is meant is that they must be ready to meet all emergencies and this they are not in good condition to do. They must be able to overtake enemy, to avoid superior force, or to fight. Are not equal in their present condition to the service which would be expected of vessels of this class. This does not apply to the *Oregon* and the *Massachusetts,* which are ready to sail.

The *Yosemite* was now at St. Thomas, whence word was received, July 17, of her arrival from San Juan, July 15. While off that port as the sole blockader, until July 14, when she was relieved by the *New Orleans,* she had, on June 28, chased ashore the Spanish transport *Antonio Lopez,*[1] six miles west of San Juan.

[1] The Lopez was totally destroyed later by the gun-fire of the *New Orleans,* Captain Folger.

The batteries opened, and the *Isabel II* and the small gun-boats, *General Concha* and *Ponce de Leon*, came out of harbor. Shots were exchanged, but with no injuries. The *Yosemite* remained at St. Thomas only to coal and, July 18, left for Hampton Roads, as ordered by the navy department, to act as convoy for the colliers destined for Watson's squadron. The *Yankee*, yet another of the Eastern squadron, left Norfolk, July 17, with the ammunition for Watson's ships, and was at Guantánamo on the 21st.

On July 16, Sampson, called upon to supply for such various purposes so large a number of ships, telegraphed:

Referring to the department's telegram of June 24, General Miles desires to move on Puerto Rico with troops remaining here on board *Yale, Columbia, Duchess*, which have not been landed, probably under 3,000 men. He had requested convoy of heavy ships capable of rendering very decided naval support. As the various expeditions ordered by the department require nearly all our naval force, I suggest no additional convoy to accompany these ships. The *Columbia* has now on board 400 tons coal, and can get more at Guantánamo, I think. As the *New Orleans* is blockading San Juan not far from the proposed landing she can render further assistance if it is required by the army. I recommend keep the *Columbia* Cape San Juan, Puerto Rico, until relieved by the convoy from Tampa, as the troops leaving here must await arrival of Tampa troops before attacking.

The next day, General Miles informed Sampson that he was ready to move with his expedition, upon Cape Fajardo, to which port all transports were to be directed as a rendezvous. July 17 he telegraphed the war department:

Guantánamo Bay, *July* 17.—I have 2,500 men in this harbor on the *Yale, Columbia*, and *Rita;* have also four light batteries on transports at Daiquiri, and other troops *en route* to Santiago. We are within forty hours of Puerto Rico, but the captain of the *Yale* reports he is nearly out of coal. Am anxious to sail to-morrow to Point Fajardo, Cape de San Juan, Puerto Rico. Am awaiting reply from Admiral Sampson, and as soon as received will cable you. Expect to leave within two days. Would like 30,000 troops for that island.

The war department, however, did not approve immediate action. It had not yet learned the character of its enemy, and

seemed to feel desirous of occupying Nipe Bay as a base, though it is incomprehensible for what reason. Guantánamo, nearer Puerto Rico by forty miles, and healthy and commodious, was, if immediate occupancy of the vicinity of Fajardo was not wished, already in possession. But the latter itself was admirable in every way as a rendezvous; there were no enemy's forces of sufficient strength to hinder, and it was but thirty miles in a straight line thence to San Juan. The following telegram from the war department was sent Miles July 17, at 9.16 P. M.:

Your proposition to go to Puerto Rico, with 3,000 troops now afloat at Santiago, does not seem best, in view of the fact that you could not be re-enforced for a week or ten days. About 12,000 troops will start this week to join you at such point as you and Sampson may designate. Nipe is suggested by the secretary of the navy, and his board, in which I concur. Until this is settled you should remain where you are. Will cable progress every day. Give copy of this telegram to Admiral Sampson.

In transmitting this to Sampson, Miles added:

The harbor of Nipe has not been surrendered. I understand it is mined and that there are some guns there. To take and occupy it may require some time, and with transports to (add and?) delayed for days and weeks would cause much embarrassment and difficulty. Have cabled several times to-day which I prefer, to go direct to Pt. Fajardo, Cape San Juan, as it was understood between us on Saturday that way best point, and I hope you will concur with that view. Please reply.

The difficulty of taking Nipe Bay was much less than the general supposed; in furtherance of this scheme and in accord with the directions of the navy department, the *Annapolis* (as senior ship), Commander Hunker, the armed yacht *Wasp*, Lieutenant Aaron Ward, and the tug *Leyden*, Ensign Crosley, were ordered on July 18 to proceed to Nipe Bay, take possession, lift the torpedoes reported, and destroy or capture the Spanish gun-boat *Jorge Juan*, known to be in the bay. Commodore Howell, in command on the northern side of Cuba, was ordered to send there from Key West the monitors *Puritan*, *Amphitrite*, and *Terror* in anticipation of joining the expedition to Puerto Rico.

The occupancy of Nipe was brilliantly accomplished, on July 21, by these ships and the *Topeka*, Lieutenant-Commander Cowles, which had been stationed off the bay.[1] The action, however, was scarcely over before orders arrived for all the ships just mentioned, including the monitors, to proceed to Cape Fajardo as a rendezvous.

On July 17, Commodore Watson had telegraphed the navy department from Guantánamo:

> General Miles, with troops still in *Yale*, contemplates retaining them on board for an expedition to Puerto Rico. Captain Wise, of the *Yale*, urges if not ordered by the department to proceed without delay to Puerto Rico, troops should be landed in a healthy place and ship return north immediately, in compliance with department's orders. If delayed here beyond to-morrow night only coal and provisions enough to reach New York. All coal here needed for squadron.

This, the readiness at Charleston of further re-enforcements, and the pressing telegrams from General Miles were to put aside Nipe as a base.

On July 18 the war department telegraphed Miles:

> What have you determined upon? We wish to know where to direct transports?

Before the war department's telegram of 9.16 P. M., July 17, had been received by General Miles, the latter sent a despatch received at Washington, July 18, at 11.19 A. M.:

> On Board *U. S. S. Yale*, Guantánamo, *July* 18, 1898.
>
> I consider it of highest importance that some officers of the navy, with efficient force, should proceed with me immediately to Puerto Rico, in order to seize wharfs and commanding positions at and in vicinity of Point Fajardo, Cape San Juan. We can land and take position to cover the deployment of the troops as fast as they arrive. After consultation with Admiral Sampson that place was considered best. I can land there or on one of the islands. One transport can remain and balance return, including *Yale*. It has abundance of coal to go there and return to New York. Not safe to transfer these troops to transports that have men on who have been exposed to fever. I

[1] See *infra*.

hope that you will ask that Admiral Schley be designated and directed to co-operate with my movement and support my command. Will remain at cable station and can talk freely with you.

An hour later he sent to the secretary of war:

Your telegram (ordering no move) was not received until 6 o'clock yesterday, forty-eight hours ago, when the surrender of the Spanish forces was an accomplished fact. I notified Admiral Sampson that I was authorized to organize and take an expedition to Puerto Rico, and desired the co-operation of the navy. Last night I sent a telegram saying I was ready to go with 3,000 men, and desired an escort to cover debarkation. No replies have been received to either of these communications. As the enterprise is so important and time valuable, I think it advisable that some naval officer, with whatever vessels may be spared, may be ordered to report at once to act under the general direction of the commanding general of the army. The experience of the last five weeks should not be repeated.

This telegram received at Washington at 12.54 P. M. (July 18) was answered from Washington 16 minutes later at 1.10 P. M.:

In reply to your telegram of this date, the secretary of war directs you land troops now on *Yale* and other transports at such points in Puerto Rico as you may designate. He gives you the fullest discretion, but your determination of time and place of such landing should be made with full knowledge that re-enforcements cannot reach you from five to seven days from this date. Admiral Sampson will be ordered to give you such assistance as you and he may regard as necessary. The secretary of war further directs that, on your landing on the island of Puerto Rico, that you hoist the American flag. Ernst's brigade, from Charleston, should sail to-day, and so should the troops from Tampa; so that it is quite possible that by your leaving orders at Santiago, or giving them direct, that these re-enforcements may reach you earlier than herein stated, but the secretary of war and the president did not think it well for you to consider them sure at an earlier date.

At the same time with this general permission to Miles, a telegram was sent by the navy department to Sampson:

You will give Miles such assistance as you and he may regard as necessary for landing troops now on *Yale* and other transports at Puerto Rico, and maintaining their landing. *Yale* will at once go from

Puerto Rico to New York to coal. Show copy of this despatch to Miles.[1]

General Miles sent the following at 5.08 P. M.:

Your telegram received.[2] Going to Nipe will cause delay. Admiral Sampson has just notified me that he hopes to be able during the day to make detail of ships to cover landing in addition to the 3,000 troops now here which I am anxious to disembark. There are six or eight ships *en route* from Tampa that can follow us to Puerto Rico. With this strong infantry and artillery force in addition to the assistance of the navy, I feel fully competent to take and occupy commanding position until additional forces arrive, and would be glad to go at once; if any unforeseen event should occur making it unadvisable to land on the main island, I can land the force on Crab Island, and release the transports. I request authority accordingly.

Prompt reply was made to this:

Your cablegram concerning Nipe evidently was sent before you received my last order. You are the judge of the situation.

R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

General Miles sent another telegram to the war department, received there at 10.16 P. M., July 18:

PLAYA, 18.—At a meeting between Admiral Sampson and myself Saturday, Cape de San Juan was considered best place to land at Puerto Rico. I believe it would avoid some complication and delay if we could go there at once. Men and animals have been many days on shipboard.

to which came reply:

WASHINGTON, *July* 18, 1898—10.45 P. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MILES, *on board Yale, Guantánamo:*

After a conference of the president, secretaries of war and navy this morning, telegram was sent you directing you to land troops now on *Yale* and other transports at such place in Puerto Rico as you may determine upon. Like telegram was sent Admiral Sampson. It is desired to know if the same has been received by you. By order secretary of war.

H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General.*

[1] This, owing to Sampson's being still off Santiago, was not received by him until July 20.

[2] This apparently refers to the telegram sent from Washington at 1.10 P. M., July 18.

General Miles, in sending to Admiral Sampson a copy of the war department's telegram of 1.10 P. M., July 18, added:

In accordance with [this] I am ready to move to Point Fajardo, Cape de San Juan, Puerto Rico, without delay, and request a strong force of naval vessels to accompany my transports, cover landing from the same, protect the flanks of the military force during the occupation of that place, and render all assistance possible in the movement from there to the investment and capture of the harbor and city of San Juan. I also desire such co-operation as may be needed in the capture of other seaport towns on the island of Puerto Rico.

If you think it advisable, I would be glad to have the corps of marines accompany my troops. I think it advisable that a strong demonstration be made near the harbor of San Juan before the landing of troops off Point Fajardo.

General Miles, however, apparently still without the several telegrams giving him full discretion, though it is difficult to understand how this could be, as he was using the telegraph freely to send his despatches, which arrived with promptness at Washington, telegraphed:

PLAYA DEL ESTE VIA HAYTI, *July* 19, 1898
(Received at Washington at 2.16 A. M.)

July 18.—Difficult to communicate with Admiral Sampson.[1] Only message by flag and telegraph, saying he hoped to-day to detail ships to accompany us to Puerto Rico. Question can be decided in Washington; and hope, considering all things, it will be decided for us to go to Point Fajardo, Cape de San Juan, at once. It would be better to rendezvous at Crab or Vieques Island, twenty miles away from Cape de San Juan, than go to harbor of Nipe. It might take some time to take that place on account of mines. That and Nuevitas can be easily taken later.

[1] Admiral Sampson was still off Santiago seeing to the completion of the clearing of the harbor entrance. On July 18, accompanied by Commodore Schley, he made an official call upon General Shafter in Santiago. He left for Guantánamo at 4 A. M., July 20, arriving there three hours later. The following ships were now in that port: the *New York*, the *Oregon* (with Commodore Watson's broad pennant), the *Massachusetts*, *Newark*, *Indiana*, *Dixie*, *Texas*, *Marblehead*, *Detroit*, *Gloucester*, *Hawk*, *Vesuvius*, *Samoset*, the supply ship *Celtic*, repair ship *Vulcan*, the torpedo-boats *Dupont*, *Rodgers*, and *Ericsson*, the *Yale* and *Columbia*, both with troops aboard, and a number of army transports. The first six and the *Iowa* and *Brooklyn* (now off Santiago) were on the detail for the Eastern expedition. There were also the five merchantmen captured in Santiago, varying from 800 to 2,200 tons register, and the small gun-boat *Alvarado*.

On the reception of this the war department, on July 19 at 9.40 A. M., repeated its "fullest discretion" telegram of July 18, and the secretary of war, apparently his patience somewhat disturbed, telegraphed:

WASHINGTON, D. C., *July* 19, 1898—11.39 A. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MILES, *Playa del Este.*

(*To be forwarded at once.*)

Your telegram of to-day concerning Nipe is not understood. I cabled you yesterday three times practically to go direct to Puerto Rico, landing where to you seems best.

Acknowledge receipt of this, so we may know you have it and that there is no misunderstanding.

R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

General Miles telegraphed the same day, apparently, an answer to this which was received at Washington at 1.50 P. M.: "Order to go to Puerto Rico received last night. Will move as soon as navy is ready."

Early next day, July 20, Sampson, now again at Guantánamo, consulted with Miles as to the proposed expedition. Sampson, with his much greater knowledge of the abilities of a ship's battery, differed essentially with the general as to what constituted "a strong force of naval vessels." He thus proposed the *Cincinnati* and *New Orleans*, the former at Key West or Havana, and the latter blockading San Juan, and in addition the *Columbia* and *Yale* as sufficient to cover the proposed landing at Fajardo, as in fact they were amply so. There were no Spanish cruisers to do harm, the only Spanish naval vessel of any importance in Puerto Rico being the destroyer *Terror* so hardly used by the *St. Paul*, June 22, and which was still in port with repairs uncompleted. The same vessel that would carry orders to the *New Orleans* would relieve the latter on the blockade.[1]

While Sampson was of this opinion expressed at the moment and unable to understand the desire for a greater force, he was

[1] The four ships proposed carried thirty-two powerful guns; the *Columbia* one 8-inch, two 6-inch, and eight 4-inch; the *Cincinnati*, one 6-inch and ten 5-inch; the *New Orleans*, six 6-inch and four 4-inch. They were sufficient to deal with any enemy at Puerto Rico not behind powerful fortifications.

quite ready to send everything which could be spared. He had, in a letter of July 19, already informed Miles of the explicit orders of the navy department (giving him a copy of the department's telegram received July 13) to prepare and hold all the armored fleet, except the monitors, for the Eastern expedition, but General Miles, without waiting for a reply to a letter from himself to Sampson asking that more ships be furnished him, sent the following to Washington:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *July* 20, 1898.
(Received 11.07 P. M.)

SECRETARY WAR, *Washington:*

Admiral Sampson came on board the *Yale* this morning. He had not at that time seen the order of Secretary Long. He was furnished a copy of it, and after sending to his flag-ship found the order there. I asked him to give us as strong a force of the navy as possible in the movement against Puerto Rico. He said he would inform me later. At 5 o'clock he came on board, and stated that he would furnish, to assist our landing, the *Yale* and *Columbia*. These are the two ships with which we left Charleston, S. C. He said that the *Columbia* would take three or four days to coal. He also stated that he would give us the *Cincinnati*, but does not know where she is. Also quote the *New Orleans*. If she is now at San Juan, quote. If the *New Orleans* is not at San Juan, there is nothing to prevent the small Spanish gun-boats coming out of that harbor and attacking the transports *en route*, and it is highly important that she should remain, blockading that harbor while we land at Point Fajardo, Cape San Juan. This assures but two vessels to cover our landing, and these are loaded with troops. The *Columbia* and *Yale* could not silence a piece of artillery on shore without risking the lives of from 300 to 1,500 of Garretson's brigade on board. This, in my judgment, is not in accordance with the order of Secretary Long—to give such assistance as is necessary for landing—or in accordance with your telegram of the 18th. I think you and the president should be apprised of the fact that, while these ten transports, loaded with troops and munitions of war, are waiting here, a great portion of the American navy [are] within cannon-shot of this place, and some of them actively engaged bringing into this harbor vessels which were captured by and surrendered to the army. There are battle-ships enough here to enable us to land within cannon-shot of the city of San Juan. I request that positive orders be given to the navy to cover the landing of at least 10,000 troops on the island of Puerto Rico, without delay, as that number will be there within a week.

This would, probably, not have been sent had there been fuller consultation. Sampson had only expressed his views. He was, as will immediately be seen, ready to modify his proposals, as he did at once, a little later, on receiving the general's request. There was evident misunderstanding as to the *Cincinnati*, she having arrived at Key West on July 15, and if not there would now be on blockading duty off Havana. Nor was it part of the army's duty to look after the blockade of San Juan. If the *New Orleans*, as a powerful fighting-ship, should be withdrawn thence to accompany him, she would, as a matter of course, have been replaced by one or more of the smaller ships which were finally directed to Puerto Rico, the ships sent from Nipe arriving there July 23, two days before General Miles touched at Guanica on the south coast, to which his force was finally directed. In the concluding sentences of the letter, referring to the battle-ships, the pressing orders of the navy department to Sampson were entirely ignored. How much more correct was Sampson's judgment as to what was necessary, will soon appear.

On the same day Miles sent a letter to Sampson:

July 20.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON, *Commanding North Atlantic Squadron:*

SIR: I am informed by my adjutant-general that you have designated the *Yale* and *Columbia* as ships to render the assistance for landing of the troops and for maintaining their landing, and also the *Cincinnati*, the whereabouts of which I understand is not known, and the *New Orleans*, if it is at San Juan. If the latter vessel is not at San Juan it ought to be, and remain there, otherwise that port is left open with nothing to prevent the Spanish gun-boats known to be there from coming out and capturing our transports now *en route* to Cape San Juan. Second, since it is not known where the *Cincinnati* is, it may or may not be of any assistance. Third, the *Columbia* and *Yale* could not silence a battery of light artillery on shore without jeopardizing the lives of the 300 to 1,500 troops on board. In view of the above facts I have to inform you that I do not consider the force above mentioned available or sufficient to cover the landing of some 10,000 men now *en route* to Cape San Juan, and I beg leave to request that an additional and ample force be immediately ordered to those waters

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General Commanding U. S. Army.

Sampson, naturally desirous of meeting Miles's wishes, sent an immediate reply as follows:

GUANTÁNAMO BAY, *July* 20, 1898.

SIR: Referring to your letter of this date, the *Cincinnati* is ordered by telegraph here. She is either at Key West, or within easy reach from there, on the Havana blockade. The *Annapolis*, *Wasp*, and *Leyden*, ordered to attack Port Nipe, have been ordered to Cape San Juan to assist in the expedition. The *Gloucester* will be added. Three monitors will join the expedition. The *Cincinnati*, *Yale*, *Columbia*, *Annapolis*, *Wasp*, *Gloucester*, and *Leyden* are amply sufficient to cover the landing of 10,000 men at the point named without the monitors. The first four are capable of silencing anything short of heavy guns in position.

General Miles was satisfied, replying July 21:

I have the honor to acknowledge your note of last night and am glad to have the assistance of the ships named therein. I am ready to sail without delay. . . . I request that you will remove the quarantine that prevails to enable me to have the necessary communication with the transports of the expedition.

and sending to the war department a telegram which, it should be said, was not received until the next day, July 21, said:

With this I will sail as quickly as the *Columbia* can get sufficient coal to take her to San Juan and last a few days. . . .

Miles had viewed the situation with reference to his own expedition and it was naturally difficult for him to take into correct account the demands of the blockade, the necessary repairs, and the fact that the presence of a considerable number of ships at the moment did not necessarily mean inactivity.

The president, naturally yielding to whomsoever had his ear, this for the moment being the secretary of war, had taken Miles's view, and sent the following to the secretary of the navy:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, *July* 20, 1898.

HON. JOHN D. LONG, *Secretary of the Navy.*

SIR: I hand you a despatch just received from General Miles. It is evident to me from this despatch that Admiral Sampson is not pro-

posing to furnish such assistance as I have heretofore directed. He should send enough ships, and strong enough, as will enable General Miles to land his troops in safety at Point Fajardo, Cape San Juan, and to remain so long as their assistance is needed.

General Wilson has already sailed from Charleston, with orders to proceed to Point Fajardo. If your convoy is delayed he will reach Point Fajardo without any protection whatever, which must not be permitted. Wilson cannot be reached by wire. He has no guns on his ships. The secretary of war says that General Wilson is due to arrive at Point Fajardo in three or four days. Prompt action should be taken to give General Wilson protection on his arrival there. It seems to me a cruiser or battle-ship, or both, should be detailed for this duty.

Please see that the necessary orders are issued at once.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

12 M.,[1] *Wednesday, July* 20, 1898.

Sampson had already informed the navy department, July 20, in reply to a telegram of the same date asking, "What vessels are you sending to Puerto Rico with Miles?":

Besides the *Yale* and *Columbia*, which is now coaling at Guantánamo, I have ordered the *Cincinnati* to come here from Key West to give the necessary assistance to General Miles's expedition, which will land inside of Cape San Juan.

The result of the president's note to the secretary of the navy was a telegram, July 21, from the latter containing an implied and wholly unwarranted rebuke to Sampson:

The president directs that you send ships of war enough to enable Miles to land at Puerto Rico, and to remain there as long as needed to render assistance, or to give him at once the *Indiana*, the *Newark* or something of each class as good. Act promptly. Why do you not telegraph about this convoy, some of them [? telegrams] are three days old. On the face of things you seem dilatory in this matter. The department awaits your quick reply.

LONG.

The secretary received it:

GUANTÁNAMO, *July* 21, 1898.

Replying to your number 56: I was ordered July 12 to prepare all armored ships and certain cruisers for special service, and I have been

[1] This was evidently meant for "midnight," as Miles's telegram was not received at the war department until 11.07 P. M., July 20.

led to believe that the department regarded this of prime importance. This work is in progress. I was ordered to send a specified force to Nipe to remove mines and hold it as a rendezvous. This was done. I was informed yesterday that the army had decided not to rendezvous there, but the expedition had sailed. I placed yesterday at General Miles's disposal the *Cincinnati*, which has been ordered from Key West, and the *New Orleans*, blockading at San Juan. The *Columbia* and *Yale*, carrying troops, are both powerfully armed. This is an ample convoy for his expedition and to effect his landing. At his urgent request for further force, however, I sent to Nipe to order the *Annapolis*, *Wasp*, and *Leyden* to Puerto Rico. They will await the troops at Cape San Juan. I also added the *Gloucester* here, and have ordered three monitors from Key West. General Miles has from the first insisted upon a convoy of heavy ships; this I have told him my instructions did not permit. The department will observe that General Miles's failure to obtain the naval force which he considers necessary is due to the department's instructions. Following the instructions in department's No. 56, I have ordered the *Massachusetts* and *Dixie*. The *Indiana* and *Newark* are under repair to steam machinery. The *Iowa* is not in condition to go. I cannot find any telegram here unanswered.

The navy department made handsome amends for its strictures. Secretary Long next day, July 22, sent the following:

Your despatch of yesterday received and is of much value as showing you have done all you could for General Miles. . . . . The information you give is what the department has needed for the last two or three days to set it and you right. Our unanswered telegram was July 19, in which we asked what vessels are you going to send to Puerto Rico with Miles.

LONG.

The following, with some omitted paragraphs relating to details not of public importance, were the detailed orders soon to be in Sampson's hands. These orders but supplement the previous telegrams. They show the imperative and pressing character of the instructions, obedience to which by Sampson had caused the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, the war department, the general commanding the army—and, it may be said, the secretary of the navy himself—impliedly at least, to

accuse Sampson of inertness and non-compliance with orders. The whole difficulty (it cannot be too often said) was but a natural corollary of the want of a central directive force such as only a general staff, and a mutual understanding between the war and navy departments as now exists, can afford:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, *July* 15, 1898.

SIR: As has been previously stated, the department sometime since decided to send a squadron to Manila to re-enforce Admiral Dewey. This decision was arrived at, in view of the then recent departure of Admiral Camara's squadron from Spain for the Philippine Islands.

2. Though Admiral Camara has returned from the Suez Canal to Spain, the department still intends to send a re-enforcing squadron to Manila; and as Camara's force, when united with other armored ships, now presumably disposable in Spanish waters, would be, on paper, stronger than the squadron proposed to be sent to the East Indies, it has been decided to send with the latter a covering squadron strong enough to guarantee against the possible efforts of all such armored ships of the Spanish navy as may now be in condition for cruising in the straits of Gibraltar, and to hold any such force as Spain may collect, blockaded in its own ports until our squadron for the East is well on its way.

3. With this end in view, the department has directed the two squadrons to be prepared at once, as below designated, the whole to be under one command until separated by order of the commander-in-chief:

4.

Covering Squadron	*Eastern Squadron*
ARMORED SHIPS	ARMORED SHIPS
New York	*Massachusetts*
Brooklyn	*Oregon*
Iowa	
Indiana	
CRUISERS	CRUISERS
Newark	*Yosemite*
New Orleans	*Dixie*
Badger	
Yankee	
Mayflower	Food ships

With the proper number of colliers to be designated by the department.

5. The men-of-war composing this expedition are to be filled with provisions, coal, ammunition, etc., and will sail from the point that is thought most convenient in the vicinity of the Windward Passage, directly to a point 200 miles W.S.W., magnetic, from the town of Punta Delgada, in the Azores, where the department will direct the colliers to rendezvous, the latter sailing from Hampton Roads under convoy of a cruiser, which will be designated by the department.

. . . . . .

8. As the speed of the fleet is regulated by that of the colliers, it would appear that about ten knots per hour can probably be maintained, in ordinary weather, though it is thought that the most economical speed of several of the men-of-war may perhaps be more than that. Great care must be taken to keep the machinery and boilers of the colliers in an efficient working condition. A few of them could, under favorable conditions, make twelve knots; but as a rule, ten will probably be as much as should be expected of most of them.

. . . . . .

13. After the operation of coaling the entire fleet has been completed, the division for the East Indies and the colliers detailed for it will be directed to proceed as mentioned at close of sixteenth paragraph. The separation should, if possible, be made by night, and the covering squadron will then hold the Spanish fleet under observation, and blockade it if necessary, till time has been allowed the Eastern Squadron to reach the Suez Canal. The covering squadron will then return to the United States, sending a vessel into Lisbon to inquire if there be any orders for it.

14. In conclusion, the department attaches importance to preserving the armored fleet in full efficiency. Therefore, while any opportunity that may offer to destroy the enemy's armed ships must be used to the utmost, the vessels must not be exposed any more than may be imperatively necessary, to the fire of the coast fortifications.

15. On approaching the coasts of Europe, one of the cruisers will be sent ahead to call on the minister at Lisbon for any orders the department may have sent to his care; the cruiser to depart from Lisbon immediately and rejoin off Cape St. Vincent, or any other point that may be designated by the commander of the combined force.

16. The department designates Commodore Watson to command the Eastern squadron. Admiral Sampson will command the covering squadron, and also the combined force until it separates, when Commodore Watson will proceed, without delay, with the *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, colliers and store-ship, to Manila, using every endeavor to make his way without any other delays than those that are absolutely necessary.

17. You will furnish Commodore Watson with a copy of this order, and you will hold the vessels designated, in such a state of readiness

that they will be able to sail at the earliest practicable moment after the receipt by you of an order from the department for them to proceed.

18. You will inform the department, by telegraph, when they are ready for the service herein mentioned.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) JOHN D. LONG, *Secretary.*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, *North Atlantic Station.*

CHAPTER XIII

THE PUERTO RICO EXPEDITION

At 3 P. M., July 21, the *Massachusetts*, Captain Higginson, the senior officer of the naval contingent of the expedition now detailed, with the *Columbia*, *Yale*, *Dixie*, and *Gloucester*, and the army transport *Macon*, sailed with orders to proceed to Cape San Juan, Puerto Rico, and disembark the troops at such place as the major-general commanding the army should indicate.[1]

The squadron's course was naturally by the north of Hayti. The day after leaving, the *Columbia* went into St. Nicholas Mole and sent a telegram at 1.15 P. M. from General Miles to the war department:

> Am disappointed in the nonarrival of Colonel Hecker with construction corps. Colonel Black arrived without snag boats or lighters. Please send at least four strong sea-going steam lighters and tugs; also General Stone's boats at Jacksonville, if not already sent, as soon as possible. Am moving along well.

General Wilson had left Charleston, July 20, with 164 officers and 3,407 men in the transports *Opdam*, *La Grande Duchesse*, and *Mobile*. General Schwan had left Tampa in six transports July 24, with 73 officers and 2,823 men, all directed to Fajardo. A force of 4,000 was at Newport News under General Brooke, and some 4,000 more about ready to sail from Tampa. General Miles would shortly have some 18,000 men at his disposition.

In the meantime Miles had come to the conclusion, although

[1] News of the projected expedition had of course reached Puerto Rico long before. The American consul at St. Thomas telegraphed July 22, 1898:

"SECRETARY STATE, *Washington:*

"A great many people of Puerto Rico leaving the island. A great many suffering. Would not recommend blockading any other ports against food. However, we must prevent ammunition arriving. I hope you will hasten invasion.

"HANNA."

SAN JUAN
Arecibo
Aguadilla
Aguada
Rincon
Anasco
Mayaguez
Cabo Rojo
Lares
Utuado
Corozal
Morovis
Vega Baja
Manati
Barceloneta
Vega Alta
Dorado
Toa Alta
Bayamon
Rio Piedras
Caguas
Trujillo Alto
Loiza
Canovanas
Fajardo
Luquillo
Rio Grande
El Yunque
Naguabo
Humacaco
Las Piedras
Juncos
Aguas Buenas
Aguas Buenas
Comerio
Naranjito
Barranquitas
Aibonito
Cayey
Guayama
Arroyo
Salinas
Patillas
Coamo
Orocovis
Ciales
Hatillo
Quebradillas
Isabela
Camuy
Moca
Las Marias
Hormigueros
Sabana Grande
San Germán
Lajas
Guanica
Yauco
Guayanilla
Penuelas
Ponce
Juana Diaz
Villalba
Santa Isabel
Arroyo
Guayama
Salinas
Aguirre
Jobos
Maunabo
Yabucoa
Humacao
Naguabo
Ceiba
Vieques
Culebra
Mona
CARIBBEAN SEA

PUERTO RICO

all orders, both naval and military, had been issued with reference to the use of Fajardo as a base, that it would be better to take possession first of the south side of the island, which was strongly disaffected to the Spanish cause, and the posts of which were but lightly garrisoned. Captain Whitney of the army, who was now with General Miles, had courageously travelled through the island in disguise in June, and had reported the conditions to be as mentioned. General Miles, July 22, wrote a letter to Captain Higginson setting forth the supposed advantages of the change:

Sir: Our objective point has been Pt. Fajardo or Cape San Juan, but so much time has occurred since the movement was decided in that direction and such publicity has been given the enterprise, that the enemy has undoubtedly become apprised of our purpose. While it is advisable to make a demonstration near the harbor of San Juan near Pt. Fajardo, or Pt. Figueroa, I am not decided as to the advisability of landing at either of these places, as we may find them well occupied by strong Spanish forces. If we draw them to that vicinity, we might find it judicious to quickly move to Puerto Guanica, where there is deep water near the shore—4½ fathoms—and good facilities for landing. We can move from Cape San Juan to that point in twelve hours (one night), and it would be impossible for the Spanish to concentrate their forces there before we will be re-enforced. I am also informed that there are a large number of strong lighters in the harbors at Ponce and Guanica, as well as several sailing-vessels, which would be useful. As it is always advisable not to do what your enemy expects you to do, I think it advisable, after going around the north-east corner of Puerto Rico, to go immediately to Guanica and land this force and move on Ponce, which is the largest city in Puerto Rico. After, or before, this is accomplished we will receive large re-enforcements, which will enable us to move in any direction or occupy any portion of the island of Puerto Rico.

Your strong vessels can cover our landing and capture any vessels in the harbor of Ponce, Guanica, or the ports on the southern coast; one light vessel can remain at Cape San Juan to notify transports that will arrive where we have landed, and another could scout off the north-west corner of Puerto Rico to intercept others and direct them where to find us.

General Miles's proposal was thus to make a feint of landing at Cape Fajardo and then, rounding the island, proceed from the north-east to almost the extreme south-west and land at the latter

point. He invested the Spaniards with a much greater activity and initiative than their methods in Cuba justified. He would probably have found as little opposition at Fajardo as did the ships which arrived there a few days later. In any case the change put between the American forces and the main Spanish position a much greater distance, and a mountain range which a determined enemy might have made impassable.

Captain Higginson's views are expressed in his report of the expedition; he says:

General Miles having expressed a desire for a consultation with me, I invited him aboard on the afternoon of Saturday the 23d. He accepted the invitation and came aboard with his adjutant-general, General Gilmore. During the interview he stated that he desired to land at Guanica, on the south side of Puerto Rico, instead of at Cape San Juan, as originally designed, giving as his reasons that the enemy were already well advised, through the public press, of the intended landing at the latter place, and consequently that they would probably concentrate troops there to oppose him. He stated that through information derived from Captain Whitney, of the army, there were no defences or troops on the south side of the island either at Guanica or Ponce; that we would find there a large number of sugar lighters which would be invaluable for the landing of the army, and that with the capture of the city of Ponce, the largest city on the island, he would be in a position to operate along a fine military road built by the Spaniards, reaching across the island from Ponce to San Juan. He also stated that on the southern portion of the island the people were largely disaffected and would in all likelihood rally to our flag. To this proposition I objected on the grounds that from a naval point of view I could not so effectually cover his landing or protect his base at Guanica as I could do at San Juan. The depth of water in the harbor of Guanica did not permit of the *Massachusetts*, *Columbia*, or *Dixie* entering, and in case of heavy weather I might not even be able to lie off the entrance, that the south coast of Puerto Rico was imperfectly surveyed, and lined with reefs, whereas on the east coast, from Cape San Juan to Point Algodon, I could approach close to the shore and cover with the guns of the fleet any position he wished to occupy, and that, moreover, by placing a vessel on the north coast of Puerto Rico just west of Cape San Juan I could obtain a cross fire over the land as far as Fajardo. I stated, moreover, that at Cape San Juan we were thirty miles from St. Thomas, where, in the absence of colliers, we could coal our ships and communicate with the government.

I recommended that we proceed to our destination at Cape San Juan and keep Guanica in reserve in case we found insurmountable obstacles at the former place. The general then took his departure and received a salute of fifteen guns.

The following messages passed by signal between the army and naval commanders on July 24:

General Miles desires, if possible. you send in advance any naval vessels you can spare to the Port Guanica, reported to be without fortifications or torpedoes. If secured, hold, and report quickly to us, Cape San Juan.

It is more important to land at Guanica than at Cape San Juan. If we can land there, he has troops enough to take the harbor of Ponce and let your fleet into that port.

Possibly all of this can be accomplished by going by the south side. Can send Captain Whitney, who was at Ponce in June, to you, if desired. Answer.

[Signal from *Massachusetts*, July 24, 1898.] All right. Guanica it is. Shall I send orders to transport at Cape San Juan to join at Guanica?[1]

[1] The following telegrams expressed the surprise of the war department:

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
"WASHINGTON, *July* 26, 1898—12.15 A. M.

"GENERAL BROOKE, *Newport News, Va.:*

"Press despatches say that General Miles is disembarking at Ponce. The secretary of war does not credit it, and yet feels that it may be so. He says that you should sail for Fajardo; not finding him there, to then proceed to Ponce. Some notice will doubtless be waiting at Fajardo. When will you get away?

"H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General.*"

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
"WASHINGTON, *July* 26, 1898—4.25 P. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL MILES, *Puerto Rico:*

"Conflicting reports here as to your place of landing. Why did you change? Doraco, near Ensenada, about fifteen miles west of San Juan, is reported an excellent place to land. The *Yosemite* went in there and remained several days. Did you leave ships to direct Schwan and Wilson, now *en route*, where to find you? General Brooke will leave Fortress Monroe to-morrow.

"R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*"

General Miles in replying to the latter, on July 28, while detailing events, said: "Circumstances were such that I deemed it advisable to take the harbor of Guanica first."

[Answer sent by General Miles.] Better be sure we can land at Guanica, then send for the transports. You can notify all vessels accordingly. Do you want Whitney?

Captain Whitney was sent to report to Captain Higginson on the *Massachusetts*, with his maps and reports.

As will be seen, much slighter forces even than those which Admiral Sampson first proposed to send, were ample to meet the needs of the situation.

The feint at Fajardo was given up. Says Higginson's report, which gives a succinct history of what followed:

We were then off the Mona Passage, and detaching Commander Davis with the *Dixie* under orders, I proceeded with the convoy through the Mona Passage and arrived at Port Guanica at 5.20 A. M., July 25, and standing in with the *Gloucester* in advance came to an anchor at 8.45 A. M.

Finding no batteries bearing upon the entrance, the *Gloucester* approached the mouth of the harbor and Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright asked permission to enter. This I granted with some hesitation, not knowing, of course, what mines or torpedoes might be in the channel, or what batteries might be concealed inside the harbor out of sight from our view, and knowing that I would be powerless to render the *Gloucester* any assistance after she had penetrated the harbor and was lost to sight. The *Gloucester* as she entered fired several shots and soon disappeared from my view. I listened attentively, however, and found that she was not being opposed by any battery. Without waiting for her to return and report, I directed the transports to enter the harbor, which they did, and hoisting out all the boats and launches from the *Massachusetts*, I sent them in at about 10 A. M., in charge of Cadet Evans, and the landing of the army commenced immediately. I learned later, as will be seen from Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright's report, . . . that he landed a company of sailors under the command of Lieutenant Huse and Lieutenant Wood, and drove back a small force of Spanish troops and hauled down the Spanish flag. In fact the *Gloucester* captured the place single-handed, and I take pleasure in commending Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright and his officers and men for their gallantry and daring. The troops on the *Columbia* were landed by her boats, and those on the *Yale* were landed by transports which came alongside and took them on board.

At 12.30 A. M., July 25, the *Columbia* was sent to St. Thomas with despatches and orders to fill up with coal. The *Yale* left at noon

July 26 for Hampton Roads to fill up with coal, and the *Dixie* rejoined us at about 2 P. M., July 26.[1] . . . On July 27, at 8 A. M., the *Wasp*, and at 11 A. M. the *Annapolis*, joined the squadron. During the forenoon of the same day General Wilson, on the transport *Obdam*, and General Ernst on the *Grande Duchesse*, arrived, but the troops were not disembarked at Guanica.

Having now a sufficient force at my command, and General Miles being anxious to transfer the place of disembarkation to the harbor of Ponce, I directed Commander Davis, of the *Dixie*, with the *Annapolis*, *Wasp*, and *Gloucester* under his command, to proceed to the harbor of Ponce to reconnoitre, capture all the lighters that could be found at that place, and occupy such positions as he thought necessary for holding the port until the arrival of the army. The *Dixie* left Guanica with the *Annapolis* and *Wasp* at 1.45 P. M., July 27, and the *Gloucester* followed at 4.30 P. M. . . . [Commander Davis] found no opposition, captured a large number of lighters, and received the surrender of the city of Ponce. I cannot too highly commend the very able and efficient manner in which Commander Davis executed his orders and cleared the way completely for an immediate and peaceful possession of the city of Ponce by the army. He was ably assisted by Commander Hunker, Lieutenant Ward, and Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright. The latter officer during the night collected lighters, moored them alongside of his ship, and when the first transport anchored the next morning the lighters were put alongside of her and an immediate disembarkation commenced. Commander Davis captured in the harbor three Spanish brigantines, a number of smaller sailing-vessels, and a large number of lighters. I placed a guard of men from the *Massachusetts* on board the Spanish brigantines, and it was my intention, as soon as they could have been gotten ready, to send them with prize crews to Charleston for condemnation, but as I came away before this could be accomplished I directed Captain Chester to carry out my intention. The sugar lighters and other vessels captured that could not be sent to the United States for condemnation, I directed to be appraised and sold at Ponce.

I left Guanica with the *Massachusetts*, General Miles, General Wilson, and transports at 4 A. M. on the 28th for Ponce and anchored there at 6.40 A. M. On our way to Ponce we met two more transports with troops and the *Cincinnati*, Captain Chester, who entered Ponce with us. We found everything ready for the immediate disembarka-

[1] The *Dixie* had called off San Juan and had been kept there overnight of July 24 by Captain Folger, of the *New Orleans*, who was blockading the port alone. On the morning of the 25th the *Dixie* seized and sent in as prize the French steamer *Manoubia*, bound for Sagua la Grande, Cuba. She was released, as Sagua la Grande had not been proclaimed blockaded, though a blockade was in force at the moment.

tion of the troops, and the army landed and took possession. All the steam launches of the squadron were placed at the disposal of the army. The harbor of Ponce is of ample dimensions, good water, and a fine place for disembarkation of troops. At 4.30 P. M. on the 28th the *Annapolis* returned to Guanica to guard that place until the arrival of the *Terror*, and at 4.50 P. M. of the same day the *Dixie* left for St. Thomas with despatches. Captain Chester, of the *Cincinnati*, was appointed captain of the port, Lieutenant Hoogewerff was appointed beach master, Lieutenant B dger was appointed harbor master, and Surgeon Byrnes was appointed quarantine officer. The *Annapolis* returned from Guanica on the afternoon of the 29th and reported that the *Terror* had arrived at that port, the latter vessel having coaled at St. Thomas before leaving for Guanica. On the 30th the *Annapolis* was despatched to Cape San Juan, to remain there until further orders and to send to Ponce all vessels arriving. The light-house on Cardona Island was relighted on the evening of the 29th, and that on Caja de Muerto was relighted on the evening following.

The *Columbia*, returning on the 30th from coaling at St. Thomas, exchanged numbers with the *Massachusetts* at 6.30 P. M. At 7.30 P. M. the *Columbia* sent the signal: "We are aground." I immediately ordered the *Cincinnati* to get under way to assist in hauling her off, and sent the navigator of the *Massachusetts*, Lieutenant Potts, to examine her position and see if we could safely render her any assistance with this vessel. It was found that she had grounded on the southern edge of a coral reef projecting from Cardona Island and was lying broadside on the reef, heading eastward. She seemed to be aground on her port bilge, about abreast of her second smokestack, in twenty-one feet of water. At 12.30 A. M., July 31, I got under way with the *Massachusetts* and went out and took a position on her starboard bow and ran hawsers to her. The *Cincinnati* took a position on her starboard quarter, but our endeavors to pull her off resulted only in parting all the hawsers. I then procured some lighters from the harbor and directed her commanding officer to hoist out ammunition and coal. General Miles kindly offered to send me any of his vessels that could be of any use, and I am much indebted to the master of the tug *Hercules* for assistance rendered in towing lighters. The *Cincinnati* then made fast again to the *Columbia's* starboard quarter, and at 6.55 P. M. of the 31st we succeeded in pulling her off the reef. Captain Sands was on the list at the time of the accident, but I was informed by Lieutenant-Commander J. H. Moore, her executive officer, that the ship was not making any water and was not seriously damaged. I directed Captain Chester to order a court of inquiry upon her grounding.

The *Dixie* arrived on the afternoon of the 31st and reported that the *Montgomery* and *Puritan* had arrived at San Juan and the *New Orleans* had gone to St. Thomas for coal. On the evening of the 31st the *St.*

Louis and transport *Cherokee* arrived with troops. On the same evening General Miles informed me that he desired to land the troops on board the *St. Louis* and *Cherokee* at the Gulf of Jobos, thirty miles east of Ponce, and requested that I send two vessels to reconnoitre, capture lighters, and ascertain the depth of water, there being no charts of this place. I therefore directed the *Gloucester* and *Wasp* to leave at 5.30 A. M. August 1 to reconnoitre the Gulf of Jobos, for the *Gloucester* to remain there in possession guarding any lighters they might capture, and for the *Wasp* to return and report. Captain Goodrich of the *St. Louis* accompanied the expedition to ascertain the soundings. At the time of my leaving Ponce at 1 P. M. on the 1st, the *Wasp* had not returned. On the 1st the *Prairie* and *St. Paul* arrived.

Having received orders from you on the 31st to return to Guantánamo at once, I turned over as soon as possible all the business under my charge to Captain Chester, and left at 1 P. M. for Guantánamo.

General Miles's report says:

Instead of making a demonstration at Pt. Fajardo, it was finally decided to go direct to Guanica. We arrived off that point near daylight on July 25, and the harbor was entered without opposition. The guns of the *Gloucester*, Commander Wainwright commanding, fired several shots at some Spanish troops on shore. The landing of the marines, sailors, and our troops immediately commenced, and after a short skirmish the Spanish troops were driven from the place, and the flag of the United States was raised on the island.

In this, and in subsequent movements, I was very ably and cordially assisted by the navy, which rendered invaluable aid in disembarking troops and supplies from the transports, using their steam launches to tow the lighters loaded with men and animals from the transports to the shore. Ten lighters were captured at Guanica and seventy at Ponce.

In the subsequent military operations in the interior, I found Captain Whitney's knowledge of the country and the information gained by him in his perilous journey through Puerto Rico to be in every respect thoroughly accurate and of great value to me in the conduct of the campaign.

At daylight on the 26th of July, with six companies of the Sixth Massachusetts and one of the Sixth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, under command of Brigadier-General Garretson, an attack was made upon a strong force of Spaniards near Yauco [some 6 miles north of Guanica], and after a spirited and decisive engagement the enemy was defeated and driven back, giving us possession of the railroad and the highway to the city of Ponce, and leaving them open for the march of General Henry's command to that place.

On the 27th of July Major-General Wilson arrived in the harbor of Guanica with General Ernst's brigade.[1] The same day Commander Davis, of the *Dixie*, entered the port of Ponce and found that it was neither fortified nor mined. The next morning the fleet and transports, with General Wilson's command, moved into the harbor of Port Ponce. The troops disembarked and marched to the city of Ponce, a distance of two miles, and we took formal possession of the city and adjacent country, the Spanish troops withdrawing on the military road to San Juan, and our troops being pushed well forward in that direction. In the meantime General Henry's command had been directed to proceed to Ponce, where he arrived shortly afterward, joining General Wilson's command.

General Miles's report enters scarcely enough into details. Captain Davis, of the *Dixie*, had already taken possession of Ponce before the arrival of the troops. He had, with the *Annapolis* and *Wasp* in company, anchored at Ponce at 5.25 P. M. of the 27th, and, finding no resistance, had sent Lieutenant Merriam to demand the surrender, detailing at the same time Lieutenant Haines of the marines, with nine of his men, to go aboard the *Wasp*, Lieutenant Ward, her commander, being directed to anchor in a position to command the principal street of La Playa (the beach), a suburb of Ponce, the town itself being two miles inland. Lieutenant Merriam had demanded of the captain of the port at La Playa the surrender of the place; the latter had replied "that as far as he was concerned we held the port and it was ours." Lieutenant Merriam endeavored to communicate with the Spanish colonel commanding some 300 men at Ponce, but failed; and returned to the *Dixie*. Immediately after Merriam's return at 6 P. M. the British and German consuls, with several gentlemen representing the commercial interests of the place, called aboard the *Dixie* and announced to Captain Davis their authority from the military commander to negotiate its surrender. Davis declining to accede to their proposals to allow them to receive instructions from San Juan, they went ashore and returned at 12.30 A. M., and a surrender was arranged, subject to the approval of the senior officer which allowed the garrison to withdraw, the municipal government to

[1] These transports had first gone to Fajardo, whence they were directed to Guanica.

remain in force, and the harbor master, the only remaining Spanish official still left at La Playa, not to be arrested as a prisoner of war. At 5.30 A. M. of the 28th the marines were landed, the flag hoisted over the custom house, and posts established which guarded the place until the arrival at 6.40 A. M. of the *Massachusetts* and of General Miles with General Wilson's command.

The report of Lieutenant Haines, however, gives the most complete and graphic account of what took place; he says:

U. S. S. Dixie,
PONCE, PUERTO RICO, *July* 28, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report concerning my movements in the landing and taking possession of the town of Ponce, Puerto Rico, by the naval force under my command:

About 5 P. M. on the 27th instant you directed me to be ready with a guard to go ashore, hoist the United States flag, and take possession of the town.

About 6 P. M. I shoved off from this ship with a guard of one first sergeant and eight privates (also Passed Assistant Surgeon Heiskell and Lieutenant (junior grade) Murdock, who had volunteered to go), with orders to report to Lieutenant Ward, U. S. N., commanding U. S. S. *Wasp*. I reported to Lieutenant Ward, and was directed by him to land and hoist the flag on the captain of the port's office; that in case of attack to fire a rocket and make my way to the landing, where he would have a boat to meet me. Upon landing I marched my men to the captain of the port's office, where I was met by Lieut. G. A. Merriam, U. S. N., executive officer of this vessel, who informed me that he was ashore under a flag of truce arranging terms of surrender, and directed me to take my men back to the boat, and later directed me to return to the *Wasp* to await further orders. About midnight I received orders from you to be ready to follow Lieutenant Merriam into the town at 5.30 A. M., and to be prepared for some resistance.

At 5.45 A. M. Lieutenant Merriam passed the *Wasp*. I followed, and at about 6 A. M. the United States flag was hoisted on the captain of the port's office by Naval Cadet G. C. Lodge, U. S. N., of this vessel.

After the flag was hoisted Lieutenant Merriam directed me to post my men as I thought best, and upon the landing of an army officer to turn the town over to him and withdraw my posts.

I posted two men with an automatic Colt gun (6 mm.) on the southwest corner of the roof of the custom-house, two men at the cable house on the water front, the remainder being held in reserve at the captain of the port's building.

About 7.30 A. M. the first boat came ashore from the United States army transports (which had just arrived), with General Wilson in it.

I met him at the landing and informed him of my orders. He asked me where would be the best place to establish headquarters. I told him that in my judgment the custom-house was, but that I had hoisted the colors on the captain of the port's building. He then requested me to show him the way to the custom-house, and at his request I placed one of my men on post at the door of his office to keep all unauthorized persons out. About fifteen minutes later General Miles landed with the colors, and I met and conducted him to the custom-house.

About 8.15 A. M. my last post was relieved by the army; the last regular post, that at the cable house, being relieved in the presence of Major Allen, chief signal officer with the army.

Shortly after the flag was hoisted, Surgeon Heiskel, Lieutenant Murdock, and Naval Cadet Lodge asked permission to reconnoitre, which request was granted. About 8.15 A. M. they returned and reported that they had been to Ponce and a mile or so beyond (inland), and that everything seemed to be tranquil, the natives almost overpowering them with their demonstrations of welcome.

After my men were relieved by the army I went with the above-mentioned officers to Ponce. Shortly after my arrival there I was informed that a number of political prisoners were confined in the city hall. I proceeded there and telephoned to headquarters (the custom-house), informing them of the fact, and asking if I might release them. Permission was granted. After being assured by the mayor of Ponce that these men were not guilty of any crime (other than political offences against the Spanish government), those that could be reached were assembled in the assembly room, and through the mayor I informed them that they were free. At this time, about 10 A. M., I directed Naval Cadet Lodge to hoist the United States flag over the city hall, which was done in the presence of the mayor, who formally turned the town over to Mr. Lodge.

The remainder of the political prisoners were confined in a room the only egress from which was through a court in which were confined a number of criminals. As I had no force with me, I sent a note to, and later went myself to Major Flagler, U. S. A., who had just arrived with a company of infantry at the castle (or main barracks of the city), requesting that he send a force to hold the city hall and to allow the political prisoners still confined to be released. Major Flagler, with four men, accompanied me back to the city hall, and in the presence of the mayor the remaining political prisoners were released.

I requested the mayor to make duplicate lists of the prisoners released, one to be furnished the army, one to be kept by himself.

Altogether I think that seventeen political prisoners were released.

Very respectfully,

H. C. HAINES, *First Lieutenant U. S. M. C.*

There were found at Ponce ninety-one vessels, two of which were under neutral flags. Of the remaining eighty-nine, ranging from a good-sized barkentine down to coasting schooners and fishing-craft, sixty-seven were sugar lighters of large carrying capacity, and of great value for the landing purposes of the army, to which they were promptly applied.

The work of occupation of the south coast was continued by the *St. Louis*, *Gloucester*, and *Wasp*, which left Ponce August 1, under orders of Captain Higginson, to examine the ports to the eastward for a suitable place to land the army division under General Brooke. The port of Arroyo was examined and the town peacefully occupied with the exception that a few shells were fired into the country beyond. The flag was hoisted at 11.28 the same day, and a guard of seamen from the *Gloucester* under Lieutenant Wood left in charge of the town, pending the arrival of the army transports.

During these operations, numbers of transports, under the orders which had been given, had arrived at Fajardo, the first being the *Opdam*, *La Grande Duchesse*, and *Mobile*, carrying General Wilson's command, early in the morning of July 26. They were met here by the cruiser *Columbia*, Captain Sands, who transmitted the order of General Miles to join him at Guanica, which place they reached the same day, too late, however, to enter. Reporting in the harbor next morning, July 27, Wilson was directed, in company with the battle-ship *Massachusetts*, to Ponce, which on arrival at 6.40 he found already occupied by the navy, and the provisional agreement established as mentioned between Commander Davis of the *Dixie* and the Spanish authorities, a part of which, General Wilson was informed, was that the Spanish forces, some 300 men, "were to withdraw from the port and town of Ponce without pursuit on our part for the following forty-eight hours." On General Wilson's reporting this to General Miles, the latter declined to be bound by any stipulations on the part of the navy in reference to the operations of the land forces.[1]

The general found at Ponce also his third transport, the *Mobile*. He reports:

[1] Wilson, *Report of War Department*, 1899, 1 (part 2), 227.

At 7 A. M. [July 28], I landed on the wharf, accompanied by my staff, established my headquarters in the custom-house, and at once began the disembarkation of my troops. Shortly after landing I designated Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick A. Hill, of my staff, to take charge of the custom-house and the collection of customs. The nine days following my arrival at Port Ponce (La Playa) had been consumed in the laborious task—made so by the lack of the most ordinary facilities for such work—of landing the troops, animals, and supplies from the transports. Had our ultimate success depended upon a prompt advance against the enemy, it would have been seriously endangered by the inadequate preparations to meet perfectly well-known conditions, such as shoal water, which prevented transports coming within half a mile of the beach, lack of wharf and landing facilities, and especially of steam launches for towing lighters backward and forward between the transports and the shore. The want of these launches had been foreseen before leaving Charleston, and requisitions had been duly made therefor upon the quartermaster-general, but they had not been supplied. It would have been almost impossible to surmount the difficulties which were encountered at Port Ponce had it not been for the assistance rendered by the navy, and particularly by Captain Higginson, of the U. S. S. *Massachusetts*. As it was, my command was delayed in its preparations to advance into the interior of the island at least a week longer than would otherwise have been necessary.

General Brooke, informed of the change of base before leaving Hampton Roads, arrived at Ponce in the *St. Louis* with Brigadier-General Hains's brigade, July 31, and was directed to Arroyo, sixty miles east of Guanica, and met the same difficulties, repeating General Wilson's remark that "had it not been for the presence of the navy the landing would have been impracticable, and but for the circumstance that a number of local lighters were available, which had the Spaniards been active, might have been destroyed, the assistance of the navy would have been of no avail in landing our artillery and horses, mules and wagons." [1]

There were two light engagements, one in the occupation of Guayama, in which an officer and four men of the Fourth Ohio were wounded, and in another reconnaissance, which developed the fact that the enemy were strongly entrenched on the road across the mountains to the north of Guayama, a few more were injured.

[1] Brooke, *ibid.*, 139.

The force under Brigadier-General Schwan arrived at Guanica July 31, and was directed upon Yauco, and thence to the points upon the west coast. The following proclamation was issued:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
PONCE, PUERTO RICO, *July* 28, 1898.

To the inhabitants of Puerto Rico:

In the prosecution of the war against the kingdom of Spain by the people of the United States in the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity, its military forces have come to occupy the island of Puerto Rico. They come bearing the banner of freedom inspired by a noble purpose to seek the enemies of our country and yours, and to destroy or capture all who are in armed resistance. They bring you the fostering arm of a nation of free people, whose greatest power is in its justice and humanity to all those living within its fold. Hence, the first effect of this occupation will be the immediate release from your former political relations, and it is hoped a cheerful acceptance of the government of the United States. The chief object of the American military forces will be to overthrow the armed authority of Spain and to give to the people of your beautiful island the largest measure of liberty consistent with this military occupation. We have not come to make war upon the people of a country that for centuries has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to bring you protection, not only to yourselves but to your property, to promote your prosperity, and bestow upon you the immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of our government. It is not our purpose to interfere with any existing laws and customs that are wholesome and beneficial to your people so long as they conform to the rules of military administration of order and justice. This is not a war of devastation, but one to give to all within the control of its military and naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization.

NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General, Commanding United States Army.

On July 29, a letter of instructions was sent to commanding officers, establishing martial law in general, but retaining municipal in so far as it affected the private right of property and persons, and the punishment of crime, except when necessary to suspend it to accomplish military objects. The ordinary tribunals were to be maintained, and such officials of justice as would accept the authority of the United States, to be continued. Should it be necessary, power was given to suspend or replace

officials. The native constabulary was to be preserved; all public funds and property belonging to the Spanish government to be seized; revenues to be collected and reported; churches and school-houses to be protected; private property to be respected; taxes and duties to be payable to the military occupant, and used for the expenses of the military government; all private property necessarily appropriated, to be paid for at fair value; all ports in actual possession to be open to trade, the duties to be levied at the existing island rates; murder, manslaughter, assault and battery with intent to kill, robbery, rape, assault and battery with intent to commit rape, and such other crimes, offences, or violations of the laws of war as might be referred to it for trial by the commanding general, were to come before military commissions or the provost court, the punishments to conform as far as possible to the laws of the United States or the custom of war, the sentences being subject to the approval of the commanding general.

The occupancy of the southern border of the island was now complete; it had in fact involved nothing beyond the act of landing and taking possession. Says Mr. R. H. Davis: "The people of Ponce were certainly the most friendly souls in the world. Nothing could surpass their enthusiasm or shake their loyalty. . . . The natives gave our men freely of everything; and the richer and better class of Puerto Ricans opened a Red Cross hospital at their own expense, and contributed money, medicines, cots and doctors for our sick soldiers." [1]

But the Spanish military strength was still untouched, and between it and the American forces stretched a range of mountains the whole length of the island, one hundred miles from east to west, rising in its highest point, the peak of El Yunque, to 3,609 feet. Elsewhere it ranges from 2,000 to 3,000 feet, with occasional gaps slightly lower than 2,000. From its crest the land slopes in broad undulations, deeply cut by streams, giving most of the interior a steep hilly surface, gradually becoming more nearly level until near the coast it spreads into broad level *playas*. The range forms the water divide, the streams flowing northward having much the longer courses and gentler slopes.

[1] Davis, *The Cuban and Porto Rican Campaigns*, 325–326.

The coast is not bordered by fringing reefs or islets, as is Cuba.[1]

Connecting San Juan and Ponce with a branch to Arroyo, and two small branches to towns north of Ponce, was a splendid road, which remains a monument to a public spirit and energy unusual in the Spanish race. Though Ponce was but forty-seven miles in a straight line south-west of San Juan, the road across the mountains was seventy miles in length, a fact which illustrates the difficult character of the region traversed. Other roads numerous enough in the coast region may be compared to the ill-kept roads of our own country districts, subsiding often into paths not traversable by vehicles. Detached lines of narrow-gauge, badly equipped railway, one hundred and fifty-nine miles in all, connected San Juan and Hatillo on the north coast; Ponce and Yauco on the south, and Mayaguez and Aguadilla on the west; all, and particularly that from San Juan to Hatillo, were on the coast.

The change of plan by the commanding general had thus landed the United States forces on the opposite side of the island from the only fortress, and thus necessarily the main objective, San Juan. On the only serviceable road for a movement in force were numerous positions of great military strength which, if entrenched and occupied, would, if well defended, have made an advance across the mountains one of utmost difficulty and great slaughter. The change of plan would probably have shown serious disadvantages had there not been an early coming of a cessation of hostilities.

The landing-place originally fixed was but forty miles east of San Juan; it was practically undefended, being occupied and held in the first week of August without difficulty by a small detachment from the monitor *Amphitrite*, Captain Barclay.[2] A road was available skirting the coast, and thus, always under the guns of accompanying ships, the numerous small rivers running north into the sea gave ample water supply, and there

[1] *Census of Porto Rico*, 1899, 11–12.

[2] See the interesting report of Lieutenant Atwater of occupancy of the fortified light-house. *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 652–657. A number of refugees were taken care of by the landing party; a show of attack was made by the Spaniards with no loss to the Americans.

were several small ports which might have served for landing supplies. On the other hand, the southern side had no value as a base for operations against San Juan. To reach the only real objective of the island would, if the war had continued, have meant fighting one's way against an enemy supported in the strongest manner by natural obstacles. The graphic accounts by General Wilson and General Schwan of the inception of the advance, which was halted by the news of peace negotiations, make evident the difficulties which were to be encountered, and which, if taken advantage of, as was to be expected, by an active and determined enemy, resolved upon resisting to the limit, might have afforded an even severer test of courage and endurance than did El Caney.

General Wilson was until August 7 engaged in organizing the civil administration of the district of Ponce, and in getting his command in shape for a forward movement.

He reports:

On Sunday, August 7, my command was composed as follows: First Brigade, First Division, First Army Corps, under command of Brigadier-General O. H. Ernst, consisting of Sixteenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Second Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, Third Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry. A battalion of light artillery, under command of Major J. M. Lancaster, Fourth Artillery, consisted as follows: Light Battery F, Third Artillery, Captain R. D. Potts; Light Battery B, Fourth Artillery, Captain H. R. Anderson; also Captain B. T. Clayton's Troop C, New York Cavalry, and Captain William H. Lamar's Volunteer Signal Company.

August 3 the regiments of the brigade exchanged Springfield rifles, calibre .45, with which they had previously been armed, for the Krag-Jörgensen, calibre .30.

As rapidly as the landing of supplies and transportation had made it possible the troops had been pushed forward along the main military road to San Juan, and at nightfall of the 7th instant the outposts occupied a line across the narrow valley about 7½ miles beyond the village of Juana Diaz, controlling the valley of the Descalabrado River. At 4 o'clock P. M. on that day I removed my headquarters to a point on the main road near the camp of the Sixteenth Pennsylvania. From the reports received from spies, deserters, and my reconnoitring parties, I became satisfied that the enemy had gathered a force of about 2,000 men—regulars and volunteers—at Aibonito, 35 miles from Ponce, a town on the military road near the summit of the main

divide, of great natural strength, and which was being daily strengthened by the construction of batteries and infantry entrenchments. The road leading down from that place toward my position follows a deep gorge, the lower part of which is drained by the Coamo and Cuyon Rivers, which flow through canyons of considerable depth. About 1½ miles south-west of Coamo the road forks, the main road leading to Ponce, via Juana Diaz, the other to Santa Isabel, via Los Baños.

Both of these roads are covered by the naturally strong position of Coamo, and which is the first of a series of such positions, by means of which an active, skilful, and courageous enemy could dispute the passage of the mountains at every step. My information was to the effect that the enemy held Coamo with a force of not less than 250 men. The Baños road was defended by a small block-house, 2 miles south of Coamo, from which fire could also be directed against the troops moving along the main road approaching from the west. This general position, if stubbornly defended, could not be taken by direct attack alone without considerable loss. I decided, therefore, to turn it. This movement was made against the enemy's right by means of exceedingly difficult mountain trails. A movement by his left would have been easier to effect, but involved the risk of detection in time to enable him to withdraw to his main position at Aibonito. On the evening of the 8th instant I directed General Ernst to send the Sixteenth Pennsylvania, Colonel Hulings, under the guidance of Lieutenant-Colonel John Biddle, of my staff, by the mountain trails, which the latter, assisted by Major Flagler, also of my staff, and by Lieutenant Pierce, of General Ernst's staff, had most skilfully reconnoitred. These trails lead north-easterly, in the general direction of Barranquitas. Colonel Hulings was directed to proceed, after bivouacking for the night, by cross trails over the divide into the valley of the Coamo River, so as to reach the main road from a half mile to a mile in the rear of the town of Coamo at 7 o'clock A. M. on the 9th instant. In order to make a simultaneous advance on both sides of the town, I directed General Ernst to move forward at 6 o'clock the next morning with the remaining two regiments of his brigade, assisted by the artillery and one troop of cavalry, so as to make a direct attack along the main road and the valley of the Coamo.

The general movement was executed substantially as directed. The Sixteenth Pennsylvania had an exceedingly difficult march to make, part of it in the darkness, and all of it over a broken mountain trail, intersected by numerous ravines with precipitous banks. I was therefore not surprised that after climbing this mountain trail for five miles the evening before, it was somewhat delayed in completing the remaining six miles on the morning of the 9th by a guide losing his way in the darkness, the regiment thus arriving at the designated point in the rear of the town an hour later than I had anticipated. Mean-

while, at 6 A. M. on the 9th instant, the main body of the brigade moved forward to the direct attack. Four guns of Captain Anderson's battery took position in an open field to the south of the road and about 2,000 yards west of the block-house on the Baños road. At about 7 A. M. the guns opened fire, first with shell and then with shrapnel, upon the block-house, from which an ineffective infantry fire was returned for a few moments. During this time the Third Wisconsin Infantry, Colonel Moore, moved to the right and front across the Coamo River, and then advanced north along the Baños road, with instructions to move upon the town by the left bank of the river. The main body of the Second Wisconsin Infantry, Colonel Born, advanced along the main road from the west toward the same objective, the gap in the centre of the infantry line being covered by the artillery in its first and second position until it was finally closed by the advance of the two regiments along converging roads.

From the opening of the artillery fire I witnessed, and so far as it was necessary directed, these movements from my position upon a hill some 300 or 400 yards to the right of Captain Anderson's battery. While the Third Wisconsin was getting into position, I directed Major Flagler to conduct Captain Clayton's troop, which was then awaiting orders in the main road to the left of the battery, to the extreme right, crossing the Coamo River in rear of Colonel Moore's position, and to get possession of the Santa Isabel road. This being done, I ordered him to proceed down the road to Los Baños, and drive from that place any of the enemy that he might encounter; then to return to protect the right flank of the line, and, at the proper moment, to reach the town by the main road, or, if found practicable and desirable, to turn the town on the east. About the time the cavalry reached the Baños road I ordered Captain Anderson's artillery to move to a bald ridge about 1,000 yards to his front and slightly to his right, from which place the town of Coamo was visible at a distance of about two miles.

At 8 o'clock sharp volleys in the rear of the town indicated that Colonel Hulings, with his regiment, the Sixteenth Pennsylvania, had completed the turning movement and engaged the enemy. The movement of the main body making the front attack was then hastened as rapidly as possible. One battalion of the Second Wisconsin, which had been formed upon the main road, for the purpose of more rapid movement, found its advance stopped by a destroyed bridge and impassable gorge, and therefore lost some time in seeking a practicable crossing. The block-house upon the Baños road had been set on fire by the artillery about fifteen minutes after the action began, and the Spaniards occupying it had, a few minutes thereafter, retired toward the town, thus removing all opposition to the advance of the Third Wisconsin northward along the Baños road.

The line of advance of the two regiments brought them together in the vicinity of the ford by which the Baños road crosses the Coamo

River, about 1½ miles south of the junction of these two roads. From this point the command making the direct attack moved rapidly upon the town, finding the entrenchments deserted by the enemy and encountering no opposition. These two regiments entered the town at about 9.40 A. M. It was preceded in this movement by Captain Clayton's troop, which, having found Los Baños abandoned by a small body of Spaniards previously garrisoning it, had returned and passed in advance of the infantry right. The entire brunt of the action had fallen upon the Sixteenth Pennsylvania.

At 4.30 P. M. of the day preceding, this regiment began its flanking movement over a trail running north and leaving the main road at a point about four miles south-west of Coamo. It marched to a point north-west of the town, and then, changing direction to the north-east, crossed into the valley of the Upper Coamo River. After a most arduous march, the regiment, at 7 o'clock on the morning of the 9th, reached the divide overlooking the Coamo River at a point some distance farther to the north than it was intended to be at that hour. Moving to the south by a very difficult path, the regiment crossed the divide and had halted for a moment, when it heard the first shots fired in the front attack upon the town. Rushing forward, the head of the column reached a plateau from which could be seen the main road leading from Coamo to Aibonito, but separated from it by the Cuyón River. Captain Burns's company, C, was thrown forward to seize the road; but it soon appeared that the Spaniards, covered by the trees and ditches along the road, occupied the position too strongly for it to be carried by an advance in this direction. As the companies of the first battalion came up in single file they were formed in open order along two benches, one slightly above, the other somewhat below, the level of the road, and both directly facing it. From this position the battalion opened fire, while the second battalion, which at first had been formed on a hill to the right rear, was moved to the left and took a position from which it enfiladed the road. This movement promptly terminated the action, which had lasted about one hour. The Spaniards on the road, by waving hats and handkerchiefs, indicated their intention to surrender. Major Windsor, with a small party, crossed over, caused them to lay down their arms, received them as prisoners, and marched them through the town to the camp occupied by the Sixteenth Pennsylvania the night before.

The casualties in this action on our side (all of which occurred in the Sixteenth Pennsylvania) were six men wounded.

Upon the Spanish side, two officers, one of them the Spanish commandant, and 4 privates were killed, and an estimated number of between 30 and 40 wounded. Only the more seriously wounded fell into our hands, the others being concealed in the houses of friends in the town and vicinity. Five Spanish officers and 162 men, with their arms, were taken prisoners.

It was evident that the Spanish garrison began its retreat at the opening of the direct attack. The Sixteenth Pennsylvania had cut off a part of their column, the remainder being well advanced on the main road to Aibonito.

A few moments after the close of the affair Captain Clayton's troop (C), accompanied by Major Flagler, of my staff, moved through the town and closely pursued the enemy to prevent them from destroying the bridges. There are numerous bridges and culverts on this road spanning deep gorges in the mountain sides, and their destruction would have very seriously impeded our further advance. In preventing this and in pushing our advance to the immediate vicinity of the enemy's position at El Peñon and Asomante, in front of Aibonito, the troop rendered most valuable service. The enemy had made incomplete preparations to blow up a number of the bridges, but the rapid advance of Captain Clayton's troop prevented their success except in one instance. The arch of a single-span bridge over a deep ravine was destroyed just before the arrival of the troops. This was at a point about four miles from Coamo, and the short delay thereby occasioned enabled me to overtake the troop, which I desired to use in making a personal reconnaissance of the enemy's position. At a point about 5½ miles from Coamo the advance of the troop was stopped by the fire of the batteries on El Peñon and Asomante Hill. I directed it to take position here as an outpost until it could be relieved by the infantry.

The enemy's position for the defence of Aibonito, as was evident from the inspection of it that I could then make, and confirmed by reconnaissances during the 10th and 11th, was one of unusual natural strength. The military road leading up from Coamo runs for about four miles in a direction a little east of north on the left bank of the cañon of the Coamo River; thence it runs north-east to Aibonito. Upon its left is the main divide of the mountain chain crossing the island from east to west. Aibonito is situated in a pocket in the hills on the northern slope. About two and a half miles north-west of the town and on the main divide is the Asomante Hill and El Peñon, constituting a position of great natural strength. Upon the summit of El Peñon and Asomante batteries had been erected, and on the slope below them infantry entrenchments, completely sweeping the highway with a plunging fire for several miles.

From the point where this position comes in sight to one moving up the steep grade of the military road, the latter, except for very short distances at a few points, was swept by the fire from the enemy's position. The two points from which artillery could be brought to bear on our side were respectively about twelve hundred and eight hundred feet below the Spanish batteries and completely exposed to the enemy's fire. Deep and precipitous ravines were encountered the moment one left the road, and the exposure of the latter evidently made a direct attack impracticable without very great loss.

On the evening of the 9th I moved my headquarters camp to a point on the river north of and immediately outside the town of Coamo. General Ernst's brigade encamped along the valley in advance, its outposts about five and a half miles to the front, with pickets well out on all approaches and both flanks.

Careful reconnaissances of all approaches having been made on the 10th and 11th, under direction of Colonel Biddle, I decided that it was practicable to again turn the enemy by his right, moving the main body of the brigade to Barranquitas, and thence to Aibonito via Honduras, or to Cayey via Comerio and Cidra, or to Las Cruces, on the main highway to San Juan, as circumstances might determine, and leaving one battalion to hold the line then occupied by our outposts in front of Aibonito. I therefore directed General Ernst to be prepared to move his troops on the Barranquitas trail at daylight on the morning of the 13th. Meanwhile, for the purpose of diverting the enemy's attention from this movement and still further developing his position, I ordered an artillery reconnaissance to be made at 1 o'clock P. M. on the 12th instant. Accordingly, Captain Potts's light battery F, Third United States Artillery, advanced from its camp at Coamo, and four guns came into position on the reverse side of a low ridge to the left of the road, at a range of 2,150 yards from the batteries on Asomante and about 1,200 feet below them. One piece, subsequently joined by an additional gun, was placed by Major Lancaster on the road some distance farther to the front.

The guns opened fire at 1.25 P. M. and at 2.15 the enemy's guns were silenced, and the infantry were apparently driven from their trenches. They returned, however, as soon as our fire slackened—the ammunition being nearly exhausted—and opened a well-aimed fire. Lieutenant Hains, Third Artillery, was seriously wounded by a rifle bullet which passed through his body from side to side below the arms. Captain F. T. Lee, Company F, Third Wisconsin, was slightly wounded in the right arm. Corporal Oscar Swanson, Company L, Third Wisconsin, was killed by a bursting shell. The same shell also wounded Private Fred Vought mortally; Corporal August Yank, left arm; Private George J. Bunce, chest, all of the Third Wisconsin. Private Delos Sizer, also of the Third Wisconsin, received a bullet wound in the left leg.

In this action the grave disadvantage of smoke powder was very apparent. Every gunshot from our side brought heavy and well-aimed volleys from the enemy, while the latter's infantry position was at all times a matter of uncertainty and conjecture.

Further advance toward San Juan on this line required the dislodgment of the enemy from this position. Before beginning the turning movement I decided to send a flag of truce to the enemy, demanding the surrender of the place. I was influenced in this by the belief that the rumors universally current in the public press as to the near com-

pletion of peace negotiations, and of which it was possible that the Spanish officers at San Juan were not informed, had some foundation. In the event of a refusal to surrender, and in the absence of official information from proper authority, I had no course but to continue my advance.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bliss, of my staff, who carried the flag, was informed that my demand would be telegraphed to the captain-general at San Juan, and that his reply might make it necessary to send an officer to confer with me. I accordingly sent an officer at 6 A. M. to the Spanish lines, who received the reply telegraphed by the captain-general. This was a curt refusal to surrender, though from its terms I suspect that General Macias was well informed as to the progress of peace negotiations. Pending the receipt of this reply, I suspended General Ernst's movement for a few hours. It was about to be resumed when I received from Major-General Miles the telegraphic orders of the president suspending all future operations against the enemy.

General Wilson praised in highest terms all concerned in the operations.

General Schwan's command consisted of the Eleventh Infantry, Colonel De Russy; light batteries C, Third, and D, Fifth Artillery, Captain Thorpe, and Troop A, Fifth Cavalry, Captain Macomb. The expedition was to proceed to Savana Grande, San German, Mayaguez, and thence to Lares and Arecibo. His orders were to drive out or capture all Spanish troops in western Puerto Rico and to accomplish this object as rapidly as possible, without, however, overtasking his command or omitting any necessary precautions against surprise or ambush.

The General says:

The approximate strength present for duty, exclusive of brigade headquarters, was: Eleventh Infantry, 26 officers and 1,100 men; artillery battalion, 7 officers and 200 men; cavalry troop, 2 officers and 78 men; ambulance corps, 1 officer and 33 men: Total commissioned, 36, total enlisted, 1,411, aggregate, 1,447. A party of well-mounted natives, numbering at various times from 6 to 11 men, accompanied the expedition as scouts. Under their chief, a Puerto Rican named Lugo Viña, who proved to be a man of character and force, they rendered and are still rendering valuable service.

My immediate objective was Mayaguez, a seaport of considerable importance, with a population of about 22,000. All necessary measures were taken soon after my arrival at Yauco to obtain reliable in-

formation respecting the strength of the Spanish garrison and the nature and location of the defensive works said to be there. It was ascertained that the Spanish force aggregated 1,362, all regulars except 252, and that it would resist our entrance of the town.

All the organizations, except Macomb's troop, being assembled on the 8th, the command started from Yauco on August 9, encamping in the evening, after a 12-mile march—which, owing to the heat and road difficulties, taxed the infantry to the utmost—on the Rio Grande near Savana Grande. Here Captain Macomb with his troop joined at a late hour.

In order that our men might have a full rest after their exhausting march of the day before, camp was not broken on August 10 until 1 o'clock A. M. At the east side of San German an hour's halt was made, the advance guard passing through the town and taking up a position to the west of it; coffee was cooked and the train closed up. Both on their own account and to make room in the already crowded ambulances, the sick were transferred at this point to a private hospital. Before quitting the town information came to me that the entire Mayaguez garrison had marched out on the San German road that morning and would contest our advance. This information, which proved to be correct, was at once communicated to the cavalry and the advance guard, with orders to proceed with the greatest care, and to reduce somewhat the distances ordinarily separating the several parts of the column.

In approaching Hormigueros (some seven miles south of Mayaguez), the cavalry was fired into by Spanish scouts. Though the men had already marched thirteen miles, it was determined to keep on, and an action ensued which resulted in the withdrawal of the Spanish, with an estimate by General Schwan of not less than fifty killed and wounded. The American loss was one enlisted man killed, and one officer and fifteen men wounded. The troops bivouacked on or near the position which had been occupied by the enemy.

March was resumed early next morning (August 11), proceeding with great caution, which, however, says General Schwan, was unnecessary, as "those of the enemy's troops that were held in reserve (some of them not far from the city) had fled precipitately as soon as they realized the extent of their defeat."

The scouts entered Mayaguez at 8.30 A. M., followed at 9.30 by the cavalry and brigade headquarters. "Many of the prominent citizens," says General Schwan, "greeted me at the office

of the mayor, who declared himself as subject to my orders. I afterward rode through the town (as I had done in Savana Grande and San German) at the head of my command, band playing and colors flying, the populace giving the troops a most enthusiastic reception. The command was placed in camp about one and a half miles from the city on one of the roads leading to Lares. The cavalry was directed to keep in contact with the retreating Spanish force." [1]

On the afternoon of the 11th word was brought that the rear guard of the Spanish was still within five miles of Mayaguez and proceeding slowly. The fatigue of the command, added to by heavy outpost duty and drenching rains, with almost impassable roads, combined with the unsettled state of the country, determined the general not to pursue with his entire force, but to despatch a reconnaissance in force under Lieutenant-Colonel Burke of the Eleventh Infantry to harass the enemy and retard his progress. Six companies of infantry and a platoon of cavalry and a section of artillery started at 10.30 A. M., August 12, arriving at the forks of the Las Marias and Maricas roads about sunset, bivouacing in the road. The latter part of the march, a stiff climb all the way, was in drenching rain. A start was made at 5.10 A. M. of the 13th over a most difficult road, the infantry pulling the guns "over roads that were almost perpendicular." [2]

Reaching Las Marias, a considerable body of the retreating Spaniards was reported on the south side of the river Prieto, which had suddenly risen, cutting off their retreat. Pressing forward and opening fire across a deep valley upon the retreating force, "the disheartened and half-famished Spanish soldiers" scattered among the hills. A number were drowned, and fifty-six prisoners, including the colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and a captain, taken. The complete demoralization of the Spaniards was shown "by the number and variety of articles of dress and equipments strewn along the route." [3]

The American troops, thoroughly worn out by the day's work,

[1] General Schwan's report. *Report of War Department*, 1898, 1 (part 2), 249–253.

[2] *Report of War Department*, 1898, 1 (part 2), 258.

[3] Lieutenant-Colonel Burke's report, *ibid.*, 260.

were ready, with the night's rest, to start again in pursuit the next morning, August 14, but were stopped by the news of the suspension of hostilities.

Two slight skirmishes, in each of which a few men were wounded—the one at Guayama, the other in a reconnaissance toward Cayey—were the only events of General Brooke's movement by way of Arroyo. His column was not in readiness to advance by reason of the non-arrival of cavalry, artillery, and wagons, until August 13. It was in movement northward, when hostilities were suspended. The troops were recalled and encamped about Guayama. Thenceforward the work of the army was a peaceful extension of occupation.

CHAPTER XIV

LAST OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC

THE whole energy of the fleet now at Guantánamo continued to be directed toward the preparation for their new cruise of the ships present detailed for transatlantic service. An engineer officer, Chief-Engineer Andrade, had been sent from Washington to report upon the absolutely necessary repairs to machinery. The *New York* and *Texas* required seven days of overhauling, the *Iowa* eight, the *Indiana*, with bulged furnaces, ten. The *Texas*, however, needed much more than repairs to engines. The firing of her 12-inch guns, which were but slightly higher than her upper or main deck, had so damaged this that any further use of them in action would, it was found, crush the deck in, and it became imperative to send her north for repairs. She thus left Guantánamo Bay on July 25 for New York.

The situation in Guantánamo town itself, among both the inhabitants and Spanish troops, was one of great distress for want of food. The admiral thus, on July 20, had forwarded to General Shafter a letter from Commander McCalla to himself, describing the situation and suggesting that steps be taken to carry out, as soon as possible, the terms of the surrender in order to supply food. He regarded the situation so pressing, however, that on July 22 he sent a launch from the *Marblehead* with a flag of truce to confer as to the possibility of sending some flour and bacon captured by the *Scorpion* in a lighter off Manzanillo.

The launch returned with a Spanish launch in company, having aboard General Pareja's chief of staff and the commander of the gun-boat *Sandoval*. These officers remained to luncheon on board the *New York* and arranged for the reception of the supplies; all those aboard the lighter being sent in a Spanish lighter towed by a Spanish launch, which came down next day from Caimanera.

A quantity of flour, some two hundred barrels from another prize, was later added for the use of the destitute inhabitants, Mr. Theodore Brooks, the prominent sugar planter of Eastern Cuba, and likewise British consul, taking charge of the distribution. Admiral Sampson requested that supplies for the Spanish troops be furnished by the army, in view of the great need of the population for such aid as he was able to offer from the fleet.

On July 25, Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, unaccompanied by any force, went to Guantánamo to receive the surrender. He was accompanied by an officer of the fleet to look after the *Sandoval* and to see that no injury was done her. The latter found that the gun-boat had been sunk in four fathoms of water but the day before, despite the warning to her commander that any action of the kind would place him outside the pale of ordinary prisoners of war. The sinking of the vessel reflects, however, less upon the officer than upon the military code of Spain, which deals so harshly with its officers, and practically forces upon them, in such a case, the violation of the recognized rules of war.

Commander Train, of the *Prairie*, on July 21, had reported from Gibara to Commodore Howell, in command on the north side, the visit aboard his ship on that date of Señor Jose Beola, who before the war had acted there as American vice-consul. He brought word of the issuance, by General Luque, in command of the Spanish troops of the district, of orders for withdrawal from Holguin and the neighboring towns. As the *Prairie* was too large to remain in the anchorage at Gibara, the *Nashville*, Commander Maynard, was sent. Maynard reported finding on his arrival the Spanish troops withdrawn and the region occupied by the Cuban forces. Some fifty-three Spanish sick had been left in the hospital, six with yellow-fever and twelve with small-pox, all, however, convalescent. Commander Maynard required the submission to him of a list of civil appointments for his approval, landed stores for the sick, and aided much in restoring the confidence of the people.

On July 26, orders came from Washington to relieve the *Newark* from duty off Puerto Rico, and prepare her for the transatlantic fleet. The preparations for the voyage were seriously

hindered by the delay in the reception of the great quantity of material landed at Key West in stripping the ships for action, and all of which was needed for distant service. Boats, boat gear, the heavy steam cranes for hoisting in launches, mess lockers, and the other multitudinous objects necessary for the comfort of the crew and the general efficiency of the ship, had been landed in great masses, and that these were finally separated and returned in fair order to the many ships concerned speaks much for the efficient control of the commandant of the port, Commodore Remey.

Although peace was now being discussed, and information had been officially given out that a message had been received from Spain by the president, looking to putting an end to the war and the presentation of terms of peace, nothing of this came officially to Admiral Sampson. So little was this indicated that on July 27 a telegram of the same date was received from Washington:

> You will prepare a letter to Commodore Howell, turning over to him the command of the naval force on the North Atlantic station during your absence, giving him an account of the stations and duties of the vessels of the fleet, with a copy of unexecuted orders. Have a fast vessel ready to send him with these papers and as (at) the moment you are ordered to proceed on new duty.

The next day, however, July 28, came from Colonel McClernand, General Shafter's adjutant-general, a copy of a telegram received by the colonel from the general manager, Mr. Mack, of the Associated Press at New York, saying: "Washington official bulletin, Spain directly to McKinley through French ambassador, sues for peace."

Orders came from Washington on the same day to put all vessels practicable on blockading duty and to advise if Sagua la Grande and Nuevitas, either or both, could be included, in order that a proclamation might be issued by the president. The difficulties of efficiently guarding the immense stretches of coast, aggravated by the diversion—and one may say the unnecessary diversion—of so many ships to Puerto Rico, was shown by the arrival of the *Montserrat* at Matanzas, of which Sampson was informed on July 29.

The situation at the town of Guantánamo, though not officially under his cognizance, was forced upon the attention of Sampson by strength of circumstances. He telegraphed, July 28:

There are about 5,000 Spanish soldiers in Guantánamo and Caimanera, 1,700 of them sick. They have not been congregated in one encampment, as suggested by us, between two rivers, on the north and west and Point Manati and west side of Joa. There are political prisoners still in jail in Guantánamo, kept there by orders of General Pareja for their safety from the violence of the Spanish volunteers, who already, it is said by Consul Brooks, attempted to take them from jail, being prevented only by a force of cavalry in the streets by Pareja's energy. These politicals are still under Spanish control and cannot with safety be removed until the city is occupied by our forces or Cuban authorities. Steps should be taken in interest of sanitation and humanity and a garrison be placed in Guantánamo, so that the prosperity of the district may begin with the reopening of the port. Two lines of torpedoes have been removed from the channel in front of fort and commercial vessels may now pass to Caimanera, but steps must be taken for organization. One hundred and sixty thousand rations arrived this morning from Santiago, but the master of the transport comes to me for orders, not knowing what to do with them. I hesitate to take any steps in these matters without request from the army, though most ready to assist if desired.

The necessities were such, however, that Sampson on the same day telegraphed Shafter of the arrival of the transport and its request for directions, adding: "Have sent it to Caimanera. Is this what was desired and can I do anything to aid your work in this vicinity?"

Sampson was still, on July 29, in ignorance of the movements of General Miles in Puerto Rico. He telegraphed Washington: "If the department has received information regarding the landing-place of General Miles I would be glad to know it, as the *Massachusetts* and *Dixie* [part of the Eastern squadron], which were ordered to return here three days ago, have not yet done so." A telegram sent next day to Ponce, directing their immediate return to Guantánamo, brought them there on August 3.

On July 31, the navy department was informed that the ships at Guantánamo were filled with provisions and nearly so with

coal; the telegram continued: "[the colliers] *Southery, Saturn, Hannibal* sent to Puerto Rico; *Southery* was to coal monitors Tortuga Island on July 26. *Mayflower* and *Badger* due here to-day."

The day before, Sampson had been informed that the *Harvard* would leave New York three days after the fleet should leave Guantánamo, with orders to proceed at utmost speed and to await its arrival at the rendezvous in latitude 33° 40′ N. and longitude 40° W. Information had been coming from time to time during the last week of July of military and naval events in Spain; that the *Pelayo* had sustained damage to machinery during her trip to Suez and back; that great anxiety reigned in Spanish ports, notwithstanding the announcement there of the postponement of the sailing of the American fleet, and that various points on the coast which were named were being armed.

As the navy department did not wish to leave room for complaint from Puerto Rico, it now directed the replacement of the *Massachusetts* and *Dixie* by what Sampson should consider suitable vessels; on receiving this order Sampson replied:

> Withdrawing the *Massachusetts*, *New Orleans*, and *Dixie*, the following vessels will remain at Puerto Rico: *Puritan, Amphitrite, Terror, Yale, Columbia, Cincinnati, Annapolis, Wasp, Gloucester, Leyden, Prairie*, and *Montgomery*.

It was a force to which exception, in point of strength, could scarcely be taken.

On August 1, Sampson telegraphed: "Shall be ready to leave with squadron Friday evening [August 5] and meet *Massachusetts, New Orleans, Dixie*, and *Yankee* at a rendezvous on our course. If *Badger* does not arrive here recommend she be omitted." Commodore Remey, at Key West, was informed that the expedition would sail on the 5th, unless contrary orders were received, and he was requested to send a fast ship with the fleet's mail to arrive in time for this.

The dispersion about Puerto Rico of the ships destined for the East was giving much difficulty. Telegrams, as mentioned, had been sent the *Massachusetts* on July 26 and 29, and orders by the *Prairie* on the 27th, to return to Guantánamo. The uncertainty

caused the sending of the ammunition for the *Massachusetts* on August 1, by the *Yankee*, which, fortunately, meeting the two ships at sea, returned with them to Guantánamo Bay on the 3d. The *Niagara*, collier, Commander Bicknell, which left the bay on August 2, with stores for the *Massachusetts*, was less fortunate, going to Ponce and having to return immediately, not arriving at Guantánamo until the 6th.

On Wednesday, August 3, arrived from Washington (dated August 2) the following telegrams:

Covering and Eastern squadron is to sail on the evening, August 5th, as proposed in your telegram of August 1st. You will command fleet and observe the directions in the letters and telegrams you have received from the department on the subject. The squadron of colliers shall sail from Hampton Roads in time to meet you at the rendezvous, 200 nautical miles S. 6 points west (W.S.W.) magnetic from Punta Delgada. Telegraph department promptly if unforeseen delay arise.

The department understands the fleet to consist of the *New York, Brooklyn, Iowa, Indiana, Oregon, Massachusetts, New Orleans, Newark,* and *Yankee, Yosemite, Dixie, Mayflower,* and *Badger.* But it is supposed *Newark* detailed to Puerto Rico and your telegram August 1st states *Badger* probably shall not join in time, so these two may be omitted if not ready when you start, and *Yosemite* and food ship *Glacier* will be sent with collier.

Sampson in reply informed the department of the arrival of the *Newark* at Guantánamo Bay, and of the expected coming of the *Badger*, adding: "Will sail Friday 5, 6 P. M. Will telegraph if anything prevents. Squadron speed will be nine knots."

By a navy department telegram of August 3, the *Newark* was detached from the Eastern squadron with the intention that she should be assigned as the flag-ship of Commodore Schley, who was to remain in Cuban waters. A sudden illness made it necessary for Captain Clark to give up the command of the *Oregon* and go north. Captain Barker was thus, on request of Commodore Watson, ordered as captain of the *Oregon* and chief of staff to the commodore. Captain Goodrich, of the *St. Louis*, arrived at Guantánamo August 6, replacing Barker in the *Newark.*

A delay now came in the movement to the East which caused

Sampson to doubt whether it was regarded an urgent matter. Recognizing that the fortress of San Juan represented the military strength of Puerto Rico, and that if the war was to continue the place must be captured before the conquest of the island could be regarded complete, he thus telegraphed, August 4:

If delay in sailing of the squadron not important, would suggest that it or part of it be first sent to San Juan, Puerto Rico, until the city has been captured. Probability of stormy resistance from land side at that place. Possibility that its fall may terminate the war. Probably require two weeks to reach the result by co-operation between navy and army. San Juan can be destroyed from the water and may yield without much resistance to a proper show of naval strength.[1]

Military operations in eastern Cuba had come to an end. The Spanish troops had withdrawn from Holguin and its vicinity; the American fleet was expecting to move elsewhere; the future use of the marine battalion, at Guantánamo became in consequence a question. General Shafter was thus informed on August 2 of the situation:

[1] (*Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, (I, 372, 379) has the following:

PONCE, *August* 9, 1898.

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington:*

I am informed the naval vessels at this place have been ordered round to San Juan. In order that there may be no conflict of authority, I request that no aggressive action be taken against that place, that no landings be made or communication be held with the Spanish officials or forces on this island by the navy. MILES.

(Personal and Confidential). PONCE *via* Bermuda, *Aug.* 10, 1898.

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington:*

I am fully convinced that Sampson has sent orders to the commander of this fleet, soon as the army leaves south coast, to take his fleet, go round to San Juan and demand the surrender of the capital or bombard the city, and not to waste ammunition on any of the batteries. First, to bombard a city containing innocent women and children would be a violation of the first order of the president. Second, it is an interference with the work given the army by the president. I ask that any such action be suspended. After we have raised the flag over all the principal cities and arrived at San Juan, any aid by the navy against land batteries, entrenchments, or fortifications would be advisable, but not against a city of noncombatants. The control of all military affairs on the land of this island can be safely left to the army. MILES.

Sampson, as seen, intended combined operations, using heavy ships; he could have had no thought of using these then in Puerto Rico against what was now a powerful fortress.

DEAR SIR:

As the principal ships on the southern blockade are to depart from these waters for a cruise to the Mediterranean, it is probably right and proper that I should inform you that they may leave Guantánamo on Friday next.

It has for some time been in contemplation to remove the small battalion of marines that have been encamped on the borders of the bay, to some other point, where they would now probably be of more service than at Guantánamo. As I am unaware of what your intentions are with regard to the army, and if it is compatible with your duties, I would be pleased to learn whether you intend to occupy the country westward of Santiago; or in which direction you are most likely to operate; because it is my wish to co-operate with you as far as I am able to do so, and this plan of co-operation would determine whether the marines should be moved to Manzanillo or some point to the westward; or whether they should go at once to a point on the northern coast of the island, where their services are now needed.

I have received your telegram of August 1st, and beg to inform you that in asking for an opportunity to sign the terms of the capitulation of the Province of Santiago, I was acting in conformity with a telegram from the secretary of war, transmitted to me by the honorable secretary of the navy.

The marine battalion broke camp on August 4 and next day embarked in the *Resolute* with the intention of proceeding to a key in the vicinity of Nuevitas; but on information to the navy department of the contemplated movement, came on August 5, from Washington, a telegram directing that they be sent at once to the Isle of Pines and landed at the earliest date advisable, the *Resolute* to return to Santiago for use in the transport north of troops. To an inquiry next day, asking if the health of the battalion warranted its being used on any further land service, Sampson replied:

Marine battalion is in excellent health. Sick list number two and one-half per cent. Fleet surgeon reports that they are in better condition for service in this climate than they were when they first arrived south in June. Contrast in the health between the battalion and the army is most marked. Health of the squadron at Guantánamo fairly good. Sick list numbers about three per cent. General tone of health of the ships' companies has fallen considerably since the first of July. This, however, is not due to the prevalence of any disease, but is probably due to the release from the strain and constant effort under which

they so long lived. And to this probably more than to any other cause is due their somewhat impaired physique. I do not think it necessary to send the battalion north. In case there is no immediate use for the *New York, Iowa, Indiana,* and *Oregon,* I would advise their going north, if but for a few days. The crews have borne privations in a manner beyond praise. Those of the first three ships have not been ashore for seven months, and these months in debilitating climate.[1]

The eastern cruise had now become very improbable; the *New Orleans* was ordered to return to the blockade of San Juan and the *Mayflower* to Cape San Juan, calling at St. Thomas, 60 miles distant, every second day in order to keep in communication. Question had arisen as to the necessity of abandoning part of the

[1] The following gives the sick report on August 5 for all the ships then in Guantánamo Bay (except the *Supply*) and of marine battalion:

	NUMBER OF PEOPLE ABOARD	NUMBER OF SICK
New York	658	21
Oregon	555	14
Brooklyn	560	27
Massachusetts	516	21
Newark	315	14
Iowa	583	8
Indiana	562	13
Dixie	325	2
Marblehead	269	6
Yankee	324	5
Detroit	250	3
Vesuvius	79	0
Resolute	122	11
Scorpion	111	4
Vixen	80	6
Wampatuck	32	0
Osceola	28	4
Marine Battalion	496	12
	5,885	171

It is doubtful if any other service has ever made a better showing as to health than did the navy during the 114 days of hostilities. The average strength of the navy and marine corps for this period (April 21 to August 12, inclusive) was 26.102. In this time there were but 56 deaths from disease, a rate of but 7 per 1,000 per annum; 18 were killed or died of wounds. The average sick lists were in fact lower than in the year preceding the war.

For a complete report of the health of the navy in 1898, see *Report of the Surgeon General, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,* 1898, 769 *et seq.;* also Appendix D, p. 481.

blockade on account of the arrival of what was generally the worst month of the hurricane season. To this Sampson was strongly opposed and so informed the navy department. He had already issued a circular letter of instructions on the subject, though the continuance of fine weather rendered the seeking of shelter unnecessary. On August 5 he had asked, in view of the delay of the Eastern expedition, if he should meanwhile distribute the ships on the blockade, but word came on August 6 that the fleet's sailing was still uncertain and that the ships, to be kept ready to start at twelve hours' notice, should not be distributed.

There was great activity at this period, with reference to the salvage of the *Maria Teresa* and *Colón*. The former, as is well known, was successfully floated, and but for a desertion by her civilian crew during a moderate gale at sea, on her way north, on November 1, 1908, would have been safely brought to port. As it was, she was to drift, deserted, upon Cat Island the first land fall of Columbus, where she remains to-day, a melancholy monument placed 406 years after the first momentous date in Spanish-American dominion.

The *Colón* was to remain stranded where she was, an evidence of the inefficiency of our means in America for such work. Cases of much greater difficulty have been successfully dealt with in Europe, and it is not soothing to our national pride that we should have so signally failed where others have made good.

The comings and goings of colliers, supply ships, and of the smaller craft destined for the blockade were frequent. The *Marblehead* was busy with raising the *Sandoval*, in which she was soon successful. There were frequent questionings of steamers now arriving, with safe-conduct papers from American consuls, for the transport from Santiago of Spanish troops. Among these came two whose movements had long been under observation, the British steamer *Burton* and the Norwegian *Marie*. Both had documents from the American consul at Pointe à Pitre, Guadeloupe, where they had long been lying with coal and provisions destined for the Spanish squadron. Safe conduct had been issued at the request of the war department, without reference to the navy department, and both thus escaped the capture which was their due.

On August 9 the *Newark*, now under Captain Goodrich, left with the *Resolute* (aboard which was the marine battalion) and the *Suwanee* for the Isle of Pines, followed next day by the *Alvarado* and *Osceola*. Captain Goodrich was met off Cape Cruz by the *Hist*, Lieutenant Young, and on receiving from the latter a report of the weak conditions of the place and that it would surrender under "reasonable pressure," determined upon the attack described in the next chapter.

The *New York* had gone, on July 11, to the *Maria Teresa*, where a strong force of men was needed to shift some of the weights of the ship and assist the people of the wrecking company, who were now living aboard, in an attempt to move her. Her anchor chains were roused up and placed amidships; two heavy lines were laid out astern and hove taut, the ship moving some feet. Further than this it was not desired to go at the time until all leaks should be stopped.

While on the point of leaving for the return to Guantánamo the *Scorpion* arrived with a telegram from Washington, dated July 10, stating the probability of General Blanco's leaving Havana that night in the *Montserrat*. Commodore Watson, the senior officer at Guantánamo, in Sampson's absence, had sent the *Dixie* and *Yankee* into the Bahama Channel in obedience to the order to use all diligence and despatch in the prevention of this action, and the *New York* went off the west end of Jamaica, obeying orders, in a fruitless search which could have had in no case any good result. The flag-ship was back again in Guantánamo Bay on the morning of August 13, finding there the telegram which had arrived the day before and which augured peace:

(Dated Washington, August 12th.) Suspend all hostilities; blockade of Cuba and Puerto Rico is raised. Howell ordered to assemble vessels at Key West. Proceed with the *New York*, *Brooklyn*, *Indiana*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, and *Massachusetts* to Tompkinsville. Schley to come north in *Brooklyn*. Place the monitors in a safe harbor in Puerto Rico. Watson to transfer his flag to *Newark* and remain at Guantánamo. Assemble all cruisers in safe harbor. Order marines north in *Resolute*.

Orders to suspend hostile operations were sent to all points and a telegram was sent to Washington:

The *New York, Brooklyn, Indiana, Iowa, Oregon,* and *Massachusetts* will sail to-morrow, Sunday morning, at 10 o'clock direct for New York. All the vessels on the south coast of Cuba have been ordered to assemble at Guantánamo. The monitors *Prairie, Wasp, Hannibal,* have been ordered to Guanica or other safe port. The other vessels at Puerto Rico have been ordered to Guantánamo, and directed to bring any sick there may be on the ships remaining at Puerto Rico; *Solace* will thus collect all sick here. Expect to arrive New York on Saturday.

On Saturday, August 20, the squadron entered New York harbor, anchoring at 8 o'clock off Staten Island, in the midst of a great demonstration which had been arranged, wholly unknown to any one of the squadron, but the arrangements for which were met by a punctuality on the part of the ships which no previous understanding could have bettered. It was a magnificent reception to the victorious fleet, not the least dramatic incident of which was the meeting in the entrance channel of the mail steamer bearing homeward the captain of the lost *Cristóbal Colón.*

CHAPTER XV

THE BLOCKADE AND MINOR OPERATIONS

The anxiety of the navy department, expressed in its frequent telegrams late in June and early in July, and which appear in the previous pages, regarding the efficiency of the blockade so necessary to make legal the detention or capture of vessels entering Cuban ports declared blockaded, was fully justified. The service, owing to the paucity of vessels in the early part of the war, was undeniably weak.[1] In recognition of the inability of the few ships of the navy to cover all the great stretches of Cuban coast, a line of full 2,000 miles, a blockade of Mariel, Havana, Matanzas, and Cardenas only had at first (April 23) been established by Admiral Sampson, under the discretionary orders given him by the government. Four days later the admiral informed the navy department that Cienfuegos was blockaded and a presidential proclamation followed. Admiral Dewey had established a blockade of Manila immediately after the battle of May 1, but no proclamation of this was made by the president. It was not until June 28 that President McKinley proclaimed a blockade of the south coast of Cuba from Cape Francis on the west to Cape Cruz in the east, and of San Juan, Puerto Rico, there being now a guard in these vicinities which made entry to the ports difficult without capture. The blockade of San Juan was, however, always weak in that there was scarcely ever more than one ship present, a fact that caused the blockade to be de-

[1] A telegram from Key West, received June 28, shows the cause, in part, of the shortness of vessels for the blockade; it was as follows: The *Windom* and *Leyden* can be got ready by June 30; the *Woodbury* about July 6th; the *Puritan* and the *Miantonomoh* cannot be finished before July 23; the *Terror* can be ready about July 15th probably; *Oneida* and yacht *Buccaneer* expected to be ready in two weeks; *Cushing* and *Foote* in fit condition; *Winslow* goes Mobile to-day for further repairs, completion indefinite.

clared ineffective in the case of the *Olinde Rodriguez* by the lower court, a decision which was set aside by the Supreme Court, which said that the question was not controlled by the number of ships but by practical effectiveness. The ability to establish the last-mentioned blockades was due to the setting free of the considerable number of ships held for the convoy of the army transport fleet from Tampa to Santiago.

The blockade of Santiago was never officially proclaimed, the only document in the subject being the telegram of May 21, 1898, to Commodore Schley to "blockade the enemy in port," nor was the blockade of the northern ports east of Cardenas, which was ordered by Admiral Sampson in a telegram of July 10 to Commodore Howell, directing him to watch Nipe and Nuevitas and "make other disposition of the force under (his) command that will blockade the north coast of Cuba as far as it is possible to do so," followed by the presidential proclamation usually looked upon as necessary to give notoriety to the fact. For the admiral's order to an officer of his fleet and not made public, could of course, not give the notoriety which only a governmental proclamation can give. The blockade in the former case only becomes legal by the warning given to each vessel upon its first endeavor to enter. Being warned, however, such vessel becomes subject to capture upon a later attempt.

Meanwhile, before it was possible through scarcity of ships to establish an effectual, and thus legal, blockade, Nuevitas, Caibarien, and Sagua la Grande on the north and the great and intricate series of coral reefs known as the Gulf of Batabanó, as well as that almost equally difficult between Port Casilda and Cape Cruz, each stretching one hundred and fifty miles east and west, with the deep waters in the neighborhood of Cienfuegos between, became points of supply for the Spanish forces. The result was the maintenance of a food supply from Jamaica and Mexico as well as from Europe, which, had it continued, would have made the reduction of Havana, for instance, impossible except by bombardment. The north-side ports mentioned had already, from the freedom of access to them, and their rail connection with Havana, become places of frequent entry.

On July 1 Commodore John A. Howell was assigned to the

command of what was termed the First North Atlantic squadron, which was that acting on the north side of Cuba, relieving in this duty Commodore John Crittenden Watson, who was assigned to the squadron now designed to go to the East. In his report to Admiral Sampson of July 17 he states that, in obedience to the latter's telegram of July 9, he had extended the blockade as far as the number of his vessels would admit. He had but seven from Matanzas to Port Tanamo, a distance of over four hundred miles; the *Topeka* and *Maple* in the vicinity of Nipe Bay; the *Prairie* off Gibara; the *Badger* off Nuevitas; the *Pompey*, *Uncas*, and *Hudson* off Cardenas and Matanzas. The *Prairie* and *Badger*, large converted cruisers, and the *Topeka* and *Hudson*, the latter a revenue cutter, were effective vessels, but the *Pompey* was but a collier armed with two 6-pounders, and the *Uncas* an armed tug. Commodore Howell estimated forty ships with twelve small craft for work inside the keys as necessary for a complete blockade of the whole north coast of Cuba, allowing for thirteen to be absent for coaling and for fresh water supply for the boilers.

Nor had the blockade of Cienfuegos, the one port declared blockaded on the south side, been other than desultory.

Every ship, as we have seen, had been withdrawn from Cienfuegos by a telegram from Washington of May 13, and thereafter for short periods, until the middle of June, there were, and unavoidably, times when the blockade of that port cannot be termed efficient. The main difficulty, as has been mentioned, rested of course in the supposed necessity of holding a strong force to safeguard the army expedition to Santiago.

The despatches from Consul Dent at Kingston, Jamaica, aroused the navy department to the increase of blockade running, and to a recognition of the necessity of greater endeavors to cut off supplies. Pressing telegrams were thus sent to Admiral Sampson on June 16 and 17, and later, as just shown, to which Sampson made answer in his telegram of June 19 that Cienfuegos and the vicinity of Cape Cruz (which included the entrance to Manzanillo) were already blockaded and that the vicinity of the Isle of Pines would be looked after as soon as the light vessels promised in a telegram of June 6 should arrive. "The president,"

he said, in expectancy of the almost immediate addition to his force of the many ships of the army convoy, "may declare immediately the blockade of the whole southern coast."

A glance at the employment of vessels will at once show the impossibility of earlier compliance with the wishes of the navy department, which, it should be said, did not press the admiral too heavily until ships were nearly at hand. There were but eighty-two armed vessels, from armed tug or torpedo-boat to battle-ship, at this moment in commission in the North Atlantic. Twelve of these were in the convoy of the army transports; twenty-two were attached to the northern blockade; fifteen were in northern ports or in the patrol squadron which was still held on the New England coast; several were en route south. There were, indeed, not more than sixteen vessels of every kind available on the south side of Cuba for any service. Six of these were armored ships and four were videttes watching Cervera. The remainder was a scant force with which to hold Guantánamo, keep communication with the nearest telegraph station, still 140 miles away, and to attempt to blockade 800 miles of coast. The advent of the force convoying the army was thus anxiously awaited even if for this last purpose alone. The *Yankee* was already (June 13) off Cienfuegos, where she had been in action with the Spanish torpedo cruiser *Galicia;* by June 20 the *Dixie* was at Cape Cruz. From now on there were rapid additions in the *Bancroft, Scorpion, Hist, Eagle, Wampatuck, Wilmington, Helena,* and *Detroit,* until the coast was well watched and blockade running on the south side made a thing of risk.

The operations of the blockade had from the beginning brought exhibitions of initiative and courage of finest quality. Two of these, on May 11, the day before the attack on San Juan, were the gallant, if unwise, action at Cardenas in which a valuable officer was slain and a torpedo-boat nearly lost; and the cutting of the Cienfuegos telegraph cables, than which last, war shows but few records of action of so cool and courageous a character.

Commander McCalla in the *Marblehead* and accompanied by the same vessels, the *Nashville* and *Eagle,* with which he had previously appeared off Cienfuegos, reached there again, after coal-

ing at Key West, on May 7. His chief duty was to blockade; his next, under the permission received by Admiral Sampson from the navy department on May 1, to cut the cables, the only ones by which Havana could communicate independently with Spain; that on the north side being under American control. Informing himself as to the situation of the cables through his insurgent friends, who communicated with him some miles west of the bay, Lieutenant Cameron McRae Winslow, the navigating officer[1] of the *Nashville* was chosen by Commander McCalla to take charge of the operation of cutting.

The cable house, a small square stone building, was on Colorado Point, a short distance east of the light-house; the neighboring land was low, ending at the sea with the vertical weather-worn coral so common along the Cuban coast, the brown and ragged character of which gives an uncanny appearance to the shore. Back of the edge was close chaparral; rifle pits were known to exist close by. Still further back there was a slight densely wooded ridge parallel to the shore, with low growth, the whole forming dense cover for the movement of men.

The steam cutter and sailing launch of the *Marblehead* and the two similar boats from the *Nashville* were detailed for the service. Lieutenant E. A. Anderson, of the *Marblehead*, was selected to take charge of the *Marblehead's* sailing launch, and Ensign T. P. Magruder, from the *Nashville*, to take charge of both steam launches. The cutting itself was to be done in the sailing launches, which are better fitted for the lifting of heavy weights and for the work of cutting. Only the men necessary to pull the twelve oars of the sailing launch, the coxswain, a blacksmith, and a carpenter's mate were to be in the launch, making, with the officer in charge, sixteen in each of these two boats. The crew of each steam cutter consisted of a coxswain, two seamen, a fireman, and a coal passer; each of these carrying in addition a sergeant of marines and six privates as sharpshooters. The *Marblehead's* steam cutter carried a 1-pounder Hotchkiss on the forecastle; the *Nashville's* a Colt machine-gun forward and one aft. All boats carried life preservers. The tools for cutting in each sailing launch were cold chisels, heavy hammers, a mall, a block of hard wood with an iron

[1] The officer next in rank to the first lieutenant of the ship.

face, an axe, wire-cutting pliers, and a hack-saw, also grapnels with stout rope for lifting the cables.

Lieutenant Winslow's familiarity with ocean cables enabled him to know what he was to meet; a very large and heavy armored cable, used as a shore section where it is exposed to much chafe from the movements of the sea in shallow water. This part of the cable was made up of many layers with a final outer protection of two layers of wire; one seven-thirty-seconds of an inch in diameter, the other five-sixteenths. "The whole," says Lieutenant Winslow, in his excellent account,[1] "was two inches in diameter and weighed six pounds to the linear foot. So far as cutting the cable was concerned, it was equivalent to cutting through a bar of iron about as thick as a man's wrist."

All preparations having been made on the night of May 10, the *Nashville* early next morning was ordered to take position off the light-house, the *Marblehead* taking post so as to look up the entrance. Both ships were so placed that the shore east of the light-house, trending N. N. E., was subject to a flanking fire. The *Eagle* had been sent some sixty-five miles west to the vicinity of Diego Perez Island to destroy the light vessel and the light-house which marked the south-east channel leading to Batabanó, frequented by blockade runners from Yucatan, and to cut the cable, if possible to find it, between Cienfuegos and Batabanó. Lieutenant Southerland carried out the first part of his orders, but was unsuccessful in the second. The revenue steamer *Windom*, which had just arrived with the collier *Saturn*, laid off seaward. The rifle-pits and the soldiers working about them as well as those at the signal station could be seen from the ships; a few cavalrymen were in sight.

At 6.45 the *Marblehead* and *Nashville* steamed into their positions and opened fire, destroying the cable house before the boats were near the beach. The launches had left the ships at 6.55 in tow of the steam cutters, Lieutenant Winslow going in the *Nashville's* sailing launch. Tow lines were dropped some distance out and all four boats in column advanced toward the cable house, the *Nashville's* sailing launch leading, the steam cutters keeping

[1] *The Century Magazine*, March, 1899.

a fire on the rifle-pits. No soldiers beyond a few about the shack-like barracks and the light-house were seen.

"Keeping a good lookout for rocks and reefs," says Winslow, "the boats pulled steadily on . . . the launches were only a few lengths apart, and every man in the boats was exposed and plainly



The Cable-Cutting at Cienfuegos.

visible. The ships were firing slowly. One well-directed volley from the enemy at this time would have killed or wounded so many in the launches that the object of the expedition would have been at once frustrated. Why the Spaniards did not then open fire is inexplicable to the Anglo-Saxon mind."

The boats were a little later within about a hundred feet of the shore line, with the eastern end of the rifle-pits about fifty feet

farther back. The white coral and sand bottom now became visible, at a depth of thirty or forty feet; it became evident on account of the quantity of rough coral that it was no use to grapple until the cable was sighted. The boats pulled in closer; the marines in the steam launches, but a couple of hundred yards from the rifle pits, holding down by their fire the enemy in the trenches. Two cables were sighted, and both sailing launches got to work together on the one trending eastward. The cable which "taut along the bottom seemed to weigh tons" was by mighty effort lifted into the launch, and after heavy work of from twenty minutes to half an hour was cut through. It was then, in order to prevent repair, underrun for about two hundred feet and again cut, the end being left in thirteen fathoms water. No attention had thus far been paid to the desultory fire from the trenches.

The cable cut was, from its direction, apparently one to Santiago. The boats thus returned to the western cable, which led to Batabanó, approaching the land to within sixty feet. "We were now," says Winslow, "directly in front of the rifle-pits and hardly a hundred feet from them. The ships, realizing the danger of our position, increased the fire until it became a furious cannonade, the shells passing so close over our heads that the crews instinctively ducked as they went by. . . . We realized that we had to take the chance of an accidental hit from our ships or receive the fire of the enemy at pistol range, and the men worked on in disregard of both." The cable was hooked, it was even harder work to lift than the other, as it was laid even more taut along the bottom, and the rough water knocked the heavy boats together, breaking and almost crushing in their planking. "The men were becoming very tired and I continually," says Winslow, "urged them to increase their efforts, working with them myself, and telling them that we should soon be under heavy fire unless we finished and got away. Whenever the ships slackened their fire the enemy would begin firing, probably from the light-house, and then as my attention was called by one of the men to the bullets dropping in the water about us, I would order the steam cutters to open fire, the ships immediately resuming the bombardment on seeing our boats engaging the enemy. Occasionally,

when the men could be spared for the work, a couple of them were directed to open fire from the launch with their rifles."

The second cable was cut as was the first, about one hundred and fifty feet being taken out, the *Marblehead's* launch making the inshore and the *Nashville's* launch the offshore cut. While doing this a third much smaller cable was discovered, which, it was later found, connected the cable house with Cienfuegos. Believing this could be quickly cut, it was, after many efforts in the rough water, finally grappled, but not before the *Nashville's* launch was within fifty feet of the shore and the *Marblehead's* not more than a boat's length farther out. They were within two hundred feet of the trenches and directly in front of the demolished cable house. The enemy, now re-enforced, suddenly opened a fierce fire, which being observed from the ships by the splash of bullets in the water, the ships again opened a heavy fire. "Still the enemy's fire increased. . . . After getting a rope under the cable and securing it," says Winslow, "I stood up and made a rapid survey of the situation. Anderson and his men were still working hard in their boat, a little seaward of the *Nashville's*. Just then I saw a marine in the *Marblehead's* steam cutter fall, shot through the head. Turning in the direction of Anderson's boat, I saw one of the men drop, struck by a Mauser bullet. As I faced the shore to look at the trenches, a seaman, Robert Volz, standing in the stern sheets of my boat, collapsed, then struggled to his feet, immediately after sank in the bottom of the boat, a gaping wound six inches long in his head, two bullet holes through his body, and a bullet in his shoulder, probably the result of machine-gun fire. Had the gun been depressed a little, hardly a man in the boat would have escaped being hit.[1]

A field piece and machine-guns were now in use by the Spaniards, and their fire, vigorously as it was returned by ships and boats, was now too hot to be supported long without the loss of all in the boats. As the small cable was evidently of little im-

[1] "This man lived and ten days later, while the *Nashville* was at Key West, he ran away from the hospital on shore [though he was very far from recovered], came off to the ship in one of our boats and reported." (Winslow's account.) This was mentioned to the present writer shortly after the occurrence. The man completed his recovery aboard.

portance, it was cast adrift and the crews ordered to the oars, "to pull the boats clear of the breakers." The men were perfectly cool and showed no sign whatever of fear or uneasiness. The men not engaged in getting out the oars continued their fire. "I myself," says Winslow, "had replaced my revolvers by a rifle." While so engaged Winslow was struck in the left hand by a Mauser bullet, which went through the knuckle of one finger, making a clean, small, round hole, and scoring two other fingers; notwithstanding he continued his firing. Magruder brought in the steam cutters, skilfully took the launches in tow, and stood toward the ships, passing necessarily close to the light-house. The *Marblehead's* launch got away first, but not before five more of her crew were wounded.

The boats meeting a rough sea and their progress slow, Lieutenant A. L. Dillingham, the executive officer of the *Nashville* (first lieutenant), who had relieved Commander Maynard in command on the latter's receiving a contusion from a spent bullet, stood close inshore with the *Nashville* and placed the ship between the launches and the fire from shore. He shortly after took the launches in tow and towed them out of range, the tow rope, however, parting twice before this was accomplished.

Lieutenant Winslow on reaching his ship got his wounded out of the boat and reported for duty on the bridge, where he remained with his wound undressed, until the close of the action. Lieutenant Dillingham hailed the *Windom* and directed her commander, Captain McGuire, to report to Commander McCalla, who was still firing. After hoisting her boats, the *Nashville* joined the *Marblehead* and *Windom*, the three ships directing their fire against the light-house, which was being used as a shelter by the Spanish, with the result that it was completely destroyed.

The *Nashville's* boats were back to their ship at 10.13, those of the *Marblehead* later. They had been absent over three hours, and most of this time under fire.

The ships ceased firing at 11.20, hoisted in the boats and stood off shore, thus bringing to an end one of the bravest of recorded deeds. The intention failed in that there were more cables in each direction than had been supposed, but this was as nothing against so brilliant a show of conduct and courage. The

whole was done with a coolness and intrepidity in comparison with which a much-vaunted cavalry charge, in which each was encouraged by the many and in which rapid movement and accompanying excitement left no time for measuring danger, was safety itself. To sit calmly within a few hundred feet of an entrenched enemy and saw an iron bar is another matter. Comparisons, as we well know, are odious, but if the brilliant hurrah of the cavalry charge deserves a poem, we cannot do less than do the best we can for this courageous band in cold but most appreciative prose. America has ever lacked the poet of heroism. There has been many a field for his effort, but none finer than this, though the dramatic sabre must be exchanged for the unpoetic cold chisel and hack-saw. The courage, however, which keeps cool and steady for three long hours, unrelieved by movement, is of far finer sort than that of the brilliant charge, and should have its meed of praise and the highest that can be given.[1]

It is remarkable that all the casualties in the launches excepting the wounding of Lieutenant Winslow and seaman Volz were in the *Marblehead's* boats, which were a trifle farther out than the *Nashville's*, due no doubt to the general tendency of the Spaniards, observed throughout the war, to fire high. That any escaped after an exposure to rifle fire for about three and a quarter hours, is very remarkable. It is equally remarkable that there

[1] The following is a full list of those in the boats, besides the officers mentioned:

Nashville's sailing launch: T. Hoban, coxswain; B. F. Baker, coxswain; E. Krause, coxswain; A. J. Durney, blacksmith; W. Meyer, carpenter's mate, 3d class; L. Nelson, sailmaker's mate; M. Gibbons, oiler; G. W. Bright, coalpasser; R. Volz, H. Van Elten, J. Eglit, R. Blume, H. H. Miller, seamen.

Nashville's steam cutter: A. Beyer, coxswain; W. Miller, C. H. Neubert, seamen; J. J. Johansen, D. D. Barrow, ordinary seamen; J. P. Riley, landsman; P. Gaughan, first sergeant; J. J. Franklin, F. Hill, P. Parker, O. W. Field, J. F. Scott, M. Kearney, marine privates.

Marblehead's sailing launch: J. H. Bennett, chief boatswain's mate; J. R. Wilke, boatswain's mate, 1st class; John J. Doran, boatswain's mate, 2d class; A. Sundquist, chief carpenter's mate; J. E. Carter, blacksmith; W. Oakley, gunner's mate, 2d class; J. Davis, gunner's mate, 3d class; H. Henrickson, H. L. Foss, A. Vadas, seamen; F. Williams, W. Severy, E. Suntzewich, apprentices, 1st class.

Marblehead's steam cutter: N. Erickson, coxswain; Freeman Gill, gunner's mate, 1st class; W. Hart, machinist, 1st class; J. Maxwell, fireman, 2d class;

were no casualties aboard ship beyond the contusion by a spent ball, suffered by Commander Maynard earlier in the action. Later, when Lieutenant Dillingham carried the ship close in and placed her between the beach and the boats, the ship was struck in many places. Having no bulwarks, the men were much exposed, but none were injured; "a few falls were cut; the boom boats have many bullet holes in them, and the indications of heavy small arm fire are to be seen all over the upper deck," said Lieutenant Dillingham in his report. It is scarcely to be wondered at that the men came to believe that the Spanish fire would do no damage.

On the same day, and almost opposite Cienfuegos on the north side of Cuba, seventy-five miles by land but over five hundred by sea, took place at Cardenas a warm action in which, owing to difficult conditions of navigation, the American force suffered a severe repulse.

Stationed off Cardenas, seventy-five nautical miles east of Havana, and thirty east of Matanzas, were the gun-boat *Machias*, Commander John F. Merry, and the revenue steamer *Hudson*, Lieutenant Frank H. Newcombe, of the revenue marine, armed with two 6-pounders, and now at this time in the service of the navy. The town, lying twelve miles from the entrance at the head of a large rectangular bay, can only be approached by shallow and intricate channels running through coral reefs. On May 11

F. Kramer, seaman; L. Chadwick, apprentice, 1st class; W. H. Russell, landsman; J. Meredith, H. W. Kuchmeister, P. Regan, W. T. West, E. Sullivan, D. Campbell, marine privates.

While the conduct of all was reported as "worthy of all praise," the following from the *Marblehead* were specially commended: J. J. Doran, J. H. Bennett, A. Sundquist, F. Gill, L. Chadwick. From the *Nashville*, E. Krause, B. F. Baker, T. Hoban and R. Blume.

The casualties, which were the first of the war (those of the torpedo-boat *Winslow* occurring in the afternoon of the same day), were as follows: Lieutenant Winslow, wounded in left hand; Patrick Regan, shot through head (died); Herman W. Kuchmeister, shot through jaw (died); Harry Henrickson, shot through liver; Robert Volz, shot in the head and three times in the body (recovered)[1]; Ernest Suntzewich, fracture, right leg; John J. Doran, gunshot wound, right buttock; John Davis, gunshot wound, right leg; William Severy, small gunshot wound, left leg.

[1] See *ante* 330.

the *Wilmington*, Commander Chapman Coleman Todd, had come to relieve the *Machias*, which needed to be recoaled. The torpedo-boat *Winslow*, Lieutenant John B. Bernadou, coming from the Matanzas blockade, had reached the vicinity almost at the same time (9 A. M.), hoping to coal from the *Machias*.



The *Winslow* had been off Cardenas on May 7, when she had shelled the Spanish signal station on Romero Key, near the entrance to the bay. During the firing the three small Spanish gun-boats in the harbor—the *Ligera*, *Alerta*, and *Antonio Lopez*[1]

[1] The *Ligera*, Lieutenant D. Antonio Perez, and the *Alerta*, Lieutenant D. Luis Pasquin, were small craft of but forty-three tons carrying one gun (1.65-inch) each. The name of the *Antonio Lopez* does not appear on the regular navy list, but is mentioned as attached to the Havana command. She seems to have been an armed tug.

—came out and joined in the firing until, one approaching sufficiently near for the 4-inch guns of the *Machias* to reach, the latter also took part with the result of the withdrawal of the Spanish vessels.

The two deeper of the three channels to the town were reported mined; the third, having a depth of but ten feet at low water, was thought not to be so. On the arrival of the *Wilmington* and *Winslow* on the 11th, Commander Merry now had present in the *Wilmington* a well-armed vessel drawing but ten feet. He conferred with Commander Todd, with the result that the *Machias* took position about a mile north-east of Diana Cay, the others proceeding into the bay, entering between Romero and Blanco Cays, where it was felt certain there were no mines. The depth shown by the chart was but one and three-quarters fathoms, which was increased at high water by a rise of one and one-half feet. The *Machias* opened fire on the Diana Cay signal station, sending in Ensign Willard to cut any wires leading to mines which could be discovered. None, however, were found. Mr. Willard hoisted the American flag on the station and brought off the Spanish flag and signal apparatus.

The *Winslow* had taken aboard a Cuban pilot, Santos, and with the *Hudson* had attempted to sweep the shallow channel for torpedoes, in doing which the *Hudson* grounded for a short time.

The remainder of the story is best told by Lieutenant Bernadou, who says in his report:

> The entrance was begun at 12.30, high tide, the *Hudson* on the starboard side and the *Winslow* on the port side of the *Wilmington* assisting in marking out shoal water. No vessels were in sight on entering Cardenas Bay save two square-rigged merchantmen with sails unbent, anchored directly off the town. As it was thought possible that gun-boats might attempt to escape, the *Hudson* was sent along the western side and the *Winslow* along the eastern side of the bay to intercept them in event of such movement; not finding them, the three vessels met off the town at a distance of about 3,500 yards. When in this position the *Winslow* was signalled to approach the *Wilmington* within hail and I was directed by Captain Todd to go in and investigate a small gun-boat then observed for the first time, painted gray with black smokestack, apparently not under steam and moored to a wharf, to the left of which arose a compact mass of buildings close to the water front. Torpedoes were set for surface runs, the fans upon the war-

noses were run up so as to provide for explosion at short range for use alongside of the gun-boat, and all preparations were made for immediate action.

At a distance of about 1,500 yards, at which time the *Winslow* was advancing at about twelve knots, which seems her maximum speed in quite shoal water, the first gun of the engagement was fired from the bow of the Spanish gun-boat, marked by a clear puff of white smoke. This shot, which passed over the *Winslow*, was at once replied to by that ship and was the signal for the commencement from the beach of a rapidly sustained fire, characterized primarily by a total absence of smoke. At the commencement of this firing I received a flesh wound in the left thigh. As the action advanced a cloud of haze collected on shore at the location of this battery, and when closest I detected one or two gun flashes from among the buildings, but at no time could I detect the exact position of the guns. My uncertainty as to the position of the enemy was attested to by the commanding officer of the *Hudson* and by officers commanding gun divisions on the *Wilmington* who inquired of me shortly after the action what I made out to be the enemy's exact position.

At this time the wind was blowing from the ships toward the shore. The first shot that pierced the *Winslow* rendered her steam and hand-steering gear inoperative and damaged them beyond repair. Efforts to work the hand-steering gear from aft were frustrated by the wrecking of that mechanism and the rupture of both wheel ropes; relieving tackles failed to operate the rudder. For a short time the vessel was held in her bows on position by use of her propellers. She then swung broadside to the enemy. A shot now pierced her engine-room rendering one engine inoperative. I directed my attention to maintaining fire from her 1-pounder guns, to keeping the vessel constantly in movement, so as to reduce the chances of her being hit, to endeavoring to withdraw from close range, and to keeping clear of the line of fire of the *Wilmington* and *Hudson*. The use of the remaining engine, however, had the effect of throwing her stern toward the enemy upon backing, while going ahead threw her bow in the same direction. Under the heavy fire of the *Wilmington* the fire of the enemy slackened. The Spanish gun-boat was silenced and put out of action early in the engagement.

The *Winslow* now being practically disabled, I signalled to the *Hudson* to tow us out of action. She very gallantly approached us, and we succeeded in getting a line to her. Previous to this, the alternate rapid backing and steaming ahead of the *Winslow* had had the effect of working her out from under the enemy's batteries, and in this way a distance of about three hundred yards was gained. Finding that we were working out in this manner, I directed Ensign Bagley to concentrate his attention upon the movement of the ship, watching the vessel so as to keep her out of the *Wilmington's* way, and to direct the movements

of the man at the reversing gear, mechanical communication from deck to engine-room being impracticable. This necessitated Mr. Bagley making repeated short trips from the deck to the foot of the engine-room ladder while directing the vessel's course, and at the moment of being on deck he stood abreast the starboard gun close to a group of men who had been stationed below, but who had been sent on deck from the disabled machinery. A shell hitting, I believe, a hose-reel, exploded instantly, killing Ensign Bagley and two others, and mortally wounding two. This accident, which occurred at the close of the action, was virtually its end; the enemy fired a few more shots, but was soon completely silenced by the heavy fire of the *Wilmington*. The conduct of Ensign Bagley and the men with him, as well as that of the crew who survived the fight, is beyond commendation. After seeing the dead and wounded removed from the *Winslow* and conveyed on board the *Wilmington*, I turned over the command of the ship to Gunner's Mate G. P. Brady, my own injury preventing me from performing active duty for the time being.

It had taken half an hour, says Lieutenant Newcomb in his report,[1] to get the tow-line from the *Hudson* secured to the *Winslow*, owing to the rapid drift of the two vessels, a work accomplished by Lieutenants Scott and Mead, of the *Hudson*. During this time the *Winslow* was the special target, though the *Hudson* was also struck by many small lead projectiles and a few from what were evidently light guns. It was not until 3.30 that all three vessels steamed out of their dangerous position.

The action was a gallant one on both sides, the commanding officers of the small Spanish craft, though they had the support of guns ashore, deserving much credit for the manner in which they faced their much larger enemies. The commander of the *Lopez* was killed, but the extent of the Spanish casualties otherwise is unknown. The whole of the American loss fell to the unfortunate *Winslow*. In Ensign Worth Bagley the navy lost a most promising officer. The others slain were John Varveres, oiler; J. Daneefe and J. V. Meek, firemen, and Josiah Tunell, cabin cook; the wounded, besides Lieutenant Bernadou, were quartermasters William Patterson and Daniel McKeown.[2]

[1] *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 203.

[2] The following men were especially commended: Gunner's mates, 1st class, G. P. Brady and F. C. Cooney; chief machinist, Hans Johnson; water tenders, O'Hearn and Madden; seaman, Cox. On the commanding officer's recom-

The strengthening of the blockade had also brought on other actions of notable character. The *Yankee*, which on June 12 had left the Santiago blockade, where she had been actively employed in bombardment, in assisting in the occupancy of Guantánamo and in keeping up telegraphic communication at St. Nicolas Mole, arrived off Cienfuegos June 13. At 1.15 P. M., lying to the southward and westward of the entrance, she discovered the torpedo cruiser *Galicia*, Lieutenant Don Aurelio Matos, lying near Colorado Point, and stood in and attacked. The torpedo cruiser, armed with six Nordenfelt 2.25-inch guns, spiritedly returned the fire, but as soon as the *Yankee*, putting her helm aport, brought her whole battery to bear, the Spanish steamer stood in with all speed for the harbor. The fire of the *Yankee*, in the almost calm, was much hindered by the smoke of her own guns as well as that of the guns of the enemy. When within four thousand yards of the battery on the eastern point, the latter opened fire. The *Yankee*, now too far to the east for her guns to bear on the torpedo cruiser, swung to the northward and westward, and under the fire of the shore batteries drove the *Galicia* and a smaller vessel, which had come to her support, into the harbor. Notwithstanding the large number of shell which dropped near the *Yankee*, there was but one casualty aboard, S. P. Kennedy, a landsman, being struck in the shoulder by a piece of shell which inflicted a serious wound, from which, however, he recovered. Commander Brownson reported that the last shots fired were directed at the Sabanilla battery and one landed directly in it. A large volume of smoke which appeared a little later was supposed to be the result of a heavy explosion in the battery.[1]

A week later (June 20) the *Yankee* sighted in the vicinity of Casilda harbor, thirty miles easterly from Cienfuegos, a vessel resembling the *Purísima Concepción*, which had been particularly active in blockade running. Standing in toward her within

mendation, Cooney was advanced to carpenter, and Johnson and Brady made gunners. These men were warranted by order of the navy department, of June 27, 1898, the advancement carrying with it, in such case, a reward of $100, and a medal of honor.

[1] Commander Brownson's report, *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 214.

half a mile of the shore he fired a shot across her bows to oblige her to show her colors; not doing so, he opened fire at four thousand yards, on which she stood to the eastward among shoals, where the *Yankee* could not follow, and escaped. The *Yankee* was opened upon by an armed hulk and a small gun-boat in Casilda harbor, but the range was too great for either the *Yankee's* guns or those of the Spaniards, and as the ship could not approach on account of the reefs, Commander Brownson desisted from replying, as doing so would have been a useless expenditure of ammunition. Efforts were made to buoy a channel in order to approach the harbor, but it was found to be impracticable. Commander Brownson, now that the *Dixie*, Commander Davis, was also present, regarded Cienfuegos as practically closed.[1]

On June 24 Commander Brownson was obliged to leave for Key West to coal, inspecting en route the vicinity of the Isle of Pines. Discovering, the next day, a number of small vessels anchored under Point Frances, the south-western extremity of the island, two armed boats were sent in under Lieutenant Cutler and Acting Ensign Dimock, who volunteered for the purpose, the *Yankee* standing in as close as the reefs would allow, to protect them if fired upon. No opposition, however, was made; five fishing vessels were brought out, and as Commander Brownson had been informed by the Cuban Colonel Zagueira, with whom he had communicated fifteen miles west of Cienfuegos, that this was the chief means of supply of food to Havana, and not being able to carry them into Key West, the vessels were burned.[2] While following the reefs between the Isle of Pines and the west end of Cuba, a number of such vessels, but beyond reach, were seen.

The *Dixie*, Commander C. H. Davis, had reached Santiago on June 19, and had proceeded to Cape Cruz the same day. On June 21 she drove the garrisons from two block-houses, the one at San Juan River, and the other between ten and fifteen miles south-east of Cienfuegos at Guayximico River, where there was a gun mounted, and a numerous garrison of infantry. On June

[1] *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 217, 218.

[2] These were the *Nemesia*, *Luz*, *Jacinto*, *Massuelita*, and *Amistad*.

22 the *Dixie* fired at long range upon a gun-boat in Casilda harbor, protected by a tongue of land. A larger vessel, armed with six guns, stood out and fired. Commander Davis, though he could not approach on account of the reef, within six thousand yards, fired effectively; the gun-boat at once took protection again under the point, showing, however, by careening so as to expose the whole flat of her deck that she had been roughly handled.[1]

On this same day, the torpedo-boat destroyer *Terror*, which had parted from Cervera's squadron off Martinique on May 12, was put *hors du combat* by the *St. Paul*, Captain Sigsbee, at San Juan, Puerto Rico.

The *St. Paul* had left Santiago, after trans-shipping a quantity of stores, on June 19, arriving off San Juan at 8 A. M., Wednesday, June 22. At 12.40 P. M. the emergency signal for manning the battery was sounded by the officer of the deck, Lieutenant J. A. Pattson, the cause being the appearance of the *Isabel II*, a bark-rigged protected cruiser of 1,500 tons, a sister ship to the *Don Juan de Austria*, and carrying four 4.7-inch besides a minor battery; she was slowly making her way out of the harbor. The *St. Paul* was lying dead in the water with her head to the easterly trade wind. The cruiser opened fire at long range, remaining under shelter of the batteries. Both ships exchanged an ineffective fire. At 1 P. M. the *Terror* appeared. She turned to the eastward, heading the same course as the *St. Paul* which was now moving slowly. At 1.20 the *Terror* opened fire with her light battery of 2½-inch guns (her 3-inch having been removed while at Martinique), and steamed rapidly for the *St. Paul*, with the evident intention of attempting to torpedo her. When she was at a distance of five thousand four hundred yards the *St. Paul* opened fire with her 5-inch, and with such accuracy that the *Terror* was struck by a shell which entered the starboard side amidships, about a foot above the water line, passed through the port side about a foot below water, wrecking, on its way, the intermediate cylinder of the starboard engine, the flying pieces of machinery instantly killing the chief engineer, and cutting off the legs and thus mortally wounding the assistant engineer. The vessel turned for the harbor, heavily listed to port, using her

[1] *Ibid*, 216.

uninjured port engine. She was run upon the Puntilla shoal, within the harbor, to save her from completely sinking. Her total loss was 2 officers and 3 men killed and 7 men wounded.[1]

The *Terror* was floated after two days' labor. Her repairs took a month to complete.

On June 25 the *St. Paul* was relieved by the *Yosemite*, Commander Emory, and left for New York to coal. Three days later the *Antonio Lopez*, one of the larger armed steamers of the Spanish Transatlantic line, was, as has been mentioned, run ashore at Point Salinas while endeavoring to escape the *Yosemite* and enter the port (p. 268).

The region in the vicinity of Manzanillo, a great and intricate labyrinth of coral shoals, became particularly one of great activity on the part of the small cruisers now at hand for blockading duty. The armed yacht *Hist*, Lieutenant Lucien Young, and the tug *Wompatuck*, Lieutenant C. W. Jungen, had left the admiral June 29 and arrived off Cape Cruz the next day, Lieutenant Young carrying orders which instructed him, besides endeavoring to stop the traffic west of Cape Cruz, to make a reconnaissance of Manzanillo. They found off Cape Cruz the armed yacht *Hornet*, Lieutenant J. M. Helm, and Young, with the two other vessels under his orders as senior officer present, proceeded on the duty given him, the *Hist* leading, with the *Wompatuck* second, in the column, all three in column at half distance (two hundred yards). Taking possession of a schooner named the *Nickerson*, loaded with provisions, and sending the tug *Osceola*, Lieutenant J. L. Purcell, which was also present, to watch the channel Cuatro Reales to prevent any vessel escaping, the column at 8.15 A. M. entered the channel leading to Manzanillo, fifteen miles north-east. The description hence is Lieutenant Young's:

> Upon turning the point that opened out Niguero Bay, I made out a Spanish gun-boat at anchor under the block-houses of the army on shore. There not being enough water for the *Wompatuck* to enter the bay, she was directed to remain in the channel to prevent the gun-

[1] *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 220–223.

boat's escape behind the key. The *Hornet* was directed to follow this vessel at close distance, and we headed in.

The gun-boat made an effort to hide behind the point that we afterward found to be alive with soldiers, our approach evidently having been signalled from the heliograph on the West Cay.

Vicinity of Manzanillo

With the aid of the pilot and the lead, we succeeded in getting well into the bay and uncovered the gun-boat. We immediately opened fire, which was returned by a machine-gun aft and a 3-pounder in the bow of the gun-boat at a distance of 1,500 yards. The *Hist* got aground close in, as did the *Hornet*, which at first interfered with the range of the *Hornet's* guns, but they soon got afloat.

The third gun from the 3-pounder of the *Hist* struck her stern and silenced the machine-gun aft. By this time a perfect fusillade of small arms opened on us from the wooded point at a distance of not more than 400 yards, but they were soon silenced by the Maxim 37-millimetre and a few well-directed shots from the 3- and 6-pounders.

The gunboat, finding she could not make her escape in that direction, steamed deliberately across the harbor, under cover of the shore and shoal water, keeping up a continuous fire from her 3-pounder. She was hit by both of our vessels repeatedly, and, in a crippled condition, got in behind one of the smaller keys, which, however, did not conceal her, and a shot from the 3-pounder of this vessel striking her amidships, she blew up.

The fire of the gun-boat was too high, but during the action both of our vessels were repeatedly struck by the small-arm fire from the ambuscade.

We had no casualties.

Having completed the destruction of this vessel, the column reformed, and, after passing through Balandras Channel, headed for Manzanillo.

The heliograph tower on the key was shelled in passing.

On the way up, a sloop with soldiers on board was discovered close inshore, and a few shells drove them on shore and to the bush.

Passing to the left of Giva Keys, we headed in and opened up the harbor of Manzanillo. Upon a nearer approach, we discovered that instead of four small gun-boats, as mentioned in your instructions, we found a crescent formation of nine vessels stretched across the harbor, close inshore. A large torpedo-boat, on the right in entering, and a good-sized gun-boat on the left, with three smaller gun-boats in the middle, all armed with machine-guns and 3- and 6-pounders. On the right the line was flanked by a big smooth-bore gun on Caimanera Point, and on the left by four large pontoons, armed with 6-inch smooth-bore guns that did effective work in the fight which followed.

To the rear the line was supported by a heavy battery of field artillery on the water front and several big guns in a fort on the hill, while the shore line for over two miles in length was lined with soldiers, who kept up a fusillade of small arms during the entire fight.

I rounded Caimanera Point and headed directly into the harbor, and when within one thousand yards of the large torpedo-boat I opened the fight with the bow 3-pounder, and putting the helm astarboard, and just turning over, brought the broadside guns into action, and, followed by the two other vessels, passed along the entire front.

We commenced action at 3.20 P. M. and came out at 5, thus being under a heavy fire from the enemy for one hour and forty minutes. Most of the enemy's shot passed over, while ours had a tendency to fall short. However, they had our range very accurate, and succeeded in striking this vessel eleven times, one of which passed clear through the

engine-room hatch and another exploded inside the hatch, both taking effect within a few inches of the main steam-pipe, which certainly would have been damaged had it not been well protected by bales of waste and a lot of cork fenders. Another shot ploughed up the deck of the bridge.

The *Hornet* was struck a number of times, one shot cutting the main steam pipe shortly after going into action, disabling her. Notwithstanding this accident she gallantly kept up an uninterrupted fire after and during the time she was being towed out by the *Wompatuck*.

In this crippled condition she succeeded in sinking one gun-boat and a sloop loaded with soldiers.

The *Wompatuck* was struck several times, once near the water line. . . .

As soon as I saw the steam escaping from the *Hornet* I signalled the *Wompatuck*, that was close to her, to take her in tow, and Lieutenant Jungen deserves great credit for the coolness and manner in which he handled his vessel under a galling fire as he came to the rescue.

The *Hist* backed down to render assistance, and was signalled "No further aid needed," whereupon she was headed in for the large pontoon that was doing serious work with the old 6-inch smooth-bore guns, and in a short while we landed a shell that set fire to the old pontoon and burned her.

With the exception of the above-mentioned damages sustained, we suffered no further, and the only casualties are three men scalded by escaping steam on the *Hornet*, while the enemy lost one gun-boat, a sloop loaded with soldiers, and a pontoon, with the large torpedo-boat disabled and several gun-boats seriously injured, and without doubt they sustained quite a loss of life. I made a careful reconnaissance of the harbor, and found the *Purisima Concepción*, a large steamer, tied up to one of the two very large side-wheel transports, the names of which are the *Gloria* and *Jose Garcia*. These three vessels were inside the line of boats and flew no flags. Inside of them, and close inshore, were a number of schooners and smaller craft.

Our approach to Manzanillo had undoubtedly been reported by telegraph from Niguero, and they were prepared to meet us, and as we slowly steamed off to the northward a gun concealed on one of the Manzanillo keys opened fire on us, but was soon silenced by a few well-directed shots. The enemy, though keeping up a continuous fire as we drew off, made no effort to follow us, and I leisurely proceeded to an anchorage for the night, the *Hornet* being in tow of the *Wompatuck*.

The *Hornet* was struck many times—once through the bulwarks, hatch combing, and steam-pipe, once in after deck house, once starboard quarter, twice through bridge screen, and several times on her light armor belt by richochet or expended shells.

The *Wompatuck* was struck but three times; one shell striking the pilot house railing and exploding, another going through the metallic life boat, and a third glancing off the starboard quarter.

The gallant action of these three small vessels, no one of which carried more than a 6-pounder, and against a greatly superior force of guns, deserves great credit. They were well within the range of musketry and of a number of smooth-bore guns of large calibre, which were perfectly efficient against such vessels, and should have done much damage.

On the afternoon of the following day, July 1, the *Scorpion*, Lieutenant-Commander A. Marix, and the tug *Osceola*, Lieutenant Purcell, having replaced Lieutenant Young's little flotilla, which had gone to Guantánamo for coal, entered Manzanillo harbor. They steered directly for the gun-boat nearest Caimanera Point and opened fire at 4.32 P. M., at a range of 2,000 yards. When about 1,400 yards from the shore fire was opened upon them by five vessels, five concealed batteries, and by musketry. The engagement lasted twenty-three minutes, when the two small craft withdrew with neither vessel nor crew injured. They remained off the port until July 5, capturing during this time a fishing schooner which was released, a sloop with provisions which was also released after destroying the latter which were bad, and a large steel lighter which was cast off by a tug towing it, which latter escaped. The lighter, filled with pork, flour and corn, was taken to Guantánamo, where, after appraisement, the lighter was turned over to the army and the provisions given later to the Cubans and foodless Spaniards.

By June 11 the *Hist*, *Hornet*, and *Wompatuck* were back in Manzanillo waters, and with the aid of an excellent pilot, cut the cable near Santa Cruz del Sur, thus destroying telegraphic communication between Havana and Manzanillo.

The little squadron, of the five vessels which have been mentioned, was now together. On July 11, Lieutenant-Commander Marix, the senior officer, wrote the chief of staff:

> I have consulted with the commanding officers of the *Hist*, *Hornet*, and *Wompatuck*, that little fleet having just arrived after cutting the cable, and they all strenuously advise not to attempt another hit at Manzanillo until we have at least one protected man-of-war here.

As they are better acquainted than I am with all the forces around these ports, I have concluded to forward to you their suggestions.

They say that in case the *Scorpion* should be knocked out by a chance shot in her steam-pipe, or any other vulnerable part, the whole thing would be brought to a standstill; whereas if we had at least one proper man-of-war, like the *Helena*, we could make the round of all the places and knock them all out; which seems to be a very desirable result.

I am therefore willing to give up the opportunity of being in command of the expedition, in order to insure success; expecting, of course, that I am to remain and be a part of it.

The other three also make special request to the same effect.

Until I hear from the admiral we will keep a vigilant blockade here, and I think I can assure you that nothing will get into Manzanillo.

Lieutenant Young [now leaving to coal] will explain to you the different forces, afloat and ashore, at each place.

I trust you will understand that I am willing and anxious to proceed without any additional force, if the admiral does not approve of sending a regular man-of-war, or even the *Manning;* but it seems to me to be right to forward this communication first.

The result was the presence on July 18, of the *Wilmington*, Commander C. C. Todd (the senior officer), and the *Helena*, Commander W. T. Swinburne, in addition to the *Scorpion*, *Hist*, *Hornet*, *Wamaptuck*, and *Osceola*. Says Commander Todd in his report to the admiral:

At 7 A. M. this morning the vessels on blockade duty in this vicinity, consisting of the *Wilmington*, *Helena*, *Scorpion*, *Hist*, *Hornet*, *Wompatuck*, and *Osceola*, approached the harbor of Manzanillo from the westward, having rendezvoused at Guayabal last evening.

At. 7.30 the *Wilmington* and *Helena* entered the northern channel toward the city; the *Scorpion* and *Osceola* the mid-channel between two cays not shown on the chart; the *Hist*, *Hornet*, and *Wompatuck* entered by the south entrance, the movements of the vessels being so timed as to come within effective range of the shipping about the same time. At 7.50 fire was opened on the shipping as the vessels came into position; and after a deliberate fire, lasting during two and a half hours, three transports, *La Gloria*, *José Garcia*, and *La Purisima Concepción* were burned and destroyed; the *Ponton*, which is the harbor guard and store-ship, probably for ammunition, was burned and blew up; three gun-boats were destroyed; one other driven ashore and sunk, and another driven ashore and believed to have been disabled . . . the ideas of the commander-in-chief were carried out as I understood them; that is, to destroy the enemy's shipping but not engage the batteries or forts. No casualties occurred on board any of the vessels.

Says Lieutenant-Commander Marix:

We were so close inshore that our sharpshooters endeavored to pick off the officers on horseback who were riding around issuing orders to the different batteries.

As soon as the shore batteries opened fire upon us we returned it, and continued firing until we had steamed out of range, having, in obedience to a signal from the senior officer, retired.

The warmth of the engagement may be measured by the fact that the *Hornet* alone fired 429 six-pounder shell and 259 one-pounder.[1] The net result was: gun-boats, *Maria* (Ponton or receiving ship), *Estrella*, and *Delgado Perrado*—burned and sunk; *Guantánamo* and *Guardian*—forced ashore and destroyed; transports, *Gloria* and *José Garcia*—burned and sunk; steamer, *Purísima Concepción*—burned and sunk at dock.

On August 10, Lieutenant Young made a report which graphically describes the condition of the neighborhood, and is thus given entire:

U. S. S. *Hist*,

Off Cape Cruz, Cuba, *August* 10, 1898.

Sir: I have the honor to report that I have, in this vessel under my command, made during the last four days, from the 6th to the 10th, inclusive, a thorough reconnoissance of the inland waters from Cuarto Reales Channel and Santa Cruz del Sur to this cape.

At Santa Cruz del Sur I steamed close in and made a circuit of the harbor within rifle shot of the forces on shore, and was therefore able to obtain a good view. I found the block-house to the eastward of the city, the one partially destroyed in the bombardment of July 20, had not only been rebuilt, but materially strengthened with a stone and sand redoubt, that between the city and this block-house a considerable sand fort had been thrown up, and upon its face I could make out two small guns. Both of these strongholds were heavily garrisoned by troops who could be distinctly seen on the ramparts, and from a not too reliable source I was informed that the town was garrisoned by about three hundred Spanish soldiers, the place being practically deserted by the usual inhabitants and noncombatants. The day before a schooner loaded with provisions from Manzanillo bound for Jucaro in tow of a small steamer, said to be German, stopped here and took on a lot of meat and then passed on to the westward. This small steamer that had her in tow has for some time been doing similar work, all the while flying the German flag.

[1] No return was made of ammunition expended by the *Wilmington*.

At Guayabal, supposed to be a Cuban port, I found a handful of sickly so-called insurgents, who reported much sickness and distress on shore. They could give me little or no information, and, with the exception of a young lieutenant, they all appeared to be in favor of any one who came along, a surmise that was borne out upon a close cross-questioning and later information. They have been in constant communication with Manzanillo and apparently on friendly terms with the enemy at that place, and, while pretending to give us information, I have no doubt they have reported all our movements and gave such information to the enemy they could obtain. These and all Cubans back of Santa Cruz, having access as they do with their native province, Puerto Principe, a cattle-raising district, have been the means of supplying beef at all times to the enemy at Manzanillo and the east. Only a few hours before my arrival a small boat sailed from this place to Manzanillo, and I tried to intercept it, but failed.

At Manzanillo I entered the harbor from the northern passage and approached close to the city, making a circuit out and around the upper cays, thence through the middle or western entrance. From this entrance I approached the front of the city and, with the helm aport, steered round close to the southern side well inside of the range of the batteries on shore, being careful to keep well clear of any range buoys. In this way I was enabled to obtain a most excellent view of the harbor and shipping from all sides. I found anchored in the harbor and alongside the dock two rather large and three small steamers, five schooners, and a number of small craft, two cargo barges, and several hulks, besides the wreckage of those vessels sunk in the bombardment of July 18. Steam was up in all the steamers and from two of the smaller ones steam was escaping, and from most reliable information two guns have been mounted upon each of the small steamers. As I passed close to the southern battery I could distinctly make out a number of Spanish soldiers manning the five guns mounted there, but they did not fire a shot, and prudence forbade my doing so. A few days before Colonel O'Ryan, after evacuating Niquero, succeeded with his forces in making Manzanillo, part of the way by land and the rest by water. When he left Niquero he had under his command nearly 400 armed guerillas, and at San Ramon picked up 125 Spanish soldiers, and again at Campechuela 175 more, which, together with a lot of camp followers, made a sum total of nearly 1,000 men, well armed and provisioned and with an abundance of ammunition. These forces, added to those already in Manzanillo, would make nearly 5,000 armed troops in the city, including the volunteers and civic guards that have recently disarmed but again taken into the ranks, but they are very short of ammunition. Manzanillo now is the only place on the coast of Cuba, from Santa Cruz east, that is occupied by Spanish troops, and I am creditably informed that they are anxious to surrender to us, provided a sufficient force is presented that will protect them from future Spanish

trial. Should such an event take place, I desire to call your attention to the conduct of this Colonel O'Ryan and his cut-throat guerillas, mainly recruited from the criminal class. My principal informant in regard to these men is Mr. Beattie, an English gentleman and owner of the Media Luna estate. He says that from the very beginning of the war up to the present time this man has been committing atrocities of all kinds, pillaging villages and robbing the inhabitants, killing in cold blood all pacificos, young and old, not even sparing children, and shooting all prisoners of war. Mr. Beattie supplemented his statement with quite a list of the unfortunate and inoffensive beings who have fallen victims to the cruelty of this man and his gang. I also learned from a reliable source that the Spanish forces in Manzanillo are desirous of forming a junction in the province of Puerto Principe with the forces from Holguin, and as they are cut off from the rear by the Cuban bushwhackers their only alternative is by water to Santa Cruz or Jucaro, and that they were making preparations for such a move. This information has confirmation in the fact that they have recently been shipping provisions west and for several days actively engaged in cutting all the corn and destroying the vegetable patches in and about Manzanillo, even planted by themselves. With the five steamers to tow and the two large barges and other craft in the harbor, they have sufficient means of transportation through the shallow channels behind the cays.

At Calcito, about six miles south of Manzanillo, I communicated with the Cuban forces of 150 encamped at that place, and near by in the neighborhood, scattered about, are 500 more troops on leave from Santiago, all well armed and with plenty of ammunition, but short of food. Here I learned that the Cuban General Rios about five days before had, with a few hundred troops, formed a junction with General Rabi with a few hundred more, making in all 500, at Cano, and the two had advanced to and taken possession of Blanquizal, only one and one-half miles to the eastward of Manzanillo and commanding the roads from that city to the interior.

General Rabi is the commander of the second Cuban army corps, which includes two divisions, the first under General Rios and the second under General Lova, and his eastern district extends from the River Bayamo to the coast, from Cape Cruz to the River Contramiestro, and they hold all the towns and villages in that district except Manzanillo. A few days ago they had a fight with the Spanish forces in the suburbs of that city, in which they killed 7 Spaniards and took 11 prisoners, with a loss of 1 officer and 2 men killed and 1 wounded. The prisoners taken in this engagement are treated with consideration.

All along the coast there is much suffering and distress from the want of food and proper nourishment, and a little back, stretching toward the interior, it is pitiful, and can only be relieved by either the

evacuation of Manzanillo by the Spanish forces or its capture and occupation by our forces.

At Calcito I gave the surgeon in charge a barrel of pork for the sick women and children, all of whom are suffering for the want of greasy food.

At Media Luna I placed in Mr. Beattie's hands, for proper distribution of a similar nature, a barrel of flour, a barrel of salt beef, and some bread, all that I could spare from my limited supplies, and I feel confident that even this little will be the means of alleviating some of the great suffering I have found to exist in these places.

I am, respectfully,

LUCIEN YOUNG,
Lieutenant, U. S. N., Commanding.

REAR-ADMIRAL W. T. SAMPSON, U. S. N., *Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Forces, North Atlantic Station.*

Manzanillo was now effectively closed. Any importance which it had as a base of supply by water of Western Cuba was destroyed. Its want of rail or common road communication left it isolated. It had been the centre of a large garrison, part of which, as seen, had made a desperate effort, worthy of highest praise in its accomplishment of difficulties overcome, in the endeavor to re-enforce the Santiago garrison.

The story of the trials of the population of the town and of the 4,000 soldiers remaining there is completed in the following report by Captain Goodrich who was now in command of the *Newark*, and with the *Resolute*, in company with the battalion of marines so long at Guantánamo aboard, had started to occupy the Isle of Pines.

On the afternoon of the 9th, the *Newark* left Guantánamo and was joined shortly after, off the entrance to that port, by the U. S. S. *Resolute*, carrying the battalion of marines under Colonel Huntington. We proceeded to Santiago de Cuba, where we communicated with the *St. Louis*, and then continued to the westward. On Wednesday afternoon, the 10th instant, we fell in with the *Hist* and *Suwanee* off Cape Cruz. Lieutenant-Commander Delehanty of the *Suwanee*, having preceded us to this point, communicated with the *Hist*, and learned from her commanding officer, Lieutenant Young, that the condition of affairs at Manzanillo was such as to warrant the belief that an attack by the force under my command would result in a speedy capitulation of the garrison and city. This he reported to me as being in entire accordance with a letter addressed to you by Commander Todd, of the

Wilmington, which he had been permitted to read on board your flagship. Lieutenant Young, who had on board a competent pilot, assured me that it was entirely practicable to approach to within about two miles of Manzanillo in a ship drawing as much water as does the *Newark*.

Inasmuch as the force detailed by you for the contemplated operations at the Isle of Pines was not all at hand, and as the *Wompatuck* could, in all probability, not leave Guantánamo until the 12th or possibly the 13th, it appeared to me well to occupy this time of waiting in an attempt at securing Manzanillo and its garrison.

We waited off Cape Cruz that night in order to be joined by the *Alvarado* and *Osceola*, and then, on the morning of the 11th, started for Cuatro Reales Channel, the following ships accompanying the *Newark: Resolute, Suwanee, Hist, Osceola*, and *Alvarado*. In order to minimize the chances of accident that would be incurred in navigating waters only imperfectly charted, I sent the *Hist*, with her pilot, ahead. On her starboard beam was the *Suwanee*. In rear of these two came the *Osceola*. In rear of the *Osceola* came the *Resolute*, and lastly the *Newark* with the *Alvarado* close aboard; all keeping the lead going constantly. By a preconcerted system of signals the presence of shoal water or other danger could be instantly communicated from the leading ships in ample time to stop the progress of the *Resolute* and *Newark*, heavy-draft vessels.

We experienced no difficulty whatever in getting through Cuatro Reales, the least water found by the *Newark* being 5½ fathoms. At dark that day we anchored inside of the Great Barrier Reef in 10 fathoms of water, about 40 miles distant from Manzanillo.

Yesterday morning, the 12th instant, my little flotilla got under way at half past 4, and proceeded to the vicinity of Manzanillo. The *Resolute, Suwanee, Hist*, and *Osceola* anchored well outside of the northern entrance. I hoisted a flag of truce on the *Newark* and proceeded to an anchorage about three miles distant from the town, whence I sent the *Alvarado*, also bearing a flag of truce, to present to the military commandant a demand for surrender, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose. This demand was placed in his hands by Lieutenant Blue at thirty-five minutes past noon. The reply was to the effect that the Spanish military code forbade a surrender, except as the sequence of a siege or other military operation.

The town being fortified, is exempt from the privileges and immunities attached to defenceless places. Nevertheless, as you will perceive from my demand, sufficient time was given to permit noncombatants to leave the city. At 3 o'clock I signalled to the outlying vessels to take the stations off the town which had been assigned, and at 3.35 hauled down the flag of truce on the *Newark* and proceeded toward Manzanillo until the shoalness of the water forbade her further approach. At 3.40 fire was opened from this ship on the batteries and was maintained with tolerable steadiness until 4.15 o'clock, with an accuracy

surprising in view of the short time during which she has been commissioned. The other vessels followed shortly after.

At 4.15 P. M., having seen supposed white flags hoisted on the Spanish gun-boat *Cuba Espanola* and the commandant's quarters, I made signal "Cease firing," and sent the *Alvarado* in under flag of truce. At the same time the *Suwanee, Hist,* and *Osceola,* all under the immediate orders of Lieutenant-Commander Delehanty, were approaching the town from the southward through the middle channel. When these vessels were within 1,000 to 1,500 yards of the batteries the Spanish authorities opened fire on them at 4.35, paying no attenion to the flag of truce on the *Alvarado,* which (as I have since been informed) they failed to perceive. The *Alvarado* hauled down her flag of truce and joined the other gun-boats in returning the fire. At 4.50 opened fire again from the *Newark.* The Cuban forces at this time appeared to the northward of the town and began discharging volleys, which were returned apparently by Spanish artillery. The *Newark* threw a number of 6-inch shells in this direction in order to assist the Cubans. The *Suwanee, Osceola, Hist,* and *Alvarado* soon returned to the neighborhood of the flag-ship, and we all anchored at about 5.30 P. M. for the night. From that time until daylight this morning one 6-inch shell was fired from the *Newark* at the batteries at irregular intervals, one shot being fired during each half hour. Daylight revealed a large number of white flags flying over the block-houses and batteries of Manzanillo and the approach of a boat from shore bearing a flag of truce. The captain of the port came off and delivered to me a cipher dispatch from the secretary of the navy, reading as follows: "Protocol of peace signed by the president; armistice proclaimed." My disappointment was, as may be imagined, very great, for I had every reason to believe that the garrison was entirely ready to surrender. I had hoped that the fleet under your command might have won one more laurel and gained one more important victory before the conclusion of peace.

A few projectiles fell close to this ship, but the enemy's attention was naturally directed chiefly against the gun-boats. I am happy to report no casualties or injuries beyond three shots from Mauser rifles through the *Suwanee's* ensign. What was possibly the last shot of the war was a 6-inch projectile fired from the *Newark* at 5.20 A. M. to-day. It gives me great pleasure to speak in the highest terms of the officers of this ship and of the remarkable gun practice she displayed.

Captain Goodrich closed his report with high praise of all the commanding officers present.[1]

[1] Captain Goodrich received in November, 1898, a personal letter from Lieutenant Young, then at Manzanillo, which enclosed some information from a Spaniard respecting the situation on August 12. This was as follows:

The vessels of the blockade had not been active only about Manzanillo. At midnight of July 4–5, when from seven to eight miles west of Havana, Lieutenant John Hood, commanding the *Hawk*, sighted a large steamer to the westward, evidently heading for Havana. Starting to overhaul her, the steamer turned west, the *Hawk* at intervals firing her bow 6-pounders, until 1.30 A. M. when the steamer apparently grounded. As there was a battery near, Hood cautiously approached to within a mile and a half and fired four shells. A white light was shown over the steamer's side which was taken as a sign of submission and Hood ceased firing. At 2.30 A. M. the only boat, a dingy from the *Iowa*, was sent in, in charge of Ensign F. H. Schofield with eight men. The men were armed with rifles, and a Colt automatic gun was carried in the bow of the boat. On approaching and hailing the ship, which was found to be aground, fire was opened on the boat from both ship and shore. Schofield headed for the *Hawk*, keeping up, however, an animated return fire, and using his automatic gun at times both against the ship and shore. He had no casualties.

When daylight came Hood saw that the ship was so hard ashore that it would be impossible to get her off, and that she must be destroyed. Having but 6-pounders, he steamed toward Havana to get the aid of heavier guns, and came back at 7 with the *Castine* in company, and both ships opened for an hour on the shore battery and the stranded ship. The latter was set on fire and destroyed, her steel hull remaining for many months with her stern deeply submerged and the bow high in air at an angle of some 40°, a melancholy witness of war's destruction. The ship proved to be the *Alfonso XII* of the Spanish Transatlantic line, of 5,000 tons. She had but the day before been chased by

Late in the afternoon of the 12th the Spanish commander appointed a board to determine what was best to do, and they recommended an immediate surrender after the fight in which we were fired on, and the general signed it. In order to carry it out they withdrew all their forces from the wharf and landing, so as to permit the landing of our forces, and that was the troop we saw marching through the street. As we did not come in then, they withdrew all their troops back of the hills for the night and signed the papers to present to you at 8 A. M. on the morning of the 13th, accepting all your demands of surrender and to permit our forces to occupy the city.

the *Eagle*, Lieutenant Southerland, off the Isle of Pines. With much greater speed than the small yacht, she had escaped, heading for Cape Antonio, and had thence attempted to enter Havana when she met her fate.

A few days later, July 12, the *Eagle* was more successful, when at 11.05 A. M. she sighted a large steamer between the Isle of Pines and Cape Frances, standing to the northward and westward. After an hour's chase the stranger grounded on a spit two miles E. ½ S. from Piedras Point, the south-east extremity of the Isle of Pines. She had evidently been bound to a small fort near the point and had grounded accidentally. A side-wheel steamer of the American river type, presumably stationed there to transfer the cargo to Batabanó, came out and ran alongside. Sounding carefully, as there were no charts of the vicinity excepting the general chart of the whole island of Cuba, the *Eagle* ran in to 2,000 yards distance from the steamer and, anchoring, opened fire on both steamers. She fired 104 6-pounder shells without setting the steamer on fire, and though the latter had two 4.7-inch guns mounted, no fire had been returned. The river boat, after taking what proved to be the whole of the people aboard, being protected by the large hull of the ship, got away without injury. On the *Eagle's* going in to 600 yards and sending a boat aboard, the ship was found deserted. Fires were under all the boilers and steam blowing off at 170 pounds.

Lieutenant Southerland reported the ship, which proved to be the *Santo Domingo* of the Transatlantic line, "literally packed with food supplies and clothing—corn, potatoes, bacon, ham, onions, bales of blankets, having been brought to view by the prize crew. Even the spare state-rooms were packed full." She also carried in her hold two 12-inch guns.

As it was impossible to get her off, the ship was fired and was soon wholly destroyed.

In neither of these two cases, though much better armed than the pursuing ships, was any defence attempted.

In anticipation of the possible use by the army of Nipe Bay, on the north-east coast, the *Annapolis*, Commander Hunker, with the *Wasp*, Lieutenant Aaron Ward, and the armed tug *Leyden*, Lieutenant W. S. Crosley, had been sent by Admiral

Sampson to take possession. The *Topeka*, Lieutenant-Commander W. S. Cowles, had been on blockade duty off the port. The insurgents had reported to him that the neighborhood of the bay was held by 800 Spanish troops; that there was a battery on the bluff at the entrance; that there were three naval vessels inside—one third-class cruiser and two gun-boats—and that the mouth of the harbor was closed by thirty mines, electrical and contact.[1] On his arrival on July 21 Commander Hunker ordered the *Wasp* and *Leyden* in to make an examination of the bay and return, the other two to act as covering vessels.

The *Wasp* was in advance, and next, the *Leyden*. A Spanish vessel, which turned out to be the *Jorge Juan*, of 935 tons and with three 4.7-inch, two 3.15-inch guns, and two revolving cannon,[2] was observed within about four and one-half miles from the entrance. Signalling "the enemy is seen ahead," which was repeated by the *Topeka*, the *Wasp*, *Leyden*, *Annapolis*, and *Topeka* in the order named stood in; fire was opened by the *Jorge Juan* on the two advanced vessels at 12.44 which was returned, beginning with a range of 4,500 yards which was gradually reduced to 1,600. The *Annapolis* and *Topeka*, when within range, opened upon the enemy, which was returning the fire at intervals of about three minutes with his bow gun. His flag-staff was shot away at 1.12, and no other colors were hoisted. At 1.21 she was observed to be sinking and at 1.42 went down in six fathoms of water, the crew escaping in their boats to the shore which was near by. A thorough search of the bay by the *Wasp* and *Leyden* revealed no other vessels.

Although there was a sharp rifle fire from the bluff at the right of the entrance on entering, no one was injured; fourteen mines were reported in the bay by the mayor of Nipe, and marks were observed indicating mine positions, but no attempt was made of an examination. Commander Hunker gave high praise to the commanders in his company who had carried their ships in

[1] Commander Hunker's *Report*. The number was undoubtedly much less. Three only were reported as actually discovered, these being of the same pattern as the contact mines at Guantánamo.

[2] The armament here mentioned is taken from the Spanish navy list of 1898. The Intelligence Office report of 1897 which gave three 6.3 M. L. Palliser, aboard, was in error.

without regard to any question of mines, and particularly to Lieutenant Ward and Ensign Crosley who with their two slight and lightly armed vessels so gallantly attacked a ship which, while not carrying the three 6.3-inch guns which they supposed her to carry, did carry a much more powerful battery than their own.

All four of the ships left Nipe the same day, orders arriving from the admiral by the torpedo-boat *Dupont*, Lieutenant Spencer S. Wood, for the *Annapolis* and *Wasp* to proceed to Cape San Juan, the *Leyden* to carry orders to the *Puritan*, *Amphitrite*, and *Terror*, which had beeen directed to Nipe, to go to the same point, and the *Topeka* to carry despatches to Key West; all with reference to the movement of the army against Puerto Rico then in progress.

The army during this time had not been inactive in endeavors to get supplies to the Cubans. Lieutenant C. P. Johnson, of the Tenth Cavalry, was charged with an expedition consisting of the transports *Florida* and *Fanita*, which carried a pack-train of 65 animals, large cargoes of provisions, ammunition and clothing, 50 men of Troop M of the Tenth Cavalry, 15 volunteers under Lieutenant Winthrop Chanler, and 375 Cubans under General Nuñez. Lieutenant G. P. Ahearn of the Twenty-fifth Infantry, accompanied the expedition as a volunteer; its destination was the south coast.

The expedition left Key West on June 25 under convoy of the armed yacht *Peoria*, Lieutenant T. W. Ryan. On June 29 a landing was attempted at San Juan River, 10 miles east of Cienfuegos, but the enemy developed in such force that the expedition moved 40 miles east, and on the afternoon of June 30, after the *Peoria* had shelled heavily without response a block-house 4 miles west of Tunás, two boats were sent in, one carrying 15 Cubans under Captain Nuñez (a brother of the general's); the other the 15 American volunteers under Lieutenant Chanler. Immediately on landing a heavy fire was opened by a concealed force of Spaniards; Captain Nuñez was killed and Lieutenant Chanler and six others were wounded. The small company forced to return hastily, left several of their wounded. These were rescued after nightfall by Lieutenant Ahearn, with a boat's

crew of regulars. His act was worthily pronounced by Lieutenant Johnson, in his report, as "a very gallant deed."

Meanwhile the *Florida* had grounded heavily within a mile of the beach, and efforts to get her off by transferring part of her cargo and throwing part overboard were unavailing. Fortunately the *Helena*, Commander W. T. Swinburne, acting in the vicinity of Tunás, observed the *Florida's* search-light in the night, and on July 1 pulled the ship off the reef. "Captain Swinburne," says Lieutenant Johnson, "deserved and received my hearty thanks for his timely assistance." Next day the *Helena* and *Peoria* engaged the batteries at Tunás, at a distance of 1,500 yards, with very destructive effect. Neither ship was struck by direct fire, though several balls from burst shrapnel came aboard the *Helena*.

The Spanish force at Tunás was evidently much too powerful to attempt a landing near-by, and the expedition went east to Palo Alto where it was successful in landing the whole force and in effecting a junction with General Maximo Gomez who was in the vicinity with some 2,000 men.

The steamer *Wanderer*, later, carried a small expedition in charge of Lieutenant J. W. Heard, of the Third Cavalry, who, with 11 of his own men and a small body of Cubans under Colonel Federico Perez, landed, on July 22, at Manimani River, 75 miles west of Havana, a cargo of 800 Springfield rifles and carbines, 550,000 rounds of ammunition, a ton of dynamite, 15,000 rations, and other stores. During the operations of the second day, July 23, a sharp engagement took place on the east side of the river, when three Cuban pickets were killed and six Cubans and two Americans were wounded. Lieutenant Heard was back at Key West on July 25, but returned next day to the Cuban coast and landed, 25 miles west of his former landing, a few Cubans, with 8 horses and supplies, engaging meanwhile, a considerable Spanish force with the result, to his own force, of one Cuban wounded. The crew of the *Wanderer* now mutinied and refused service on the Cuban coast; suppressing the revolt with his own men, Heard decided to land the rest of his cargo eastward, and on August 1 landed a portion at Manati River, 360 miles east of Havana, and next day the remainder at Puerto

Padre, 20 miles further east. He was back at Key West on August 5.

The story of these events is not complete without mention of the independent individual effort made by several officers, at great personal risk and in difficult circumstances, to aid in the great and vital element of successful military action—information.

The earliest of these attempts was that of Lieutenant Henry H. Whitney, who had been in charge of map construction in the military information division of the war department, and who as early as August, 1897, requested to go to Cuba to work upon the topography of the neighborhood of the larger ports, beginning with Santiago. Unfortunately, in the light of later events, this was refused by the adjutant-general. It was not until April, 1898, that he was informed that there was a change of mind, but by this time it was too late to carry out Lieutenant Whitney's previously proposed views as to the acquirement of topographical information. He started for Cuba, however, furnished with a confidential letter from the navy department to Admiral Sampson, Lieutenant A. S. Rowan going at the same time to Jamaica whither Whitney was to send him such information as the latter might acquire.

As a result of the interview with Sampson, Whitney reported to Captain Taylor, of the *Indiana*, who at this time was detailed as the senior officer in charge of the proposed cable-cutting expedition to Santiago. This, as mentioned, was dropped by force of circumstances.

On May 5, Whitney received telegraphic orders to communicate to Gomez the war department's proposal of a reconnaissance in force on Mariel. Again, however, the rapid development of affairs prevented the execution of the duty. Word had now come of the departure of Cervera's squadron from the Cape Verdes and, consulting Captain Taylor, Whitney decided to remain with the fleet now leaving for Puerto Rico, and try what might be done in the latter island. He transferred himself to a press boat, the *Anita*, at St. Thomas, thence to a British tramp steamer, bound for Puerto Rico, by bribing a member of the crew to desert and

then asking to serve aboard in his place. He thus spent a month as an "able seaman."

The steamer's destination was the south side of the island, and on her arrival at Ponce, Whitney, by an understanding with her captain, spent ten days ashore in the acquirement of information, later of much value to the service, rejoining his ship at Maunabo. He could well say, in his description to the writer, that "the feeling of the noose about my neck was never absent." His zeal, courage, and accomplishment deserve high praise.

The fact that war had been declared when Lieutenant Rowan reached Kingston, Jamaica, on April 23, 1898, materially changed also the intentions with which he had started. Rowan thus at once arranged with Cubans at Kingston to cross the one hundred miles of water between Jamaica and Cape Cruz with the intent to communicate with General Calixto Garcia. He drove across Jamaica to the north-west in the direction of Falmouth harbor; found, as arranged, a boat with a Cuban crew, and landed about midnight of the second night afloat near Portillo, half-way between the final resting-place of the *Cristóbal Colón* and Cape Cruz. He met Garcia on May 1 at Bayamo whence the Spanish troops had just been driven, left the same evening, and at 11 P. M. on May 5 started with five others from a bay a little east of Nuevitas in a small pulling boat for the Bahamas. He sighted in the morning Sampson's fleet moving east; was picked up on the north side of the Old Bahama Channel by a sponge fisherman, and went to Nassau whence he found his way to Tampa and Washington with the reports from Garcia of the situation of the Cuban forces and their needs.

The operations of Ensigns Henry Heber Ward and William Henry Buck were of a much more extended character. Captain Crowninshield, the head of the Bureau of Navigation, under whom, in general, came the direction of affairs afloat, and who was also a member of the board on strategy, detailed these two young officers for the duty of keeping the navy department informed from abroad of Spanish naval movements. They left the United States on April 30, the day after Cervera's departure from the Cape Verdes, and arrived at Liverpool on Sunday, May 8, where both assumed the outward character of British

subjects. Two yachts had already been chartered for their use, and in one of these[1] Ward, on May 12, after consultation with Lieutenant C. C. Colwell, our naval attaché at London, went to sea apparently as a British subject in a British yacht on a cruise of pleasure. He was followed next day in the other yacht by Buck.

The destination of Cervera's squadron was still so much in doubt, during Ward's four days' stay at Liverpool, that Lieu-Colwell assured him that he believed it was in Cadiz harbor; the secretary of the navy was telegraphing Admiral Sampson so late as May 7 "the Spanish squadron's position not known. . . ." and on May 12 "the department has no reliable news as to the present whereabouts of the Spanish fleet from Cape Verde. It has been reported at Cadiz, and that report was afterwards pronounced incorrect. Has not been heard of on our coast. It may be attempting to intercept *Oregon* which sailed May 10 from Bahia." On this same day it was sighted off Martinique.

This, however, was at the time not known to Ward, now on his way to Brest, where he touched to communicate, through a private address, with the navy department. He then went to Lisbon where Buck had already arrived. At both Brest and Lisbon Ward's information had to be derived from newspapers and other unreliable sources, the reports being so conflicting that he could feel no assurance of Cervera's reported crossing, nor could he feel sure that Cervera had all the ships with him which he was reported to have. This doubt and a telegram from the navy department that Camara's squadron was reported at Cadiz destined for the United States and even that they had possibly sailed, decided Ward to go into Cadiz, leaving Buck at Lisbon to follow. A telegram came in reply to Ward's report to the navy department outlining his movements, ordering that neither officer should go to Cadiz, but Ward had already gone; the call there by Buck was naturally given up.

Ward was detained by heavy weather at Cadiz longer than he expected and was thus able to inform himself fully as to the ships in the harbor and at Caraca (the Cadiz dock-yard). Upon his

[1] Now the *Wanderer*, belonging to Mr. Henry A. C. Taylor, of New York and Newport.

arrival, May 23, at Gibraltar he telegraphed the information he had found, stating also that he would now sail westward for the Canaries. While at Gibraltar he received more complete information about the ships at Cadiz and the contracts for the delivery of coal there.

Leaving Buck at Gibraltar to observe, Ward left May 27, touched Tangier, and went to Madeira where he learned that there were but three torpedo-boats at the Canaries. He thus gave up going there, and on May 30 started directly for St. Thomas in the West Indies, where he arrived June 11. He inspected the vicinity of Culebra and Crab islands on the 13th and then proceeded along the north shore of the island to San Juan. His inspection of the islands had, however, been observed, and this, with a probable report of suspicion from the Spanish consul at St. Thomas, had aroused the San Juan authorities; the Spanish, moreover, had become very doubtful as to England's attitude. All this caused Ward to be met off San Juan by an armed tug which signalled him, "Regular survey is necessary." While stopping for this the destroyer *Terror* came out of port and stood by. He was allowed to enter the port. The yacht was boarded by the port officers who, after inspecting his papers, informed him that he must not leave the harbor nor communicate with the shore. The *Terror* anchored about one hundred yards on the port beam and placed a picket boat to starboard, making a decidedly nervous situation.

Ward had requested the Spanish boarding officer to request the British consul to come off, but in the consul's absence came the acting vice-consul, accompanied by the same Spanish officials who had been aboard before. After a half hour's reinspection of papers and close cross-questioning, and setting a time but a few hours off for departure, the vessel was released and Ward was allowed to go ashore, accompanied, however, by the Spanish officials. A Spanish naval officer with him suggested a call upon the naval commandant, which was made and which assisted much in establishing Ward's assumed character.

The feeling against the English caused Ward to give up any idea of inspecting the fortifications, and after a few hours' stay, which enabled him to report definitely that but the gun-boats,

Isabel II and *General Concha*, the *Terror*, and two tugs armed each with two 6-pounders, were present, he left for St. Thomas, having shown in this adventure qualities of coolness and courage such as are the gift of few men. The remainder of his cruise was spent in observations throughout the West Indies eastward of St. Thomas, extending his cruising to Martinique and Barbados, whence he returned to St. Thomas.

Ward had learned on June 26 of the eastward advance of Camara's fleet, a fact which put aside the original purposes of his cruise, but on July 9 he was telegraphed to go to Curaçao and Oruba to investigate reports of the assemblage there of Spanish supplies, the rumors of which turned out to be incorrect.

There was now no special reason for his continuance in the Caribbean and he advised his return north, and on July 17 he proceeded by mail steamer to New York.

Buck left at Gibraltar, kept touch with Camara's movements, followed his fleet to Suez and back, keeping the navy department informed by telegraph of all its movements. This service now being completed, he left his yacht at Gibraltar and returned home.

CHAPTER XVI

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA AND DESPATCH OF TROOPS

The first few days after the battle of the first of May were employed by Admiral Dewey in occupying Cavite and in seizing and dismantling, as has been mentioned, the several outlying positions at the entrance of Manila Bay which the Spaniards had endeavored to fortify. He had lifted and cut the telegraph cable on May 2, on the refusal of the Spanish governor to allow it to be used by him, thus supposedly cutting off the only means of telegraphic communication of Manila. As under the contract of the Eastern Extension Cable Company with the Spanish government they could not receive messages which Dewey might have been able to arrange to send from Manila Bay, the necessity of transmission of messages between Hong-Kong and Manila by steamer thus caused a delay of at least two days in the reception of telegrams, a condition which was to last until August 21.

On May 7 the secretary of the navy telegraphed:

> The president, in the name of the American people, thanks you and your officers and men for your splendid achievement and overwhelming victory. In recognition he has appointed you acting rear-admiral, and will recommend a vote of thanks to you by Congress as a foundation for further promotion.[1] The *Charleston* will leave at once with what ammunition she can carry. Pacific Mail Steamship Company's steamer *Pekin* will follow with ammunition and supplies. Will take troops unless you telegraph otherwise. How many will you require?

To this, besides sending, on May 12, his personal thanks for his promotion, Dewey replied from Cavite, May 13 (Hong-Kong, May 15):

> The squadron thanks the president for his message in your telegram of May 7. I am maintaining strict blockade of Manila by sea, and believe rebels are hemming in by land, although they are inactive and

[1] This was passed and signed by the president, May 10, 1898.

making no demonstrations. Great scarcity of provisions in the city. I believe the Spanish governor-general will be obliged to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any moment. To retain possession and thus control Philippine Islands would require, in my best judgment, well-equipped force of 5,000 men, although United States troops sent by *Pekin* will be very useful to relieve the *Olympia* of guarding Cavite. United States troops should make provision for extremely hot, moist climate. Spanish force is estimated 10,000 men. The rebels are reported 30,000 men. I should suggest the *Charleston* or *Pekin* bring a few officers and about 100 men, partly engineers' department, to man transport *Manila* and captured vessels. I am loading *Manila* with ordnance from the Spanish man-of-war. I propose to assign Lieutenant-Commander Singer to command. Captured on May 12 the Spanish gun-vessel *Callao* attempting to run blockade; released on parole officers and men. I have plenty of coal for the present and can purchase more in Chinese ports. Will hold frequent communication with Hong-Kong. One British, one French, two German, one Japanese men-of-war here observing. . . .

The curiosity of naval commanders in the East was intense but natural. There was no question of the friendliness of those of England and Japan, with whom the American admiral was on most cordial terms. But the attitude of the powers of Continental Europe was doubtful, and when the number of German ships rose to five and their movements assumed an activity and character not consonant with friendliness, the situation assumed a serious character and brought a tension which gave the American commander cause for sharp comment and brought an unfortunate anti-German feeling in America which was slow to dissipate. Admiral Dewey's firm attitude, however, and that of the British Commodore Chichester, who was very clearly more than commonly friendly to the former and who pointedly informed the German admiral that in the actions complained of he was contravening international law, brought more peaceful relations. Dewey's situation was thenceforward one of expectancy as to what should be done in the United States to support him. Spain's chief thought was to attempt to recover her ascendancy in Philippine waters. Dewey's estimate of the number of troops needed to control the Philippines showed how little was understood or known of the activity of the Aguinaldo faction, which was now in large numbers in trenches before Manila.

A few words of antecedent history are necessary to an understanding of the situation, which, previous to the outbreak of war with the United States, was not dissimilar, in the island of Luzon at least, with that which had obtained in Cuba, though affairs in the former were complicated by an element non-existent in the latter, viz., the enormous power, both spiritual and financial (the latter through ownership of a great extent of landed property), exercised by the religious orders of the Roman Church.

The late insurrection, to quell which there had been employed an army of 41,000 men, 17,000 of whom were natives,[1] had come to an end through the promise of the payment of $1,700,000; $400,000 of which was payable in Hong-Kong to the leaders of the rebellion; $400,000 on condition that the treaty known as the Biacnabato treaty should be fulfilled, the remainder to be paid to the families of those, not rebels in arms, but who suffered the evils of war; the entire payment of the sum was to be completed when peace should have become an accomplished fact.[2]

The first instalment had been paid, but for reasons which in the main were patent in the treaty, viz., the agreement to suppress the religious societies, the remainder "was not forthcoming and Aguinaldo and a chosen few migrated to Singapore and lived *incognito* to escape the rigor of the Hong-Kong courts, where the forty-two leaders were using each other and Aguinaldo for a division of the original $400,000 paid over by [Captain-General] Rivera's representatives as a price of peace. Aguinaldo set up a junta at Singapore and there with the counsel of English sympathizers, plotted to return to his native country and again assume the rôle of headman."[3]

The situation in Manila in February, 1898, is thus described by Mr. Oscar F. Williams, the American consul:

> Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, and hospitals are full. Prisoners are brought here and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law. The crown forces have

[1] *Investigation of Conduct of War with Spain*, II, 1210.

[2] Edwin Wildman, aforetime U. S. vice and deputy consul-general at Hong-Kong, *Aguinaldo*, 47. For the treaty, see *ibid.*, 46, 47.

[3] *Ibid.*, 51.

not been able to dislodge a rebel army within ten miles of Manila, and last Saturday, February 19, a battle was there fought and five dead left on the field . . . bribe and deportation only multiplied claimants and fanned the fires of discontent. . . . A republic is organized here as in Cuba. Insurgents are being armed and drilled, are rapidly increasing in numbers and efficiency, and all agree that a general uprising will come as soon as the governor-general embarks for Spain, which is fixed for March. While some combatant regiments have recently returned to Spain, it was for appearance only, and all authorities now agree that unless the crown largely re-enforces its army here it will lose possession.[1]

On May 19, Manila being now closely blockaded by the American squadron, Aguinaldo arrived by the revenue cutter *McCulloch*. Dewey telegraphed next day:

Situation unchanged. Strict blockade is continued. Great scarcity prevails at Manila. Foreign subjects fear an outbreak of the Spanish soldiers. Arrangements have been made for them to be transferred to Cavite by the foreign men-of-war, if necessary. Aguinaldo, the rebel commander-in-chief, was brought down by the *McCulloch*. Organizing forces near Cavite and may render assistance that will be valuable. I do not consider submarine mines practicable here, on account of great depth and width of bay and entrance. If attacked by superior force, the squadron will endeavor to give good account of itself. The American bark *Saranac* was captured off Iloilo, Philippine Islands. Upon the arrival of the *Charleston* with ammunition, I propose to recapture and to clear the island of small Spanish gunvessels. When is *Charleston* expected to arrive? I request you will send to the Asiatic station the *Bennington* and the *Yorktown*, if possible. Will be more useful than the *Philadelphia*. How many troops coming here *Pekin?* When expected to arrive? I request send provisions for the squadron—2,000 men for three months. Also small stores.

This was replied to by Secretary Long on May 26:

You must exercise discretion most fully in all matters, and be governed according to circumstance which you know and we cannot know. You have our confidence entirely. It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future.

[1] Report, February 22, 1898. *Investigation of the Conduct of War with Spain*, II., 1206.

On May 27, Dewey telegraphed:

No change in the situation of the blockade. Is effective. It is impossible for the people in Manila to buy provisions, except rice. The French men-of-war must go to Saigon for provisions. It is important that I should know as early as possible whereabouts and strength of the possible Spanish expedition to the Philippines, and, if possible, that the squadron should be re-enforced with a battle-ship or armored cruiser. The captain of the *Olympia* (Gridley) condemned by medical survey; is ordered home; leaves by Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company's steamer from Hong-Kong on May 28. Commander Lamberton has been appointed to the command of the *Olympia*. Steamer has just arrived from Amoy with 3,000 Mauser rifles and great amount ammunition for Aguinaldo, whose force is increasing constantly. . . . Bark *Saranac* is sailing under the British flag; is loading with sugar at Iloilo for New York.

He was informed by a telegram of May 29:

There is no Spanish force en route to Philippine Islands. You will be notified of the departure of such. Twenty-five hundred men, United States troops, left May 25 from San Francisco, Cal., for Manila.

On June 3 (Hong-Kong, June 6), Dewey telegraphed, thanking the navy department for its expression of confidence and added:

Have acted according to the spirit of department's instructions therein from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the defences of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession.

On the same date (from Hong-Kong) he telegraphed:

Insurgents have been engaged actively within the province of Cavite during last week; they have won several small victories, taking prisoners about 1,800 men, 50 officers; Spanish troops, not native. I am preparing arsenal and Cavite for the occupation United States troops, and will have vessel off Cape Engaño to meet United States transports.

The government, now anxious as to the Philippine situation, telegraphed the admiral on June 14:

Report fully any conferences, relations, or co-operations, military or otherwise, which you have had with Aguinaldo, and keep informed the department in that respect.

LONG.

Dewey replied June 27:

Receipt of telegram of June 14 is acknowledged. Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived May 19, by permission, on *Nanshan*. Established self Cavite, outside arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and organized his army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any way with the force under my command, and on several occasions I have declined requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invariably. My relations with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The United States has not been bound in any way to assist insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not, to my knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he expects to capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt ability, they not yet having many guns. In my opinion, these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.[1]

On June 12 (Hong-Kong, June 17), Dewey telegraphed:

There is little change in the situation since my telegram of June 3. Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically surrounded Manila.

[1] On June 12, Dewey sent by mail translations of three proclamations by Aguinaldo (see *Report, Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 104). He stated his position thus: "Now that the great and powerful North American nation have come to offer disinterested protection for the effort to secure the liberation of this country, I return to assume command of all the forces for the attainment of our lofty aspirations, establishing a dictatorial government which will set forth decrees under my sole responsibility assisted by the advice of eminent persons until these islands are completely conquered and able to form a constitutional convention and to elect a president and cabinet in whose favor I will only resign the authority.

"Given in Cavite the 24th of May, 1898. EMILIO AGUINALDO."

They have taken 2,500 Spanish prisoners, whom they treat most humanely. They do not intend to attack city proper until the arrival of United States troops thither; I have advised. Twelve merchant vessels are anchored in the bay with refugees on board under guard of neutral men-of-war; this with my permission. Health of the squadron continues excellent. The German commander-in-chief arrived to-day. Three German, two British, one French, one Japanese men-of-war now in port; another German man-of-war is expected. I request the departure of the *Monadnock* and the *Monterey* be expedited.

It was, from a political point of view, a situation of instant perplexity and of much more to come. On June 30, the first detachment of American troops, 2,500 men, under Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, arrived, and were at once established in camp at Cavite.

On May 3, four days before the arrival in the United States of Dewey's own despatch giving the news of the Manila victory, General Miles wrote the secretary of war advising as follows:

I have the honor to recommend that General Thomas M. Anderson be sent to occupy the Philippine Islands, in command of the following troops: Two battalions Fourteenth Infantry; two troops Fourth Cavalry; one regiment of infantry, California Volunteers; two batteries heavy artillery, California Volunteers; one regiment of infantry, Oregon Volunteers; one regiment of infantry, Washington Volunteers; the troops to go with all the necessary appliances, supplies, and equipment.[1]

That the subject had already been considered by the president would appear by his quick approval in the following memorandum:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, *May* 4, 1898.

The troops designated by General Miles, if approved by the secretary of war, should be assembled at San Francisco, Cal., for such service as may be ordered hereafter.

W. McK.

The above is only carrying out verbal instructions heretofore given.

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

[1] For this and the following army correspondence see *Investigation of the Conduct of the War with Spain*, II, 1191, *et seq.*; also *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, Vol. II.

As has appeared, General Shafter had with his staff left San Francisco on April 21 to take command of the troops assembling at New Orleans and later at Tampa. On April 15, Colonel H. C. Merriam, later major-general of volunteers, was ordered to the command of the Department of California. When he assumed command, the small garrison of the Presidio had already been reduced by the withdrawal east of the First Infantry and two light batteries of the Third Artillery. Colonel Miller had been left with seven batteries of his command, aggregating 25 officers and 418 men, a force only a tenth sufficient to man the modern guns then in position.

On May 12, Major-General Wesley Merritt was detached from the command of the Department of the East and ordered to the command of the proposed expedition to the Philippines, the personnel of which, with slight exception composed of volunteers, was now rapidly assembling at San Francisco. The *City of Pekin* had been chartered and was to carry the First Regiment of California Volunteers and four companies of the Fourteenth Regular Infantry, which had been left at the Presidio; the total of the force amounting to 1,200 men. Brigadier-General Elwell S. Otis, in command at Denver, was ordered on May 12 to San Francisco to take command of the expeditionary force pending General Merritt's arrival.

The views of General Merritt as to the number of troops necessary, differed widely from those expressed in General Miles's letter of May 3 to the secretary of war. On May 13, Merritt wrote from Governor's Island to the president as follows:

Mr. President:

As I promised yesterday in my interview with you, I have the honor to furnish the following as my estimate of troops necessary to constitute an expedition to the Philippines with a fair chance of success after arriving there.

In this connection I desire to point in very emphatic terms to the fact that the volunteers from the North-West are not as well drilled or disciplined as those from any state in the East or interior. For that reason I urgently request the number of regular troops I have asked for. I feel that I would be doing the country, the force in Manila harbor, and myself a great injustice to attempt to carry out your wishes

with a smaller force or one differently constituted. I make this representation because I feel sure, Mr. President, that you will consider it in all its bearings, after which I am thoroughly willing to leave the matter in your hands and to cheerfully obey your instructions.

In the above connection I desire to call your attention to the fact that an immense volunteer reserve can be advanced to perfection as soldiers day by day here, and are within supporting distance of any force operating against Cuba or Puerto Rico, should it be necessary, while the command that goes to the Philippines must depend on itself in the face of casualties from sickness or other causes and cannot be readily re-enforced. If I neglected to represent this matter to you fully and freely, I would feel that I had failed in an important duty. . . .

The general enclosed an estimate of the force he proposed; it amounted to some 14,000, of which 8,000 were to be volunteers. Two days later he asked to add a siege battery and a small ordnance detachment.

General Miles was not slow to change his previous estimate. On May 16, he wrote the secretary of war suggesting the sending of two regiments of regular infantry, 2 squadrons of regular cavalry, a battery of heavy artillery, and 2 batteries of light artillery, and in addition 12,975 volunteers. He added:

I also recommend that two 12-inch guns, two 10-inch guns, with disappearing carriages, and eight mortars, to be dismounted, also two 8-inch guns now at Benicia Barracks—all to be placed on board ships at San Francisco and sent to Manila, there to be mounted as speedily as possible for the defence of that harbor, and used together with any rapid-fire guns that can be spared from the fleet now at that place. When this is accomplished, the fleet can be released for more important service. The guns and mortars referred to should be replaced as soon as possible, by others sent to San Francisco from the gun foundries and arsenals on the Atlantic coast.

The general does not intimate what more important service the naval force under Admiral Dewey might be applied to: there could scarcely be any more so than holding what was to become a new naval base and protecting from naval attack the bay on the shores of which the army was to operate.

General Merritt, however, did not, when General Miles's letter was referred to him, agree. He returned it on May 17 to the adjutant-general endorsed:

I consider the composition of the force outlined by the major-general commanding the army as unsuited to the ends to be accomplished and insufficient in efficiency for the expedition to the Philippines.

Two regiments of regular infantry, two-thirds of a regiment of regular cavalry, and two light batteries is a very small proportion of the 42 regular regiments in the army when the work to be done consists of conquering a territory 7,000 miles from our base, defended by a regularly trained and acclimated army of from 10,000 to 25,000 men, and inhabited by 14,000,000 of people, the majority of whom will regard us with the intense hatred born of race and religion.

Besides, if I am not greatly mistaken, the suggested command is only on paper, as the Fourteenth Infantry is only partially available. My letters of May 13 and 15 give the composition and minimum strength of the regular forces I deem necessary.

General Miles, on May 18, returned the document to the secretary of war, endorsed:

The reference to the Spanish troops is believed to be very much exaggerated. No reports have been received thus far that there is anything like the number indicated in the above endorsement, while the population of that territory is probably nearer one-half the number stated. The number of troops already ordered to the Philippine Islands is three times as many as Admiral Dewey called for. The force ordered at this time is not expected to carry on a war to conquer an extensive territory, and the chief object of the within letter was to suggest a means of quickly establishing a strong garrison to command the harbor of Manila, and to relieve the United States fleet under Admiral Dewey with the least possible delay. This, in my judgment, is of pre-eminent importance. The troops mentioned in the within letter as available to send to that department number 15,425. The Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, ordered to-day, will be approximately 1,000 more. These troops, in my judgment, are all that would be advisable to send to the Philippine Islands at this time. If it be deemed advisable to send additional regiments, they can be sent from New Orleans or Tampa, but the force now ordered to be sent is, as already indicated, 10,000 more than will be required for the purpose. It is, however, in my judgment, of the highest importance that orders should be sent to place the six high-power guns and eight 12-inch mortars, with at least 50 rounds of ammunition per gun and mortar, on vessels at San Francisco, and possibly Puget Sound, with the least possible delay, and sent to the harbor of Manila and mounted as speedily as possible. It may be advisable to send additional guns. These orders should be sent by telegraph, and the engineer and ordnance departments should be directed to expedite the work by every possible means.

On May 16, General Merritt was assigned to the command of the Department of the Pacific, which it was to be understood was to include the Philippine Islands only, though not so mentioned in orders. He arrived at San Francisco May 30 and took over the command of the expedition, relieving in this General Otis, who had meanwhile, since May 17, been in charge and who remained at San Francisco again in command after General Merritt sailed on June 29, until he himself left for the Philippines on July 15.

The preparations already made by May 20 at San Francisco included the chartering of the *City of Pekin*, the *City of Sydney*, and the *Australia*.

On May 25 the expedition sailed, with 117 officers and 2,382 men of the army, under Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, and with 11 officers and 76 men of the navy. Commander Gibson was placed in command in the *City of Pekin*. Among the stores carried were 400 tons of ammunition for Admiral Dewey's squadron.

The expedition reached Honolulu June 1 and found there the protected cruiser *Charleston*, Captain Henry Glass, which had left Mare Island May 21 and had arrived at Honolulu on May 29. The four ships left Honolulu on June 4, Captain Glass carrying with him orders from the navy department of May 10 to seize the island of Guam, make prisoners of the governor and other officers and of any armed force, and to destroy any fortifications and any Spanish naval vessels to be found there. The expedition arrived off the island at daylight of June 20 having taken sixteen days to make the 3,337 miles of distance from Honolulu.

Visiting first the port of Agaña, the capital, and finding no vessels, Captain Glass proceeded to San Luis d'Apra, where, it was rumored, were a gun-boat and a military force. Fort Santiago, at the entrance of the harbor, was found in ruins; steaming in and firing a few shots at Fort Santa Cruz, the latter was also found abandoned. The only vessel in port was a small Japanese trader. A boat came off to the ship bringing a Spanish naval officer, who was captain of the port, and an army surgeon, the health officer, who informed Captain Glass that they had had

no news from Manila, 1,500 miles distant, since April 14. They were informed of the existence of war and that they were prisoners. Released on parole to carry the news to the governor at Agaña, the latter's secretary appeared at 5 P. M., bringing a very courteous letter, stating that being prohibited by law from going aboard a foreign vessel, the governor requested an interview ashore. As it was now too late to send a force ashore, this was delayed until next morning, when, at 8.30, a body of marines and two companies of the Second Oregon Regiment were landed, and Lieutenant Braunersreuther, of the *Charleston*, sent with a flag of truce and a written demand for surrender of the island and all officers and persons in the Spanish military service. The result was the reception and transfer to the *City of Sydney*, the only ship with proper accommodation, of the governor, Lieutenant-Colonel Don Juan Marina and 5 other officers, and of 54 non-commissioned officers and privates.

No Spanish vessel of war had visited Guam for eighteen months; no coal was found; the forts were unarmed, and altogether it may be assumed that the state of affairs was such that no hardship beyond the sudden enforced separation from their families was caused to the prisoners by the hoisting of the American flag at 2.15 P. M. June 21, and declaring Guam an American possession.[1]

Captain Glass, waiting until next day to allow such arrangements as the sudden leaving of their posts by the Spanish made necessary, left on June 22 for Manila.

The expedition arrived on June 30 and the disembarkation of men and material began the next day. General Anderson reports:

> Cavite was selected as the landing place and base of operations. Rear-Admiral Dewey gave every possible assistance and favored me with a clear statement of the situation.
>
> On the 1st day of July I had an interview with the insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, and learned from him that the Spanish forces had withdrawn, driven back by his army, as he claimed, to a line of defence immediately around the city and its suburbs. He estimated the Span-

[1] For Captain Glass's report, see Appendix, *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, 151–157.

ish forces at about 14,000 men, and his own at about the same number. He did not seem pleased at the incoming of our land forces, hoping, as I believe, that he could take the city with his own army, with the co-operation of the American fleet.[1]

General Merritt, on May 21, had requested four general officers in addition to General Otis and Anderson, already assigned, naming in the following order: George W. Davis, A. R. Chaffee, and Edwin V. Sumner, the latter still colonel of the Seventh Cavalry. He also hoped that Colonel Francis Vinton Greene, of the Seventy-first New York (then at Tampa), and Colonel Garretson, of Ohio, would be added. The three officers first named could not be spared, but Greene, Garretson, and Colonel Marcus P. Miller, of the Third Artillery, were nominated brigadiers on May 27, and ordered for duty with the expedition, but by an unfortunate misunderstanding in regard to General Garretson's wishes, he was not ordered.

On May 24, General Otis reported from San Francisco:

The troops now in camp and intended for expedition, First California, Second Oregon, Fourteenth United States Infantry, and detachment of California Heavy Artillery. Already shipped are Seventh California, First Colorado, Thirteenth Minnesota, First Nebraska, Twentieth Kansas regiments, averaging 47 officers and 968 enlisted men, having a total of 236 officers and 4,842 enlisted men. Also here in camp a battalion of California Heavy Artillery, two battalions Idaho, one battalion Wyoming, and the Utah Artillery, numbering 63 officers, 1,464 men; total, all told, 299 officers, 6,306 enlisted men. Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment will arrive to-day. Of these troops the Colorado, Minnesota, and Nebraska regiments are in fair condition; need to be outfitted with necessary stores not yet received, but arrive in two or three days. These regiments are being inspected to ascertain what ordnance necessary. They can be placed in condition to sail early next week. All other infantry organizations cannot be put in condition in less than two weeks. Carefully inspected yesterday by an officer of my staff. The Utah Battery, if it had horses and harness, could leave at any time. The great obstacle to moving is vessel transportation. Only one small vessel chartered; full capacity, 800 men; and she cannot discharge freight upon arrival and be put in condition to transport troops before the 31st instant. Have reported on this subject. Quartermaster making every effort here and not meeting with much success. Think seizure only possible solution.

[1] *Annual Report, War Department*, 1898, I (Part 2), 54.

The difficulty regarding transports was, however, overcome. Not only was the supply limited, but much had to be done in the way of preparation for the voyage of 7,000 miles. Extra galleys, sinks and wash-rooms, bunks, and electric lights were installed, and for the men themselves summer clothing and helmets purchased, no provision of such character, as has been noted, having been made by the war department previous to the declaration of war. Notwithstanding all efforts, and, says General Greene, who commanded the force which sailed next after that of General Anderson, "whatever human energy could accomplish was done," there were many shortcomings, a forcible reminder that energy in great crises cannot make good the want of foresight and antecedent preparation.

General Greene received his orders at Tampa on the afternoon of May 29. He left by the first train and arrived in San Francisco on June 4. On June 15 he sailed with the second expedition selected from the troops most thoroughly organized and equipped and consisting of the First Colorado, the First Nebraska, the Tenth Pennsylvania, a battalion each of the Eighteenth and Twenty-third Regular Infantry, two batteries of the Utah Light Artillery and twenty men of the Engineers, in all about 3,500 men. Of these the *China* carried 1,300, the *Senator* 900, and the *Zelandia* and *Colon* nearly 700 each.

Reaching Honolulu on June 23, two days were taken to coal. On July 9 the ships sighted Guam, where it had been intimated that a convoy might have been sent from Manila. None was, however, found, and eight days later, July 17, the expedition anchored off Cavite, having been accompanied during the last two days by the *Boston*, Captain Wildes, which had been sent to meet it at the north end of Luzon.

On May 20, Admiral Dewey had been informed from Washington:[1]

Reports are current to the effect that *Carlos V*, *Pelayo*, *Alfonso XII*, and some transports sailing to the Philippine Islands with large body of troops. Other reports say they are bound for the east coast of the

[1] For naval telegraphic correspondence with Admiral Dewey, see *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 97 *et seq.*

United States, and one report says they have sailed for the latter destination; but as our means of receiving intelligence from Spain are very untrustworthy you are given this information for what it is worth.

On May 27, Dewey was told of the intention to send him the *Monterey*, which could be expected at the end of July. On May 29, as already noted, he was informed that no Spanish force was yet in transit for Manila and that he would be notified of any departure of such. Next day he was informed that the *Monadnock* would also be sent.

On June 18 more definite word was sent him as to Spanish movements:

The Spanish fleet, two armored cruisers, six converted cruisers, four destroyers, reported off Ceuta, sailing to the east, by the United States consul at Gibraltar. If they pass Suez, Egypt, will cable you. The *Monterey* and the collier sailed [for] Manila from San Diego on June 11. The *Monadnock* and the collier will follow June 20, if possible. Could not you have a vessel at Hong-Kong to receive notice concerning Spanish fleet passing Suez?

The telegram also added information of the sailing of General Greene's division, and a later one, June 25, advised if practicable to send a convoying vessel to Guam, which it was expected he would reach by July 10. Under the circumstances the presence of so large a force of the army as was expected (none having at this date arrived), could not but add to the admiral's cares. On June 25 word was telegraphed:

The Spanish fleet from Cadiz passed Cape Bon, going to the east, June 22, 3 P. M. Expected to go to Manila. Comprise *Pelayo, Emperor Carlos V*, three torpedo-boat destroyers, three auxiliary armed steamers, and seven transports. In all 15 sail.

Two days later (June 27) this was followed by two telegrams:

The *Monadnock* sailed June 25 from San Francisco, accompanied by collier *Nero*. Was ordered to proceed at utmost speed safely possible, and stops as short as possible, and to make best of way to a point 600 nautical miles east true from Cape Engaño, and thence to run to the west true until up to Cape Engaño. If then she has not received from you a message to the contrary, she will proceed at once to Manila.

This enables you to meet the *Monadnock* or to send a message to her within 600 nautical miles of Cape Engaño, if you desire to do so. Furthermore, General Merritt's third division of transports will leave about June 27 from San Francisco with about 4,000 men and not convoyed, but he has been advised to make and to sail the 600 knots east and west line as described for the *Monadnock*.

Camara's fleet arrived off Port Said June 26, and is reported by our agent there as follows: *Pelayo, Carlos V, Audaz, Osada, Proserpina, Patriota,* 12 guns, and three unarmed transports, *Colon, Covadonga,* and *San Francisco.* They will coal immediately—to be supplied by Cory Brothers, whose agents are Savon Bazui. The bottom of ships apparently foul. A telegram from Lieutenant Sims at Paris, June 25, says that special agent now at Cartagena reports one transport carries munitions of war, *Buenos Aires* and *Panay* each one regiment of infantry, and *San Francisco* one battalion marine infantry. Auxiliary fleet has 20,000 tons of coal. All cruisers unarmed except *Rapido, Patriota,* and *Buenos Aires.* . . .

Rapido and *Patriota* were formerly *Normannia* and *Columbia,* and reported each to carry four 6.2-inch, four 4.8-inch, two 3½-inch, and four revolving cannon. Other reports say more, but that is doubtful. We have not the particulars of *Buenos Aires's* battery. . . .

Before these were received, however (telegrams still having to be sent by despatch vessel to and from Hong-Kong), Dewey had sent a despatch, received in Washington the same day the two last above were sent, saying:

No change in the situation since my telegram of June 17. Five German, three British, one French, one Japanese men-of-war in port. Insurgents constantly closing in on city. The United States transports and the *Charleston* have not yet arrived. The *Baltimore* is at Cape Engaño awaiting them. Have received information Cadiz squadron passed Gibraltar Friday morning, June 17, bound eastward. Shall the *Monadnock* and the *Monterey* arrive in time? In my judgment, if the coast of Spain was threatened, the squadron of the enemy would have to return. One hundred and twenty-one officers, United States navy, 6 paymaster's clerks, and 1,709 men were engaged battle of Manila Bay.

The navy department, as has been seen, had already anticipated in its telegram to Admiral Sampson of June 18,[1] the judgment expressed by Dewey as to the effect of a demonstration by sending a squadron across the Atlantic, but it now made public

[1] *Supra,* 211.

the fact of the intention, and, as will be seen, with marked effect. The department replied on June 29:

The different re-enforcements sent to you are as follows: First army detachment and the *Charleston* sailed May 21 from San Francisco via Honolulu and Guam. Estimated speed, 10 knots. The *Monterey* sailed June 11 from San Diego, Cal., via Honolulu and Guam, probably estimated sea speed, 10 knots per hour. The *Monadnock* sailed June 25 from San Farncisco for Honolulu, and then direct. Estimated sea speed, 6 knots per hour; perhaps more. Third army detachment sailed June 27 from San Francisco; was recommended to go direct. Squadron under Watson, the *Iowa*, and *Oregon*, the *Yankee* and the *Dixie*, the *Newark* and the *Yosemite*, and four colliers preparing with all possible despatch to start for Spanish coast. The Spaniards know this.

The navy department also advised on July 1:

It would be well to ascertain the possibility of landing the United States troops in Binangonam anchorage, east side of Luzon, or at some other point on Luzon, and thence marching to Manila by sea (land), as it might become necessary to hold Luzon with troops pending your concentration with the monitors.

And on July 5 telegraphed:

Camara reported to have passed Suez Canal July 5, July 6, after having partly coaled in Mediterranean Sea. Intends to coal again in Red Sea and thence direct to Philippine Islands. Supposed will coal from his own colliers. His ships are as stated in department's telegram of June 27, except that Spanish destroyers *Audaz*, *Osado*, and *Proserpina* have returned to Spain, which would indicate that he expects to make speed.

Dewey was also informed by a telegram of July 8:

The *Monterey* and *Brutus* reported anchored outside bar off Honolulu June 29, making slight repairs of the machinery of the *Brutus*, and they hoped to sail on same night for Manila, via such intermediate places as might be necessary. The *Monterey* has not orders to run down the 600-mile line drawn east true from Cape Engaño. They have made 7 knots per hour from San Diego to Honolulu.

On July 4 (from Cavite; July 7 from Hong-Kong), Dewey telegraphed that the first division of troops had arrived and were

comfortably housed at Cavite, adding: "Aguinaldo proclaimed himself president of the revolutionary republic on July 1;" and on July 13 (from Hong-Kong) telegraphed:

Aguinaldo informed me his troops had taken all of Subic Bay except Isla Grande, which they were prevented from taking by the German man-of-war *Irene*. On July 7 sent the *Raleigh* and the *Concord* there; they took the island and about 1,300 men, with arms and ammunition; no resistance. The *Irene* retired from the bay on their arrival. I shall send the *Boston* Cape Engaño about July 16 to meet second army detachment. It is not practicable to send Guam. No chartered vessel available.

Aguinaldo now wrote the admiral a letter which was sent to Washington by mail, July 17:

BACOOR, *July* 15, 1898.

His Excellency the Admiral of the Squadron of the United States in the Islands.

SIR: The revolution having taken possession of the various provinces of the archipelago, this government has found it necessary to adopt the form and organization best suited to the popular will. I have, therefore, the pleasure and honor of placing in your hand the enclosed decrees,[1] which contain the organization referred to, begging that you will communicate to your government that the desires of this government are to remain always in friendship with the great North American nation, to which we are under many obligations.

I beg, also, that your excellency will have the kindness to forward the enclosed packages to H. B. M. consul, with a request from me that he will forward them to their respective destinations.

For which favor the Filipino people and your humble servant will be most deeply grateful to your excellency.

Very respectfully, etc.,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

On July 17 (from Cavite; July 20 from Hong-Kong), Dewey telegraphed:

Situation unchanged. Second army detachment arrived to-day. All well on board. The health of the squadron continues good. No sickness whatever. I have taken the coal of the British ship *Honolulu*

[1] For these decrees, see *Report of the Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 111–117.

and I am retaining her until the port is opened. Have provisions for six months. The receipt of telegram of July 7 is acknowledged; in view of the information therein shall retain *Pekin* and *China* as auxiliaries. I do not expect the *Monterey* before August 5, and the *Monadnock* ten days later. If necessary, shall proceed with the squadron to meet the *Monadnock* to the east Cape Engaño, Luzon. Shall return other transports to the United States as soon as possible.

Such was the situation, complicated enough, when the second division of the army expedition arrived on the day this last telegram was sent. General Greene says:

We had been thirty days without news from the outer world. The *Boston* [which had awaited them off the north end of Luzon] brought us the latest information by way of Hong-Kong, which was dated July 2, and consisted in a few brief telegrams to the effect that Admiral Camara's fleet had passed through the Suez Canal and was coaling in the Red Sea, and, as soon as this was completed, would continue its voyage to Manila; and that General Merritt had sailed from San Francisco in the steamer *Newport* on June 28.

These telegrams showed that a most interesting race was in progress on two sides of the globe, each of the contestants with about seven thousand nautical miles to go. Camara was coming east and Merritt was coming west; and the *Monterey*, which we left coaling at Honolulu, and the arrival of which was of such vital importance to Dewey, was also coming west, all having the same objective, Manila Bay. As we steamed down the coast of Luzon, I spent several hours figuring on a time table to see which would come in first. Allowing the *Monterey* six knots, Camara's fleet ten knots, and the *Newport* twelve knots, I figured that Camara would reach Manila July 26, Merritt July 28, and the *Monterey* August 4. Would he sail east to intercept Merritt? Would his arrival be delayed beyond August 4? Would he come at all? . . .

The interception of General Merritt's force could hardly come into Admiral Camara's calculations. The only question that could be really considered was that of naval predominance in the Philippines. The American squadron defeated, everything in Manila Bay or which should arrive there would be his. In case Admiral Dewey had left temporarily, he would naturally himself have taken all precautions to meet and protect General Merritt's force, which had been ordered to come westward to a point 600 miles true east from Cape Engaño, the north end of

Luzon, and thence proceed on a true west course to the cape. This would have enabled Dewey to meet him with certainty.

General Greene's account continues:

The admiral was convinced that if Camara continued his voyage he would reach Manila before the *Monterey*. Having no battle-ship at his command he was outclassed by the *Pelayo*. The safety of the army and the transports, at such an enormous distance from America, depended entirely upon keeping his fleet intact. He therefore came to the determination in case news was not received in less than a week that Camara had turned back, to take his fleet and the transports to the north of Luzon, and then cruise eastward until he met the *Monterey* and the *Monadnock*, which was following her; then he would return and destroy Camara's fleet. He felt reasonably confident that he would not be gone longer than August 10, and he asked General Anderson, who was the senior [army] officer, what he would do. The latter promptly replied that he would take thirty days' rations, march into the hills about twenty miles east of Cavite, entrench, and await the return of the fleet. My opinion was asked, and I fully concurred in the wisdom of the departure of the fleet and the propriety of taking the troops inland to await its return.

If Camara's nerve had held out the result would have been a very interesting campaign in the Philippines. Merritt arrived three days ahead of schedule time, and the *Monterey* arrived on the very day calculated, but Camara did not come at all. Definite information that Camara had turned back reached the admiral on July 22,[1] just as it was becoming necessary to take steps to carry the above plan into operation.[2]

It was not, however, a question of "Camara's nerve"; it was, as officially declared in the Cortes by Señor Sagasta on July 9, 1898, one of alarm of the Spanish people and fear of an uprising through the news given out by the American government of the proposed movement of Watson's squadron across the Atlantic.

[1] So late a date must be in error. On July 11 the following telegram left Washington: "Camara's fleet has passed out of the Suez Canal at Port Said, and is now on its return to Spain." There is, unfortunately, no record of the time of its reception, but it would seem impossible that it should have taken ten days to get this telegram to Manila after its arrival at Hong-Kong. It is thought that even earlier word than that from Washington came from Mr. James Gordon Bennett, of the *New York Herald*, who was in Paris and who also kept Dewey constantly informed of events.

[2] Greene, "The Capture of Manila," in *Century Magazine*, March, 1899.

CHAPTER XVII

THE CRUISE OF CAMARA'S SQUADRON

THE account by the distinguished officer and author, just given, of what might have been, would have good basis had we been dealing with an active and energetic enemy. There is throughout the underlying idea that the Spanish government would do as General Greene himself would have done. But the whole intention of the Spanish authorities was far different; so much so that Camara's going to Manila and attacking the American squadron had not even been seriously considered. To understand what had been and now was designed, a short history of Camara's command is necessary.

The squadron was first formed with a view to a raid upon the American coast, and orders issued long before it was ready, possibly with the idea by such premature action of encouraging Spanish spirit.

Admiral Auñon, the minister of marine, had issued the following to Admiral Camara on May 27:[1]

HONORED SIR:

The equipment of the squadron under your excellency's worthy command having been completed, and the ships supplied with provisions and coal, you will arrange for its immediate departure for the harbor of Las Palmas, where without loss of time you will replenish the coal consumed and take whatever quantity of provisions you may deem necessary, according to the respective purposes for which the different units are intended. At Las Palmas you will form the squadron into three divisions. The first, composed of the battle-ship *Carlos V*, cruisers *Rápido*, *Patriota*, and *Meteoro*, and despatch-boat *Giralda*, will re-

[1] For these instructions in full, see Cervera, *Documents*.

main under your excellency's immediate command.[1] The second division, composed of the battle-ships *Pelayo* and *Vitoria* and destroyers *Osado*, *Audaz*, and *Proserpina*, will be placed under the orders of the senior captain, the commander of the *Pelayo*, Captain José Ferrándiz y Niño. The third division, of which the auxiliary cruisers *Buenos Aires*, *Antonio Lopez*, and *Alfonso XII* will form part, will be commanded by Captain José Barrasa y Fernández de Castro.

[Leaving with all the ships and taking care to conceal their final true direction;] the first division, under the command of your excellency, will shape its course for the Bermudas; and at a proper distance from those islands you will detach a fast vessel to acquire at Hamilton all possible information, besides such as the government will communicate to you through our consul, as to the location, number, and quality of the hostile forces distributed along the Atlantic coast [the rest of the division to remain out of sight of the Bermudas].

Taking into account the information you may acquire and eluding an encounter with superior forces, your excellency will choose such point on the United States coasts as you may deem best adapted—Charleston, if possible—to carry out from south to north a series of hostile acts, in the energy of which you will be guided by circumstances, against fortified positions as well as against such places as, owing to their industrial, military, or commercial importance, will justify the operation. . . . Key West being the enemy's principal base of operations, the forces detached to oppose your operations will follow you instead of going to meet you, as would otherwise be the case.

Your excellency will determine to what point the hostilities should be carried, remembering that the object of hostilities is not only to make reprisals for the enemy's unjustified acts on our own coasts, but principally to call his attention toward the north, dividing his forces, and thus facilitating the movements of the third division and at the same time those of Admiral Cervera's squadron. You might find it convenient (but this is not imposed on you as a duty) to go up north so far as to permit you to detach a cruiser to Halifax in order that Lieutenant

[1] The following was the coal capacity and daily consumption of these ships:

SHIP	COAL CAPACITY	DAILY CONSUMPTION	
		At 11.22 Knots	At 15 Knots
Carlos V	2,000	70	169
Rápido	2,362	66	158
Patriota	2,749	Not known	Not known
Meteoro	1,945	99	236
Giralda	436	33	48

Ramón Carranza, who is assigned to Canada, may give you such information as he may have acquired beforehand.

Having accomplished on the United States coasts the object indicated, and following the route which offers the greatest security, you will try, unless reasons of greater importance should prevent, to pass north of the island of Mariguana or Turk's Island, and collect at the latter the information which the government will take care to forward to you there.

From that favorable position you may proceed at your discretion to the southern coast of Cuba, around Cape Maysi; and enter Santiago harbor; or following said coast, enter Havana harbor; or passing north of the keys, enter the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Rico. Any prizes you may be able to capture on this expedition you will despatch to the Peninsula with a suitable prize crew on board, or incorporate in your division as the case may be. If the services such prizes can render do not compensate for the trouble they require, it will be better to get rid of them by sinking them or setting them on fire, after trans-shipping whatever you may deem serviceable, in any event the personnel and flags, the portable armament, and the ship's papers.

As to the second division; in order that its separation from the rest of the squadron may remain unknown as long as possible, and also in order that it may be in a position to reach speedily, if need be, any given point of the Peninsula or Canaries, where its defensive action may be required, it will cruise between parallels 30 and 36 north latitude, the ninth meridian west, and the coast of Africa, for ten or twelve days from the date when it begins to act independently, which is probably the time it will take your excellency to reach the United States coast, after which the second division will proceed to Cadiz to receive further orders.

The third division, upon leaving your excellency's flag-ship, will proceed to the latitude of Cape St. Roque, to cut off the route of the vessels plying between the eastern coast of the United States and South America, or the Pacific. . . .

In case of injury or other unfortunate circumstance making it necessary for ships of this division to seek a port, you will see, provided there is possibility of choice, that preference be given to the French colonies. . . .

If the vicissitudes of the voyage give your excellency an opportunity to join Admiral Cervera's squadron, you will do so at once, and the forces will remain united until the government decides that it is expedient to separate them again, or until both commanders, or in case of difference of opinion, the senior, should deem such separation necessary.

The instructions ended with complimentary phrases trusting that the expedition "will be carried out in such manner as to

earn the approval of the nation and serve as a brilliant example of what may be accomplished in spite of the scarcity of resources, by energy, intelligence, and good-will placed at the service of the king and the country."

That the orders were given with any earnest intent is hardly possible. No serious arrangements seem to have been made for supplying coal for such a long and arduous service which demanded a much greater supply than that carried by the ships. Eighteen days after the order was written Admiral Camara was writing (Cadiz, June 15), mentioning that the *Carlos V* would refill bunkers as far as possible while the 3.94-inch armament was completing. About the same time the minister of war advised the minister of marine, in a telegram of strictest secrecy, that he had very serious news from the Philippines, and that the government considered it necessary for the squadron or part of it to leave immediately in order to calm the public anxiety. Thus, on the day (June 15) that Camara was writing of his unreadiness new orders were prepared directing him to the East. These directed him, as soon as preparations could be completed and troops embarked, to proceed with the ships named in a memorandum, simulating a south-west direction until nightfall, after leaving Cadiz, and then going through the Straits of Gibraltar and to the Suez Canal. But four fighting ships were named in the memorandum which accompanied the order as those which were to proceed to the final destination: the *Pelayo, Carlos V, Patriota,* and *Rápido,* and the two last were but converted cruisers of no fighting value. There were three destroyers, the *Audaz, Osado,* and *Proserpina,* which were to turn back from the canal. The other ships were the troop-ships *Buenos Aires* and *Panay,* and four colliers: the *Colón, Covadónga, San Augustin,* and *San Francisco.* Four other (practically) unarmed ships, the *Alfonso XII, Antonio López Giralda,* and *Piélago,* sailed with the squadron, but were to separate from it at once, when out of sight, and proceed on other duty connected with the ministry of war. The colliers as they discharged their cargoes were to return to Spain. "In any case," the destroyers were to return from the Suez Canal.

The route laid down for the squadron, which, as said, was to

be reduced as a fighting force to the four first-named, was to Socotra and the Laccadives.

Said the instructions:

From the Laccadives you may choose your route according to circumstances, either passing from the north through the Strait of Malacca, and coaling again at some anchoring place on the northern coast of Sumatra; or passing through the Strait of Sunda, touching at Singapore or Batavia if deemed necessary, and proceeding thence to Labuan, Borneo, or, finally passing south of Sumatra and Java, and through the Strait of Lombok, going thence directly to Mindanao without stopping at Labuan. If either of these first two routes is adopted, you can communicate at Labuan with Madrid, stating the condition in which the ships arrive, and receive the confirmation or modification of these instructions, after which you may proceed with the united squadron, or detach ships, as in your judgment may be most effective, to Balabac, Jolo, Basilan or Zamboanga [all widely separated points in the Philippines], re-enforce the detachments with the landing troops, or if possible enter into communication with the authorities at Manila for the purpose of co-operating in the future.

It is evident from the foregoing that the expedition was but an effort to make a display of force throughout the islands which should leave no ground for the United States to claim conquest when the question of peace should come. This is shown in the next paragraph of the instructions which proceeds:

As it is the main object of the expedition to assert our sovereignty in the Philippine Archipelago, and as it is impossible to tell what will be the condition of the islands at the comparatively remote date of your arrival at Mindanao, you will from that time on make your own plans, and take such steps as will lead to the attainment of the total or partial success of this enterprise, according to circumstances, either assisting the Bisayas, or running along the east coast of the archipelago to effect a landing of the forces on the opposite coast of Luzon, provided the conditions of the territory in the part nearest the lagoon and Manila admit of doing so; or passing around the north of said island to operate upon Subig or Manila, if the information you may acquire as to the hostile forces will permit you to meet them without signal inferiority on your side, and even detaching the convoy of troops with more or less escort, or without it, if deemed expedient, in order to facilitate movements or conceal the true object.

If you succeed in communicating with the governor-general of the Philippines, you will consult with him and proceed, within the means

at his disposal, to do anything that may lead to the defence or reconquest of the archipelago, but always trying to operate carefully, as the ordinance prescribes, so as to obviate all encounters which have no prospect of success, considering it an essential point to avoid the useless sacrifice of the squadron, and, under all circumstances, to save the honor of arms.

It is clear that the last thing thought of as desirable was to try conclusions with the American squadron.

Camara's squadron left Cadiz on June 16 with sealed orders, carrying 4,000 troops and 20,000 tons of coal. It reached Port Said June 25. Thanks to the activity of Mr. Ethelbert Watts, the deputy consul-general at Cairo, the Egyptian government refused to allow coal to be supplied or even taken from the Spanish colliers, it being held that under the international rules this could not be done, as the Spanish ships had already enough coal with which to return to a home port. Mr. Watts also secured a lien upon all the available coal at Suez. On June 29 Camara was requested by the Egyptian government to withdraw from Suez, as he had already much exceeded the twenty-four hours to be accorded belligerents; nor was he allowed to remain to effect what he claimed as necessary repairs. On July 1 he sent two transports into the canal and himself went with the rest of his ships into the Mediterranean and out of territorial limits. An endeavor to coal from the colliers by boats during July 2 and 3 availed little, on account of a rough sea.

During the passage from Spain the three destroyers had to be towed. Lines were parted, collisions occurred, many and severe injuries to machinery sustained; when the admiral started with his fleet through the canal, on July 5, they were ordered back to Spain. No sooner had he passed the canal than he was directed by the Egyptian government to leave Suez within twenty-four hours. He thus proceeded seven miles into the Red Sea and attempted to coal during July 7. On July 8 he re-entered the canal, called to return to Spain.

Had he, now insufficiently coaled and with his ships in not over-efficient condition, attempted to continue his voyage to the Philippines from which he was now distant 6,300 miles, his plight would have been much that of Admiral Rojestvensky six years

later. To summarize somewhat, he was, by his orders, to choose a point in the Red Sea or in the island of Socotra to provision and coal; he was to go thence to the Laccadives, distant 1,200 miles, and seek to coal, thence through the Strait of Malacca or Sunda, as he should choose, and thence to Labuan in Borneo; or, passing south of both Sumatra and Java, go through the Strait of Lombok and thence directly through Macassar Strait to Mindanao, a distance by such a route of over 7,000 nautical miles.

To accomplish the voyage to Mindanao would have taken thirty days constant steaming at ten knots. At least ten days would have to be allowed for repairs and coaling, so that had the squadron left Suez for the East on the same day, July 8, that it started on its return to Spain, it could not have been at Mindanao before August 17. And even then, still seven hundred miles from Manila, it would have been without any real and actual purpose. The admiral was to "proceed with the united squadron, or detached ships as in [his] judgment may be most effective, to Balabac, Jolo, Basilan, or Zamboanga, re-enforce the detachments with the landing troops, or, if possible, enter into communication with the authorities at Manila for the purpose of co-operating in the future."!

Again springs to mind that almost greatest, if not the greatest, adage of war: "Seek to know the character of your enemy." For it is by temperament, individual and racial, that all things move, whether in religion, politics, or war, and prominent among all the characteristics of the Spanish race is the indirection so luminously exhibited in the document just quoted. Its admiral was to go somewhere and do nothing. To scatter his fleet hither and thither and land a few soldiers was to play at war. The one wise order given was to direct his return home. Spain got off cheaply with the expenditure of the coal used and of the £64,000 which she paid for the useless promenade to and fro through the Suez Canal.

The last order to Admiral Camara which needs to be noted was one addressed to him at Cartagena, July 23, on his return:

> When the torpedo-boat destroyers have rejoined your squadron, start for Cadiz with the *Pelayo, Carlos V, Rápido, Patriota, Buenos*

Aires, and the destroyers, keeping close to the shore, so as to be seen from Spanish cities, exhibiting, when near them, the national flag, illuminated by search-lights, which are also to be thrown upon the cities. If you meet any coast-guard vessels communicate with them. . . .

Such was war from the point of view of the Spanish ministry.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ARMY AT MANILA

To return to Manila. Though Dewey was, no doubt, somewhat concerned, he was far from being so much so as the previous account would intimate. He knew the difficulties Camara would have to meet in the Indian Ocean through the heavy sea of the south-west monsoon, then blowing in full force, and that Camara's continuance of his voyage, once he was in face of these difficulties, was very doubtful, and certainly that he could not arrive at so early a date as that mentioned. That this was Dewey's view is known by his conversation with some of his captains.[1]

Says General Greene:

On the morning after my arrival, Admiral Dewey furnished a steam launch to General Anderson and me, and we steamed up to reconnoitre the Spanish position. We went toward Manila, well beyond their lines and within easy rifle range, but without drawing their fire. Dewey had sent word to the Spanish captain-general some weeks before, that the first shot fired on any of his ships or boats would be the signal for opening a bombardment, and this warning was carefully respected. Having obtained a fair idea of the Spanish position in the vicinity of the bay, we stopped on our return to find a site for a landing and camp and picked out a flat field about four feet above tide, planted with peanuts, but otherwise entirely open. It was about a mile and a half long by a quarter of a mile wide and enclosed on three sides by dense thickets of bamboo and other tropical trees and by rice swamps, and on the fourth side by the beach and a narrow fringe of large trees. It was sufficiently large to accommodate seven or eight thousand men, and its northern edge was just out of range of musketry, but well within the range of field artillery in the Spanish lines. The beach was flat, of fine white sand, and landing was feasible in calm weather but very difficult in high winds.

[1] From Rear-Admiral Asa Walker, then commander of the *Concord*.

The existence of this field, so close to the Spanish lines, was a piece of good fortune for us, as subsequent reconnaissance showed the entire country about Manila to be composed of rice swamps and bamboo



thickets, and there was not another place between Cavite and Manila where five thousand troops could be camped in one body. Preparations for disembarking from the transports and landing on the beach were begun the following morning [July 19]. . . .

The difficulties of getting established on the shore were not slight. Not an animal or wagon of any description had been brought from America, and the native means of transportation were *caramattas* or light two-wheeled vehicles drawn by ponies, the largest of which was less than eleven hands high, and capable of hauling a load of not over five hundred pounds. In addition to these there was the *carabao*, or water buffalo, an animal of great strength, dragging a heavy two-wheeled cart or a sledge through the mud. It was in the midst of the rainy season and the roads were nothing but quagmires. Such little hauling as was done was usually on sledges drawn by buffaloes. On the water there were available only two small tugs, which had been captured from the Spaniards, and eight or ten *cascos* or native lighters, somewhat resembling the Chinese junk but without sails. Each of these was capable of carrying about two hundred men with their shelter tents, packs, and ten days' rations.

As the landing point was within easy range of the Spanish artillery and the water was very shallow, it was thought best not to bring the transports up from Cavite. The rations were therefore placed in the cascos and each loaded to its full capacity with the men; and a string of three or four of them was then towed up to the landing place at high water and left aground. The men jumped into the water and waded ashore, and as the tide receded, returned to unload their rations. Everything was carried into the camp on the backs of the men. The first regiment was landed and established after dark, but the others on successive days in broad daylight. The Spaniards did not open fire or interfere in any manner. Fortunately, the water was comparatively smooth, and four thousand men were landed without loss or mishap of any kind, the last of them, with eight field-guns, getting ashore on July 22.[1] General Anderson, with about two thousand men, remained at Cavite pending the arrival of the next expedition. . . .

The Spanish line began at the southerly edge of the suburb of Malate and led up to a strong stonework called Fort Antonio de Abad, mounting field artillery of the same calibre as our own. This was situated on a peninsula formed by a stream which flowed out from the city; in front of the fort it was about one hundred feet wide, and it was reported not to be fordable. It was spanned by a stone bridge with stone parapets backed with sand bags about five feet high and eight feet thick, with traverses at intervals of a few yards. This extended

[1] The general omits to mention the use of the steam launches of the squadron, all of which were actively employed in assisting in the disembarkation. An avoidable drawback was in the failure to utilize the earlier hours of the morning when it was invariably calm. The strong sea breeze usually set in about 10 A. M. and then made any landing at Camp Dewey rough and difficult. The cascos were thus frequently stove or swamped, drenching the men and their accoutrements and rations.

inland for about a thousand yards to a block-house of the familiar Spanish type, on a piece of hard ground commanding one of the roads which led into town; the other road from the south leading directly past Fort San Antonio. From the block-house, the number of which, 14, was plainly painted upon it, the line made a sharp turn to the north and disappeared in the bamboo thickets.

The country outside of the peanut field in which we were camped was a succession of rice swamps through which led a few roads, almost impassable, on the borders of which were enormous clumps of tall bamboo poles, which were quite impassable. What little hard ground there was in the intervals between the swamps was cultivated with beans growing on high poles, and each lot or garden was surrounded by a high hedge through which a man could not make his way. The country was perfectly flat and there was no point from which a general view of it could be obtained.

The portion of the Spanish lines nearest the shore could be clearly made out from a white house called by us (erroneously) the "convent," situated in a field near the beach, and a little less than one thousand yards from Fort San Antonio. The house was a fine target for the Spanish artillery as well as for the infantry, and was completely riddled with bullets and shells.

Block-house No. 14 could be approached by crawling through the bean fields and thickets to a peasant's house about two hundred yards distant from it. The slightest exposure at either of these houses instantly brought a rain of bullets. Off to the right there was a cross-road leading through about two miles of swamps to a slight hill just above the convent of San Pedro Macati, on the Pasig River. From this hill a fine view could be obtained into the back of Manila, and across the intervening rice swamps and thickets the block-houses and adjacent trenches of the Spaniards on the east of the city could be distinguished.[1]

The Spanish situation at Manila is described by General Greene:

The Spanish troops, 13,000 in number, occupied the old fortifications in the centre of Manila and a line of block-houses and trenches thrown up around the city in a semicircle with a diameter of five miles. Just outside the Spanish lines were barricades on every road, and a few small trenches between them, all occupied by an armed force of Philippine insurgents, said to number about 10,000 men. These blockaded the city on the land side to such an extent as to prevent the entry of any food. The insurgents had captured the water-works and cut off the supply from the city. Within the city meat was very scarce and

[1] Greene, *The Century Magazine*, March, 1899.

the Spaniards were living on horseflesh, which was regularly slaughtered and sold . . . the large Chinese population was eating cats and dogs. . . . During the day everything was quiet, but at night the city was brilliantly lighted by electricity, and a sputtering infantry fire, with an occasional shot from a field-gun, usually broke out between the Spanish and insurgent lines about 10 o'clock, lasted for an hour or more, and then subsided until just before dawn, when it was resumed. At daylight the firing ceased by mutual consent.

Large bodies of the insurgents, armed with Mausers and Remingtons, were between General Greene's position and the Spanish lines. They "took turns in serving in the trenches for a few days and then returning to their homes in the vicinity for a week to rest, their posts and arms being taken by others. . . . They were constantly engaged in desultory fighting with the Spaniards, and when their ammunition was exhausted they would abandon the barricade in a body and go off to get more." The Spaniards, remarks Greene, would have had no trouble with a large force in running over them, but the view so frequently mentioned in this book is corroborated by the general, who says: "The Spaniard, like the Turk, is not given to offensive operations. His plan of warfare is to fight behind entrenchments, barbed wire, and fortifications." Nevertheless, being but three-quarters of a mile to the rear of the insurgents, the American general took no chances and kept a fourth of his force on outpost duty. He thus awaited General Merritt's arrival, which was to be but a few days later, July 25.

The third expedition of 197 officers and 4,650 men, under command of Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, left San Francisco; the first four ships, the *Indiana*, *City of Pará*, *Morgan City*, and *Ohio*, June 27; the *Valencia*, June 28; the *Newport*, in which also sailed General Merritt and his staff, on June 29.[1] The expe-

[1] The following was the composition of the expedition: Detachment of 6 enlisted men of First Regiment Nebraska Infantry, United States Volunteers. Headquarters, band, and Companies B, C, G, and L, Twenty-third United States Infantry, with recruits for First Battalion, Twenty-third United States Infantry, 11 officers and 481 enlisted men, Colonel Samuel Ovenshine commanding. Headquarters, band, and Companies C, D, F, and H, Eighteenth Infantry, with recruits for First Battalion, Eighteenth Infantry, 9 officers and 519 enlisted men, Colonel D. D. Van Valzah commanding. Batteries G, H, K, and L, Third United States Artillery, 9 officers, 722 enlisted men, Cap-

dition, as mentioned, arrived at Manila July 24, four days earlier than expected.

General Merritt carried with him detailed instructions, signed by President McKinley on May 19, which to some degree foreshadowed later policy. They began as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, *May* 19, 1898.

To THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR: The destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, followed by the taking of the naval station at Cavite, the paroling of the garrisons, and acquisition of the control of the bay, have rendered it necessary, in the further prosecution of the measures adopted by this government for the purpose of bringing about an honorable and durable peace with Spain, to send an army of occupation to the Philippines for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and giving order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States. For the command of this expedition I have designated Major-General Wesley Merritt, and it now becomes my duty to give instructions as to the manner in which the movement shall be conducted.

The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under this changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the people of the

tains W. E. Birkhimer and James O'Hara, Third United States Artillery, commanding. Company A, Engineer Battalion, 2 officers, and 100 enlisted men, First Lieutenant C. P. Echols, Engineer Corps, commanding. Thirteenth Regiment Minnesota Infantry, United States Volunteers, 44 officers, and 963 enlisted men, Colonel C. McReeve commanding. First and Second Battalions, First Regiment Idaho Infantry, United States Volunteers, 32 officers and 657 enlisted men, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Jones commanding. First and Second Battalions, First Regiment North Dakota Infantry, United States Volunteers, 30 officers and 642 enlisted men, Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Treumann commanding. First Battalion, First Regiment Wyoming Infantry, United States Volunteers, 14 officers and 322 enlisted men, Major F. M. Foote commanding. Company A, Signal Corps, United States Volunteers, 5 officers and 55 enlisted men, Captain E. A. McKenna commanding. Artillery detachment Astor Battery, 3 officers and 99 enlisted men, First Lieutenant P. C. March, Fifth United States Artillery, commanding. Thirty-six staff officers, 65 enlisted men of Hospital Corps, United States Army; 19 enlisted men attached to General Merritt's headquarters; 30 civilian clerks; 2 civilian messengers, and 3 newspaper correspondents, total, 197 officers, 4,650 enlisted men, 35 civilians.

Philippines should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the expedition, immediately upon his arrival in the islands, to publish a proclamation declaring that we come, not to make war upon the people of the Philippines nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, co-operate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and protection. Our occupation should be as free from severity as possible.

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man, under the supervision of the American commander-in-chief. The native constabulary will, as far as may be practicable, be preserved. The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when it may be necessary to do so.

While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will be such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a different kind if, unfortunately, the course of the people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or expel the native officials in part or altogether, to substitute new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist, or to create such or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and his experience and a high sense of justice.

The instructions continued, dealing with the treatment of property and collection and administration of revenues and the administration in general of the territory under military occupation. Harmonious action between the army and navy was enjoined, and all ports occupied were to be open to the commerce

of all nations, in articles not contraband of war and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty.[1]

General Merritt found in Greene's camp, situated as it was amid swamps, with shelter tents only and without "adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season," "the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance" which was so remarkable among the troops everywhere during the war. But he found also a less cheerful element in the presence of the army of Aguinaldo, estimated by Merritt at some twelve thousand men, "well supplied with small arms with plenty of ammunition and several field-guns," and which held positions of investment opposite the Spanish line of detached works throughout their full extent. Aguinaldo neither visited him nor offered his services, and General Merritt wisely decided not to hold any direct communication with him until the American forces should be in possession of the city. Preparations were thus pressed and operations conducted without reference to the insurgents, except that General Greene was directed to influence General Noriel to move to the right in his own trenches, which were about a mile north of the American camp, to allow the Americans an unobstructed control of roads in their immediate front. This, after a reference by the insurgent general to Aguinaldo, whose headquarters were eleven miles in the rear, was done, and at 8 o'clock the next morning (June 29) a battalion of the Eighteenth Regular Infantry, a battalion of the First Colorado Volunteers, and four guns of the Utah Artillery were in the trenches nearest the beach. A stronger trench, however, was constructed, mainly by the First Colorado, about one hundred and twenty-five yards in advance, during the night of July 29–30. This was about two hundred and seventy yards only in length; on its right were the insurgents.

Mounted in and near Fort San Antonio, immediately in front, were three bronze field-guns of 3.6-inch, four bronze mountain guns of 3.2-inch, and, near the block-house, two steel mountain guns of like calibre. The line was manned throughout by infantry, with strong reserves at Malate.

[1] In full in *Investigation of the Conduct of the War with Spain*, II, 1232–1234.

On July 30 two battalions of the First California relieved the previous infantry; the work of strengthening the trenches was steadily continued, and on July 31 the men were relieved by two battalions of the Tenth Pennsylvania and a company of the Third Regular Artillery, who kept up the work for a third day without any interruption by the Spaniards further than occasional picket firing. The rain was incessant and the black loam, nearly saturated, washed down almost as fast as thrown up. No bags were yet available from the transport, but bamboo poles were cut and used with considerable success.

Shortly before midnight of July 31–August 1, the rain falling in torrents and the night of inky blackness, a heavy fire of infantry and artillery was opened from the Spanish position, but 750 yards away. This fire, instead of remaining unnoticed as usual by the men in the trenches, who were, if not standing, perfectly protected, was answered by the Pennsylvanians, the bright flashes of whose powder served to give direction to the Spanish fire. The whole camp was aroused and under arms. Captain Hobbs with Battery K of the Third Artillery moved forward at once without orders, a battalion of the First California was ordered to the trenches, and a second battalion of the same regiment and three battalions of the First Colorado Infantry were advanced to within one thousand two hundred yards of the trenches and held in reserve. The firing ceased about 2 A. M. Captain Hobbs of the artillery was slightly and Captain Richter of the First California mortally wounded. The whole losses of the night were 10 killed and 43 wounded, of whom 6 killed and 29 wounded were among the Pennsylvanians.

The *Boston*, Captain Wildes, had been stationed some one thousand five hundred yards from shore and was in signal communication with General Greene's position. It was understood that her captain would open fire whenever this was requested, but, says General Greene, the admiral was very anxious that this should not be done, unless absolutely necessary, until after the arrival of the *Monterey*. The general was thus reluctant to make the signal unless convinced the Spanish were advancing in overwhelming force. Greene became convinced that there was no advance and no signal was made.

The remarks of the able correspondent of the *New York Sun* are in all probability correct. He says:

As the unfortunate affair gets further away and so into better focus, it becomes more and more clear that it was a mistake, and it cost the Tenth Pennsylvania men who made it dear. There was no need of replying to the Spanish fire. The entrenchment was almost perfect protection. When the men kept well behind their earthwork the Spanish fire was practically harmless. The First Colorado men, who began the trench, and the First Nebraska boys, who finished it, suffered no loss, although they worked steadily through the day as well as at night in throwing up the parapet. There was desultory firing at them much of the time, but it was all wild and they made no response. They paid not the least attention to the Spaniards and went on with their work.

The day after the fight I went over to Camp Dewey from Cavite, and spent that night in the trench with the First Colorado, Utah Batteries, and Third Battalion, First California. The Spaniards kept up a terrific fire nearly all night. For a few minutes after it began the Utah boys kept up a lively fire with their 3-inch guns, and the Colorada boys showed the Spaniards a trick in volley firing. Then our fire ceased and thereafter from the main trench not a shot was fired all night. Not a man was hurt after our firing stopped. They sat behind their parapet and let the Spaniards blaze away. Bullets and shells flew over our heads in whistling chorus until daylight, and then there was a tremendous outburst. Colonel Hale, however, kept his men down, and after a while the Spaniards got tired.[1]

General Greene now decided to extend his trenches to avoid a possible flank attack. His report says:

Although not covered by my instructions (which were to occupy the trenches from the bay to Calle Real and to avoid precipitating an engagement), I ordered the First Colorado and one battalion of the First California, which occupied the trenches at 9 A. M., August 1, to extend the line of trenches to the Pasay road. The work was begun by these troops and continued every day by the troops occupying the trenches in turn until a strong line was completed by August 12, about one thousand two hundred yards in length, extending from the bay to the east side of the Pasay road. Its left rested on the bay and its right on an extensive rice swamp practically impassable. The right flank was refused, because the only way to cross a smaller rice swamp, crossing the line about seven hundred yards from the beach, was along a cross-road in rear of the general line. As finally completed the works were very strong in profile, being from five to six feet in height and eight to

[1] *New York Sun*, September 11, 1898.

ten feet in thickness at the base, strengthened by bags filled with earth. The only material available was black soil saturated with water, and without the bags this was washed down and ruined in a day by the heavy and almost incessant rains. The construction of these trenches was constantly interrupted by the enemy's fire. They were occupied by the troops in succession, four battalions being usually sent out for a service of twenty-four hours, and posted with three battalions in the trenches and one battalion in reserve along the cross-road to Pasay, Cossack posts being sent out from the latter to guard the camp against any possible surprise from the north-east and east. The service in the trenches was of the most arduous character, the rain being almost incessant and the men having no protection against it. They were wet during the entire twenty-four hours, and the mud was so deep that the shoes were ruined and a considerable number of men rendered barefooted. Until the notice of bombardment was given on August 7 any exposure above or behind the trenches promptly brought the enemy's fire, so that the men had to sit in the mud under cover, and keep awake, prepared to resist an attack, during the entire tour of twenty-four hours. After one particularly heavy rain a portion of the trench contained two feet of water, in which the men had to remain. It could not be drained, as it was lower than an adjoining rice swamp in which the water had risen nearly two feet, the rainfall being more than four inches in twenty-four hours. These hardships were all endured by the men of the different regiments in turn with the finest possible spirit and without a murmur of complaint.

On the night of August 1–2 the trenches were occupied by the First Colorado Infantry. Firing from the Spanish lines began about 10 P. M. and was kept up for more than an hour. It was replied to by the guns of Battery B, Utah Artillery, but in compliance with instructions the infantry made only a slight response. Casualties were, 1 killed and 1 wounded. A Spanish shell struck one of the guns, carrying away the sight. The Spanish fire again opened at 5 A. M., August 2, and continued half an hour, but was not replied to.

August 2 the trenches were occupied by the First Nebraska and one battalion Eighteenth United States Infantry. Heavy fire was opened by the Spaniards at 9.45 P. M. and continued for three-quarters of an hour. The commanding officer (Colonel Bratt, First Nebraska) being convinced that the Spaniards had left their trenches to attack him, replied vigorously with both artillery and infantry. Casualties, 1 killed and 2 wounded.

August 3 and 4 there was no firing, except occasionally between pickets in advance of the trenches.

August 5 the trenches were occupied by five companies Fourteenth United States Infantry and four companies Twenty-third United States Infantry, then temporarily under my command.

August 6 there was no firing except occasionally between pickets.

Before the firing, difficulty had been found in preventing the men through curiosity from strolling up the beach toward the Spanish lines and drawing their fire. Sentinels had been posted to prevent this, but thereafter none were needed; the troops came to a realization of the soberness of their work, the results of which, under the cheerless influences of the climate, were depressing enough. Says Mr. F. D. Millet:[1] "The skies were dull gray and lowering; the ground was soaked and half flooded, and violent winds unceasingly drove the rain into the open shelter, pitilessly drenching the men and all their possessions."

If so full of the disagreeable to a veteran campaigner in many lands, and who among many experiences had witnessed the tragedy of Plevna, how much more so to the young and light-hearted volunteer, now seven thousand miles from his usual comfortable and cheerful surroundings, and subjected not only to the cheerlessness of continued rain and knee-deep mud, but to the tropical heat which, combined with a saturated atmosphere, made life thoroughly miserable. But there was no flinching; it was all accepted with a cheerful good humor and a courage which clamored for places on the firing line; their bearing was an everlasting honor to the young men called upon thus to suffer.

On August 4 the *Monterey* arrived and Admiral Dewey had with him a ship capable of receiving and giving the hardest knocks of war. Her battery, of two 12-inch and two 10-inch guns, was a powerful addition to the 8-inch guns of the squadron already present, if it should be needed to use these against the fortifications of the walled city. There was already no question of the possibility of dealing successfully with the guns of the city fortifications, as the eight-, six-, and five-inch guns of Dewey's squadron had a much longer range than any that were ashore. Dewey's telegram "I can take the city at any time" was thus perfectly correct. He could subject it to bombardment while he himself was out of Spanish range.

As for the Spanish forces entrenched to the south, they were always wholly at the mercy of the squadron's guns. The Spanish

[1] The distinguished artist who accompanied General Merritt and was correspondent of *Harper's Weekly* and the *London Times*.

lines, beginning at Fort San Antonio (two and a half miles south of which was the American camp), ran at right angles to the beach and could thus be completely enfiladed by the fire of the ships. They would not be tenable a moment after such fire should be opened. General Greene, now that the *Monterey* was come, and there was a ship present which could withstand heavy fire at moderate range, was anxious that some decisive step should be taken. Admiral Dewey was convinced that a little delay would cause the city to yield without loss. "It was better," said Dewey to Greene, "to have small losses, night by night, in the trenches than to run the risk of greater losses by premature attack. But," he added, "the decision rests with you. If you burn the blue light on the beach the *Raleigh* will immediately open fire, and the *Charleston* will go to her assistance, and the *Boston* and *Monterey* will follow if the engagement continues. All of these ships have steam up every night and these orders have been given to their captains, but I hope you will not burn the blue light unless you are on the point of being driven out." I assured him that there was little danger of that.[1]

General Merritt, after an interview with Admiral Dewey on August 5, maintained the existing situation. That night the Spanish fire began at 7.30 and lasted until 10. "As usual," says Greene, "the mistake was made of thinking the Spaniards were advancing and our men fired away nearly 20,000 rounds. Our losses were 3 killed and 7 wounded."

Although [says Millet] Manila was invested by land and blockaded by sea there was a certain amount of recognized communication with the town through the agency of the foreign fleet. Occasionally, too, foreigners had permission to enter or leave the town, and twice or three times several Englishman in business in Manila came aboard the *Newport* [in which were the army headquarters]. They were very reticent about the situation in the town, evidently considering themselves bound in honor not to impart any information at all, but they did not deny that they had a full larder themselves or contradict the statement that the inhabitants were reduced to eat horseflesh. The Belgian consul, M. [Eduard] André, was apparently the recognized official messenger between the belligerents, and it was reported that he was earnestly trying to persuade the Spanish authorities to surrender the place and

[1] Greene, in the *Century Magazine*, April, 1899, 923.

avoid further loss of life. He afterward told me that this was so, and that the governor-general refused to consider the proposition, declaring that Spanish honor was at stake, and this would be compromised in the eyes of the world if he surrendered without a fight. M. André aptly remarked to me that this was a *façon de parler.*[1]

Pundonor was the real stumbling block; there must be at least a semblance of attack and defence to fulfil the demands of the Spanish military code.

Newspapers frequently came out of Manila, and that of August 5 announced the removal of Lieutenant-General Davila as governor-general and captain-general of the Philippines and as general in command of the troops, and the succession of his second in command, General of Division Don Fermin Jaudenes.

[1] Millet. *The Expedition to the Philippines*, 111.

CHAPTER XIX

THE SURRENDER OF MANILA

THERE were now with MacArthur's and Greene's brigades about 8,500 men ashore, and in the bay the powerful re-enforcement of the *Monterey;* thus on August 6 a joint letter to the Spanish governor-general was prepared notifying him that he should remove all non-combatants within forty-eight hours and that operations against the Manila defences might begin at any time after the expiration of the period. This letter, sent on August 7, was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES LAND AND NAVAL FORCES,
MANILA BAY, P. I., *August* 7, 1898.

THE GENERAL IN CHIEF, *Commanding Spanish Forces in Manila.*

SIR: We have the honor to notify your excellency that operations of the land and naval forces of the United States against the defences of Manila may begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eight hours from the hour of receipt by you of this communication, or sooner if made necessary by an attack on your part.

This notice is given in order to afford you an opportunity to remove all non-combatants from the city.

Very respectfully,
WESLEY MERRITT,
Major-General, United States Army,
Commanding Land Forces of the United States.
GEORGE DEWEY,
Rear-Admiral, United States Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station.

To this the governor-general replied:

MANILA, *August* 7, 1898.

To THE MAJOR-GENERAL OF THE ARMY *and* THE REAR-ADMIRAL OF THE NAVY, *Commanding, respectively, the Military and Naval Forces of the United States.*

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to inform your excellencies that at half past 12 to-day I received the notice with which you favor me, that

after forty-eight hours have elapsed you may begin operations against this fortified city, or at an earlier hour if the forces under your command are attacked by mine.

As your notice is sent for the purpose of providing for the safety of non-combatants, I give thanks to your excellencies for the humane sentiments you have shown, and state that finding myself surrounded by insurrectionary forces, I am without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick, women, and children who are now lodged within the walls.

Very respectfully, and kissing the hands of your excellencies,

FERMIN JAUDENES,
Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines.

From this time forward, until August 13, no shot was fired on either side, though "it was with great difficulty, and in some cases not without force, that the insurgents were restrained from opening fire and thus drawing the fire of the Spaniards."[1]

The forty-eight hours' notice expired at noon of August 9. The interval had been used by many of the foreign inhabitants of the city to carry themselves and property aboard the foreign men-of-war. "About 10 o'clock [of the 9th] we saw from the beach the English and Japanese vessels leave their anchorage and slowly steam across the bay to Cavite, where they took up a position near our squadron. The two German and two French cruisers remained, as far as we could see, at their moorings off the breakwater."[2] Red Cross flags began to appear over buildings in many parts of the city, a sign of anticipation of a bombardment. Instead of immediately proceeding to carry out the threat, a joint note was sent by General Merritt and Admiral Dewey:

MANILA BAY, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, *August* 9, 1898.

SIR: The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded, sick, women, and children, in the event that it becomes our duty to reduce the defences of the walled town in which they are gathered, will, we feel assured, appeal successfully to the sympathies of a general capable of making the determined and prolonged resistance which your excellency has exhibited after the loss of your naval forces, and without hope of succor.

We therefore submit, without prejudice to the high sentiments of honor and duty which your excellency entertains, that surrounded on

[1] Greene, *Century Magazine*, April, 1899. [2] Millet, 129.

every side as you are by a constantly increasing force, with a powerful fleet in your front, and deprived of all prospect of re-enforcement and assistance, a most useless sacrifice of life would result in the event of an attack, and therefore every consideration of humanity makes it imperative that you should not subject your city to the horrors of a bombardment. Accordingly we demand the surrender of the city of Manila and the Spanish forces under your command.

Very respectfully,

WESLEY MERRITT,
Major-General, U. S. A.,
Commanding Land Forces of the United States.

GEORGE DEWEY,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. N.,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES.

To this the governor-general replied:

MANILA, *August* 9, 1898.

GENTLEMEN: Having received an intimation from your excellencies that, in obedience to sentiments of humanity to which you appeal, and which I share, I should surrender the city and the forces under my orders, I have assembled the council of defence, which declares that your request cannot be granted, but taking account of the most exceptional circumstances existing in the city, which your excellencies recite and which I unfortunately have to admit, I would consult my government if your excellencies will grant the time strictly necessary for this communication by way of Hong-Kong.

Very respectfully,

FERMIN JAUDENES,
Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines.

THE MAJOR-GENERAL OF THE ARMY *and* THE REAR-ADMIRAL OF THE NAVY, *Commanding, respectively, the Military and Naval Forces of the United States.*

This request, as shown in the following, was refused:

MANILA BAY, *August* 10, 1898.

SIR: We have the honor to acknowledge the communication of your excellency of the 8th instant, in which you suggest your desire to consult your government in regard to the exceptional circumstances in your city, provided the time to do so can be granted by us.

In reply we respectfully inform your excellency that we decline to grant the time requested.

Very respectfully,
WESLEY MERRITT,
Major-General, U. S. A.,
Commanding U. S. Land Forces.

GEORGE DEWEY,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Meanwhile the good offices of the Belgian consul continued, and by August 11 it was understood that no serious resistance would follow American action. Orders were thus given for the ships of the squadron to take position at 9 A. M. of August 13, opposite the Spanish entrenchments which began at Fort San Antonio, and open a heavy fire in their direction, following which the *Olympia* would steam up in front of the walled city with the international signal to "surrender" flying. It was expected that the Spanish troops would fall back as soon as the fire of the ships was well developed, and on the hoisting of a white flag on the city walls, officers of the fleet and army were to go ashore and arrange terms.

The *Concord* had already been stationed about a mile off the end of the breakwater to control ingress and egress to and from the city, and on August 12 the commanding officers of all the ships were ordered aboard the *Olympia*, informed as to the positions to be occupied, and instructed not to fire upon the city front unless they themselves were fired upon. At the same time the field artillery ashore was to fire against the front of the fort and the trenches.

On August 12, General Merritt issued General Orders (No. 4) which stated that a combined land and naval attack would be made on the enemy's works the next day at noon. "It will consist of a naval and artillery attack. Our lines will make no advance but hold the trenches, the infantry covering the artillery." The First Brigade (on the right), with 8 battalions in the advance and 3 in reserve, was to have Block-house No. 14 and the adjoin-

ing trenches as its objective; the Second Brigade (on the left next the bay), with 7 battalions in the advance and 8 in reserve, Fort San Antonio and the trenches near. The men were to take a day's cooked rations and 100 rounds of Springfield ammunition or 150 Krag-Jörgensen.

A memorandum for general officers regarding "the possible action Saturday August 13" was also issued.

The navy, under Rear-Admiral Dewey, is to sail at 9 o'clock in the morning, August 13, moving up to the different positions assigned to the war-ships and open fire about 10 o'clock. The troops are to hold themselves in readiness, as already agreed upon, to advance on the enemy in front, occupying the entrenchments after they are so shaken as to make the advance practicable without a serious disadvantage to our troops. In case the navy is delayed in dismounting the enemy's guns and levelling the works, no advance is to be made by the army unless ordered from these headquarters. In the event of a white flag being displayed by the enemy on the angle of the walled city, or prominently anywhere else in sight, coupled with a cessation of firing on our part, it will mean surrender, as the admiral proposes, after having fired a satisfactory number of shots, to move up toward the walled city and display the international signal "Surrender." If a white flag is displayed, this will be an answer to his demand, and the troops will advance in good order and quietly.

These headquarters will be on board the *Zafiro*, which has been placed at the disposal of the commanding-general by the admiral. Six companies of the Second Oregon Regiment, now quartered at Cavite, will accompany these headquarters, to be used in occupying and keeping order in the walled city in the event of necessity. If the white flag is displayed, the admiral will send his flag lieutenant ashore, accompanied by a staff officer from these headquarters, who will bring word as to the proposition made by the enemy. The troops in the meantime will advance and, entering the enemy's works by our left flank, move in such positions as may be assigned them by orders from these headquarters. This is not intended to interdict the entrance, if possible, by the First Brigade or part of the troops over the enemy's works on the right. It is intended that these results shall be accomplished without the loss of life; and while the firing continues from the enemy with their heavy guns, or if there is an important fire from their entrenched lines, the troops will not attempt an advance unless ordered from these headquarters.

In the event of unfavorable weather for the service of the guns on board ship, the action will be delayed until further orders. . . .

WESLEY MERRITT, *Major-General.*

A second memorandum gave careful instructions for both brigade commanders to prevent the moving forward, beyond certain points, of any armed men except Americans.

General Greene's brigade, after passing the trenches at the beach and vicinity, will move forward through Malate and Ermita as rapidly as possible, placing a guard at the Spanish trenches with similar instructions to those given to General MacArthur's troops, and leaving small guards in Malate and Ermita to be relieved by General MacArthur's troops.

General Greene will move forward as directed, and, passing on the road which runs to the eastward of the walled city, will cross a portion of his forces on the bridge leading to Quiapo for the protection of the residence portion of the city, said to exist along the river in the direction of San Miguel. He will also cross with a larger portion of his brigade on the bridge leading to the Calle de la Escolata, and establish his headquarters at Binondo for the protection of that portion of the city known to contain the principal business warehouses and stores. General Greene will leave guards to hold both bridges crossed, and will raise the American flag on the north side of the Pasig River.

Forcible encounters with the insurgents in carrying out these orders will be very carefully guarded against, but pillage, rapine, or violence by the native inhabitants or disorderly insurgents must be prevented at any cost.

Care should be taken by both brigade commanders not to get the men too much scattered. Camp will be left standing and regimental quartermasters and a guard of 100 men for each brigade will remain in it.

At 9 o'clock, August 13, the signal "Ships take their stations" was made by the flag-ship and immediately executed; the *Concord* off the mouth of the Pasig, some 1,400 yards; the *Boston*, *Baltimore*, *Charleston*, and *Monterey* off the city front, and the *Olympia*, *Raleigh*, and *Petrel*, with the captured *Callao* and tug *Barcelo*, off Fort San Augustin. The *Olympia* opened fire on the fort, which was followed by the ships which were stationed with her.

It is somewhat difficult to discuss military operations which were to be bloodless, or, in the words of the memorandum, intended to "be accomplished without loss of life," though to the rank and file in general they were thoroughly serious and were met with a spirit ready to dare the utmost.

The proper and dignified procedure of the Spanish authorities would, of course, in such a case of *force majeure* as that by which they were faced, have been to yield outright. The Spanish commander was clearly not justified in subjecting the city to a bombardment by sea which would but have brought a final surrender after a terrible waste of life and property, leaving to the Americans and Filipinos a combined occupancy of a ruined city, and one, too, which the Spanish hoped finally to retain under their dominion. The harsh military code of Spain, however, stood in the way, and Jaudenes had but too much reason to keep it in mind.[1]

If, however, the Spanish authorities could suppose that they could, by the arrangement made, "save face" and the Americans save Manila from a savage onslaught by the insurgents, whom it would have been impossible to control in the midst of a fierce battle against a common enemy, it was wisdom and humanity in the American commanders to do what was done. The question was one of gaining an end, not of slaughtering men. While it was intended that the movement should be without loss of life, there were, through some failures of correlation and through the activity of the insurgents, to be some losses.

The position assigned General Greene's brigade extended from the beach to a small rice swamp, some 700 yards. The seven battalions in the trenches by 8 A. M. were the First Colorado and Eighteenth Regular Infantry and the Third Artillery. The eight battalions in reserve were the First California, First Nebraska, and Tenth Pennsylvania. There were seven guns in the trenches between the beach and the Camino Real. Two navy 3-inch boat-guns manned by men of the Utah Artillery were placed 600 yards from Block-house No. 14.

Says Millet in his picturesque and accurate account of events at this end:

> At 4 o'clock [A. M., August 13], the bugles sounded their harsh call and this time there was no grumbling to be heard as we struggled into our wet clothes, at least at my tent, which I now occupied alone, as

[1] For the treatment of General Jaudenes on his return to Spain, see vol. I, pp. 201-203, note.

Colonel Potter had gone away ill. A slight drizzle was falling and the skies were lowering and the atmosphere was heavy and depressing. After a hasty breakfast at 6 o'clock, General Greene and his staff mounted their ponies and, crossing the camp already half deserted, plodded slowly through the mud up the Camino Real. Long lines of men, for all the world like Confederates in their slouch hats and ragged brown uniforms, silently followed a sinuous trail through the fields, and other detachments picked their way along the canal of black slime which now bore little resemblance to a highway. We had gone but a short distance beyond the camp when a violent tempest swept across the sea and land, and peal after peal of heavy thunder rumbled ominously all around us. The rain came down in streams, not in drops, and ponchos were little protection in the driving storm. In a pause of the echoing thunder we suddenly heard, just ahead of us and a little to the right, the familiar and heavy boom of the insurgent cannon on the Pasay road. General Greene, who was leading our little cavalcade, turned around with a look of disgust as much as to say, "Those idiots of insurgents will spoil the whole game with their foolishness." [1]

General Greene went with his staff to what was known among the Americans as the white house, a residence just within the American lines and near the beach. "We noticed," says Millet, "that the embrasures on the water battery under the stone fort were no longer darkened by the muzzles of the field-pieces which had so often annoyed us. This was significant and did not look like business."

Shortly after 9 o'clock, "great masses of vapor and heavy showers of rain" sweeping over the bay and shore, making things almost invisible, the *Olympia* opened the firing against Fort San Antonio, in which the field artillery ashore also joined. "The enemy made no sign."

Soon after 10, the firing now having lasted over half an hour, it was determined to advance. Some time was expended and difficulty experienced in getting signals to the ships, which continued firing some time, no doubt at such an elevation now as to know that it would not incommode the men on the beach, though there was evidently some nervousness on that point. Soon, however, the Colorado men "streamed up the beach, waded the river, and scattered all around the fort. It was evidently deserted." In a few moments the American flag was hoisted by

[1] Millet, 137.

Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy, of the Colorado regiment, the appearance of which sent an exultant yell along the line, "which drowned all other sounds with its strident savage note of victory." In the fort were two dead and one wounded. Four guns were left from which the breech blocks had been removed.

Firing now began to come from the vicinity of Block-house No. 14. The squadron was approaching the town; word came that General MacArthur was meeting with "stubborn resistance." "So we all," says Millet, "rode rapidly up the beach and beyond the fort upon the high bank along shore, which was honeycombed with rifle-pits and zigzags."

There was a second line of defence some two hundred yards to the north of the fort. Here there were some shots fired by the Spaniards which caused the party for a moment to take shelter.

The column advanced again, although a spattering fire continued from the houses of Malate, and once in a while a heavier drift of bullets would come spasmodically from the woods to the right. Now our men began to stream along the Camino Real. across the bridge and up the road toward the houses, not at all as if they were advancing upon an enemy, but as if on march, with their coffee coolers along and their rifles at right shoulder shift. No return firing had been yet allowed; shortly, however, a few volleys were ordered in the direction of the most annoying fire, and thence on spasms of firing from both sides were frequent. The captured gun-boat *Callao,* under Lieutenant Tappan, carrying one 3-inch and several machine-guns, kept abreast or slightly in advance of the head of the column and within two hundred yards of the shore all the way to the walled city, and was "always in position to render most valuable assistance had determined resistance been met."[1]

The Camino Real had been entered just north of the second line of defences. "The broad straight thoroughfare was now busy with our men dashing across by squads from one side to the other and peppering the retreating Spaniards whenever they caught sight of them."

[1] General Greene's *Report.*

General Greene halted and reformed his men in the square of Malate, and again went forward. "It was now exactly noon, and although we were not yet in sight of the walled town, we knew it was but a short mile to the gates. Pushing rapidly on up the street, we met a civilian who shouted:

"The Spaniards have raised a white flag!"

The general, followed by those few who were mounted, galloped ahead and came out on to the Luneta, "the dreary waste . . . with its shabby band stand, its scrubby trees and ugly lamp-posts, was quite deserted and uninviting in its baldness. The gray walls of the citadel frowned ominously directly in front four hundred yards away, and on a prominent corner a great white sheet, hastily tied by its corners to a swaying bamboo pole planted in the turf, fluttered lazily in the wind." The parapet was covered with Spanish infantry.

General Greene continued on toward the walls. The farther we went on, the more we seemed to become the target of the enemy, and we could not always tell where the shots came from, behind us or from the right or even from the walls of the town. Our little party had none of the signs of authority about it . . . every one wore a rain coat or a poncho and all were splashed from head to foot with mud.

General Greene, coming to the south-west angle of the citadel, spoke to an officer who appeared at an embrasure and asked if the town had surrendered. He was informed that officers were on their way ashore to receive the surrender, and he was directed, in answer to his request to enter the town, to the first bridge over the moat at the Puerta Real, where he would probably be met by a Spanish officer. By this time a small body of American troops had appeared coming out of the Paco road, which turned out to be a company of the Twenty-third Regulars, Captain O'Connor. They formed in the road near the parapet, which was crowded with Spanish soldiers. The Paco road was now filled with Spanish infantry falling back from Santa Ana. A California battalion arrived; firing still went on near at hand. The Spanish troops in the Paco road had been halted by Captain O'Connor, but General Greene, on seeing in the distance additional American troops, directed the Spanish officers to march the men into

the town, retaining the commanding officers. Soon after they had disappeared in the covered way beyond the bridge, a carriage and pair with two men in livery came dashing out and a note was handed to the general. He at once drove into the town, taking with him Captain Bates, his chief of staff.[1]

The note was from Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier, of General Merritt's staff, who, with Lieutenant Brumby, Admiral Dewey's flag-lieutenant, had come ashore as soon as the white flag had been hoisted. The note had been written from the captain-general's office, asking General Greene to stop the firing, as the negotiations for surrender were in progress. Says Greene in his report:

I returned within the walls with the messenger and found the late governor-general, Augustin, the acting governor-general, Jaudenes, Admiral Montojo, Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier, and Lieutenant Brumby of the navy. The Spaniards had drawn up terms of surrender, which Colonel Whittier informed me would probably be accepted by General Merritt, who was now on his way ashore from the *Newport*. I then returned to the troops outside the walls and sent Captain Birkhimer's battalion of the Third Artillery down the Paco road to prevent any insurgents from entering. Feeling satisfied that there would be no attack from the Spanish troops lining the walls, I put the regiments in motion toward the bridges, brushing aside a considerable force of insurgents who had penetrated the city from the direction of Paco and were in the main street with their flag, expecting to march into the walled city and plant it on the walls. After crossing the bridges the Eighteenth United States Infantry was posted to patrol the principal streets near the bridge, the First California was sent up the Pasig to occupy Quiapo, San Miguel, and Malacanan, and with the First Nebraska I marched down the river to the captain of the port's office, where I ordered the Spanish flag hauled down and the American flag raised in its place.

The Nebraska regiment was posted in that part of the city occupied by the custom-house and warehouses; the Third Artillery was posted to guard the bridges on the right, the First Colorado to protect the territory near San Sebastian and Sampaloc, on the left of the California regiment, and the Tenth Pennsylvania to occupy Santa Cruz between the Colorado regiment and the Third Artillery. In this way every

[1] Condensed mainly from F. D. Millet, *Expedition to the Philippines*. 147–151. Mr. Millet, artist, veteran traveller, and war correspondent of great distinction during the Turkish-Russian war of 1877–78, was a cool-headed and most competent observer.

bridge and principal street leading into the city on the north side of the Pasig was occupied before dark. The Utah batteries, Hotchkiss guns, and engineer company were stationed in the centre near the Hotel de Oriente, where I established my headquarters. The streets were filled with large crowds, but there was no disorder. The shops were all closed. The orders to the troops were to preserve order in the streets, protect all property, and prevent any armed bodies of insurgents from entering the city.

The night passed quietly, the troops, for the most part, sleeping in the streets. In the morning the Third Artillery, Tenth Pennsylvania, and First Colorado were advanced so as to occupy a line of broad thoroughfares—Paseo de Axcarraga, Calle Nueva, Calle del Gral Izquierdo, Calle de San Bernardo, and Calzada de Iris—extending from the bay on the west to the Pasig River on the east. Accommodation was found for the men in barracks, public offices, or private buildings, substantially in the districts above indicated, where they have since remained.

General MacArthur's brigade, more in contact with the insurgents, whose fire irritated the Spanish troops, met a greater resistance than had the left. The brigade was formed on the road leading from Pasay to Block-house No. 14.

His point was very narrow, between impassable rice swamps on each side. Moreover, General Merritt's instructions, not to have any rupture with the insurgents and not to construct any fresh trenches which might bring on partial engagements, had prevented him from making desirable arrangements for the advance of his troops. He was obliged, therefore, to form them in detachments behind stone walls and houses, on each side of the road, at intervals all the way from Pasay to within about two hundred yards of Block-house No. 14. They were all in position before 9 o'clock; the Astor Battery on the right of the road, one Utah gun in an insurgent emplacement on the road, the Thirteenth Minnesota on the right, and the Twenty-third Regulars on the left, his remaining battalions being in the reserve. From his position he could see the flag-staff on Fort San Antonio but could not see the ships or my trenches. He heard the bombardment on the left, then the infantry firing, saw the Spanish flag hauled down, and heard the cheering which followed.[1]

This was shortly after 11 o'clock and not long before the white flag, announcing the surrender, was hoisted. The flag could not be seen by General MacArthur's forces, nor was he aware of the

[1] Greene, *Century Magazine*, April, 1899, 927.

time of the going ashore of the officers to receive the surrender, and this want of knowledge of what had transpired, combined with the want of foresight on the part of the Spanish officials in hoisting the flag but at one point and our own defective arrangements both for communicating with the shore and along the lines, brought a real combat and a loss of life which might possibly have been avoided. The true fundamental difficulty was, of course, in the presence of the insurgents, whose entry the Spaniards were determined to oppose and against whom they supposed the chief part of their firing to be directed.

General MacArthur's own account, speaking of the events on the left, says:

Sergeant Mahoney, with a squad of Company D, Twenty-third United States Infantry, by a well-conducted scout, soon ascertained that the Spanish line was abandoned, and a general advance was immediately ordered. At about 11.20 a United States flag was placed upon Block-house No. 14, thus concluding the second stage of the action without opposition and without loss.

A battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel French, was stationed at this point to prevent armed bodies other than American troops crossing the trenches in the direction of Manila. The general advance was soon resumed, the Thirteenth Minnesota leading, with Company K as advance guard; then the Astor Battery, a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry, the battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, and the North Dakota regiment, following in the order named.

At a point indicated on the map for a three-gun emplacement, just south of Singalong, a block-house was found burning, causing a continuous explosion of small-arms ammunition, which, together with a scattering fire from the enemy, retarded the advance for a time. All difficulties were soon overcome, however, including the passage of the Astor Battery, by the determined efforts of Lieutenant March and his men, assisted by the infantry of the Minnesota regiment, over the gun emplacement which obstructed the road.

In the village of Singalong the advance fell under a loose fire, the intensity of which increased as the forward movement was pressed, and very soon the command was committed to a fierce combat. This strong opposition arose at Block-house No. 20 of the Spanish defences, a detached work with emplacements for six guns, which fortunately were not filled on the 13th instant; but the work was occupied by a detachment of infantry—probably a strong rear guard.

The advance party, consisting of men of the Minnesota regiment, re-enforced by volunteers from the Astor Battery, led by Lieutenant

March, and Captain Sawtelle of the brigade staff, as an individual volunteer, reached a point within less than eighty yards of the block-house, but was obliged to retire to the intersecting road in the village, at which point a hasty work was improvised and occupied by a firing line of about fifteen men. Aside from conspicuous individual actions in the first rush, the well-regulated conduct of this firing line was the marked feature of the contest, and it is proposed, if possible, to ascertain the names of the men engaged, with a view to recommend them for special distinction.

The main body of the fighting line, consisting of Company C, Twenty-third Infantry, Companies C, E, G, H, K, and L, Thirteenth Minnesota, and the Astor Battery, were well screened behind the village church and stone walls of adjacent gardens. In the early stage of the contest it seemed possible that an offensive return might be attempted; accordingly the position was secured by detached posts east and west on the intersecting road, and the construction of a succession of hasty entrenchments in the village street, and the occupancy of a strong defensive position by the main body in the rear. It soon became apparent, however, that the enemy was making a paroxysmal effort, and would soon yield to steady pressure.

Lieutenant-Colonel French, commanding a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry, composed of Companies D, F, G, and H, acting on his own initiative, advanced without orders to the sound of the combat, and placed his battalion in position on the intersecting road to the west of the village, in precisely the position where, in the event of a crisis, he would have been most useful.

At about 1.30 P. M. all firing had ceased, and two scouting parties, voluntarily led by Captain Sawtelle and Lieutenant March, soon thereafter reported the retreat of the adversary. The city was entered, without further incident, through the Paco district; detachments being placed at the bridges indicated in Memorandum No. 2 herewith. The contact was made about 12 o'clock and the contest continued with great ferocity until 1.35; that is to say, about an hour and a half. The loss in the combat was 3 officers wounded, 4 enlisted men killed and 33 wounded, including 1 man of the North Dakota regiment wounded far in the rear of the fighting line; making the total casualties for the day 43 killed and wounded.

As is well known, official reports are not given to details, and we turn again to Millet for a more detailed account of MacArthur's advance. He says:

What had actually happened on our right was this. The Astor Battery and a Utah gun had been sent up to the front near Block-house

No. 14 on Friday evening. . . . Finding the insurgents unwilling to give up their positions, they had passed the night among the native huts and waited for the developments of the morning. Their trouble began early enough, for the first insurgent gun which startled us on our way to the front awoke the Spaniards to activity and they began a fusillade which at that close range was very troublesome. As soon as possible after breakfast Captain March cut a path through the bamboo and dragged two of his guns up to a group of native huts directly opposite the Singalong road, where it makes a sharp turn to the west to meet the Pasig road in front of Block-house No. 14. He placed one of the guns in a hastily constructed embrasure and the other he was obliged to drag under one of the huts, almost directly in range of the first gun, because this was the only place where there was an opening through which he could fire.

When the bombardment by the fleet began, the three pieces of artillery were set to work, the Utah men directing their attention chiefly on Block-house No. 14, a short two hundred yards away, and the Astors throwing shells first into this and then into Block-house No. 13, a large structure with thick stone walls on the west side of the Singalong road. The Spanish gunners had the range of the insurgent positions very accurately, for the first shell they fired struck one of the Astor guns and wounded three men, one of them, Private Dunn, mortally. Fortunately the shell did not explode or the story would be different. The Thirteenth Minnesota Regiment was supporting the artillery, and when the converging fire from the three pieces made the block-house untenable they rushed across the narrow open space and took possession of the stronghold with its adjacent earthworks and captured a number of prisoners. The Twenty-third Regulars advanced across the open to the left and entered the line of the enemy's entrenchments, meeting with no very serious opposition.[1]

The village of Singalong was soon occupied, and here General MacArthur for the moment established his headquarters. There was some loss by a rather inconsiderate dash forward of Captain March and some dozen men of the Astor Battery. "There was plenty of shelter in the houses and behind the walls and, as the retreat of the enemy was a foregone conclusion, there was no necessity for reckless exposure. . . . A line of Minnesota men lay across the open road so crowded together that they could scarcely handle their rifles and, exposed to the severe fire at close range, lost heavily and to no purpose." It was difficult, of course, to restrain the men in such circumstances.

[1] Millet, 153.

Captain Sawtelle, of MacArthur's staff, and Captain March made a reconnaissance and found that the fire had come from a heavily barricaded house and a sand-bag breastwork across the road not over two hundred yards from the village. Calling for volunteers, a dash was made up the road, but on reaching the position it was found deserted. The advance now continued, many large bands of insurgents who had avoided the guards, pushing forward on the flanks, "sometimes crowding in with our troops in such a way that they had to be elbowed aside as they marched along." Soon the insurgents, now increased to several thousands, "swarmed over the rice fields between Ermita and Paco, and, finding themselves neck and neck with the retreating Spaniards, promptly opened fire on them, and quite an active little battle took place near the observatory. Both parties lost quite heavily, and one of the insurgent leaders, Mariana de la Cruz, was killed. It was this body of Spaniards whose appearance on the Paco road has already been mentioned.

General Merritt had soon followed Colonel Whittier and Lieutenant Brumby ashore, going at once to the palace of the governor-general, and there, after a conversation with the Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement as to terms was signed by the latter and himself.

Immediately after the surrender the Spanish colors were hauled down by Lieutenant Brumby, and the large American flag, which he had brought ashore for the purpose, hoisted and a salute fired from the fleet. The Second Oregon Regiment had been brought in a transport from Cavite, and was brought into the city as a provost guard. The colonel was directed to receive the Spanish arms and deposit them in places of security. The town was filled with the Spanish troops, regiments formed and standing in line in the streets, but the work of disarming proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred.[1]

A commission was appointed by the American army and navy commanders and by the Spanish governor-general to consider the preliminary capitulations of the surrender, and on the next day, after some discussion with regard to the final return of their

[1] General Merritt's report, *Report of War Department*, 1898, I (part 2), 43.

arms to the Spanish troops, to which the Spanish authorities strongly held as allowed by the preliminary terms, the following definite terms were signed:

MANILA, *August* 14, 1898.

The undersigned having been appointed a commission to determine the details of the capitulation of the city and defences of Manila and its suburbs, and the Spanish forces stationed therein, in accordance with agreement entered into the previous day by Major-General Wesley Merritt, United States Army, American commander-in-chief in the Philippines, and his excellency Don Fermin Jaudenes, acting general in chief of the Spanish army in the Philippines, have agreed upon the following:

1. Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate with the city and defences with all honors of war, depositing their arms in the places designated by the authorities of the United States, and remaining in quarters designated and under the orders of their officers and subject to control of the aforesaid United States authorities until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent nations. All persons included in the capitulation remain at liberty, the officers remaining in their respective homes, which shall be respected as long as they observe the regulations prescribed for their government and the laws in force.

2. Officers shall retain their side arms, horses, and private property; all public horses and public property of all kinds shall be turned over to staff-officers designated by the United States.

3. Complete returns in duplicate of men by organizations, and full lists of public property and stores shall be rendered to the United States within ten days from this date.

4. All questions relating to the repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish forces and of their families, and of the expenses which said repatriation may occasion, shall be referred to the government of the United States at Washington. Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them; the return of arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city or when the American army evacuates.

5. Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied by the United States according to their rank, with rations and necessary aid as though they were prisoners of war, until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the United States and Spain. All the funds in the Spanish treasury and all other public funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States.

6. This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its

educational establishments and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.

F. V. Greene,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers, U. S. Army.
B. P. Lamberton,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
Chas. A. Whittier,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General.
E. H. Crowder,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Judge-Advocate.
Nicholas de La Pena,
Auditor-General Excts.
Carlos Reyes,
Coronel de Ingenieros.
José Maria Olaquen Felia,
Coronel de Estado Major.

On the same day General Merritt issued a proclamation based upon the president's instructions of May 19.[1]

On August 15, Brigadier-General T. M. Anderson was assigned to the command of the district of Cavite, Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur was appointed military commandant of the walled city, and provost-marshal-general within the municipal jurisdiction of Manila. On August 17, Brigadier-General F. V. Greene was appointed in charge of fiscal affairs and Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Whittier collector of customs. On August 23, General Merritt took over the duty of military governor of the Philippines, transferring the command of the Eighth Army Corps to Major-General E. S. Otis, who had arrived on August 21.

The most imminent question was that of the insurgent Filipinos. On August 13, Merritt and Dewey had sent a joint telegram:

Cavite, *August* 13, 1898.

Since occupation of the town and suburbs the insurgents on outside are pressing demand for joint occupation of the city. Situation difficult. Inform me at once how far I shall proceed in forcing obedi-

[1] *Supra.* 396. For proclamation in full see *Annual Report, War Department,* 1898, I (part 2), 49.

ence in this matter and others that may arise. Is government willing to use all means to make the natives submit to the authority of the United States?

MERRITT.
DEWEY.

To this reply was made the day of its reception at Washington (August 17):

The president directs that there must be no joint occupation with the insurgents. The United States in the possession of Manila City, Manila Bay, and harbor must preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory occupied by their military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the president. Use whatever means in your judgment are necessary to this end. All law-abiding people must be treated alike.[1]

The situation was a complicated and difficult one. On August 12 was signed by the secretary of state on behalf of the United States and by the ambassador of France at Washington on behalf of Spain, a protocol of an agreement preliminary to the final establishment of peace between the United States and

[1] On August 21 the president telegraphed Admiral Dewey:

"Receive for yourself and the officers, sailors, and marines of your command, my thanks and congratulations and those of the nation for the gallant conduct all have again so conspicuously displayed."

And to General Merritt:

"In my own behalf and for the nation I extend to you and the officers and men of your command sincere thanks and congratulations for the conspicuously gallant conduct displayed in your compaign.

"WILLIAM MCKINLEY."

These were answered by telegrams to the president, August 23:

"On behalf of the squadron and myself I thank you most heartily for the congratulations and thanks you were pleased to express. It will always be a source of pride to us all to have received such commendation. Your cable will be published on board the ships of the squadron to-morrow.

"DEWEY."

"For my troops and myself accept my sincerest acknowledgment for your generous praise of the success of our campaign. America can well be proud of the troops.

"MERRITT."

Spain. The date involved a weighty question for, though the date at Manila through difference of time was the 13th, the attack, at the time of signing, had not taken place. A telegram conveying the information had been sent from Washington at 4.23 P. M., August 12.

MAJOR-GENERAL MERRITT, *Manila:*

The president directs all military operations against the enemy be suspended. Peace negotiations are nearing completion, a protocol having just been signed by representatives of the two countries. You will inform the commander of the Spanish forces in the Philippines of these instructions. Further orders will follow. Acknowledge receipt.

At 5 P. M., of the same day, was telegraphed the proclamation of the president, declaring a suspension of hostilities:

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

Whereas by a protocol concluded and signed August twelfth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, by William R. Day, secretary of state of the United States, and his excellency Jules Cambon, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively representing for this purpose the government of the United States and the government of Spain, the United States and Spain have formally agreed upon the terms on which negotiations for the establishment of peace between the two countries shall be undertaken; and

Whereas it is in said protocol agreed that upon its conclusion and signature hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and that notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces:

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, president of the United States, do, in accordance with the stipulations of the protocol, declare and proclaim on the part of the United States a suspension of hostilities, and do hereby command that orders be immediately given through the proper channels to the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United States to abstain from all acts inconsistent with this proclamation.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this twelfth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-third.

(Signed) WILLIAM McKINLEY.

By the president:

WILLIAM R. DAY, *Secretary of State.*

To this was added a précis of the protocol.[1]

Both telegrams were received at Manila on the afternoon of August 16 (Manila date), three days after leaving Washington. Within Manila were over 13,000 Spanish troops who had been surrendered along with 22,000 stand of arms which, on leaving, were to be returned to them. The men, sheltered in the churches and other large buildings, were allowed to wander freely about the city. In the suburbs and adjacent to the town of 400,000 population was an army of 10,000 Filipinos, who, though General Merritt telegraphed on August 27 that they were anxious to be friendly, were far otherwise and were making unfortunate and exaggerated demands such as could come only from persons who, if their words were sincere, supposed themselves to control the situation. "They took possession of all the block-houses from No. 1 to No. 14, held the filtering reservoirs and the pumping station of the water-works, the villages of Santa Ana, Paco, and Singalong, our earthworks at Maytubig, and all the territory between the Paco road and the street parallel with the Camino Real in Malate and Ermita, including the observatory and exhibition buildings, and even pushed forward to the water front at Malate Square, cutting through our own area of occupation in such a way that the men relieving guard at the stone fort were obliged to pass two lines of insurgent sentinels."[2] Aguinaldo was making demands for a division of the Spanish property surrendered, and for the palace of Malicañang and the archbishop's palace in Malate to be turned over for his own use.

The question of our relations with the insurgents is beyond the scope of this work. "After the taking of Manila, the feel-

[1] *Infra*, 440.

[2] Millet, *The Expedition to the Philippines*, 182.

ing between the Americans and the insurgents grew worse day by day. All manner of abuses were indulged in by the insurgent troops, who committed assaults and robberies and, under the orders of General Pio del Pilar, even kidnapped natives who were friendly toward the Americans and carried them off in the mountains or killed them. In the interest of law and order it became necessary to order the Filipino forces back, and this order made them angry. Aguinaldo removed his seat of government to Malalos, where the so-called Filipino congress assembled."[1]

The result, as the world knows, was a long-drawn-out and bloody warfare.

The situation, unlike that of Cuba, which only presented difficulties which we ourselves chose to create, and which was to be so long and unwisely held in the air by the administration, was for the moment, and until it should be settled by actual treaty, one which could only be met by tact and as much firmness as the conditions would allow.

[1] *Report of the Philippine Commission*, I, 173.

CHAPTER XX

THE PEACE PROTOCOL

The promulgation of the protocol was but a suspension of hostilities; peace was yet in the future. Spain was still the nominal possessor of the Philippines, in all of which, outside of Manila and its immediate vicinity, were numerous Spanish posts and official establishments. The United States, under the third article of the protocol, was to "occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government" of the archipelago, words which were to be the subject of much and, particularly on the part of Spain, embittered controversy.

The protocol had been the outcome of a three weeks' action and discussion.

On July 18 the Duke of Almodóvar del Rio, the Spanish minister of state, had telegraphed the Spanish ambassador at Paris asking that he request the good offices of the French government to enable M. Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington, who had charge in the United States of Spanish affairs, to present a communication directed to the president "in which he is invited to put an end to the painful situation in Cuba, Spain showing herself disposed to agree upon means of pacification of that island, if it is possible to concert upon acceptable bases. Our principal argument is the suffering imposed by the war upon the inhabitants of that Antille, now so totally blockaded that it is impossible for us to send food there. The army is able to sustain itself for some time, but, lacking a naval force sufficient to protect the shipment of food, there is serious inferiority between the respective forces." The French ambassador was to be requested to "negotiate for a suspension of hostilities as preliminary to

definite negotiations according to the instructions this government transmits, in case the tenor of this message receives the approbation of the American government."[1]

The Spanish ambassador at Paris telegraphed the minister of state at Madrid on July 20, 1898, after a conversation with the French minister of foreign affairs, "that consideration of such an important matter requires the approbation of the president of the council of ministers and of the president of the republic, to whom he will submit your desire. I do not expect to receive a definite answer until day after to-morrow because the president [Faure] is at Rambouillet and the minister of foreign affairs will not be able to see him before that time on account of illness, and to-morrow is the day of diplomatic reception," trivial reasons for delay which for once was not in accord with Spanish wish. An immediate response came from Madrid that the ambassador should understand that the Spanish request was "not such as to admit of delay, but on the contrary should be answered with extreme despatch. The loss of hours, not to speak of days, might be of grave consequence in the negotiation of peace. The capitulation of Manila, which may occur at any time; the occupation of other points in the Philippines; the attack upon Puerto Rico, and perhaps a landing upon that island, are all contingencies which counsel haste, to the end that a delay in arriving at the opening of direct relations, forerunner of an understanding, may not give place to greater advantages on the part of our adversaries in deeds of arms, which might result in greater claims." An immediate answer was to be requested from the French government, in order that other resources might be used, if its answer should be unfavorable, though this was not expected.[2]

The Spanish ambassador in Paris thus stirred, telegraphed the next day, July 21, the willingness of the French government to allow M. Cambon, its ambassador at Washington, to present the message from Spain looking to peace. On July 22 the substance of the message which it was intended to send was communicated to the ambassadors of the great powers at Madrid, the message

[1] The minister of state to the Spanish ambassador (Señor Leon y Castillo), at Paris, *Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents*, 1896–1900, 200.
[2] *Ibid.*, 201.

itself being sent by post to Paris whence it was telegraphed to Washington.

The archives of the Spanish legation at Washington, among which was the key to their cipher, had been placed with the Austrian legation. The Austrian minister was absent, the key could not be found, and the Spanish government was obliged to direct its consul-general at Montreal, in Canada, to send a copy by messenger to Washington for the use of M. Cambon. This delay and the short delay of the Spanish ambassador at Paris, caused the presentation of the Spanish message to the president to be deferred until July 26, when it was presented by the French ambassador. It was as follows:

MADRID, *July* 22, 1898.

MR. PRESIDENT: Since three months the American people and the Spanish nation are at war, because Spain did not consent to grant independence to Cuba and to withdraw her troops therefrom.

Spain faced with resignation such uneven strife and only endeavored to defend her possessions with no other hope than to oppose, in the measure of her strength, the undertaking of the United States and to protect her honor.

Neither the trials which adversity has made us endure nor the realization that but faint hope is left us could deter us from struggling till the exhaustion of our very last resources. This stout purpose, however, does not blind us, and we are fully aware of the responsibilities which would weigh upon both nations in the eyes of the civilized world were this war to be continued.

This war not only inflicts upon the two peoples who wage it the hardships inseparable from all armed conflict, but also dooms to useless suffering and unjust sacrifices the inhabitants of a territory to which Spain is bound by secular ties that can be forgotten by no nation either of the old or of the new world.

To end calamities already so great, and to avert evils still greater, our countries might mutually endeavor to find upon which conditions the present struggle could be terminated otherwise than by force of arms.

Spain believes this understanding possible and hopes that this view is also harbored by the government of the United States. All true friends of both nations share no doubt the same hope.

Spain wishes to show again that in this war, as well as in the one she carried on against the Cuban insurgents, she had but one object—the vindication of her prestige, her honor, her name. During the war of insurrection it was her desire to spare the great island from the dan-

gers of premature independence. In the present war she has been actuated by sentiments inspired rather by ties of blood than by her interests, and by the right belonging to her as mother country.

Spain is prepared to spare Cuba from the continuation of the horrors of war if the United States are on their part likewise disposed.

The president of the United States and the American people may now learn from this message the true thought, desire, and intention of the Spanish nation.

And so do we wish to learn from the president of the United States upon which basis might be established a political status in Cuba, and might be terminated a strife which would continue without reason should both governments agree upon the means of pacifying the island.[1]

In the conversation which resulted, M. Cambon said to the president: "Although up to the present time I have not received more than the mission of presenting the message, I believe myself authorized to express the hope that after the results of this campaign your excellency will feel inclined, influenced by the highest motives, to be humanely Christian and generous." Answering the secretary of state, who was present, he said: "If the message . . . referred particularly to the pacification of Cuba, it is because the state of affairs existing in the island was the initial cause of the war; that if this cause of conflict were suppressed under conditions acceptable to both countries, the war would then cease to have reason for being." "If I understand you well," said Mr. Day, "Spain, while she limits herself to asking that we seek by a common understanding a method of resolving the Cuban question, desires to know under what conditions it would be possible to terminate hostilities in all the points where they now exist." M. Cambon replied that the beginning of the negotiations "appear to imply the termination of the war on account of the unhappy condition of the populations which suffer its ravages." On Mr. McKinley asking if he had any propositions to formulate, M. Cambon stated that he would request the Spanish minister of state to empower him to take part in the conversation to which the president proposed to invite him after he had consulted with the cabinet.[2]

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 819.
[2] *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 206.

The immediate result was the presentation to the press from the department of state and the French embassy of an identic statement that "the ambassador of France in the name of the government of Spain and in execution of instructions from the minister of state of Spain, has presented this afternoon [July 26] to the president of the republic a message from the Spanish government looking toward putting an end to the war and setting forth terms of peace."[1]

On July 28, and before a formal reply was made to the message from Spain, a telegram was sent M. Cambon, that Spain would be disposed to accept any solution that would conduce to the pacification of Cuba. This was immediately followed by another, "very confidential," in explanation of the former. It said:

In the war with the United States there is need to distinguish its object and the means employed to carry it on. The object was the separation of Cuba from the dominion of Spain. The means have been, and are, attacks upon the colonial dependencies of the Spanish nation. Regarding the first, Spain is disposed to accept the solution which may please the United States—absolute independence, independence under the protectorate, or annexation to the American republic, preferring definite annexation, because it would better guarantee the lives and estates of Spaniards established or holding property there. In regard to the second, which I allude to in my former telegram as "any other solution which may be required as a consequence of the war," your excellency will understand that reference is made to the claims which the Americans may have outside the territory of Cuba; whether by military operations, which constitute temporary occupation, or, possibly, from expenditures for the campaign. As with regard to Cuba this government makes no reserve, it should maintain reserve regarding the second. It certainly admits the principle of indemnification in reasonable proportion and measure, but desires that it should not be responsible for unnecessary expenditures, considering also unnecessary certain military operations as a foundation for a right in the territory where they took place. There is also no reason to forget that the Spanish nation did not provoke the war, and although fortune has been adverse to us this government understands that the conqueror should not be arbiter of territories foreign to Cuba which have been attacked by the United States. I will feel much obliged to your excellency if on this point you investigate the dispositions of Mr. McKinley re-

[1] *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 207.

garding Puerto Rico and the Philippines. If the president is inclined to present in a brief time the bases concerted for an understanding, and your excellency observes that they accommodate themselves to the general ideas of this government, your excellency will please press the demand for the suspension of hostilities which this government desires to obtain promptly in order to prevent sufferings from hunger in the Antilles and the horrors of massacre in the Philippines. Once in accord as to the cardinal matters, this armistice could be proclaimed without prejudice to beginning negotiations of peace at a convenient time. Permit me to suggest that anything in the line of an international congress be avoided. The best method for a quick understanding would be that each of the two governments nominate its delegation in a neutral point—no place more convenient than Paris.[1]

The Spanish message of July 22 was answered by the secretary of state, on July 30. The reply expressed the satisfaction of the president in receiving the Spanish proposal and after entering at some length into the question of causes, part of which might without loss to the weight of the paper have been omitted, said:

Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba, intimates that Spain has desired to spare the island the dangers of premature independence. The government of the United States has not shared the apprehensions of Spain in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island, aid and guidance will be necessary, and these it is prepared to give.

The United States will require:

First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and her immediate evacuation of the island.

Second. The president, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now put forth any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war, or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must therefore require the cession to the United States, and the evacuation by Spain of the island of Puerto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.

Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy, and will hold, the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.

[1] *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 208.

If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety, commissioners will be named by the United States to meet similarly authorized commissioners on the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated.[1]

The French ambassador telegraphed on July 31 the conversation that he had the day before with the president, who had invited him "to make any observations which the demands formulated by the United States might suggest."

After mentioning Spain's fear of the danger to Cuba of premature independence and Spain's willingness to leave the question of Cuba entirely in the hands of the United States, he said:

Then taking up article II, I set forth the contradiction existing between the declaration of disinterestedness formulated by the United States at the beginning of the war and the spirit of conquest which proposes conditions so hard for Spain. In making claim for the cession of Puerto Rico and one of the Ladrones, it seems, I said, that you concede to the opinion recently formed which considers as a definite conquest all territory upon which the fortune of arms has permitted an American soldier to put his foot—an opinion contrary to right and the erroneousness of which the evacuation of Mexico by the Federal troops suffices to demonstrate. The secretary of state interrupted me there to call my attention that in history it would be very difficult to meet with another example where a victor, after a costly war, did not demand a pecuniary indemnification. This is true, I said, but is not the cession of the island of Cuba the richest of indemnification? To demand also the remaining Antilles and one of the Ladrones, however great the expenditures of war may have been, would exceed the measure of the responsibilities which Spain, to whom fortune had been adverse, should support. *A fortiori*, I added, the demands formulated in article III, are for the purpose of compromising in Madrid the success of this preliminary negotiation—above all if between the words *control* and *government* of the Philippines is maintained the word *possession* which appears to place in doubt from now on the sovereignty of Spain over this colony. "You will observe," the president of the republic then remarked to me, "that my demands set forth in the first two articles do not admit of discussion; I leave to negotiations the task of resolving the question of the Philippines. If the American forces have remained until now in their positions, it is in obedience to a duty which respect to residents and strangers and the progress of affairs impose upon me." Seeing the president of the republic resolved not to modify the terms

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 820, and *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 211.

of article III, I made such a pressing appeal to his generosity that he seemed affected, and in spite of the opposition of the secretary of state, Mr. Day, ordered the word *possession* replaced by the word *disposition*, which does not prejudice the result of the negotiations and does not have the same general acceptation. The secretary of state having gone out to make the modification in the text, the president of the republic talked familiarly with me and expressed sorrow that Spain would not ask for peace after the naval battle of Cavite." "The conditions which we would have then demanded," he remarked, "would have been less rigorous than those of the present, so if my present demands are refused Spain would necessarily be exposed to greater sacrifices. I beg your excellency, Mr. Ambassador of France, to make this known in Madrid."

Mr. McKinley expressed the wish that the negotiations should be in Washington. In accord with the instructions from Spain, M. Cambon made a strong effort to obtain a suspension of hostilities. Mr. McKinley agreed to concede this immediately on being informed of Spain's acceptance of the negotiations upon the bases indicated by the American government and of M. Cambon's authorization to sign the preliminary act. The conference lasted two and a half hours.[1]

In a telegram of August 1, Spain "set forth some observations" which, however, were sent only in the way of suggestion, full discretion being left to the French ambassador. The despatch said:

The government of Spain considers it inopportune to discuss the causes of the war and the acts by which it occurred, but cannot accept the responsibility of having declared it, because Spain intended to do nothing more than protest against the resolution of the congress of the republic, when, in order not to hear its notification, she caused diplomatic relations to cease. The declaration of war was made solely by the congress of the United States for the purpose of obtaining the independence and liberty of Cuba, from which it is inferred that the favored one should be at all events the one who ought to indemnify the sacrifices of properties and fortunes placed at the service of the Cuban cause. For this reason it should be expected that the United States would follow the conduct of Austria and Prussia, who, in order, to emancipate the Duchies, sent an army against Denmark. The treaty of October 3, 1864, stipulated, as was just, that the Duchies should pay the expense of the war, and Spain would be disposed that

[1] *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 213.

the indemnification should rest upon Cuba, whether by immediate adjudication, as your excellency has been pleased to propose, or in form of a pledge; at all events, it is deemed necessary for the government to know (admitting that the demand for the cession of Puerto Rico is founded upon the plea that the government of the republic cannot be insensible to the losses and expenditures occasioned to the nation) if there would not be means of substituting for Puerto Rico another form of territorial compensation for such losses and expenditures. The government of his majesty hopes that, as we are treating merely of a cession for payment, the United States will not insist on imposing what they may consider their due—the severe step of alienating that which, never having been in contention, has an especial value of affection. I would desire, therefore, to know if, the just reasons alleged by your excellency (and approved in this despatch) not being listened to regarding the manner of satisfying at Cuba's expense the expenditures for her liberation, the president of the republic would accept the proposition of admitting in substitution for Puerto Rico some other form of territorial compensation.

The third point, which determines the form of disposition of the Philippine Islands, seems lacking in precision to this government. The government has supplied the deficiencies noticed in it, supposing that there is no question respecting the permanent sovereignty of Spain in that archipelago, and that the temporary occupation of Manila, its port, and bay by the Federal government is to continue only for the time necessary for an understanding between both countries regarding administration reforms; also that it will be well understood that all discussions regarding such reforms shall be exclusively between Spain and the United States.[1]

The result, given in a telegram from M. Cambon on August 4, was inflexibility on the part of the president. M. Cambon said:

I did not conceal from the president that the government of his majesty considered excessively rigorous the conditions offered, and that the necessity of ceding Puerto Rico as indemnification for the war was regarded particularly severe. This island, I said to him, has not for a moment been an element of conflict between Spain and the United States; its inhabitants have remained loyal to the crown, . . . would desire in consequence that the president would consent to accept other territorial compensation in place of Puerto Rico. As far as could be seen Mr. McKinley showed himself inflexible, and reiterated that the question of the Philippines was the only one which was not definitely resolved in his mind. I improved this opportunity to ask the presi-

[1] *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 214.

dent to have the kindness, as far as possible, to define his intentions regarding the Philippines. On this point, I said, the answer of the Federal government is drawn in terms which may aid any claims on the part of the United States, and in consequence may arouse the fears of Spain regarding her sovereignty. Mr. McKinley replied to me: "I do not desire to leave any ambiguity on this point. The negotiators of the two countries will be the ones to decide what will be the permanent advantages that we shall demand in the archipelago, and finally the control (*controle*), disposition, and government of the Philippines"; and he added: "The Madrid government may be assured that up to this time there is nothing determined *a priori* in my mind against Spain; likewise, I consider there is nothing decided against the United States."

In accord with the request of the Spanish government, M. Cambon suggested Paris as a place of negotiation instead of Washington. The president requested time to decide, but that same evening Mr. Day called at the French embassy and announced the acceptance of the suggestion.

Says M. Cambon:

The secretary of state improved the occasion of calling for the last time my attention to the scope and sense of the conditions proposed by the United States.

"It should be perfectly understood," he said, "that the acceptance of these conditions by Spain implies, *ipso facto*, for the United States the right of demanding the immediate evacuation of Cuba and Puerto Rico, without awaiting the treaty of peace. From this it does not necessarily follow that the United States will make use of this right. We understood that the evacuation, in its execution, will raise questions of detail, which should be resolved by both governments. What we desire to see confirmed is solely the principle of our right." I observed that the suspension of hostilities supposes that each of the belligerents shall maintain his position. This complete cessation of the hostilities would favor peace.

I have foreseen that the president of the republic would remain firm, and since your excellency honors me by asking my personal opinion, I cannot but persist in the idea that all vacillation will further aggravate the severity of the conditions.[1]

[1] *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 216. There were differences between the memoranda of the French ambassador and those of the secretary of state. Mr. Day's version of the conferences will be found in a telegram from Paris of November 18, 1898, in *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 955–957. The differences as to the conference of August 3, while somewhat marked, do not appear essential. Both reports would seem to make clear that (in the words of the answer

On August 7 the Spanish minister of state telegraphed through the French ambassador the following message to the American secretary of state:

Mr. Secretary of State: The French ambassador at Washington, whose good offices have enabled the Spanish government to address a message to the president of the United States, has forwarded by cable your excellency's reply to this document.

In examining the arguments used as a preamble to the specification of the terms upon which peace may be restored between Spain and the United States, it behooves the Spanish government to deduct from the order of events that the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States had no other purpose than to decline the acceptance of an ultimatum which Spain could only consider as an attempt against her rightful sovereignty over Cuba.

Spain did not declare war; she met it because it was the only means of defending her rights in the Greater Antilles. Thus did the queen and the United States see fit to transform and enlarge the purely local question of Cuba.

From this fact your excellency draws the conclusion that the question at stake is no longer only the one which relates to the territory of Cuba, but also that the losses of American lives and fortunes incident to the war should in some manner be compensated.

As to the first condition, relating to the future of Cuba, the two governments reach similar conclusions in regard to the natural inability of its people to establish an independent government. Be it by reason of inadequate development, as we believe, or on account of the present distracted and prostrate condition of the island, as your excellency states, the fact remains that Cuba needs guidance. The American people are willing to assume the responsibility of giving this guidance by substituting themselves to the Spanish nation, whose right to keep the island is indisputable; to this intimation we have nothing to oppose. The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being imperative, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this territory shall not have fully reached the conditions required to take rank among other sovereign powers, provide for rules which will insure order and protect against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the Cuban natives still loyal to the mother country.

of the American commissioners to the proposition of the Spanish commissioners of November 3, 1898) "it was the purpose of the president in everything written and spoken to leave to the negotiators of the treaty the most ample freedom with reference to the Philippines, and to settle, if their negotiations should result in an agreement, the control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands." (Senate Doc. 62, part 1, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 132.)

In the name of the nation the Spanish government hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and engages to the irremeable evacuation of the island subject to the approval of the Cortes—a reserve which we likewise make with regard to the other proffered terms—just as these terms will have to be ultimately approved by the Senate of the United States.

The United States require, as an indemnity for or an equivalent to the sacrifices they have borne during this short war, the cession of Puerto Rico and of the other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the Federal government.

This demand strips us of the very last memory of a glorious past, and expels us at once from the prosperous island of Puerto Rico and from the Western Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized through the proud deeds of our ancestors. It might, perhaps, have been possible to compensate by some other cession for the injuries sustained by the United States. However, the inflexibility of the demand obliges us to cede, and we shall cede, the island of Puerto Rico and the other islands belonging to the crown of Spain in the West Indies, together with one of the islands of the archipelago of the Ladrones, to be selected by the American government.

The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor, and the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be that of conquest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a native supported and provided for by the American admiral, Manila still holds its own, and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should constitute a guaranty. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines; but as the intentions of the Federal government by regression remain veiled, therefore the Spanish government must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they do not *a priori* renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms which the condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives may render desirable.

The government of her majesty accepts the third condition, with the above-mentioned declarations.

Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish government has the honor to submit in reply to your excellency's communication. They accept the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties.

The agreement between the two governments implies the irremeable suspension of hostilities and the designation of commissioners for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing it, under the terms above indicated.[1]

The presentation of this message came near to breaking off the negotiation. M. Cambon, in a telegram of August 10, said:

The reading visibly annoyed the president of the republic and the secretary of state. After a prolonged silence Mr. McKinley said to me: "I demand of Spain the cession and consequently the immediate evacuation of the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Instead of a categorical acceptance, as was expected, the Spanish government addresses me a note in which it invokes the necessity of obtaining the approbation of the Cortes. I cannot lend myself to entering into these considerations of domestic government." I observed that the government of his majesty, in conforming to its constitutional obligations, did not do more than imitate the president, upon whom is imposed analogous obligations, and that in his answer of July 30 he had expressly reserved the subsequent ratification of the Federal senate. I added that while it was true the government of Madrid was striving to maintain itself within the limits of its powers, nevertheless it accepted in all its parts the demands of the United States. All my observations were fruitless. Seeing he was on the point of terminating the conversation, I then begged the president to tell me what pledges of sincerity Spain could give. "There is," he answered, "a means of putting an end to all quibbles. We can draft a project of a protocol which will set forth the conditions proposed to Spain on the same terms in which I have already formulated them, and which will fix the period in which, on the one hand, the plenipotentiaries charged to negotiate in Paris the treaty of peace will be appointed, and, on the other, the special commissioners charged with the duty of determining the details of the evacuation of Cuba and Puerto Rico. I shall request your excellency to communicate this project of a protocol to Madrid, and ask from the Spanish government authority to sign in its name. Then, but only then, will hostilities be suspended. My commission will place itself within the time agreed in communication with the military authorities of Habana and San Juan. This single act would constitute, in my view, the beginning of the execution I expect from Spain." The president of the republic added that in his opinion this preliminary document will not have any other purpose or effect than to consecrate without delay the understanding of the two governments for the commencement of peace, and that therefore it would not be necessary to reserve in it either the rights of the Cortes or those of the Federal senate, required simply to ratify

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 822.

a definite treaty. The project of protocol will probably be communicated to me to-morrow; its terms will be, without doubt, of rigorous obligation. I should not conceal from your excellency that I am persuaded there will not be any modification admitted in it, and if it were proper for me to express myself here, however much it may cost me, I would express my conviction that if the Madrid cabinet does not think it possible to accept this document Spain will have nothing more to expect from a conqueror resolved to procure all the profit possible from the advantages it has obtained.[1]

Mr. Day, however, on the evening of the same day sent a note to M. Cambon, saying: "The Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transformations which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it has reached the hands of the president, entirely explicit. Under these circumstances it is thought that the most direct and certain way of avoiding a misunderstanding is to embody in a protocol, to be signed by us as the representatives respectively of the United States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace are to be undertaken," and enclosed a draft which, besides arranging for the appointment of commissioners for the evacuation of the Spanish islands in the West Indies and for the appointment of commissioners to treat for peace, "embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain" in the note of July 30. They were as follows:

Article 1. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba.

Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States the island of Puerto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.

Article 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

Article 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol,

[1] *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 219.

meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Puerto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Puerto Rico and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.

Article 5. The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, and the commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.

Article 6. Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.[1]

Two days later the protocol was signed and hostilities ordered suspended. The Washington date was Friday, August 12; the hour 4.30 P. M. It was 5.30 A. M., Saturday, August 13, at Manila, and the American forces had just begun to take position for their move against the city.

There was no loss of time in telegraphing the fact that hostilities were suspended. Manila, however, was the one point of operations which could not be quickly reached, and meanwhile the city was to be in actual occupancy by American troops. The news of the suspension did not reach there until the afternoon of August 16 (Manila date).

On August 17 the American government agreed to the restoration of postal facilities between Spain, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and to the importation of Spanish ships of supplies to the two latter, with the understanding that American vessels for the time being should not be excluded from Spanish ports, and if hostilities should be renewed, such vessels should be allowed the immunities accorded to Spanish vessels by articles 4 and 5 of the president's proclamation of April 26. Spain's request of August 19, that one of her consuls from Canada should be permitted to act in Washington as an unofficial agent in the questions

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 824.

of detail the settlement of which the cessation of hostilities necessitated, was declined, with the hope that the French ambassador would continue as the intermediary of Spain.

No time was lost in appointing commissioners by both governments for the evacuation of Cuba and Puerto Rico, who met at Havana and at San Juan, on the same day, September 10.[1]

The instructions to the Spanish evacuation commissioners held that Spanish sovereignty should remain paramount in Cuba until the treaty of peace should be ratified and proclaimed; a claim which, in response to the despatch of October 5, of the chairman of the American commission, was at once pronounced by the president as wholly inadmissible, the discussion of which, it was later held, was beyond the powers of the evacuation commission. A return to this subject by the Spanish government in a note from the French embassy of October 11, received reply that the government of the United States was not able to accept the

[1] M. Cambon was informed on August 16 that the American commissioners were as follows:

For Cuba: Major-General Wade, Rear-Admiral Sampson, Major-General Butler.

For Puerto Rico: Major-General Brooke, Rear-Admiral Schley, Brigadier-General Gordon.

The French ambassador on August 22 announced as the Spanish commissioners:

For Cuba: The General of Division Gonzales Parrado, Rear-Admiral Pastor y Landero, and Marquis de Montoro.

For Puerto Rico: General of Division Ortega y Diaz, Naval Captain of the First Class Vallarino y Carasco, and Auditor of Division (military judge) Sanchez del Aguila y Leon.

The principal instructions to the American commissioners were as follows:

The evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands by the Spanish military forces will devolve upon the United States the duty of taking possession, holding, and preserving all the immovable property therein heretofore belonging to the government of Spain; you will therefore arrange for and take into possession for the United States all public buildings and grounds, forts, fortifications, arsenals, depots, docks, wharves, piers, and other fixed property heretofore belonging to Spain, and will arrange for the care and safekeeping of the same under the authority and control of the United States.

The small arms and accoutrements, batteries of field artillery, supply and baggage wagons, ambulances, and other impedimenta of the Spanish army in Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands you will permit to be removed, if desired, by the representatives of Spain, provided such removal shall be ef-

conclusions of that of Spain, and that as the question was before the peace commission at Paris, it was considered inexpedient to enter upon it at that moment.[1]

More serious was the attitude taken first in a note of September 11, through the French ambassador, regarding the Philippines, which claimed that the occupation of Manila and its harbor and bay should be considered in the light of the protocol of August 12, and not in virtue of the capitulation of August 14; that the occupation did not confer the right to alter Spanish laws in force there, but that the civil administrative, judicial, and political institutions should be maintained until the final treaty of peace should deter-

fected within a reasonable time. The armament of forts, fortifications, and fixed batteries, being in the nature of immovable fixtures, will not be permitted to be taken, but will, in connection with said forts, fortifications, and batteries, be taken over by you into the possession of the United States.

It will be your duty to see that all state papers, public records, and other papers and documents necessary or convenient for the government of the islands and records pertaining specially to their history be taken into your custody and preserved for the future use of such government as may be established therein. You will also provide that all judicial and legal documents and other public records necessary or convenient for securing to individuals the titles to property shall also be saved and preserved.

In taking over public property into the possession of the United States, you will have brief descriptions and full inventories made and transmit the same to the secretary of war, duly verified.

You are authorized to allow such persons as may so desire to depart from the islands in a peaceful and regular manner with their personal possessions.

It will be your duty to confer with the general commanding the military forces in Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands from time to time with reference to the details of the evacuation, and to arrange through the commanding general that the United States shall be prepared to take possession of each city, town, place, or port with a suitable garrison as fast as the Spanish forces evacuate the same.

In like manner you will arrange, in connection with the commanding general, to take charge of the custom-houses and other public buildings as the same are severally delivered over to the representatives of the United States.

. . . . . .

It is desired that your duties as commissioners shall be performed with all possible expedition.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

For the instructions to the Spanish commissioners, see the *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 232–237.

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 818 and 918.

mine the "control, disposition, and government" of the islands, Spain not having renounced her sovereignty there; that Spain considered the troops of the Manila garrison as free and proposed to use them in other parts of the archipelago to suppress rebellion and maintain order. The paper also included a request that the United States demand of the Tagal rebels the surrender of Spanish prisoners held by them; and a declaration that it was Spain's intention to treat any armed vessels fitted out by the insurgents as pirates. The despatch ended by asking that the families of the officers taken from the Marianne islands, and who were stated to be in deplorable circumstances, be brought to Cavite or returned to Spain.[1]

The proposal of the use of the Spanish troops against the insurgents had already been declined in a note of September 5 from the American secretary of state in reply to an informal note from the Spanish government through the French embassy on August 29, which had expressed the same desire, with the addition of the supposition that if the United States saw any objection to such an arrangement, it would have no reason to oppose the despatch of troops directly from the Peninsula to the Philippines. The American note of September 5 had said:

> It can scarcely be expected that this government would even consider the question of adopting the first alternative, in view of the fact that for some time before the surrender of Manila the Spanish forces in that city were besieged by the insurgents by land while the port was blockaded by the forces of the United States by sea. As to the second alternative, it will be a matter for regret if it should be adopted on the strength of rumors, some of which have been shown to be groundless, while others yet are unconfirmed. The government of the United States will, through its military and naval commanders in the Philippines, exert its influence for the purpose of restraining insurgent hostilities pending the suspension of hostilities between the United States and Spain.
>
> It would be unfortunate if any act should be done by either government which might, in certain aspects, be inconsistent with the suspension of hostilities between the two nations, and which might necessitate the adoption of corresponding measures of precaution by the other government.[2]

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 813.
[2] *Ibid*, 1898, 811.

Bound up with this was the large question of the nullity of the capitulation of August 14, which was naturally held by Spain as one of the utmost importance in the probable necessity of combatting claims of the United States to Luzon or other parts of the archipelago. Here, for the moment, the American secretary of state took untenable ground, saying in his note of September 16, in reply to that forwarded by M. Cambon on the 11th, that "the department is unable to concur in the opinion of the Spanish government that the capitulation of Manila was null and void because after the signature of the protocol. It was expressly provided in the protocol that notice should be given of the suspension of hostilities, and it is the opinion of this government that the suspension is to be considered as having taken effect at the date of the receipt of notice, which was immediately given by this government. . . ."

The shortly succeeding statement that "as to the nature of the right by which the United States holds the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, it is the opinion of this government that it is immaterial whether the occupation is to be considered as existing by virtue of the capitulation or by virtue of the protocol, since in either case the powers of the military occupant are the same,"[1] had a better basis and was held to throughout the negotiation of the treaty.

It is undeniable that there was much that was reasonable in the Spanish requests and much force in Spain's argument respecting the status of Manila. She was still the titular sovereign of the islands and the insurgent forces, now numerous and well armed, were active against her except in the neighborhood of Manila. The insurgent leaders had returned to the islands with American concurrence; it stood to reason that the numerous small garrisons distributed over the great stretches of the archipelago beyond the capital should receive adequate protection either through the American or Spanish forces. The former, however, had no actual right to act.

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 814. For the American and Spanish arguments in this question, see annexes to protocols 12, 13, and 14 of the Peace Conference. Senate Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., pp. 110–196.

The shorter statement of the conditions given in reply to the notes of the American department of state should be given:

MR. THIÉBAUT TO MR. HAY.

EMBASSY OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
IN THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, *October* 4, 1898.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: On different occasions, and especially by its notes of August 29 and of September 3 and 11, this embassy has had the honor to communicate to the department of state various observations of the Spanish government, having reference—

1. To the painful situation, at Guam, of the families of the Spanish officers of the garrison of the Marianas who were taken as prisoners to Cavite.

2. To the bad treatment suffered by the Spanish prisoners who have fallen into the hands of the Tagals.

3. To the necessity under which Spain is of using, in order to combat the progress of the insurrection in the Philippines, either the troops who have been rendered inactive in consequence of the capitulation of Manila, or troops sent directly from the Peninsula.

4. To the expeditions sent to various points of the archipelago by insurgent vessels armed for war and flying a flag which is not recognized by the maritime powers, which subjects them to being treated as pirates.

5. Finally, to Spain's right to expect that, during the peace negotiations, her institutions will be integrally maintained at Manila, whose bay, city, and harbor are occupied by the American forces in virtue of the protocol of August 12, and not in virtue of the capitulation of the 14th of that month.

The minister of state at Madrid, to whom the replies made by your honorable predecessor in his notes of September 5, 6, and 16 were communicated, has just requested me to lay the following observations before you:

1. The Spanish government rejects, as contrary to international law and to the history of wars between civilized countries, the theory which the Federal government announced in its note of September 16 relative to the effects of the protocol of August 12 and the capitulation of the 14th of that month concerning the occupation of Manila.

2. In opposition to this theory the Spanish government maintains that according to the terms of article VI of the protocol any act of hostility committed subsequently to the signing of that instrument is morally without legal value. If the belligerent forces could not be at once notified of the agreement made, this was merely due to a material

impossibility, owing to the cutting by the Federal authorities of the cable whereby telegraphic communication was maintained between Manila and Asia.

Under these circumstances the Spanish government persists in its conviction that the capitulation of August 14 is null and void, and will consider it useless to make any reference thereto until certain acts of the American authorities at Manila shall come to its knowledge.

3. The Federal government has expressed the opinion that it is unimportant whether the occupation of Manila originated in the protocol or the capitulation. The Spanish government is unable to share this view. If the capitulation were really valid the United States would have all the rights which are conferred upon them by the clauses of that instrument; on the contrary, according to the terms of article III of the protocol, the United States cannot exercise, in the city, port, and bay of Manila, over which the sovereignty of Spain has not been relinquished, anything more than the jurisdiction which is indispensable to secure public order until the conclusion of the treaty of peace. Under these circumstances (as the Spanish government remarked in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the note delivered to the department of state by the ambassador of France on the 11th ultimo) the American authorities would not be justified in changing the laws, institutions of good order, the economical and fiscal régime established by Spain in the Philippines, or in devoting to other objects the customs revenues which have been set apart for the payment of legally contracted obligations.

4. According to recent information the Spanish prisoners who are in the hands of the Tagals continue to be subjected to the worst treatment, even in the territory occupied by the Americans. The Spanish government is concerned about what the Federal government proposes to do for the protection of these prisoners, and insists, in the name of humanity, that a stop be put to their sufferings.

The Spanish government, moreover, renews the request which it has already made for the repatriation of the families of the officers of the garrison of the Marianas who were taken prisoners.

5. The Spanish government has been informed that several insurgent vessels are navigating in the waters of the Visayas for the purpose of stirring up the natives of the country to rebellion, and that 1,500 Tagals have landed at Panay with sundry pieces of artillery. General Rios is obliged to oppose these rebels with insufficient forces. This information naturally causes deep anxiety to the royal government, and fully justifies the proposition made by the minister of state through this embassy (note of August 29, 1898), to transport to those points of the archipelago that are menaced by the insurrection either the troops who have been rendered inactive by the capitulation of Manila or troops sent directly from the Peninsula. The Spanish government can but regret that the refusal of the United States to allow Spain to utilize her troops has contributed to the extension of the insurrection,

and deems it to be its duty to refer to these facts in order that it may not be held responsible for the results.

In declining to entertain the double suggestion of the minister of state, the honorable Mr. Moore expressed himself in his note of September 5 as follows:

It would be unfortunate if any act should be done by either government which might, in certain aspects, be inconsistent with the suspension of hostilities between the two nations, and which might necessitate the adoption of corresponding measures of precaution by the other government.

Almost on the day following that on which the royal government received communication of this reply, various organs of the European press announced that the American armored vessels *Oregon* and *Iowa* were to be sent to Manila. The government of her majesty refuses to believe that the United States government has really resolved to increase its land and sea forces in the Philippines, after having opposed the measures which Spain proposed to take in order to repress, as is its right and its duty, the progress of the insurgents in its possessions. If, according to the aforesaid reply of the honorable Mr. Moore, a shipment of Spanish troops to General Rios, who is attacked by superior forces, appears to the Federal government to be inconsistent with the suspension of hostilities, is not the case the same with the shipment of re-enforcements to Admiral Dewey, who is threatened by no enemy? In expressing the hope that each of the two governments would abstain from any act that might "necessitate the adoption of corresponding measures of precaution by the other government," did not your honorable predecessor assume, in a manner, for the United States the engagement not to modify the status quo in any way? Under these circumstances, her majesty's government deems it to be its duty to cause a statement to be rectified which it cannot but consider as being without foundation.

This was answered by Mr. Hay, who had now replaced Mr. Day, the head of the American commission to Paris, as secretary of state, as follows:

October 29, 1898.

Sir: I had the honor duly to receive the note which you addressed to me on the 4th instant, in which, at the request of the minister of state of Spain, you lay before me certain observations of the Spanish government made in reply to this department's notes to Mr. Cambon of the 5th, 8th, and 16th ultimo.

Among these observations are included several subjects which are now under discussion by the peace commisssion at Paris, and for that reason the government of the United States does not think it convenient to discuss them here.

I deem it proper, however, to say:

1. That the government of the United States is not able to accept the interpretation placed by the government of Spain upon the respective effects in law and in fact of the protocol of August 12 and the capitulation of August 14 upon the military situation at Manila.

2. That the president has given orders to the American authorities in the Philippines to use their good offices, wherever possible, to prevent any excesses of the insurgents or any cruel treatment of prisoners or Spanish subjects.

3. That the American men-of-war to which your note referred as having been ordered to Manila are actually under orders to visit the coast of Brazil and afterwards to proceed to the Hawaiian Islands.

CHAPTER XXI

THE TREATY OF PEACE

THE commissioners[1] for the treaty of peace met in Paris, October 1.

The instructions to the American commissioners, after formally reciting the demands and other terms of the protocol, referred to the instructions to the commissioners appointed to carry out the details of the evacuation of the Spanish islands in the West Indies. A copy of these instructions was enclosed.[2] The document continued:

By these instructions you will observe that the evacuation of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies is treated as a military operation, and will, when carried into effect, leave the evacuated places in the military occupation of the United States. The purposes of the United States during such occupation are set forth in General Order No. 101 of the war department of July 18, 1898, which was issued by direction of the president on the capitulation of the Spanish forces at Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern part of the Province of Santiago and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States. . . .

As the evacuation of Cuba and the other Spanish islands in the West Indies by the Spanish military forces devolves upon the United States the duty of taking possession of and holding and preserving all the immovable property therein previously belonging to the government

[1] They were, on the part of the United States, ex-Secretary of State William R. Day, Senators Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, and George Gray, and Mr. Whitelaw Reid, with Mr. John Bassett Moore as secretary.

On the part of Spain they were President of the Senate Don Eugenio Montero Rios; Senator Don Buenaventura Abarzuza; Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Don José de Garnica y Diaz; the Spanish minister to the Belgians, Don Wenceslas Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia; and General of Division Don Rafael Cerero y Saenz, with the Spanish minister to Morocco, Don Emilio de Ojeda, as secretary.

[2] For these, see *ante*, pp. 442, 443 note.

of Spain, the evacuation commissioners of the United States are instructed to arrange for the taking into possession and to take into possession for the United States, all public buildings and grounds, forts, fortifications, arsenals, depots, docks, wharves, piers, and other fixed property previously belonging to Spain, and to arrange for the care and safe-keeping of such property under the authority and control of the United States. Small arms and accoutrements, batteries of field artillery, supply and baggage wagons, ambulances, and other impedimenta of the Spanish army in Cuba and other Spanish islands in the West Indies are to be removed, if desired, by the representatives of Spain, provided such removal shall be effected within a reasonable time; but the armament of forts, fortifications, and fixed batteries, being in the nature of immovable fixtures, are not to be allowed to be taken, but are, in connection with such forts, fortifications, and batteries, to be taken over into the possession of the United States. The instructions of the evacuation commissioners also contain appropriate clauses in regard to the custody and preservation by the United States of state papers, public records, and other papers and documents necessary or convenient for the government of the islands, as well as all judicial and legal documents and other public records necessary or convenient for securing to individuals the titles to property.

It will be proper to confirm these transactions by appropriate clauses in the treaty of peace.

Similar clauses will be inserted in respect to the island ceded to the United States in the Ladrones. This government has selected the Island of Guam, and you are instructed to embody in the treaty of peace a proper stipulation of cession.

A rumor has reached us from various quarters to the effect that the Spanish peace commissioners will be instructed to claim compensation for the public property of the Spanish government in Cuba, as well as in territories agreed to be ceded to the United States. This rumor is not credited, but it is proper to make a few observations upon it. No such claim on the part of the Spanish government is to be entertained in respect to any territory which Spain either cedes to the United States or as to which she relinquishes her sovereignty and title. The cession of territory or the relinquishment of sovereignty over and title to it is universally understood to carry with it the public property of the government by which the cession or relinquishment is made. Any claim, therefore, on the part of Spain, such as that above suggested, would be inconsistent with the express agreements embodied in the protocol.

In the correspondence leading up to the signature of that instrument you will observe that this government waived, for the time being, the requirement of a pecuniary indemnity from Spain. This concession was made in the hope that Spain would thereby be enabled promptly to accept our terms. But if the Spanish commissioners should, contrary to our just expectations, put forward and insist upon a claim for com-

pensation for public property, you are instructed to put forward as a counterclaim a demand for an indemnity for the cost of the war.

By article 6 of the protocol it was agreed that hostilities between the two countries should be suspended, and that notice to that effect should be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces. Such notice was given by the government of the United States immediately after the signature of the protocol, the forms of the necessary orders having previously been prepared. But before notice could reach the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United States in the Philippines they captured and took possession by conquest of the city of Manila and its suburbs, which are therefore held by the United States by conquest as well as by virtue of the protocol.

In view of what has taken place it is necessary now to determine what shall be our future relations to the Philippines. Before giving you specific instructions on this subject it is my desire to present certain general considerations.

It is my wish that throughout the negotiations entrusted to the commission the purpose and spirit with which the United States accepted the unwelcome necessity of war should be kept constantly in view. We took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfilment of high public and moral obligations. We had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest. Through the long course of repeated representations which preceded and aimed to avert the struggle, and in the final arbitrament of force, this country was impelled solely by the purpose of relieving grievous wrongs and removing long-existing conditions which disturbed its tranquillity, which shocked the moral sense of mankind, and which could no longer be endured.

It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original action. The lustre and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be confidently rested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not under any illusion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive demands or into an adventurous departure on untried paths. It is believed that the true glory and the enduring interests of the country will most surely be served if an unselfish duty conscientiously accepted and a signal triumph honorably achieved shall be crowned by such an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in victory as best comports with the traditions and character of our enlightened republic.

Our aim in the adjustment of peace should be directed to lasting results and to the achievement of the common good under the demands of civilization, rather than to ambitious designs. The terms of the

protocol were framed upon this consideration. The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that requirement, we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged. It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, but simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history, to say that it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent peace on and near our own territory that the Spanish flag should remain on this side of the sea. This lesson of events and of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the other islands belonging to Spain in this hemisphere.

The Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less true, however, that, without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.

Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on large territorial possession than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal privileges.

It is believed that in the practical application of these guiding principles the present interests of our country and the proper measure of its duty, its welfare in the future, and the consideration of its exemption from unknown perils will be found in full accord with the just, moral, and humane purpose which was invoked as our justification in accepting the war.

In view of what has been stated, the United States cannot accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon. It is desirable, however, that the United States shall acquire the right of entry for vessels and merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States into such ports of the Philippines as are not ceded to the United States upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and merchandise, both in relation to port and customs charges and rates of trade and commerce, together with other rights of protection and trade accorded to citizens of one country within the territory of another. You are therefore instructed to demand such concession,

agreeing on your part that Spain shall have similar rights as to her subjects and vessels in the ports of any territory in the Philippines ceded to the United States.

We are informed that numerous persons are now held as prisoners by the Spanish government for political acts performed in Cuba, Puerto Rico, or other Spanish islands in the West Indies, as well as in the Philippines. You are instructed to demand the release of these prisoners, so far as their acts have connection with matters involved in the settlement between the United States and Spain.

It will be desirable to insert in any treaty of peace which you may conclude a stipulation for the revival of the provisions of our former treaties with Spain, so far as they may be applicable to present conditions.

I have directed General Wesley Merritt, the late commander at Manila, to report to the commission at Paris, where he will arrive October 2, with such information as he may possess; and it is understood he will carry with him, for the use of the commission, the views of Admiral Dewey. To the views of these distinguished officers I invite the most careful consideration of the commission.

It is desired that your negotiations shall be conducted with all possible expedition, in order that the treaty of peace, if you should succeed in making one, may be submitted to the senate early in the ensuing session. Should you at any time in the course of your negotiations desire further instructions, you will ask for them without delay.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

The immediate demand of the Spanish commissioners at the first meeting, October 1, was that the American commissioners should join in declaring that the *status quo* existing at the time of the signature of the peace protocol should be immediately restored in the Philippines.[1] To this the American commissioners made reply at the next conference, October 3, saying that with a view to prevent the diversion and failure of the negotiations as well as on the ground of want of power, they were obliged to reply that the questions involved having been presented to and answered by the American government, any further demand as to military operations in the Philippines must be presented by the Spanish government to that at Washington.[2]

This question with that of the Cuban debt and the demand for the Philippines were to be burning controversies of the confer-

[1] Annex to protocol No. 1, Senate Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 15.
[2] Annex 1 to protocol No. 2, *ibid.*, 21.

ence, in all of which Spain, with a feeling vividly expressed in the correspondence of the head of her commission with the minister of state,[1] finally acceded to the stand taken by the United States.

On October 7 the Spanish commissioners proposed the transfer of the sovereignty of Cuba to the United States, which was to accept this in order at the proper time to turn it over to the Cuban people, the transfer to include charges and obligations of every kind which Spain may have lawfully contracted for the service of the island or which might have been lawfully chargeable to the insular treasury, including all debts, salaries, civil and ecclesiastical, and pensions, civil and military, up to the ratification of the treaty; the cession of Puerto Rico to be final and subject to like conditions. Stipulations as to property, archives, and other subjects were also included.[2]

On October 11 these propositions were rejected by the American commissioners. The Spanish commissioners filed reasons in support of their position on the Cuban debt, and now proposed that the United States should accept the sovereignty of the island without any express obligation to transfer it to the Cuban people. Senator Gray favored this latter as avoiding complications while the process of pacifying the island should be proceeding. Instructions being asked in reference to this point, reply was made from Washington that the president saw no reason for departing from instructions already given, but many reasons for adhering strictly to terms of the peace protocol. "We must carry out," he said, "the spirit and letter of the resolution of congress."[3]

On October 17 the American commissioners presented a paper in which while recognizing the fact that the government of the United States assumed all responsibilities for the preservation of life and property that legally attach to it during the occupation of Cuba, finally declined to assume the burden of the debt, either for the United States or Cuba, and offered as a substitute for the articles previously presented by them the precise stipulations of articles I and II of the protocol as to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and

[1] *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 1896–1900.
[2] Annex 2 to protocol No. 3, Senate Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 27.
[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 927.

other islands in the West Indies and the island to be ceded in the Ladrones.[1]

By this time, affairs had become seriously strained between the commissioners of the two powers. Señor Montero Rios, the president of the Spanish commission, on October 18, was writing confidentially to the minister of state:

> It may be the fate that the treaty referring to the Antilles will have to be limited [to the first two articles of the protocol], and as those provisions are already in the protocol, it is evident that there is not even cause for the supposition that the American commissioners propose to execute any treaty between Spain and the United States in relation to the Antilles. It is fair to suppose that similar things will occur in respect to the Philippines. The United States will impose upon us their conditions, but will not favor us in anything. If this happens the treaty will be a singular deed in the diplomatic history of peoples, because it will be reduced to one of the parties submitting itself unconditionally to the obligations and exigencies which the other imposes upon it without the other on its part recognizing any right or making any concession. . . . But between signing this treaty and as a last resort denying the demands of the United States there is a middle course which, not guarding the interests, may at least save the honor and dignity of our country. The measure consists in replacing the treaty by an act which shall contain the demands which the United States makes on Spain, with a declaration of the absolute powerlessness of Spain through lack of means to oppose said demands, and that Spain consequently cedes to force, granting that which the United States demands, and protesting against the injustice and violence of said demands.
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> I do not conceive how the United States, in view of this manifestation of Spain, can begin war again, because we accede to what is demanded although we do not acknowledge the right of such demands and protest against their injustice. . . . I must put an end to this letter which only the terrible solemnity of the present moment can excuse.[2] . . .

The difficulty at the moment was the question of the Cuban debt. At the conference of October 24, the American commission declined to recede from their refusal of any acknowledgment of responsibility for any part of this. The question was finally asked of the Spanish commission whether they would refuse to

[1] Annex to protocol No. 6, Senate Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 52.
[2] *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 293.

sign any articles unless such acknowledgment was made. They asked time for reply, and adjournment being made until Wednesday the 26th, a telegram was sent to Washington explaining the situation and asking: "Would you approve an article in treaty which would provide that the United States, while not contracting any independent liability of its own, would use its good offices with any people or government possessing sovereignty in Cuba for acknowledgment of any debts incurred by Spain for existing internal improvements of a pacific character in the island, a mixed commission to be appointed to ascertain whether any such debts exist and if so their amount?"

To this reply came at once that "under no circumstances" would the American government assume any part of the Cuban debt or engage to use its good offices as suggested.

On October 25 the Spanish ambassador to Paris called upon General Porter, the American ambassador, and "discussed the subject in all its bearings." "I am obliged to tell you," he said in his telegram to the minister of state, "that if an understanding on the Cuban debt is not possible an agreement might be arrived at by the United States making concessions in regard to the "Philippines." In the evening of the same day he called upon Mr. Reid and informed him that the Spanish commissioners must break off the treaty rather than abandon the claim on the Cuban debt unless they could get some concession elsewhere; that Montero Rios could not return to Madrid if known to have accepted entire Cuban indebtedness; that if forced to a direct answer on the question now, they must answer no, and break off the conference. The Spanish ambassador asked Mr. Reid to search for some possible concession and hinted as to the Philippines. Mr. Reid said that at first the American people were not eager for them; believed, however, that they "had practically conquered them when [they] conquered capital, sunk fleet, and captured arms; and had right to all of them. Preponderance of sentiment in favor of the taking all, but respectable and influential minority which did not go to that length. It was possible, he said, but not probable, that out of these conditions the Spanish commissioners might be able to find something in territory or debt which might seem to their people at home like a concession." [1]

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 936.

At the conference of October 26 the Spanish commissioners made formal reply, stating that they did not refuse "to consider any articles as to Cuba and Puerto Rico which contain no provision for the assumption of indebtedness by the United States or Cuba or both," subordinating the final approval of such articles to that of the others which are to form the complete treaty, and proposed to take up the discussion of the Philippines. The crisis was, for the moment, tided over.[1]

At the meeting on October 27 the Spanish secretary, Señor Ojeda, informed Mr. Day that the Spanish commissioners accepted the first two articles as proposed by the American commission in the hope of liberal treatment in the Philippine Islands. Señor Ojeda said that no government in Spain could sign a treaty giving up everything and live, and that such surrender without some relief would mean national bankruptcy.[2]

The way was now open for the discussion of the Philippines, information on which had been diligently sought by the commissioners. General Merritt, who had left the command in the Philippines, had now arrived in Paris, and on October 6 had come before the American commissioners with a statement of his own views, with those of Admiral Dewey, General Greene, and other American officers, and also those of M. André, the Belgian consul at Manila, to whose opinions of Philippine conditions, which included "the United States must take all or nothing," General Merritt gave much weight. Mr. Foreman, long intimately acquainted with the islands, also gave testimony. On October 14 a telegram from Admiral Dewey to the secretary of the navy was forwarded to the commissioners:

> It is important that the disposition of the Philippine Islands should be decided as soon as possible and a strong government established. Spanish authority has been completely destroyed in Luzon, and general anarchy prevails without the limits of the city and bay of Manila. Strongly probable that islands to the south will fall into same state soon. Distressing reports have been received of inhuman cruelty practised on religious and civil authorities in other parts of these islands. The natives appear unable to govern.

[1] Annex to protocol No. 9, Senate Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 77.
[2] *Ibid.*, 936.

The many differences of opinion developed among the American commissioners had, on October 25, been telegraphed to Washington. Mr. Day could not agree that the entire group should be demanded; that in the spirit of their instructions and bearing in mind the declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs of conquest, "we should be consistent in making peace. Territory permanently held must be taken as war indemnity and with due regard to our responsibility because of the conduct of our military and naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents. Whether this conduct was wise or unwise is not now important. We cannot leave the insurgents to mere treaty stipulations or to their unaided resources. . . . On all hands it is agreed that the inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government." He favored keeping the experiment of colonial expansion within bounds and thus confining demands to Luzon and the other islands north of a line through San Bernardino Strait to the Naranjos Islands and Tambisan on the northeast coast of Borneo, "thus controlling the entrance to the China Sea with additional harbors and ports of call. The objection that other islands will be acquired by European powers without regard to our interests can be obviated by treaty stipulations for nonalienation without the consent of the United States." With stipulations for freedom of trade and intercourse among the islands there would be practical control of the situation with a base for the navy and Eastern commerce, and responsibility for those to whom we owed obligation and who were most likely to become fit for self-government. This would "not leave us open to the imputation of following agreement to negotiate with demand for the whole subject-matter of the negotiation ourselves."

Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid favored demanding the whole group, and as the instructions provided only for the retention of Luzon, asked for an extension of instructions. With the destruction of Spain's fleet and surrender of her army, "we became as complete masters of the group as she had been." There was no natural place for any division, from which in any case must result great danger from the certainty of revolt already active against Spain in Visayas. "Division would thus ensure lawlessness and turbulence within gunshot of our shores, with no pros-

pect of relief unless in Spanish sale of islands to unfriendly commercial rivals, which would probably happen if we hold the most important—Luzon—and release the others. . . . Moral obligations not to return Manila and Luzon to the oppressive power from which we have relieved them applies also to the rest of the archipelago, since Spanish power is now broken and cannot be restored without our consent. We believe public opinion in Europe, including that of Rome, expects us to retain whole of the Philippines and would prefer that to any other solution save the impossible one of restoration of Spanish power over all the islands." If there should be any division, they suggested as the only one admissible that mentioned by Mr. Day. They believed the Mohammedans of Mindanao and of the Sulu archipelago would be less intractable under American than under Spanish rule, "while the other would be comparatively easy to control and glad to welcome [the] strong and just rule of [the] United States."

Judge Gray was emphatic in his dissent, saying:

The undersigned cannot agree that it is wise to take Philippines in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse accepted continental policy of country declared and acted upon throughout our history. Propinquity governs case of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into European politics and the entangling alliances against which Washington and all American statesmen have protested. It will make necessary a navy equal to largest of powers, a greatly increased military establishment, immense sums for fortifications and harbors, multiply occasions for dangerous complications with foreign nations, and increase burdens of taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for American labor in labor market already overcrowded and cheap, no area for homes for American citizens—climate and social conditions demoralizing to character of American youth. New and disturbing questions introduced into our politics, church question menacing. On whole, instead of indemnity—injury. Undersigned cannot agree that any obligation incurred to insurgents is paramount to our manifest interests. Attacked Manila as part of legitimate war against Spain. If we had captured Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would not owe duty to stay by them at conclusion of war. On contrary, interest and duty would require us to abandon both Manila and Cadiz. No place for colonial administration or government of subject people in American system.

So much from stand-point of interest. But even conceding all bene-

fits claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful, and Christian nation; we exchange the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in hour of victory that becomes the advanced civilization we claim, for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully assumed. We should set example in these respects, not follow in the selfish and vulgar greed for territory which Europe has inherited from mediæval times. Our declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn and deliberate definition of our purpose. Now that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our word. Third article of protocol leaves everything concerning control of Philippines to negotiation between the parties. Absurd now to say that we will not negotiate, but will appropriate whole subject-matter of negotiation. At the very least, let us adhere to president's instructions, and if conditions require the keeping of Luzon forego the material advantages claimed in annexing other islands—above all, let us not make a mockery of the injunction contained in those instructions, where, after stating that "we took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfilment of high public and moral obligations," and that "we had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest," the president, among other things, eloquently says: "It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original action." This and more, of which I earnestly ask a reperusal, binds my conscience and governs my action.[1]

There is no questioning the cogency of Judge Gray's argument, nor the nobility of its sentiment. To demand the Philippines was undoubtedly to alter the moral position of the United States and change its attitude from one of altruism to one of self-interest. This much is self-evident and scarcely requires statement. The large question of what is known as state policy is not within the scope of this book except to say that it seems clear that there was no middle ground such as that proposed by the ex-secretary of state, and such as was mentioned in the instructions to the commission. Policy and humanity demanded if any demand should be made, it should be for the whole of the archipelago and not for a part. To subordinate a part to American

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 932–935.

control and leave the remainder to chaotic turbulence, or future inimical control, was to court difficulties later.

The president already having instructed the commission that at least Luzon should be demanded, had now come to this latter opinion. Thus, on October 26, Mr. Hay telegraphed:

> The information which has come to the president since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required. The president reaches this conclusion after most thorough consideration of the whole subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this course will entail less trouble than any other, and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility.

Two days later, October 28, Mr. Hay telegraphed more fully the attitude of the president, which had "the cordial concurrence of the seven members of [the] cabinet now in Washington."[1]

> While the Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest, which position must not be yielded, yet their disposition, control, and government the president prefers should be the subject of negotiation, as provided in the protocol. It is imperative upon us that as victors we should be governed only by motives which will exalt our nation. Territorial expansion should be our least concern; that we shall not shirk the moral obligations of our victory is of the greatest. It is undisputed that Spain's authority is permanently destroyed in every part of the Philippines. To leave any part in her feeble control now would increase our difficulties and be opposed to the interests of humanity. The sentiment in the United States is almost universal that the people of the Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from Spanish domination. In this sentiment the president fully concurs. Nor can we permit Spain to transfer any of the islands to another power. Nor can we invite another power or powers to join the United States in sovereignty over them. We must either hold them or turn them back to Spain.
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> Consequently, grave as are the responsibilities and unforeseen as are the difficulties which are before us, the president can see but one plain

[1] Mr. Long, secretary of the navy, was absent in Massachusetts.

path of duty—the acceptance of the archipelago. Greater difficulties and more serious complications, administrative and international, would follow any other course. The president has given to the views of the commissioners the fullest consideration, and in reaching the conclusion above announced, in the light of information communicated to the commission and to the president since your departure, he has been influenced by the single consideration of duty and humanity. The president is not unmindful of the distressed financial condition of Spain, and whatever consideration the United States may show must come from its sense of generosity and benevolence, rather than from any real or technical obligation. The terms upon which the full cession of the Philippines shall be made must be left largely with the commission. But as its negotiations shall proceed it will develop the Spanish position, and if any new phase of the situation arise, the commission can further communicate with the president. How these instructions shall be carried out and whether to be presented as a peremptory demand, the president leaves to the judgment and discretion of the commissioners.[1]

"Your course," said Mr. Hay, "has the warm approval of us all."[2]

It will be noted that the claim by conquest was still put forward, and from this the president was loath to recede, but the realities of international law were against the view of himself and the cabinet. Thus, on November 3, Mr. Day telegraphed:

(For the president, special.)

After a careful examination of the authorities the majority of the commission are clearly of the opinion that our demand for the Philippine Islands cannot be based on conquest. When the protocol was signed Manila was not captured, siege was in progress, and capture made after the execution of the protocol. Captures made after agreement for armistice must be disregarded and *status quo* restored as far as practicable. We can require cession of Philippine Islands only as indemnity for losses and expenses of the war. Have in view also condition of islands, the broken power of Spain, anarchy in which our withdrawal would leave the islands, etc. These are legitimate factors.

On October 30, Mr. Frye had telegraphed the president:

It seems to me that the most undesirable happening would be our return without a treaty of peace, and yet that is probable in my opinion.

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 937. [2] *Ibid.*, 938.

If the Spanish commissioners should accede to our demands as at present outlined they could not return home, while our country it may be would not justify us in tendering any more liberal terms. Spain made a determined fight to secure concessions as to the Cuban debt, while we were persistent in our refusal to yield anything. Our articles were accepted, but provisionally, for if no final agreement is reached they too failed. It seemed to me that we might have agreed to use our good offices with any government hereafter established in Cuba to secure the assumption by it of any indebtedness incurred [in] internal improvements there, and ourselves assume any like indebtedness in the territories finally ceded to us. The amount could not be large. Might we not go further, and agree to pay Spain from $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 if a treaty could be secured? If no treaty then war, a continued disturbance of business, an expenditure of a million dollars a day, and further loss of life. Would not our people prefer to pay Spain one-half of war expenditures rather than indulge in its costly luxury? Europe sympathizes with Spain in this regard exactly. The correspondent of the *London Times* in his yesterday's letter criticised severely our attitude. The precedents of the last century are antagonistic to our position. Of course we will not pay debts incurred in the suppression of colonial rebellions. I do not forget that we demand no money indemnity for cost of war to us. It may be because our enemy is bankrupt. I am sorry the Carolines were not taken by us, as they are infinitely more valuable than the Ladrones. If war is resumed, I hope orders will be given Dewey to seize at once all of the Philippine islands, as also the Carolines.

Word was returned by the department of state:

If it should be the opinion of the commissioners that there should be paid a reasonable sum of money to cover peace improvements which are fairly chargeable to us under established precedents [the president] will give his hearty concurrence. The money payment, if any is determined upon, should rest solely upon the considerations suggested in your message of Sunday night. He desires that you may read this to the commission with your message to him.[1]

At the conference of Monday, October 31, was presented the American demand for the Philippine archipelago, upon which, in the coming sessions of November 4, 9, and 16, ensued the elaborate arguments in the question, much too long to be more than referred to[2] by saying that Spain maintained, as the essence of

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 939, 940.
[2] See Senate Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 110–196.

her contention, that the demand was a violation of the peace protocol which by its terms contemplated only a provisional occupation of Manila and did not impair Spanish sovereignty over the group, and that nothing has occurred since signing the protocol to justify the United States in enlarging its demands.

The president of the Spanish commission expressed his personal views in a telegram of November 1, to the minister of state, saying:

> Truly the said proposition which is wholly outside the protocol of Washington and in contradiction to its provisions causes amazement because, as it is drawn, it is equivalent to proposing to Spain that she present to the United States the Philippine archipelago, doubtless as a demonstration of our gratitude for its course in the Cuban question.[1]

The American commissioners, with a request for definite instructions, again laid their individual views before the department of state at Washington in a telegram of November 11. Mr. Day favored minimizing our holdings in the Philippines to the lowest point consistent with our obligations which "seem to require us to take Luzon and [the] islands so near as to be essential thereto." If it should be determined to take the whole group, he would pay say fifteen millions, "recognizing that we are dealing with a bankrupt people; that Spain loses her colonies, the revenues of which are charged with outstanding debts, and parts with a considerable portion of her revenue-producing domain. I would assume no part of the so-called Cuban and Philippine bonded debt. Rather than fail to secure a treaty of peace, I think demand for whole group might be so modified as to let Spain keep Mindanao and Sulu group without conditions, paying same sum."

Mr. Frye favored taking the whole group and paying ten millions. "If necessary to secure treaty, and, believe it is, I would take Luzon, Mindoro, Palawan, also Ponape of the Carolines, paying from five to ten millions," with a number of stipulations of a liberal character.

Mr. Gray feared the result of a failure of the treaty, the result of which would compel the United States to "act the part of a ruthless conqueror." He would thus be willing to take the islands

[1] *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 310.

by treaty, making such concessions "as would comport with the magnanimity of a great nation dealing with a weak and prostrate foe. I mean that I prefer the latter alternative to the former, not that I have changed my mind as to the policy of taking the Philippine Islands at all."

Mr. Reid favored regarding any cession of the islands as an indemnity for the expenses of the war which he reckoned at some $300,000,000. In order certainly to secure a treaty he would leave Spain Mindanao and the Sulu group and take the Carolines and Ladrones, or take the Carolines and all the Philippines, paying from $12,000,000 to $15,000,000 for past pacific expenditures. Finally, he would not sacrifice the treaty for the sake of Mindanao and the Sulu group.

Mr. Davis was of opinion that the situation required the presentation of an ultimatum demanding the entire Philippine archipelago. He would pay no money on any account whatsoever. "The Spanish commissioners have re-occupied their first position that the United States shall assume or be bound for the so-called colonial debt, and it is plain that so long as her commissioners thus contend the negotiation stands just as it did at its beginning. I do not believe we shall ever get a treaty except as a result of such an unyielding ultimatum."[1]

Two days later, on November 13, Secretary Hay telegraphed the instructions demanded:

> A treaty of peace is of the highest importance to the United States if it can be had without the sacrifice of plain duty. The president would regret deeply the resumption of hostilities against a prostrate foe. We are clearly entitled to indemnity for the cost of the war. We cannot hope to be fully indemnified. We do not expect to be. It would probably be difficult for Spain to pay money. All she has are the archipelagoes of the Philippines and the Carolines. She surely cannot expect us to turn the Philippines back and bear the cost of war and all claims of our citizens for damages to life and property in Cuba without any indemnity but Puerto Rico, which we have, and which is wholly inadequate. Does Spain propose to pay in money the cost of the war and the claims of our citizens, and make full guaranties to the people of the Philippines, and grant to us concessions of naval and telegraph stations in the islands and privileges to our commerce,

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 945–948.

the same as enjoyed by herself, rather than surrender the archipelago? From the stand-point of indemnity both the archipelagoes are insufficient to pay our war expenses; but, aside from this, do we not owe an obligation to the people of the Philippines which will not permit us to return them to the sovereignty of Spain? Could we justify ourselves in such a course, or could we permit their barter to some other power? Willing or not, we have the responsibility of duty which we cannot escape.

You are therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole of the Philippines, and, if necessary, pay to Spain $10,000,000 to $20,000,000, and if you can get cession of a naval and telegraph station in the Carolines and the several concessions and privileges and guaranties, so far as applicable, enumerated in the views of Commissioners Frye and Reid, you can offer more. The president cannot believe any division of the archipelago can bring us anything but embarrassment in the future. The trade and commercial side, as well as the indemnity for the cost of the war, are questions we might yield. They might be waived or compromised, but the questions of duty and humanity appeal to the president so strongly that he can find no appropriate answer but the one he has here marked out. You have the largest liberty to lead up to these instructions, but unreasonable delay should be avoided.

Thus, at the conference of November 21, in a paper which reviewed at length the Spanish proposal of November 16,[1] to submit the meaning of articles III and VI to arbitration, the American commissioners submitted "a final proposition," which was for the cession of the entire archipelago of the Philippines, the United States paying Spain $20,000,000, "and it being the policy of the United States to maintain in the Philippines an open door to the world's commerce, the American commissioners are prepared to insert in the treaty . . . a stipulation . . . that for a term of years Spanish ships and merchandise shall be admitted into the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as American ships and merchandise." Mutual relinquishment of all claims for indemnity, national and individual, which had arisen since the beginning of the Cuban insurrection; the question of religious freedom in the Carolines; the release of prisoners held

[1] For this long and interesting document of the Spanish commission (22 pp.), see Senate Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 174 *et seq.*; also Mr. John Bassett Moore's resumé in a telegram, November 18, to Mr. Hay. (*Foreign Relations*, 1898, 951–954.)

for political offences in connection with the Cuban and Philippine insurrections; the acquisition of the island variously known as Kusaie, Ualan or Strong Island in the Carolines; cable-landing rights elsewhere in Spanish jurisdiction and the revival of certain treaties, were, besides the first two articles, already provisionally agreed to regarding Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Guam, among the American proposals.

There was no conference again until November 28, the delay being caused by a correspondence between the presidents of the commissions in which, on November 24, were submitted by Señor Montero Rios certain propositions which appear in a telegram sent November 25 to Secretary Hay:

President of our commission received last night from the president of the Spanish commission a communication submitting for adoption in lieu of our final proposition of last Monday any one of the three following alternative propositions:

First. Relinquishment by Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and cession of Puerto Rico and other Antilles, the island of Guam in the Ladrones, and the Philippine Islands archipelago, including Mindanao and Sulu, to the United States, the latter paying to Spain the sum of $100,000,000 as compensation for her sovereignty over the archipelago and the works of public utility which she has executed during her rule in all the islands of the east and west, the sovereignty over which she relinquishes or cedes.

Second. Cession to the United States of the island of Kusaie, in the Carolines, of the right to land a cable on any of these or of the Marianas, while they remain under Spanish rule, and cession of the Philippine Islands archipelago proper—that is, beginning on the north, the islands of Batanes, Babuyanes, Luzon, Visayas, and all the others following to the south as far as the Sulu Sea, Spain reserving to the south of this sea the island of Mindanao and Sulu, which have never formed a part of the Philippine Islands archipelago proper. The United States as compensation for said islands, for the right to land cables, and for the public works executed by Spain in said islands during her rule will pay to Spain the sum of $50,000,000.

Third. Spain relinquishes her sovereignty over Cuba and gratuitously cedes to the United States the Philippine Islands archipelago proper, besides Puerto Rico, the other West Indies, and the island of Guam, which she cedes as compensation for the expenses of the war and as indemnity to American citizens for injuries suffered since the beginning of the last Cuban insurrection. The United States and Spain will submit to an arbitral tribunal what are the debts and obligations

of a colonial character which should pass with the islands the sovereignty over which Spain relinquishes and cedes.

On these propositions the commissioners hold the following views: Messrs. Day, Davis, and Reid think we are committed to our final proposition of last Monday; Commissioners Frye and Gray favor submitting a proposal to leave to Spain Mindanao and Sulu group and take instead Ualan or Strong Island in the Carolines, paying only $20,000,000. Mr. Day would favor this if it were an original proposition. He believes that Mindanao and the Sulu group can be readily separated from the other islands and that with their population they are likely to be a source of trouble and expense, and are not desirable for us. He thinks Ualan or Strong Island would be very valuable to us, and he would prefer it. He also thinks that this concession would probably bring a treaty and that it may be that our present ultimatum will; but, as already stated, he thinks our only consistent course now is to stand by that ultimatum. Commissioner Gray prefers above all acceptance of third proposition.

Our commissioners desire to answer president of Spanish commission to-morrow.[1]

Senators Davis and Gray sent personal telegrams; the former urging adherence to the ultimatum; the latter favoring arbitration for "some part of the so-called colonial debts. We have nothing," said Gray, "to fear from arbitration, but have much to gain in moral prestige and maintenance of our pre-eminence in recognizing the obligations of international law."[2]

The situation of the Spanish authorities was one of distracted perplexity. Señor Montero Rios, in a letter to the minister of state, on November 21, favored leaving the Antilles and the Philippines to the United States under pressure of *force majeure*, and terminating the negotiations without a treaty,[3] but on November 25 the minister of state wrote that the council of ministers agreed that if the Americans insisted upon their definite proposition "further resistance will be useless and the rupture of the negotiations which is threatened will be dangerous . . . in order to avoid greater evils, the painful necessity of submitting to the will of the conqueror becomes imperative . . . the government desires now that the treaty must be signed . . . to refuse to sign would only make the situation graver, a circumstance which

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 958.
[2] *Ibid.*, 960.
[3] *Spanish Diplom., Corres. and Docs.*, 325.

the Americans would take advantage of by more severe acts and perhaps in extreme irritation extending the effect of their action to Europe and creating difficulties in the Peninsula, if only by the threat to do so . . . imperative foresight imposes upon the government the necessity of eliminating all cause for new complications," these being found partially in the internal state of Spain, the population of which was getting anxious for a termination of the contest. The minister of state proposed, though with much doubt, the question of making a formal protest "as a final demonstration against the violence practised."[1]

The telegram from the American commissioners of November 25 had brought a response the same day, Secretary Hay telegraphing:

> The president has considered the three proposals of the Spanish commission submitted to you. He finds no reason for departing from his last instruction and your proposal thereunder. Your instructions are that you adhere to your last proposal and decline those of the Spanish commission. He repeats his instruction of November 13, by which you are authorized in case of cession of an island in the Carolines and other concessions mentioned by Messrs. Frye and Reid, to offer additional compensation. If negotiations in regard to Philippines are successful, you will communicate to the president what amount is required for Strong Island and he will instruct you.

The way was now clear to an understanding. There were conferences on November 28 and 30 and on December 2, 5, and 6. Spain refused to sell the island of Kusaie (Strong Island) in the Carolines, or to concede in the treaty the right to land cables within her jurisdiction. Her government requested through the commission on December 6 the appointment of an international commission to investigate the causes of and responsibility for the catastrophe of the *Maine*, which, the American commissioners rejected, stating "that they considered the case as closed." They rejected also the Spanish proposition that the United States should pay in the future the pension paid since the time of Columbus to his descendants $3,400, of which had been chargeable to the treasury of Puerto Rico and $4,000 to that of the Philippines.

[1] *Ibid.*, 333.

There was a final conference on December 10, and at 8.50 in the evening of that day, was signed the treaty, of which the following abstract was telegraphed to the United States.

First. Relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba and the assumption by the United States of any obligation under international law for the protection of life and property during occupation.

Second. Cession of Puerto Rico and other islands in West Indies and Guam.

Third. Cession of Philippine Islands archipelago and the payment of twenty millions within three months after the exchange of ratifications.

Fourth. Admission of Spanish ships and merchandise to Philippine Islands for ten years on the same terms as American ships and merchandise.

Fifth. Evacuation of Philippine Islands by Spain; immediate return of Spanish soldiers at Manila by the United States to Spain; disposition of war material and armaments in Philippine Islands and Guam.

Sixth. General release and return of prisoners, military and political.

Seventh. Mutual relinquishment of claims arising since the beginning of the insurrection in Cuba and before the exchange of ratifications; the United States to adjudicate and settle claims of its own citizens.

Eighth. Transfer of public property, archives, records.

Ninth. Citizenship in relinquished and ceded territories. Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, may, within a year, elect to retain Spanish nationality. Civil rights and political status of native inhabitants of ceded territories to be determined by congress.

Tenth. Protection of all persons in their religion.

Eleventh. Jurisdiction of courts.

Twelfth. Preservation of pending judicial proceedings.

Thirteenth. Protection of copyrights and patents in ceded and relinquished territories.

Fourteenth. Appointment of consuls by Spain in such territories.

Fifteenth. Each country to accord to merchant vessels of other same treatment as to its own in respect of port charges.

Sixteenth. Any obligations assumed by the United States as to Cuba limited to time of occupation, but the United States will at the end of occupancy advise any government established in Cuba to assume same obligations.

Seventeenth. The exchange of ratifications at Washington within six months after signature of treaty.[1]

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1898, 965. For the full text of the treaty see *ibid.*, 831; also Senate Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 263 *et seq.*, both in Spanish and English.

The treaty was approved by the United States senate on February 6, 1899, ratified by the president on the same day, and by the queen regent of Spain on March 19. The ratifications were exchanged at Washington on April 11, 1899, and the treaty proclaimed the same day, thus bringing a peace which all well-wishers to the two countries must hope may never be broken.

While by the treaty Spain relinquished "all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba," the question of the future status of the island was left in the air. Spain ceded to the United States Puerto Rico, her other islands in the West Indies, and Guam, with no reservation; the cession was in effect a conquest; the Philippines came to the United States practically as a purchase, which, though Spain assented to it against her will, was to save her, whatever might have been the outcome otherwise, untold expenditure of life and treasure.

One of the great mothers of nations, Spain's successive despoilments, whatever their cause and however just, must appeal to every instinct of the pathetic and tragic. A great drama such as that of Spanish conquest, colonization and deprivation cannot close without the world's yielding her sympathy for her misfortunes and honor for her achievements.

The result of the treaty has been not only momentous in ending a hundred years of friction between the two nations, but in starting both in new ways: Spain in that of home development, which her colonial difficulties had ever obstructed; the United States in a career of foreign and international interests from which, from the beginning, our government had steadily held aloof. The treaty was of highest import in bringing a new and strange polity into our own system for which it is difficult to find a place. We are still seekers for light.

Few, in April, 1898, could have supposed that eight short months would have brought such a situation; that we should have the burden of the ownership of a great Asiatic archipelago, and the government of seven millions of people among the most alien in kind and temperament to ourselves, and who, as those also of Puerto Rico, are now ruled as subjects and not as American citizens. The great difficulties of the situation can only be met by

the altruism which shall subordinate what we may call our personal benefit to the benefit of the new races which have come under our flag. So long as we shall accept and act upon this principle we shall at least be in the way of safety and honor. To do otherwise is to put aside every profession of the administration which made the peace and to take the road of difficulty and danger. It is a fair claim, and it is increasingly manifest, that the country is determined that our acts shall accord with our early promises.

The question of the Philippines as connected with American influence in the East, is beyond the scope of this book. The forces which impel national action, and which led us thither, lie in this case as in most, too deep for any real analysis. The actors who are supposed to guide are but unconscious instruments of great natural and unexplainable influences, which perhaps find their best definition in "Man proposes; God disposes," and which, as applied to ourselves, we have been pleased to call "Manifest Destiny."

Political forecast is therefore usually vain effort; it is more often, by far, wrong than right, but if one thing would seem sure it is that the East will be the scene, in not distant years, of one of the great dramas of social and material development. It may be that in the part which the possession of the Philippines will assist the United States to play, will be found the best justification of the treaty of Paris.

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OF THE MORE IMPORTANT AUTHORITIES ON THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

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These are the government publications. Foremost among those issued by the American government are:

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main features of the war; *Sketches of the Spanish-American War*, by Commander J(acobsen), of the German navy; *The Spanish-American War, Blockades and Coast Defence*, by Severo Gomé Nuñez, captain of (Spanish) artillery; *A Collection of Documents Relative to the Squadron Operations in the West Indies*, arranged by Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete; *The Squadron of Admiral Cervera*, by Captain Victor M. Concas y Palan, commander of the *Infanta Maria Teresa;* there is also published with these, *The Effect of the Gunfire of the U. S. Vessels in the Battle of Manila Bay*, by Lieutenant John M. Ellicott, U. S. N.

Relating to the army are: *The Report of the Secretary of War for* 1898, which includes the *Annual Report of the Major-General Commanding the Army, to the Secretary of War.* This latter, of 676 pages, gives the reports of all the corps commanders and of many other officers, the *Report of the Adjutant-General*, etc. It is an official document of the highest value, being analogous to that of the bureau of navigation just mentioned, and in itself a very complete history of army operations. The *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain.* (Senate Doc. 221, 56 Cong., 1 Sess.) This is in eight volumes, with a total of some 4,000 pages. It includes the correspondence, telegraphic and other, of the war department, and the testimony of a great number of officers and civilians on subjects of every character connected with the handling of the army; *The Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, and Conditions Growing Out of the Same*, which is included in the eight volumes mentioned, is also published by the war department separately; this extends to the period of July 30, 1902, thus including much more than the actual war. This work also includes an appendix giving the organization of army corps and a brief history of the volunteer organizations in the service of the United States during the war. These two volumes and the eight others just mentioned take a first rank in the value of their contents.

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Nor must mention be omitted of Michael Quinlan, printer, United States navy, who served aboard the *New York* and himself printed aboard ship *The Spanish-American War,* unique of its class, and a valuable compendium of events. It is a little book of amazing labor, scope, and accuracy.

There was published by Doubleday & McClure Co., 1898, a *Reprint of the Squadron Bulletins of the North Atlantic Squadron,* with an introduction by Admiral Sampson. These are of value as being the account written and printed daily for the information of the blockading fleet.

There were numerous magazine articles which appeared during 1898 and 1899, some of which are of great value. There were particularly valuable papers in the *Century, Scribner's, McClure's,* and *Harper's* magazines. The reader is referred for these to Poole's *Index of Periodical Literature.*

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TRANSPORT ASSIGNMENT OF SHAFTER'S ARMY

TRANSPORT	DESIGNATING NO.	TROOPS ON BOARD	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
Alamo	6	Headquarters band, and companies C, D, E, and G, 10th U. S. Infantry; companies C and E, Engineer Battalion, and headquarters 2d Infantry Brigade, 1st Division	33	574
Allegheny	17	Headquarters Cavalry Division. Enlisted men caring for horses	14	80
Arkansas	27	Loaded with the transportation, etc., of the 3d U. S. Infantry	2	13
Berkshire	9	Light Artillery Battalion and light batteries A and F, 2d U. S. Artillery	14	268
Breakwater	29	3d U. S. Infantry	20	467
Cherokee	4	12th U. S. Infantry and headquarters and 3 companies 17th U. S. Infantry	35	852
Comal	7	Company I, 7th U. S. Infantry, and light batteries E and K, 1st U. S. Artillery	10	284
Concho	14	Headquarters 2d Infantry Brigade, 2d Division, 4th U. S. Infantry, and 25th U. S. Infantry	53	1,034
Clinton	32	Companies D and B, 2d U. S. Infantry	2	169
City of Washington	16	24th U. S. Infantry and 1 battalion 21st U. S. Infantry	33	751
D. H. Miller	19	Companies E, G, and H, 7th U. S. Infantry	8	280
Iroquois	25	Headquarters and companies A, B, C, D, and F, 7th U. S. Infantry; companies C, G, H, and K, 17th U. S. Infantry; headquarters 2d Infantry Division, and headquarters 3d Infantry Brigade, 2d Division	38	722
Knickerbocker	13	Headquarters and 8 companies of 2d Massachusetts Infantry	32	588
Leona	21	8 troops 1st U. S. Cavalry, 8 troops 10th U. S. Cavalry, and headquarters 2d Cavalry Brigade, Cavalry Division	51	910
			345	6,992

TRANSPORT	DESIGNATING NO.	TROOPS ON BOARD	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
Manteo	36	2 companies 17th U. S. Infantry and 2 companies 2d Massachusetts Infantry	10	265
Matteawan	26	20th U. S. Infantry, Troops F and D, 2d U. S. Cavalry, and headquarters Independent Infantry Brigade	32	734
Miami	1	6th U. S. Infantry and 8 troops 9th U. S. Cavalry	55	919
Morgan	30	Major Rafferty and Troop C, 2d U. S. Cavalry	3	69
Olivette	11	Hospital ship	3	35
Orizaba	24	22d U. S. Infantry and batteries G and H, 4th Artillery (Siege Artillery Battalion)	35	622
Rio Grande	22	8 troops of 3d U. S. Cavalry and 8 troops 6th U. S. Cavalry; Balloon Signal detachment, and headquarters 1st Cavalry Brigade, Cavalry Division	49	882
San Marcos	18	Companies A, E, F, and H, 2d U. S. Infantry; 16th U. S. Infantry, and headquarters 1st Infantry Brigade, 1st Division	38	1,237
Santiago	2	9th U. S. Infantry; 1 battalion 10th U. S. Infantry, and headquarters 1st Infantry Division	51	739
Saratoga	20	13th U. S. Infantry, headquarters band, and companies C, D, E, and H, 21st U. S. Infantry, and headquarters 3d Infantry Brigade, 1st Division	38	635
Segurança	12	1st U. S. Infantry, Balloon Signal detachment	17	477
		Headquarters 5th Army Corps, staff	16	
		Officers accompanying the expedition	5	
Seneca	5	8th U. S. Infantry, 2 companies 2d Massachusetts Infantry, and headquarters 1st Infantry Brigade, 2d Division	32	656
Stillwater	28	Troop A, 2d U. S. Cavalry	3	69
Vigilancia	23	71st New York Infantry	44	954
Yucatan	8	Headquarters band and companies C, D, G, and B, 2d U. S. Infantry, and 8 troops 1st Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders)	43	773
Total	..		819	16,058
Cumberland	31	Stevedores.		
Gussie	3	Teamsters and packers.		
Kanawha	34	Water-tender.		
Laura	33	Steam-lighter.		
Stevens	35	Water-tender.		
Whitney	10	Teamsters.		

Also, 2,295 horses and mules.

NOTE.—1st, 3d, 6th, 9th, and 10th United States Cavalry dismounted. First Volunteer Cavalry dismounted. Troops A, C, F, and D, 2d United States Cavalry, mounted. (Alger, 76–78.)

The *Alamo* carried a pontoon train. The *Florida* damaged by collision, could not be used.

APPENDIX D

HEALTH OF THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS DURING THE PERIOD OF HOSTILITIES, APRIL 21 TO AUGUST 12, 1898, INCLUSIVE

The average strength of the navy and marine corps for the 114 days of hostilities (April 21 to August 12, inclusive) was 26,102.

The total number of deaths occurring during this period was 85, of which 29 were from injuries and 56 from diseases, being at the rate of 10.40 per 1,000 per year.

There were 18 persons killed in battle or died subsequently of their wounds. The number of deaths from all causes, exclusive of those killed in battle, was 67, being at the rate of 8.19 per 1,000 per year.

The general health of the fleet was better during the war in 1898 than for the same period in 1897.

There were but 13 cases of typhoid fever and no death aboard ship and but 1 in hospital. There were but 18 cases of dysentery.

The average strength of the marine battalion at Guantánamo was 588—21 officers and 567 men. This battalion was also 36 days aboard a transport, 10 days of which were at sea.

The daily average of patients was 13.14. There was no death from disease and but 19 cases of malarial disease. There was no case of typhoid.

An interesting fact in connection with the health record of this force is that for the 39 days intervening between the signing of the protocol and the disbanding of the battalion there were only 14 admissions to the sick list, with a total of 115 sick days, affording as the daily average of patients 2.94, and the ratio per 1,000 of force sick daily 5.

The whole is a very remarkable showing and one never equalled elsewhere. It is one which reflects high honor upon all officers, medical or others, as showing a wise and enlightened care for the health and well-being of the men.

The following is a tabulation of the casualties in action (in most cases the wounds were only contusions):

	NUMBER OF CASUALTIES	KILLED	WOUNDED	DIED SUBSEQUENTLY AS RESULT OF WOUNDS	DISCHARGED TO DUTY	INVALIDED FROM SERVICE	CONTINUED UNDER TREATMENT	
Action of Manila Bay (May 1)	9	..	9	..	9	..	..	
Action off Cienfuegos (May 11)	12	1	11	1	8	1	1	
Action off Cardenas (May 11)	8	5	3	..	3	..	..	
Action off San Juan, Puerto Rico (May 12)	8	1	7	..	5	2	..	
Engagements at Guantánamo, Cuba (June 11 to 20)	22	6	16	..	11	2	3	
Engagement off Santiago (June 22)	10	1	9	..	7	2	..	
Engagement off Santiago (July 3)	11	1	10	..	10	..	..	
Miscellaneous:								
Yankee (June 13)	1	..	1	..	..	1	..	
Eagle (July 12)	1	..	1	..	1	..	..	
Bancroft (August 2)	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	
Amphitrite (August 7)	1	..	1	1	..	..	..	
Total	84	16	68	2	54	8	4	

APPENDIX E

THE CASUALTIES OF THE ARMY DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN

Total killed and wounded during the war:

LOCALITY	KILLED		WOUNDED	
	Officers	Enlisted men	Officers	Enlisted men
Cuba	23	237	99	1,332
Puerto Rico	..	3	4	36
Manila	..	17	10	96
Total	23	257	113	1,464

The number of deaths, from all causes, between May 1 and September 30, inclusive, as reported to the adjutant-general's office up to October 3, were—

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
Killed	23	257
Died of wounds	4	61
Died of disease	80	2,485
Total	107	2,803

being an aggregate of 2,910 out of a total force of 274,717 officers and men, or a percentage of 1.059.

Principal camps of United States troops, dates of establishment, and number of deaths by diseases, accidents, etc., at each to September 30, as reported to the adjutant-general's office:

CAMPS	DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT	DEATHS
Camp Thomas, Chickamauga Park, Ga.	Apr. 14	425
Camp Cuba Libre, Jacksonville, Fla.	May 26	246
Tampa, Fla.	May 2	56
Cuba (not including killed or died of wounds)	June 22	427
At sea, en route from Cuba to Montauk	Aug.-Sep.	87
Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, N. Y.	Aug. 7	257
Manila, Philippine Islands	June 30	63
Puerto Rico	July 25	137
Camp Alger, near Falls Church and vicinity	May 18	107
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Of deaths by disease, it is estimated that 37.3 per cent were from typhoid fever, and 5.7 per cent from malarial fevers (which would include yellow fever). If all the malarial cases had been yellow fever, this would make a total of 160 deaths from this cause. As, from Feb-

ruary, 1895, to December, 1897, inclusive, the deaths from yellow fever in the military hospitals of Cuba were 13.808, or an average of 391 a month (see the report of the surgeon-general of the army for 1899), the losses of the American army from such cause must be regarded as moderate.

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